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THE COMMUNIST PRESENCE IN FRANCE

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Apparent revival of Communist power in the recent French elections raises once again the thorny problem of appraising the strength of this huge and partially submerged political force.[1] Some Western observers, forgetting that the drop in popular support for the party in 1951 was largely a consequence of the bizarre workings of the election law, were distressed by the gains scored in January of this year.[2] In fact, the Communists were competing on an equal footing with the other parties (in contrast with 1951) and could rely on supporters who, in that year, had deserted on election day. Divisions among French center parties in 1956 meant that a vote for the PCF was no longer regarded as just a "throw-away protest." From the standpoint of political statistics, it is important to recognize that under optimum conditions the party was able to do no more than make up for the setback suffered in 1951. Indeed the Communist vote declined slightly as a percentage of total popular vote, stabilizing at about 4,500,000 in a year when some 2,250,000 more voters went to the polls.[3] The true picture, then, is one of impressive, but not steadily advancing, strength.

This paper proposes to leave further scrutiny of election returns to others more competent in that field of political analysis. The popular following which the party boasts is an important index of its power and vigor, but emphasis here will be largely on the party as an effective instrument of political persuasion and manipulation. It is proposed first to evaluate the PCF as a structural entity with a complex of specific functions in French society. Secondly, some suggestions as to the changing shape of that society will be advanced. Finally, tentative hypotheses will be offered on the future of France in terms of the relationship between the party's political posture and the social imperatives of the nation.

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[1] One commentator with the courage to make his observations before the 1956 elections produced a sober and instructive article on this general topic, offering somewhat different conclusions than the present writer's. See Charles A. Micaud, "The Bases of Communist Strength in France," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 8, pp. 354–66 (Sept., 1955).

[2] In the 1951 election, the center parties profited by the bonus accorded to common lists, or *apparentements*, by which any alliance of parties, or any single party winning more than 50 per cent of the votes in a district, thereby won all the parliamentary seats in that district. In many constituencies where the Communists were by far the strongest single party, they were completely shut out by alliances of several smaller center parties. In 1956, with the center parties badly divided and rarely able to form wide alliances, the seats of most districts were distributed according to the proportion of popular votes cast for each party. The best discussion of the complicated electoral law is contained in Dorothy Pickles, *French Politics* (London, 1953), appendix 1, pp. 288–92.

[3] The percentages of the total popular vote won by the Communist party have been—1946: 28.6; 1951: 25.9; 1956: 25.6.

I

To assess current capacity of the PCF to represent the "revolutionary element" of France, we must first examine its behavior as the largest French party. One thing is clear: the party has not spared its corps of officialdom in filling arduous posts of leadership. Communist presence on every possible commission, committee, and public and semi-public body has given the party its reputation as a public servant—irrespective of ultimate goals. There is, even in the most cynically anti-Communist quarters, a begrudging respect for this integrity of tirelessness. By a curious paradox, however, it is exactly this furious activity which is in part responsible for a perceptible waning of Communist prestige. As party representation is perpetuated, bureaucratization is invited at every level of the hierarchy. The Communist presence is considered by the party a useful short-run goal of and for itself. Militants who specialize in making themselves indispensable members of a local parent-teachers council, for example, are expected to be tenacious about their positions. Tenacity often leads to a routinized performance of unnecessary functions.

There are three spheres where Communists are represented: those organizations launched and maintained almost exclusively by the party and its fellow travellers; organizations in which the party shares responsibility with representatives of different political opinions; and bodies where the party retains a toe-hold, but where its emissaries sit scorned, isolated, and outvoted on every issue. In all of these there are opportunities for tens of thousands of the energetic faithful to prove their indispensability to PCF superiors, to devise new functions, to propose the creation of new committees of coordination or liaison, and above all to preserve their own special uniqueness as party functionaries.[4]

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[4] One indication of the scope of Communist presence is the fact that, by recent count, there were at least 26 semi-public bodies dealing with educational affairs at the national level in which party members play a major role. The number of regional and local units is not known.

Within the official structure of the party itself, there has been a similar tendency toward bureaucratization. At the national level the turnover of leadership positions has been low. Except for a handful of celebrated cases that have had, more often than not, a purely political symbolism—as in the exclusion and subsequent defamation of André Marty—Communist officials have come to be accepted as permanent fixtures. The French public is becoming used to the same dreary parade of familiar faces in the newspapers, the Assembly, and on public platforms commemorating the days of the Liberation.

The classic dilemma of an opposition party languishing in its own torpor has been described by Schumpeter in his essay on the pre-1914 German Social Democrats.[5] Not dissimilar conditions exist today in France, and the PCF's response to them follows the same degenerative lines. Exiled to opposition, the party seeks to sustain the fidelity of its elite by promising security of jobs within the hierarchy. Once an official or a back bench deputy masters the rules of Communist conduct, his path is relatively smooth. Opposition is the most tranquil role for any party *équipe*. It provides few definitive tests of personal capacity; there are no troublesome resolutions of responsibility versus ideology, no embarrassing inquiries into the conduct of a ministry, no criticisms of committee reports. Although Maurice Thorez' adaptation of Stalin's maxim that "the Communist party is not a party like the others" may still be technically valid, it is becoming less and less meaningful.

Despite symptoms of advancing senility, which most Frenchmen—and indeed some party members—admit is stifling the dynamic of the PCF, few observers anticipate a dramatic decline in the party's nationwide support. There has been only a small reduction in the number of Communist fiefdoms which have characterized most industrialized areas since the war.[6] Even more important, the hold of the party on the working class as exercised by the CGT union has not been successfully challenged by either the Socialist-oriented CGTFO or the Catholic CFTC. Union shop committee and social security board elections are still won with impressive majorities by the CGT candidates. There was a slight rollback of CGT predominance in 1952 in most sectors, but even then the majority union was backed by an average of 67 per cent of the voters in industry and basic services.[7] Election results in the mine basins gave CGT 71.8 per cent, on the railroads 66.8 per cent, and at the Citroen automobile plant 73.6 per cent.

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[5] Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 3rd ed. (New York 1942), pp. 341–48.

[6] Some decline has, however, been registered in the number of Communist-controlled cantons in Le Nord and Pas-de-Calais.

[7] Good comparative figures for the election results of 1952 can be found in *L'Observateur*, June 19, 1952. Scattered reports of individual plant elections are available in *Le Monde*, June 12, 1952.

Since the recoil in 1952, the CGT seems to have regained the ground lost, and in a few places virtually monopolizes the whole union field.[8] It would be unwarranted to infer, however, that CGT candidates survived the mild reversals of 1952 because of outstanding past performance. The incapacity of the weaker unions to capitalize on the modest gains won in 1952 confirmed the feeling of many workers that it was better to go along with a powerful union machine—no matter what its politics or personnel. Once again, as it has so many times since 1947, the CGT benefited by the sheer weight of preponderant numbers.

Other signs of declining Communist influence via the CGT, although not susceptible of precise measurement, are significant. Political manifestations have proved so unpopular that they are rarely undertaken by union leaders even under heavy pressure from the party. Admissions of strike failures are made openly by high-ranking CGT officials.[9] Relations between local federations and the national union are, according to published complaints of responsible officers, even worse than usual.[10] One shoddy piece of union fecklessness tickled non-Communists in the spring of 1953. The CGT officers of the Paris Subway Workers union decided on a surprise protest strike of limited duration. Service was halted during the early morning hours when the workers were streaming into Paris from the suburbs, but all was normal again by 9 A.M. when "the bosses" rode to work.[11]

Even when the party speaks officially, the CGT is under fire. Marcel Servin's organizational report at the 1954 Congress revealed that, of total party membership, only 25 per cent belonged to plant cells—an obligation for all wage-earning card carriers.[12] Of these, 38 per cent were industrial (mostly metallurgical) and arsenal workers, an indication that party representation in other trades is scattered at best.[13] The party Secretary also disclosed that a sampling of membership cards showed that 26 per cent of bearers entitled to belong to the CGT were not members of any union.[14] The gap between CGT sympathy (and it is more often sympathy than affiliation) and Communist sympathy is symbolized by the present situation at the mining center of Fives Lille. Twenty-seven of the 29 delegates to the Plant Committee were elected from the CGT list. The majority union received 5,300 votes, virtually sweeping the field, but of those casting ballots only 300 were party members. While the plant is under the control of the CGT, the workers' living quarters at Hellemmes has had a Socialist mayor since 1947.[15] As one observer notes, the CGT depends ". . . on a solid general staff which occupies the key post [in the plants] enabling it to bring along an immense crowd of hesitants and indifferents."[16]

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[8] A sampling of 1955 CGT successes can be found in *Le Monde*, May 21, May 29, and June 4, 1955.

[9] See especially the contrite resolution adopted by the June, 1954 meeting of the CGT National Committee, after the poor showing of the April demonstration for a minimum wage of 25,000 francs, as reported in *L'Humanité*, June 21, 1954.

[10] See for example the thunderous warning of Frachon addressing the leaders of the Paris area metal workers. *Le Peuple*, supplement, Sept. 15, 1952.

[11] See the caustic report in *Le Monde*, April 11, 1953.

[12] Report of M. Servin, *L'Humanité*, June 5, 1954.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] *Ibid.*

Control of these key CGT positions has always been the prime strategy of the party. It is a realistic policy which recognizes the hard facts of French union life—loose organization, no closed shops, and a virulently individualistic, or perhaps anarchistic, mistrust of leaders by the rank and file.[17] From one point of view, the Communists' adaptation to these conditions must be regarded as a skillful "making do" with very little. The key to continued success, however, is always the suppleness with which the leadership adjusts to the volatile demands of its following. When there is no identity of Communist and trade union goals, the rapport between leaders and rank and file is strained or vanishes altogether. The same leadership may well reassert itself, but there will always be long periods when the leadership function of the party in its union is virtually non-existent. No Communist lexicon prepares the union officer for this; in fact, a reading of Marxist materials invites him to believe that the most fertile field for the exercise of organizational techniques is the "mass man," the army of industrial workers tied to the same factory, to the same squalid working-class suburb—in a word, the industrial "prole." Subject to the rigid requirements of the party's line as devised to serve political ends, the militant risks losing all influence with the CGT rank and file in attempting to square a transitory political line with the everyday interests of his troops. At the same time, the party holds him responsible for the activities of his union, and for the success or failure of both strikes and political manifestations. Thus the Communist union boss is squeezed between irreconcilable forces; internal crises are precipitated and autocritiques demanded.

This dilemma has reached the highest levels of the CGT hierarchy. The union's crusty General Secretary (and *ex officio* member of the party's politburo), Benoit Frachon, in preparation for the general strike of April, 1954, sought to generalize the movement by vigorously denying that the CGT's initiative was politically motivated: "Those who try to invent some sort of political manoeuvres on the part of the CGT are themselves fully aware that they are lying."[18] Two months later the unhappy union boss was listening to a searing criticism of the strike, delivered by none other than acting party Secretary Jacques Duclos, from the tribune of the party Congress.[19] The following day Frachon made his own autocritique, admitting (one supposes with fingers crossed) that he had erred in emphasizing the purely material aspect of the strike demands: " . . . workers are not merely specialists in union affairs, they should apply themselves to the whole line of a class."[20] The veteran party and union militant had attempted to broaden the scope of the strike by appealing to all labor elements, but had been forced to recognize that the party's doctrinaire purposes could not be relegated to a minor theme. As in most such affairs, however, the tempest signalled a new change in party line which recognized too late, perhaps, the difficulties that had produced a damaging admission of internal disharmony. The old saw of union unity was dusted off in the 1954 Congress and pushed with more vigor than at any time since the Liberation.[21] Implicit in this new turning was an undertaking to de-emphasize purely philosophic or doctrinaire differences separating the various elements of the left. (The aim was to reduce Socialist and left-wing Catholic opposition to a few specific short-range goals of Communist polity, i.e., the defeat of EDC and the establishment of an East-West *détente*.) In arriving at this benevolent position, however, the party had crudely exposed itself not only to its own following, but to the whole French public.

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[15] See "La Classe Ouvrière se détache-t-elle du Parti Communiste?," part III of a series by M. P. Hamelet in *Le Figaro*, Dec. 9, 1954.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] The best description of this attitude can be found in Val R. Lorwin, *The French Labor Movement* (Cambridge, 1954), Ch. 9.

Part of the new pose of the CGT is relaxation of controls on discussion of basic issues within the organization. The artificially-created liberal atmosphere reached a somewhat unpromising climax in the annual convention of the union in June of 1955. Two nominally non-Communist union officials were permitted to plead against the general report on economic conditions prepared by the party leadership.[22] That their opposition was effectively restricted by the regular Communist leadership suggests that they were given the platform only to dramatize a superficial change in attitudes on internal democracy.[23]

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[18] *Le Peuple*, April 15, 1954, supplement.

[19] Duclos' speech appears in *L'Humanité*, June 4, 1954.

[20] Frachon's autocritique appears in *L'Humanité*, June 5, 1954. Interesting commentary on Frachon's dilemma is contained in the Catholic journal *Syndicalisme*, June 24, 1954, under the title, "Autour des Déclarations de B. Frachon."

[21] Actually the CGT had initiated this renewed call for unity in its 29th Congress of June 7–12, 1953. For interesting commentary on the party's redoubled enthusiasm for unity of all members of the working class, see L. Rioux, "Une Nouvelle Orientation de la CGT," *France Observateur*, July 1, 1954.

[22] The opposition, led by Le Brun and Rouzard, was spirited, if not widely followed.

In summary, then, one must conclude that all is not well within the most formidable bastion of the party. The CGT is not weak in numbers nor even in supporters, but as an instrument of party policy it has been dissipating a reputation carefully nurtured during and since the *Résistance.* It cannot depend on widespread support for party-inspired strikes; its leaders are often compromised by their party attachment. Conversely, what vigor the CGT does possess is probably due to the furious activity of Communist officials and the sheer numerical following which the label CGT commands. The posturing which Communist allegiance imposes on the organization no longer fools anyone. It does not drive the non-Communists or the apathetic into rival unions, but it does reduce the inclination of the rank and file to respond to the bidding of their leaders. Certainly they cannot be counted on for any comprehensive implementation of Communist party aims.

The same general developments can be noted if recent behavior of the PCF as a whole is examined. We have suggested that the Communist presence is now an accepted part of French life. The turbulent excitement of the post-Liberation period, when the PCF was riding a crest of popularity, has long since passed. There are no longer dramatic conversions of prominent intellectuals, announced with flamboyant flourishes in the Press—but there are countless unannounced desertions. The opinion of the party is no longer sought on every issue—it can be accurately foretold by anyone. In a word, the party is becoming "old hat."

Evidence of declining interest comes not only from professional critics of communism, but also from official reports of the party's own leadership. The last announcement of membership figures (which in themselves are probably inflated) showed 506,250 cards delivered in 1954, as contrasted with 786,855 in 1949 and 907,785 in 1947.[24] Official complaints of the "disappearance of dozens and dozens of cells" indicate

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Le Brun's Congress speech was reported in full by almost all newspapers June 15, 1955. For a detailed if over-optimistic description of the minority, see "Tendances à la PCF," *France Observateur,* June 3, 1954.

[23] The CGT Congress was not allowed to vote on the minority economic report presented by Le Brun and his small following of dissidents, and extraordinary efforts were made to persuade him to accept compromise formulas.

[24] From the report on party organization delivered by Marcel Servin at the 1954 Congress, *L'Humanité,* June 5, 1954. A rightist paper claimed that only 230,000 cards were distributed in 1955. See *Le Figaro,* April 27, 1955.

weakness of internal organization.[25] Even the organ *L'Humanité* is reported as staggering under the double problem of losing the subscriptions of militants and of competition from "bourgeois journals." Editor Étienne Fajon made a full and frank autocritique before the party's Central Committee in late 1954,[26] confessing to a sharp drop of circulation and geographic coverage. Before the war there were two PCF dailies; although there are now 15, the total number of readers is not significantly higher. The sales of *L'Humanité* reached 336,000 in 1937; today the combined sales of all 15 papers is 517,000 (by Communist estimates). In the three departments of the Seine which comprise the Paris region there are only 77,000 subscribers to *L'Humanité.* Fajon also announced that three-quarters of the Communist electors in the Paris area read other than party dailies. Thirty-two departments have no distribution of Communist provincial newspapers, and in these departments the circulation of *L'Humanité* is lower than before the war.

Nothing suggests that Fajon's autocritique has produced a more promising upturn in the capacity of the party to beam its message. According to one observer, *L'Humanité* now exists thanks only to the charity received from its Sunday edition, *L'Humanité Dimanche,* which is hawked by volunteer militants at high rates.[27] Even the more sophisticated theoretical review, *Cahiers du Communisme,* has been forced to print its own autocritique—confessing too arid and pretentious an approach, of little direct concern to the average militant.[28] The party's propaganda difficulties were climaxed at the turn of the year by the announcement, not in the official paper, but in *France Nouvelle,* a semi-popular magazine, that Jeanette Vermeersch, onetime mistress and now wife of ailing party boss Maurice Thorez, had assumed direction of the "agitprop" activities of the party.[29] To date "la belle Jeanette," as she is called by more obsequious comrades, has produced no new shakeups, and there are no signs that the informational and educative services of the PCF have improved. In fact, Mme. Vermeersch's elevation is probably better explained as a tightening of centralized control by organization veterans than as a sincere effort to recoup on the propaganda front.[30]

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[25] See *L'Humanité,* Nov. 22, 1954.

[26] The speech of Fajon before the Committee is contained in his own journal, *L'Humanité,* Nov. 13, 1954.

[27] See A. Griotteray-Brayance, "Le Parti Communiste en 1955," *Monde Nouveau,* Jan., 1955, pp. 28–33. Even the eminently successful journal edited specifically for peasants, *La Terre,* is losing ground. See L. P. Hamelet, "Le Parti Communiste et les Agriculteurs," *Le Figaro,* April 7, 1955.

[28] The autocritique of the *Cahiers* is contained in the article by two editors, V. Michaut and M. Limbourg: "À Propos du xxx^e Anniversaire des Cahiers," *Cahiers du Communisme,* Vol. 31, preface (Feb., 1955).

[29] A discussion of this curious and somewhat clandestine replastering of party functions can be found in *Le Figaro,* Jan. 14, 1955.

That the monolithism of the party's structure and its exile in opposition have produced a dry rot eating away at its *élan vital* is denied by few, even among the most faithful. Even fewer, however, will openly discuss the antics of the highest ranking officers to maintain their privileged positions. The failing Thorez, who unquestionably uses Jeanette Vermeersch as the champion of his own personal power, symbolizes in many ways the present condition of the party. Illness has aged him well beyond his years. (The party's organizational secretary complained at the last Congress that of 100,000 new members in 1954, only 11 per cent were under 25, while 29 per cent were over 50.)[31] He shows increasing fear of inability to maintain his position. The party now finds it necessary for security reasons to house the delegates to its Congress in the homes of faithful Parisian militants, to insist on communal eating arrangements during the three or four days a provincial delegate is in the Paris region, and to grant the platform to only one centrally chosen speaker per delegation.[32] At least one report declares that at the central committee meetings of the party only 15 (out of 75) ever speak, and that they are always the same fifteen.[33]

Only the most obvious symptoms of hardening of the arteries within the PCF have been recorded here. Much remains that is not reducible to documentation. For example, it is still extremely difficult to assess the degree of Communist success with the peasantry. The peasants' cooperative organization, the CGA, has succeeded in ridding itself of most of its Communist officials, but this was a hollow victory since it can no longer boast of widespread support in the countryside.[34] In contrast, while party strength may have waned in many rural areas, it continues to mount slowly south of the Loire, especially in the districts experiencing a decline in population.[35] This development will be considered more fully in a later section of this paper.

Attempts to create a new band of irreconcilable *durs* out of harried

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[30] See below.

[31] See the report of Marcel Servin as reported in *L'Humanité*, June 4, 1954.

[32] See the interesting commentary on these tight-rein methods in *Le Figaro*, July 7, 1954. Further rumblings over Servin's inner party police and espionage methods after the Baranes affair are reported in the same paper, Oct. 28, 1954.

[33] This is a report from *Unir*, the organ of the Le Brun opposition within the CGT, as relayed by *Le Populaire*, June 28, 1955. The writer was unable to obtain back issues of *Unir* and cannot, therefore, confirm the authenticity of the source.

[34] See M. P. Hamelet, "Le Parti Communiste et les Agriculteurs," *Le Figaro*, April 7, 1955. In English the best study is Henry W. Ehrmann, "The French Peasant and Communism," this REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 19–43 (March, 1952).

[35] Hamelet, *Le Figaro*, April 8, 1955.

North Africans, who are, everywhere in France, the least favored of the working class, are meeting with small success.[36] The reasons for failure of the party's appeal to the North Africans are not yet clear. Certainly the PCF has operatives, clandestine and otherwise, in all the nationalist movements, and it can even count on a few battalions of colored marchers to demonstrate on May Day. The religious question may be a serious deterrent to Moslem sympathy, but many Algerian and Morrocan spokesmen will suggest privately that the most telling reservations concern the party's tendency to dominate the leadership cadres of the North Africans by imposing its own functionaries.

The party is in trouble. It is losing its dramatic quality. Rigidity and tight-fisted control have produced too many mistakes. A sterile opposition role adds no new lustre to its colors. The powerful assault batteries of the CGT are no longer the fearful organisms they were in 1947 and 1948. Because of the party's ubiquitous presence everywhere in French society, it has become for many a bore. But there are deeper and more threatening fissures opening between the party and the French public. These reflect the incapacity of the Communists—because of the doctrines with which they are encumbered—to adjust themselves to new forces that are beginning to fracture the centuries-old crust of France's social and economic structure. Some observations on these changes will be presented in the section that follows.

II

So far this discussion has been concerned with the description of a decaying colossus—a colossus so mighty that even serious difficulties weaken it relatively little in relation to competing forces. The substantial residue of power which the Communists still dispose risks further compromise from a peril even more grave than bureaucratization, nepotism, and the shrivelling effects of long years of political isolation. That danger is contained in the present ideological posture of the party. This section has as its theme the relationship between the doctrinal position of the PCF and the current social context of France. It is too early as yet to be certain that the two are badly out of joint, but the sclerosis induced by organizational *malaise* would seem to make adjustment to societal changes more difficult.

First of all, why pursue the question of ideology? Are not the creeds of parties (especially French parties) less important than the historical locus they establish for themselves? Do the rank and file really follow

[36] The best English treatment of this question is David S. McLellan, "The North African in France," *Yale Review*, Vol. 44, pp. 421–38 (Spring, 1955). See also A. Vielle-Michel, "L'Évolution des Travailleurs Musulmans en France," *Esprit*, Vol. 23, pp. 864–84 (May, 1955).

the twists and turns of doctrinal development—especially those springing from Marxian dialectics? The same questions can be phrased more simply: is not the PCF better known as a symbol of the *Résistance* than as a faithful conveyor of the Moscow line? Is not the thorough and painstaking organization of Communist communes and municipalities more telling on election day than the brilliance of a rhetorical defense of Marxist art by Aragon before the Central Committee? Perhaps so, but if in the long run inconsistencies between the imposed ideological line and concrete, observable social fact become too marked, the party risks losing its position in the mainstream of history. One suspects that the Soviet leaders are beginning to recognize this danger, but can they unwind the ideological rack on which they have bound their subordinate national units?

It is from this perspective that the present ideological posture of the party is important as an index of its overall health. We shall explore only one point in the current theoretical offering of French communism. This precept is, conveniently, the most vulnerable, but it is also the most difficult to abridge, to "correct" later, and even if next week it is suppressed it cannot easily be evaporated in a "memory hole." Should it be erased, there would be little left of Marxian economic theory. This postulate is the much discussed "absolute and relative impoverishment of the masses"—the axis of current Communist philosophy in France.

The pauperization theme, as it is known, was revitalized by Maurice Thorez when he took up the cudgels to answer a speech by Douglas Dillon, the United States Ambassador to France, delivered in New York in January, 1955.[37] The Ambassador had remarked on "a new economic turning" for France, commenting favorably on the rise in productivity, the general steadiness of employment, and visible evidences of increased purchasing power of the working class. The bitter response of the Communist leader unleashed a host of other criticisms elaborating on the basic pauperization theme.[38] Thorez' argument revolved around the classic Marxist maxim of the existence of two polar forces—the one, the capitalist bourgoisie in full process of concentration; the other, the working class undergoing rapid and absolute impoverishment. The rising productivity rate he admitted, but ascribed it to mechanized production, increase in hours worked, and the "speed up." Thus, rising productivity and even availability of more goods to the working class are achieved by a more intense process of exploitation. Finally, Thorez insisted that the much vaunted new productive capacity pales into insignificance when compared with gains in Germany, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

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[37] Dillon's speech is reported in *The New York Times*, Jan. 15, 1955.

[38] Thorez' original statement on pauperization appeared in *Cahiers du Communisme*, Vol. 31, pp. 259–79 (March, 1955), under the title, "La Situation Économique de la France." The line is further developed by Thorez under the title "Nouvelles Données sur la Pauperisation," *Cahiers du Communisme*, Vol. 31, pp. 803–26 (July, 1955). Official technical elaborations of the doctrine are offered by several writers in various issues of *Économie et Politique*, Vol. 2, 1955. For an interesting Socialist (and neo-Marxist) criticism of the new line, see P. Rimbert, "Pauperisation et Niveau de Vie des Travailleurs, I," *La Revue Socialiste*, Vol. 88, pp. 179–84 (July, 1955).

The Thorez blast was in part an answer to Dillon. It was also indicative of the party's concern over the seemingly enthusiastic response by all French classes to the Mendès-France program.[39] If the popular ex-premier symbolized anything, it was the capacity to abandon artificial and limiting strictures on political and economic policy. The Communist boss was in effect warning the faithful against the seductions of *Mendèsisme*—reminding them that a clear understanding of classical Marxist economic theory would forestall disillusionment in the future.[40] In a way, it was an appealing tocsin because it played on the eternal sentiment of the downtrodden that things are really as bad as they fear—if not worse. On the other hand, it was certainly a message of hopelessness if the visible omens of better times were illusory and no call to revolution was practicable.

It was, in fact, around the question of "abandonment to despair" that opposition within the CGT was mounted in 1955.[41] Pierre Le Brun (even though he may have been playing the role of "straw man" for "new party democracy") voiced misgivings about following the Thorez line to this final logical absurdity. The minority spokesman presented his case in advance of the June CGT Congress in a written interview pleading for a constructive attitude. He asked how the French people could be marshalled against the orthodox program of increased productivity and free convertibility and at the same time be expected to oppose the Mendès-France program of technical progress, planned investment, and full employment. By opposing everything, he charged, "Do we not risk appearing to be protectionists, conservatives, opponents of all progress?"[42] Failure to meet the challenge of the Mendès-France experience would, he added, "be to play the game of our adversaries . . .

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[39] The relationship of Mendès-France to the Left in general is the subject of a number of articles in the special issue of the Sartre-edited *Les Temps Modernes*, Vol. 10 (Nos. 112–13), 1955, entitled "La Gauche." See especially the articles by Lavau, Neville, and Martinet.

[40] There is an interesting critique of the pauperization doctrine from this point of view in the pro-Mendès-France weekly *France Observateur*, March 3, 1955, under the title "Durcissement au Parti Communiste."

[41] See above, part I.

[42] Le Brun's position before the Congress is given full treatment by J. Armel, "CGT," *France Observateur*, April 7, 1955. See also M. P. Hamelet, "Conflict du Doctrine à la CGT," *Le Figaro*, April 22, 1955.

those who wish to relegate us to isolation, sectarianism, weakness." He suggested that militant action by the working class itself might hold in check the law of pauperization of the masses.

In rejoinder, the party leadership coldly reminded him to reread his Marx, and especially his "little Lenin library."[43] Almost all of the top CGT officials condemned the Le Brun position on the floor of the Congress, but the most interesting and revealing criticisms were made by a member of the party politburo, Francois Billoux:

> The good apostles of class collaboration pretend that the communists condemn the workers to despair. It is precisely the Socialist chiefs who, by their sermons on the acceptance, submission to, and resignation before the possibility of definitive and successive ameliorations [in the standard of living], try to dissuade the workers from renouncing forever the capitalist regime.[44]

A few days later Louis Saillant, General Secretary of the Communist-dominated *Fédération Syndicale Mondiale,* was quoted: "The modernization of the economy can only accentuate the enrichment of the rich and the impoverishment of the poor."[45]

Floods of propaganda elaborating on the new emphasis have poured out of party offices. Because Dillon and others made a special point of the ability of French workers to buy scooters, motorcycles, and even automobiles, Communist spokesmen have been particularly anxious to dispel the notion that this is an indication of relative well-being. The official explanation seems to be that workers buy these things not because they can afford them, or because they have "bourgeois desires" to enjoy the freedom and mobility gained by owning a *Renault* or a *Vespa,* but because they find them in the long run a cheaper means of transportation to and from work than the *metro* or the bus. (Fares have been priced out of normal range by "reckless, anti-social policies of bourgeois government."[46]) This neat trick of logic turns the purchase of a vehicle by the French worker into another measure of his impoverishment.[47]

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[43] Before the Congress the party let go a couple of its biggest guns against the "Le Brun opposition" in editorials by Benoit Frachon, the CGT General Secretary, in *L'Humanité,* May 3, 1955, and by Jeanette Vermeersch, in *L'Humanité,* May 10, 1955.

[44] *L'Humanité,* July 2, 1955.

[45] *L'Humanité,* July 4, 1955.

[46] This was the explanation offered by Marcel Servin at the Central Committee meeting of the party in September, 1955.

[47] Estimates of automobile ownership in France are difficult to come by. However, 2,087,900 private cars were licensed in 1955—certainly a low ratio compared to the total population. A better picture of French "motorization" can be obtained by adding the 3,135,000 velomotors, scooters, motorcyclettes, and motorcycles. The combined figures suggest a rough ratio of one unit for every eight persons. Statistics on registration appear in the automobile trade journal, *L'Argus,* May 19, 1955, supplement.

While these prophecies of doom are being disseminated from every party rostrum, the French economy has continued to improve. Evidence of greater working-class security and comfort is fairly widespread. Nevertheless, real social and economic inequities persist. The advances which have been made are spotty and largely confined to urban areas. In addition, external difficulties might undermine economic recovery at any time. For the moment, however, there is no denying that considerable improvements have been recorded in a number of fields, and that the worker's lot has been ameliorated in most industrial centers.[48]

In fact, French society as a whole (and especially that sector of it hitherto most susceptible to Communist pressure) is going through an evolution for which party ideologies are unprepared. The process of change is difficult to follow with real precision, but some indications suggest themselves as markers of the future. The most striking social trend in modern France, that is, the steady increase in urbanization, is of long standing.[49]

More recent trends include rapid growth of service industries and the overall rising skill level of the working force. These developments suggest new opportunities for social mobility, and, in consequence, the importance of re-evaluating worker psychology. Roughly 20 per cent of the active population, or one-third of all salaried workers, now fall into the occupational category which the French call *employé,* that is, those employed in clerical, commercial, and distributive activities.[50] Of this group, nearly a quarter are sons and daughters of working-class fathers.[51] Here the Communist appeal has never been warmly received, and the organizational task of the party is complicated by the absence of large, closely assembled groups of militants in a single plant.

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[48] Although wages as such are still at dismally low levels, and in some cases barely equal to those of prewar France, two other factors are important in assessing the condition of industrial workers. First is the increase in total take-home pay due to *allocations familiales* or social benefit payments, amounting in some cases to a sum equivalent to wages. Second, except for scattered areas, employment has been high since the war, with no disastrous lean periods to dissipate small savings. Furthermore, since 1952 there has been considerable success in halting inflation. For details, see J. Dumontier, "La Conjoncture Économique à la Fin 1954," *Économie et Réalités Mondiales,* Jan., 1955, pp. 21–23; J. Romeuf, "Les Salaires en France en 1955," *Les Cahiers Économiques,* Jan., 1955, p. 23; and the anonymous analysis, "L'Évolution Récente des Revenus Salariaux Modestes en France," *Études et Conjonctures,* Aug. 8, 1954.

[49] There are interesting comparative figures of all principal French cities and their suburban towns for the years 1936, 1946, 1954 in *Annuaire Statistique de la France 1953* (1954 ed.), Vol. 60, N.S. #2, Paris, Institut National de la Statistique, Table I, pp. X–XIII.

[50] M. Collinet, *Essai sur la Condition Ouvrière* (Paris, 1951), p. 55. Explicit details of occupational divisions in 1954 are available in *Bulletin Hebdomaire de Statistique,* Institut National de la Statistique, Paris, #369, May 28, 1955.

[51] M. Bresard, "La Mobilité Sociale en France," *Cahiers Français d'Information,* Jan.–Feb., 1952, p. 18.

As the commercial and service sector of the economy continues to expand, manufacturing is also expanding, but at a slower rate. The distribution of skill groups within this sector is significant in itself for social change. Unskilled workers are no longer an important proportion of the total, and semi-skilled or specialized workers, although still predominant, are not increasing in numbers as fast as are professional workers and technicians.[52] The modest beginnings of automation and other progressive industrial techniques promise an acceleration of this process.

The general rise of the skill median in industry might well lead to a new social role for the industrial worker. More technical training is becoming available; in some quarters union leaders will admit privately that as factory conditions become less onerous, workers are willing to work overtime for a higher take-home pay. Greater security from unemployment and somewhat higher earnings by the industrial working class explain in large part heavy purchases of consumer goods in the last year.[53] Apparently one strong impulse is to "motorize" by buying, usually on credit, a motor bike or scooter. This in turn enables the worker to escape, occasionally, the most repressive features of urban industrial living—and, incidentally, to dodge the Communist party militant who would occupy his evenings and weekends with party entertainment and party propaganda.

Something like the process of "privatization" of interest, which Otto Kircheimer has described as taking place in postwar Germany, may also be unfolding in France.[54] For the nation as a whole, this would not be surprising, but for the French worker, whose public life has been marked traditionally by violent strikes, demonstrations, and class solidarity, it represents something of a revolution. Working-class consciousness is by no means dead, but as a rallying cry some of its pungency has disappeared. Almost despite its revolutionary heritage, the working class seems to be adapting to basic changes in occupational character. Whatever new patterns of economic or social behavior finally do take root in French society (and the long-run significance of the trends discussed above are not yet clear), they make mockery of the Communists' pauperization theme.

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[52] Of every 1,000 workers in 1901, 440 were engaged in raw material production, 373 in manufacturing, and 187 in service industries. In 1951 the figures were, respectively, 330, 415, 255. See the chart of these changes in M. Collinet, "Structure des Classes Salariés en France depuis Cinquante Ans," *Revue Internationale du Travail,* March, 1953, pp. 229–52. Other useful statistics may be found in P. Bleton, "Mouvement Économique et Évolution Social," *Économie et Humanisme,* July–Aug., 1955.

[53] See "Economic Conditions in France," published by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, Paris (Nov., 1955). This report indicates (p. 8) that nearly two-thirds of the 1955 increase in production was absorbed by private consumption.

[54] Otto Kircheimer, "Notes on the Political Scene in West Germany," *World Politics,* Vol. 6, pp. 306–21 (April, 1954).

III

Continued alienation of Frenchmen from Communist discipline depends only in part on the degree to which the party makes unrealistic demands on its followers' credibility. Another important factor is whether a period of relative domestic tranquillity will afford business and government opportunity to "lift the face" of the economy.[55] Whether an economic recession would enable the Communist party to regain its position as a central institution in French life, capable of competing successfully with traditional symbols to which Frenchmen owe their loyalty, such as the Republic, the democratic ideal, or devotion to intellectual independence, is doubtful. Too much has been lost by the party in terms of broad national appeal. Certainly it will remain strong in the industrial areas where its organization is most effective.

There might even be an opportunity for the party to gain real strength in the backwater rural districts, where the decline in the number of Communist cells has been less marked than in urban areas.[56] More than a million French peasants have holdings within the five-to-twenty hectare range, and many of them are engaged in bare subsistence farming. In *départements* where such farms are characteristic, especially in southeast France, the percentage of Communist votes runs as high as anywhere in the country.[57] Although soil productivity is unquestionably low, poverty is more often the consequence of apparent inability to take advantage of new techniques and markets. Should the youth of these backward areas be drawn away to decentralized industries and services now establishing in provincial cities, the "abandoned" districts may grow even further apart from the dynamic areas of the French economy.[58] Increasing isolation could make large sectors of rural France a fruitful hunting ground for the party.

If the drift away from the party is to continue, the path to those occupational and economic activities which are commercial, or of a higher skill level, and, more importantly, "middle-class" in psychological orientation, must be kept open. Lack of social fluidity is still the key problem of French life. Evidence abounds, both statistical and of the type immediately apparent to the casual tourist, to demonstrate that movement between class levels and social strata, although growing, is still highly restricted. The most telling index is educational opportunity. Technical training is now more widely offered, but the formal educational process shows only slight change in recent years. In a sample poll taken in 1952 of 3,000 French industrial workers, none had entered the *stage supérieur* or higher education, although 13 out of every 100 had had some form of technical education.[59] Eight of every 100 had advanced past primary schooling.[60] A recent survey of university students revealed that 2.3 per cent of those enrolled in state universities were the sons and daughters of skilled workers, as compared to 18.7 per cent who were the children of the lowest ranking *employés* and *petits functionnaires*.[61] Sixty-five per cent of successful candidates for the National School of Administration, which provides France with its top bureaucrats and managers, were from the highest socio-economic group—industrialists and top-flight technical specialists. Only 3.3 per cent came from working-class homes, and none from unskilled or farm labor parentage.[62]

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[55] At least the O.E.E.C. is not altogether optimistic about the continuance of an untroubled prosperity in the context of present fiscal practices. See note 53, above.

[56] See the report of the 1953 Party Congress statistics in "Le Communisme en France," *Bulletin de l'Association d'Études et d'Information Politiques Internationales* (March 1–15, 1955), p. 25.

[57] See the interesting statistics compiled by M. P. Hamelet, "Le Parti Communiste et les Agriculteurs," *Le Figaro*, April 9–10, 1955. A general survey of the poorer peasants' disposition to follow the party may be found in Ehrmann, "The French Peasant and Communism" (cited in note 34). See also François Goguel, "Pourquoi les Français Votent comme Ils le Font," *The French Review*, Vol. 28, pp. 318–30 (Feb., 1955).

[58] Interesting commentary on the new form of industrialization coming to the provinces is contained in the case study by J. Goulier, *Naissance d'une Grande Cité: Le Mans au Milieu du XXe Siècle* (Paris, 1953). For a warning that the western half of France might become an agricultural backwater, see A. Philip, "France's Economic Situation," *Yale French Studies*, No. 15, pp. 87–98 (Winter, 1954–55).

The figures cited above are somewhat more comprehensible when it is remembered that there are few opportunities for student employment or scholarship aid in France. In the Paris region, for example, out of 140,000 secondary and advanced students only 15,705 were receiving any sort of official scholarship aid in a typical postwar year.[63] The principal path to advancement is still through the traditional two-generation process. A modest post in some administrative office may be open to the worker's son with little education, but only his grandson may anticipate sufficient education for a significant advance up the social ladder. The steady movement toward tertiary occupations will doubtless exacerbate the urge for mobility. An infusion of new blood into the élite has long been a real need in professedly democratic France.

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[59] Bresard, "La Mobilité Sociale en France" (cited in note 51).

[60] *Ibid.* One writer cites a more recent survey in the Seine (Paris) region, in which five per cent of the *Lycée* students were of working-class origin. T. Bottomore, "La Mobilité Sociale dans la Haute Administration Française," *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, Vol. 12, pp. 167–78 (1952).

[61] P. L. Reynaud, "Le Rôle du Facteur Humain dans la 'Stagnation' de l'Économie Française," *Nouvelle Revue de l'Économie Contemporaine*, Vol. 4 (July, 1954).

[62] See Micaud, "The Bases of Communist Strength in France" (cited in note 1). and Bottomore, *op. cit.*

[63] From a survey quoted by Bottomore, *op. cit.*

The pressures and counter-pressures beginning to operate in this area of social and economic activity should be crucial to the survival of the "middle-class urge" at the expense of the Communist emphasis on working-class consciousness.

One further word should be added in assessing the impact of Communist power and its adaptability to contemporary French moods. Perhaps the Communists are out of step; perhaps, to push the argument to its logical extreme, their influence will evaporate in the face of powerful social drives for the status and semi-security of *petit bourgeois* living. If so, there remains the unpleasant possibility that the PCF has already accomplished too much. There may be nothing to take the party's place for those who abandon it. Years of bombast fired at the "criminal Republic" and all its works have added imperceptibly to the Frenchman's normal disdain for government in any form, and particularly for the government in power. The crisis of civic conscience cannot but sharpen for those who, consciously or not, have drunk deeply of Communist propaganda.[64] The Communist peace theme has deeply affected attitudes on foreign issues. The fact that France's foreign policy dilemma has centered on the emotionally unpopular issues of German rearmament, the Indo-Chinese conflict, and maintenance of the colonial presence in North Africa plays into Communist hands.[65] This is not to say that neutralism has entirely triumphed in the battle for Frenchmen's opinions on international matters, but rather that Communist persistence has strengthened it.[66] The real winner in the struggle that has been going on since Liberation may be the grey hosts of complete political irresponsibility and disaffection from public life. Powerful drives for new status may spell the collapse of Communist power. These urges, overemphasizing the ignoble French middle-class preoccupation with material security and private interests, may, however, also prove a danger, not only for France, but for all Western Democracy.

[64] That this problem seriously preoccupies French leaders is demonstrated by the tone and content of the papers offered at the annual lay Catholic national meeting held in 1954. See *Crise du Pouvoir et Crise du Civisme*, Chronique Sociale de France, Collection Semaines Sociales de France (à Rennes) (Paris, 1954), especially the articles by Auby, Savatier, Delouvrier, Therez, Blondel, and Simon.

[65] For interesting commentary on the party's ability to capitalize on these issues see Griotteray-Brayance, "Le Parti Communiste en 1955," (cited in note 27). For a lengthy, and in places brilliant statement of the fellow-travelling camp see J-P. Sartre's report, "Les Communistes et la Paix," in various issues of *Les Temps Modernes*, Vols. 8 and 9 (1953 and 1954).

[66] Some recent views on this subject may be found in John T. Marcus, "Neutralism in France," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 17, pp. 295–328 (Summer, 1955).

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SENATE POLICY COMMITTEES

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The subject of party responsibility for public policy in Congress has commanded much attention among political scientists. Creation of the Senate ✓ party policy committees in 1947 with legal sanction and public appropriations was heralded by some political scientists as a major step in the direction of centralizing and evolving a so-called party program. These committees have now been in operation for nine years, during which the Republican and Democratic bodies have each served about the same amount of time in the majority and minority. The committees may be said to have passed the experimental stage. Notwithstanding this, there is a paucity of material, both descriptive and analytical, concerning their operations.

In 1951 extensive hearings were held to evaluate the operation of the Legislative Reorganization Act.[1] Yet none of the three Democratic Policy Committee chairmen—Senators Barkley, Lucas, and McFarland, nor any member of their staffs appeared to testify. Senator Robert A. Taft, Republican Policy Committee Chairman, made no reference to his committee when discussing the Act. His staff director, George H. E. Smith, made relatively brief comments about the policy committee, and these were directed primarily to the need for additional help for his overburdened staff. Robert Heller and political scientist George B. Galloway had only a few comments to make on the subject. Indeed, it is remarkable that in over 650 pages of testimony the policy committees received so little attention. In answer to a questionnaire on congressional reorganization only seven out of 80 senators and representatives who replied indicated that priority should be given to the question of majority-minority policy committees.[2]

I. PROBLEMS OF STUDY AND METHODOLOGY

The policy committees themselves have preferred to operate unobtrusively and to hide their light under a bushel. Even within the Senate, they more or less consciously remain in the background. One freshman senator noted that during his first session he had little awareness of the committee and was never approached by a member of the committee on any matter of policy. All meetings are in secret, and only members and the staff director are present. It is almost impossible for the outsider to obtain information on the real workings of either committee, since no staff member or senator has prepared data on the subject for publication. The Republican Policy Committee has made available ✓for public distribution the party conference rules and a brief mimeographed statement outlining the functions of the committee.[3] Its Democratic counterpart has nothing available on either rules or functions. A major reason for preferring to operate in an unpublicized, sub-surface manner is to avoid giving the impression that the committee is "laying down a party line" or trying to bind its members in the Senate.

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[1] *Hearings on Evaluation of the Effects of Laws Enacted to Reorganize the Legislative Branch of the Government before the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments*, 82nd Cong., 1st sess.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 7. It may be observed that few textbooks more than mention these committees. George B. Galloway in *The Legislative Process in Congress* (New York, 1953) gives some attention to the subject (pp. 334–37, 602–5). Perhaps the aspirations for the policy committees are best expressed in the so-called Heller Report prepared for the National Planning Association under the title *Strengthening the Congress* (1944), pp. 14–17. For Mr. Heller's critical evaluation of the composition and operation of these committees in practice, see *Hearings* (cited in note 1), pp. 287–90.

While minutes of the policy committee meetings are kept, they are not made public and are unavailable to the scholar. In the 83rd Congress, a résumé of Republican Committee discussions was provided to all Republican senators but not to the general public. Such summaries of the Democratic meetings have never been prepared. Communication on what was discussed in the policy committee is largely through word of mouth. Each senator reports informally to other senators. Press correspondents usually wait outside the committee room for the chairman to emerge from the meeting. At this time the Democratic chairman sometimes gives out statements or reports certain items which were considered. Republican chairmen have customarily held press conferences after the meetings. Individual policy committee members sometimes render information on promise of having their names withheld.[4] These persons are the only ones who promote information.

Because of the absence of official records, public statements by spokesmen for the policy committees, and articles by staff members and journalists, the ordinary methods of the social scientist and social psychologist are unproductive for the study of policy committees. Quantification techniques, attitude and sociometric measurements, content analysis and the like, are usable for only a very few isolated aspects of the committees' activities. Moreover, these methods are capable of yielding but little data helpful to the political scientist desiring to understand and to conceptualize the role and procedures of the policy bodies. "Institutionalists" and "behaviorists" alike are bound to be frustrated in their studies of the committees. Because of the individualism of the Senate and the importance of interpersonal influence, uniformities and regularities are hard to find and generalizations difficult to make. There is scarcely enough knowledge and information upon which to formulate hypotheses capable of being tested by empirical research.[5]

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[3] See "Republican Conference Rules, January 11, 1955" and "Functions of the Senate Republican Policy Committee and Work of Its Staff," August, 1953.

[4] Typical of press reports is the story in the *Washington Post and Times Herald,* March 30, 1955, which reported on a three-hour Democratic Policy Committee meeting in such terms as these: "A Democratic spokesman, who asked not to be identified, said Democrats have no intention of handing Mr. Eisenhower an ultimatum . . . . What disturbed the Senate Democrats, one of their number said, was the recurrent pattern of so-called 'leaks' about which the President knew nothing . . . . Deeply irritated by the conflicting stories, the Democratic spokesman said . . . ." The remarkable thing about this report is that Senator Lyndon Johnson, the committee chairman, gave out no statement and his name appeared nowhere in the column-long article.

Ralph K. Huitt has utilized the status and role theory successfully to study and to explain a congressional committee.[6] Such an approach, if it could be used, would be a productive one for studying policy committees. But the latter, unlike standing committees, hold no open hearings and afford no opportunity for examination of their records or actions. First-hand observation, moreover, is impossible.

When other methods are unavailable, unusable, or inappropriate, interviewing to elicit information, impressions, and expressions of opinion must be utilized. The interviewer soon finds that senators who are members of the policy committees are reluctant to discuss some of the most fundamental aspects of committee operations. Strategy to be effective often has to be secret, and confidentiality is an integral part of the rules of the game in the Senate. Senators are unlikely to reveal the basic secrets even to their own administrative assistants, let alone to the outside investigator. Hence those trying to obtain a picture of the policy committees must also gather and evaluate the more readily available information in the form of hearsay judgments, impressions, and even gossip from nonmembers.

Notwithstanding the handicaps, an interest in the policy committees tempted the writer to bring together here diverse fugitive materials and information on them. Except for the very few descriptive materials which can be "documented," this is largely an impressionistic product, an attempt to sift contradictions, and to weave together confirmations.[7] The writer has two purposes in mind in this presentation. First, an effort is made to record some of the most important details about this little known congressional institution in the hope additional studies may be encouraged. Second, an attempt is made to develop a few general theories about the action of the policy committees.

II. CREATION, COMPOSITION, AND DEVELOPMENT

The Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress reported that "strong recommendations" had been made to it concerning the need for the formal expression within the Congress of the main policies of the majority and minority parties. These representations called for some mechanism capable of bringing about more party accountability for policies and platform pledges. The committee recommended the creation of policy committees "to formulate over-all legislative policy of the two parties."[8] The Senate accepted this proposal as it was incorporated in the Legislative Reorganization Bill, but the House deleted it. The Senate, however, created such committees for itself by attaching an item in the Legislative Branch Appropriation Act.[9]

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[5] An interesting question confronting the "behaviorists" is the amount of information and impression required before an acceptable hypothesis capable of verification can be drafted. The writer resists any temptation to deal with this question except to observe that he has seen no hypothesizing about the policy committees. Whether this is due to lack of information about the committees, a lack of interest in them, or something else, is not known.

[6] See "The Congressional Committee: A Case Study," this REVIEW, Vol. 48, pp. 340–65 (June, 1954).

[7] The writer gathered this material in 1954–55. Several senators who were on the policy committees and several ex-members were interviewed. Interviews with senators were necessarily brief and unstandardized, and unstructured questions were used in order to elicit information which, in the writer's judgment, the senator was best able to provide. In addition, the writer observed the staffs at work, talked at some length with many staff members of both committees, and sought the views of numerous administrative assistants and other people on the "Hill." By agreement, none of the senators or staff members are quoted. Evaluations, judgments, and errors of fact are entirely the author's.

In preceding congresses the Republicans had made considerable use of a steering committee under the leadership of Senator Robert A. Taft. This body was simply converted, with few changes, into the Republican Policy Committee. Senator Taft became chairman of the new committee and retained the position until he became majority floor leader in 1953. Taft did not wish to hold both positions and Senator William Knowland took over the committee chairmanship. Upon the death of Senator Taft a few months later, Senator Knowland followed the precedent set by Taft and relinquished the chairmanship to Senator Homer Ferguson.

Democratic practice has been quite different. The Senate floor leadership, the chairmanship of the Democratic Policy Committee, and the chairmanship of the Democratic caucus have been held by the same person, while the Republicans fill the offices with three different persons. The first Democratic chairman, Senator Alben Barkley, made little use of the committee because he saw no need for it. He handled policy and leadership matters to his satisfaction. Senators Lucas, McFarland, and Johnson, who succeeded him, convened the committee fairly regularly. Both committees generally meet weekly while the Senate is in session.

The size and complexion of the Republican committee have undergone considerable change. From the beginning several officials have been *ex officio* members—the chairman and secretary of the Republican Conference, the floor leader, the whip, the president *pro tempore* of the Senate (if a Republican) and, of course, the policy committee chairman. The remainder are nominated by the chairman of the Conference and ratified by it. Senators have the privilege of sending suggestions for nomination to the chairman.[10] The fact that the party officials are on the committee has guaranteed that persons with seniority and a generally conservative orientation dominate its membership. In response to complaints of freshman senators, Senator Taft added two younger persons to the committee in 1949. There were nine senators on the first policy committee and the number was raised to 11 during the 81st and to 12 in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses.

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[8] For discussion of recommendations concerning the establishment of the policy committees, see *Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress Pursuant to H. Con. Res. 18*, 79th Cong., 2d sess. Report No. 1011, March 4, 1946, pp. 12–13.

[9] 60 *Stat.* 911, 79th Cong., 2d sess. The committees are charged with "the formulation of over-all legislative policy of the respective parties" and are given a staff "to assist in study, analysis, and research on problems involved in policy determinations." Appropriations for the committees have been gradually increased and in 1954 each received an annual appropriation of $74,760.

[10] See "Republican Conference Rules" (cited in note 3). All of the Republican party officers are chosen by the Conference.

Senator Ferguson's defeat in 1954, plus the loss of majority control of the Senate, led to considerable reorganization at the beginning of the 84th Congress. Styles Bridges, who had been president *pro tempore* of the Senate during the 83rd Congress, was chosen as chairman of the Republican Policy Committee. In a surprise move it was decided to make every Republican senator up for re-election in 1956 a member of the committee. Two others were added,[11] making a total of 23 on the committee. A major purpose of this move was to give the prestige of being on the "policy body" to each person running for re-election. With this move, which virtually doubled the size of the committee and put on it about half the Republican membership in the Senate, the body obviously could no longer be regarded as a small one concerned with legislative planning and scheduling. The composition of the committee insured that it would be an agency strongly sensitive to the political realities of the forthcoming 1956 election.

The committee's composition in the 84th Congress appeared to have one additional virtue. It brought onto the committee (by coincidence) many ranking members of standing committees. Ten of the 15 committee chairmen during the 83rd Congress were included, thereby insuring that the policy body would be kept apprised of developments within many important committees.

Senators serve on the Republican Policy Committee for two years and are not eligible to succeed themselves, but may be reelected after two years have intervened. However, since all of the party officers are on the committee *ex officio*, several have served many years. Senator Millikin, by reason of being Conference chairman, has served on the committee since its creation. Senator Saltonstall, who became the whip in 1949, and Senators Young and Bridges have served several terms. During the 82nd and 83rd Congresses there was a fairly adequate sectional representation on the committee and a balance between the larger and smaller states.

In sharp contrast, membership on the Democratic Policy Committee has no terminal point and has tended to be self-perpetuating. Turnover has occurred when there were changes in the three *ex officio* members (the floor leader, the whip, and the caucus secretary) or when members dropped out of the Senate. The number on the committee has remained at nine. Three who were appointed in 1947—Green, Hill, and Russell—have served without interruption until the present. Senators Johnson, Clements, and Kerr were first put on the committee in the 82nd Congress and have continued to serve ever since. The remaining three members on the committee in 1956 were Senators Hennings, Murray, and Hayden.

The six members appointed to the committee were chosen presumably on the basis of seniority, points of view, and geography. But its membership in the 84th Congress lacked the broad sectional basis of its Republican counterpart. Although there were four Democratic senators from the West Coast (two each from Oregon and Washington), the area was not represented. There were also none from the Midwest, despite Democratic representation from such large states as Illinois, Michigan, and Minnesota (and from Iowa and Ohio in the preceding Congress). Senator Green of Rhode Island was the sole member from New England and the Middle Atlantic States, although there are Democratic senators from his own state, New York, Massachusetts, and Delaware. Conversely, the Southern and Border states had seven of the nine members. In terms of Democratic representation in the Senate, of course, the Southern and Border states can argue that they provide two-thirds of the membership and are entitled to a lion's share of the representation on the policy body. Nevertheless, the needs of certain important Northern interests have no impressive voice on the committee. One member of the Democratic Policy Committee, however, sees it as operating in the "country as a whole" and as simply a part of the process of reconciling sectional and factional differences within the party. It may be noted that extremists have been left off the committee and that moderates compose the membership. Except for this, diverse points of view are reasonably well represented on the committee.

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[11] Senators Alexander Smith and Margaret Chase Smith.

The policy committees have been personal rather than institutional leadership devices. When Lyndon Johnson was absent for several weeks early in 1955 due to illness, the Democratic Policy Committee did not even meet. After his heart attack in July, the committee met long enough to prepare a statement that it would carry out "his policies." Most chairmen in both parties have used the policy committees at their own discretion. When Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois served as floor leader, he was confronted with the necessity of obtaining cooperation from Southern Senators and made considerable use of the committee as an agent for broadening the basis of his leadership.

✓ In Democratic circles on the Hill the Democratic Policy Committee is often spoken of as the "personal staff of Senator Johnson."[12] Johnson is highly successful as a floor leader. He tries to foster a type of discussion among Democrats which will end in friendship rather than in splitting the party. He uses the policy body to work for a large Democratic vote and to keep the party together. In recent years Democratic leaders have feared that the caucus would lead to quarrelsome debates and create party disunity, so a caucus has been held only at the beginning of a session. In the interim the policy committee is used to a considerable extent to eliminate the need for convening the caucus. The fact that the floor leadership and policy committee chairmanship are held by the same person has tended to make the committee an instrument of the leadership. The staff of the Democratic Policy Committee serves also as the staff for the duties of the chairman as floor leader.

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[12] Senator Johnson generally directs the staff work. In the Republican committee, allocation of the staff work is usually handled by the staff director and secretary, Lloyd W. Jones.

Although both party committees are instruments of personal leadership, the Republican body has been considerably less personal. After Taft gave up the chairmanship, the Republican Policy Committee gave more thought to its own corporate nature and tried to institutionalize itself. By having its own chairman, and by maintaining separate identities for its floor leader and conference chairman, the policy group avoids becoming exclusively the tool or personal staff of the chairman. Leadership of the Senate Republicans is *pro forma* more highly dispersed. Institutionalization has also been fostered by prescribing rules for democratic election and concerning this committee's membership; by issuing a public statement on the functions of the committee and the staff; and by providing that none except the *ex officio* members are eligible to successive terms on the committee.

III. GENERAL OPERATION AND STAFF WORK

From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that there is a substantial difference between the two policy committees. Nowhere have the Democrats set down the functions for their policy committee; hence a normative judgment is difficult if not impossible. The Republicans, on the other hand, have prepared an enumeration and brief description of their work operations and functions.

In the Republican Conference rules it is stated that "The Policy Committee shall consider the legislative program in the Senate and the question whether any Party Policy is involved, shall prepare and present recommendations for action by the Conference, and advise all Senators on legislative matters which they desire to present to the Policy Committee." In the memorandum prepared in August, 1953, the following 12 types of operations were assertedly being performed by the committee in pursuance of the authority given to it in the Conference rules: (1) consideration of legislative program to be scheduled for floor operations; (2) consideration of parliamentary procedure; (3) canvass of measures before standing committees; (4) cooperation with the President and White House staff; (5) preparation and issuance of statements on matters involving policy committee interests and actions; (6) advice on the undertaking of committee investigations; (7) consideration of questions arising out of presidential nominations; (8) discussion with individual senators of matters of interest to them; (9) attempts to reconcile divergent views among senators on legislation with the object of promoting party unity; (10) initiation of studies on legislative matters "to advance the national welfare, to implement the party platform, and to strengthen Republican leadership"; (11) recommendation of occasions for calling the whole Republican conference; and (12) cooperation with House Republican leadership.

There is no reliable evidence upon which to determine which of these functions is the most important. The last one, cooperation with House Republican leadership, is no longer of any significance. For a short while after the House Republican Policy Committee came into being in 1949,[13] it met in joint meetings with the Senate group. Poor attendance on the part of House members led to abandonment of these meetings. There is considerable informal relationship between House and Senate leaders, even though the formal policy body relationships no longer exist.

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[13] In January, 1949 the House Republicans converted their steering committee into a policy committee of 22 members. Party leaders serve on the committee *ex-officio* as in the

When in the minority, the Republican Senate policy group considered certain of President Truman's nominations, but the screening of nominations was of little importance after Eisenhower's inauguration.

The staff of the Republican Policy Committee is composed of about 10 professionals and five secretaries. Virtually all of the former possess the baccalaureate or graduate degrees and are largely researchers. Although they are generalists, they tend to specialize in certain areas, such as agriculture, conservation, or public works. The staff serves the committee, the Republican Conference, and the Republican Calendar Committee.[14]

The Republican staff produces a large number of publications and has tried to provide materials which Republican senators will need on important legislation and policies. One of its best known publications is the weekly memorandum entitled, "Senate Republican Memo," intended for use in speeches, press releases, newsletters to constituents, and radio and television dicussions.[15] It assists Republican senators in outlining and drafting speeches dealing with legislation and policy. It gives limited help on campaign speeches. At the end of each session of Congress, the staff prepares a detailed report on the Republican record and performance.

Senate policy committees, and 17 additional persons are chosen on a regional basis. The committee meets only occasionally for discussion of major legislative issues. It is largely an advisory body. For the text of the resolution creating it, see Galloway, *op. cit.*, pp. 334–35. Sam Rayburn has been unenthusiastic about policy bodies; hence the Democrats have never elected to create one. It might be noted that the congressional campaign committees in the House perform several services for representatives which the policy committee members render to the senators.

[14] The Republican Policy Committee has a suite of offices in the Senate Office Building. The Democratic staff is located near the Senate floor in the Capitol, in less spacious quarters. There are only six professionals and four clerks on the Democratic staff. Turnover has been higher in the Democratic office and no person has been with the staff from its beginning. Only one person has been with the staff since 1949; several of the professionals joined the committee when Lyndon Johnson became its chairman. As a result, there is no staff member who possesses first-hand knowledge of the history of the committee's work. By contrast, two staff members have served the Republican committee since its inception. In taking note of the larger Republican staff, former staff director George H. E. Smith testified quite plausibly in 1951 that the Democrats "do not need a staff as large as ours because they have the executive departments handing down most of the messages that they wish to embody into legislative policy, along with a tremendous amount of data developed by economists, lawyers, statisticians, and so forth, in the executive departments which we ordinarily do not have access to as readily as does the majority." *Hearings* (cited in note 1), p. 477.

[15] Illustrative titles include, "The Dixon-Yates Contract," "The Political, Hypocritical $20 Tax Scheme," "More Evidence of Communist Influence in Democratic Administrations," and "Republicans Sell Rubber Plants for Top Prices." In March, 1955 the staff put out a 51-page analysis of the Yalta papers under the title, "Highlights of the Yalta Papers and Related Data." This analysis stirred up a considerable amount of Democratic ire.

Upon request from senators, the staff will conduct interviews with individuals and organizations having an interest in legislation and will report the findings to the senators. Other services include analyses of the legislative record of senators, legislative histories, and bill drafting upon request.

The rules and procedures governing the work of the Republican staff are extraordinarily interesting and merit attention.[16] Work is initiated at the request of: (1) the policy committee as a whole in session; (2) the chairman; (3) any member of the committee (usually upon consultation with the chairman); (4) any member of the Republican Conference (since the staff serves the entire Conference); and (5) the staff director. In the last-mentioned instance, the director generally consults with the chairman or submits the material to the chairman for his approval before issuance. Although the staff directors have broad initiative, the chairmen appear to have kept a firm grip on all of the work done, exercising final direction and command. There have been only two staff directors and each has served under more than one chairman. Nevertheless, there is undoubtedly a personal accountability to the chairman.

The floor leader as an *ex officio* member of the committee can and does ask the staff to do jobs for him. If he states that the work is for his exclusive private use, he does not clear the request with the chairman. If it is on a general problem, it is usually cleared with the committee in session or with the chairman. This is in accordance with a rule that permits the staff to serve any Republican senator on request and without clearance if the material required is stated by the senator to be for his exclusive private use. If the memorandum is likely to become public or to affect other senators, or if the material has application to Republican party interests, clearance is usually required. Clearance may be had by conferring with the chairman or appearing before the committee. If the request is granted, a copy of the finished product is also supplied to the chairman and the committee. Over the years the floor leaders have been served by the staff and requests have been fulfilled both with and without clearance. It is reasonable to conclude, however, that the policy staff serves as an auxiliary staff to the Republican floor leader much less than is the case with the Democrats. As is true with practically all standing committees, the staffs of both policy committees are to a considerable degree auxiliary staffs of the chairmen.

The association of the staff with other Republican Policy Committee members is not nearly so close as with the chairman. In general, staff work for Republican senators is contingent upon whether the material desired concerns party interests and principles. If help is requested outside this frame of reference, senators are likely to be advised that their own staff aids and other sources should be used.

On nearly all publications put out for general distribution, the following printed disclaimer appears: "NOTE: Neither the Members of the Republican Policy Committee nor other Republican Senators are responsible for the statements herein contained, except such as they are willing to endorse and make their own." This protective statement is used to cover situations where the material was originated either by the staff director, or by one or a few senator members of the committee. It also absolves other senators whose views might be at variance with those expressed in the staff study.

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[16] The rules were worked out by Senator Taft and the first staff director, George H. E. Smith; most of them remain in force today. The writer and many political scientists are indebted to Mr. Smith for his reports on staff operations.

The number and variety of publications by the Democratic policy staff are much less impressive than in the case of its Republican parallel. Very little work is done for individual senators. The staff does a good deal of spot research for the chairman and prepares legislative status reports. It compiles quorum records, noting presence and absence from roll calls and votes, and prepares a vote card that goes to every Democratic senator very soon after a vote is taken on a bill. It also prepares a list of expiring legislation, which goes to committee chairmen and senators. Presidential recommendations and speeches are analyzed for partisan overtones.

As might be expected, the research of the policy committee staffs is politically-oriented and partisan. The research is designed to document the party's record and find holes in the opposition's armor. Both staffs gather materials from congressional committees, the executive agencies, and private interest groups. Since the policy committees are a part of Congress, they may and do use the services of the Legislative Reference Service. The committees, therefore, have access to about the same sources of information as the standing committees of Congress. It has been a function of the Republican policy staff in particular to take the raw materials it receives and to try to apply the party's position to them and point up the policy problems involved. The work of the Republican staff is clearer, and more apparent and tangible than that of the Democratic staff. One wishes that the work of the Republican Policy Committee could be made as clear as that of its staff.

IV. SOME ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The usefulness and accomplishments of the policy committees in three fields are fairly well recognized on Capitol Hill. These areas are: (1) service and research, (2) education, (3) legislative scheduling. The services provided by the staff have been described. In addition, the Republican committee has helped senators to secure administrative assistants and secretaries, and high-level personnel. Certain personnel procedures were systematized in 1947 and the new committee chairmen were supplied with names of qualified personnel for committee staffs.

The Republican staff prepares a considerable number of individual memoranda at the request of senators, sometimes as many as 100 per year. These memoranda may be used to accompany legislation or for answering letters. The Republican staff has also met with administrative assistants and other employees in the senators' offices. During campaigns the staff sends research materials to the Republican National Committee and has done a limited amount of speech writing. Some research is also done for the Republican Senatorial Committee. The Republican Congressional, National, Policy, and Senatorial committees exchange and make some use of each others' materials. In a general sense, all of the materials put out are designed to be helpful to the party in defending its record and pointing to weaknesses in the Democratic record. Some Republican senators believe that from 1947 to 1950 Senator Taft saw the policy committee as an instrument for electing Republicans.

The educational function of the Republican Policy Committee is rather significant. Committee chairmen have appeared before it to report on major problems and measures before their committees. This has helped the policy members to get a broader view of policies, program, and legislation, and committee leaders in turn have been helped by the policy members. During the first few months of the Eisenhower Administration, many cabinet secretaries appeared before the committee. This resulted in giving "political" education to the secretaries and in providing the senators with a greater understanding of departmental programs and wishes. The committee has helped the newer senators to learn their way around and has added to their knowledge of how the Senate really operates.

The Democratic Policy Committee has likewise served educational purposes, but its activities have been less obvious and less broad in scope. Its meetings are luncheon affairs and other senators and executive officials are seldom present.[17] Yet its operation, as will be seen shortly, undoubtedly results in educating a number of Democratic senators.

The policy committees perform useful functions in preparing for the call of the calendar, a procedure for the disposition of minor bills and resolutions.[18] This has had an interesting history. Beginning in 1938, Senator John Danaher of Connecticut began to monitor the calendar as a possible way of checking certain minor bills of the Roosevelt Administration. Senator Guy Cordon of Oregon took over after Danaher's defeat. Both served without staff. In 1949 Cordon prevailed upon the Republican Policy Committee to set aside funds to hire a lawyer to service what became known as the calendar committee.[19] The committee determines the bills to be acted on the calendar call, and prepares an analysis of the bills. When Lyndon Johnson became the Democratic chairman, he appointed a Legislative Review Committee to serve in the same capacity.[20] When the calendar is called the counsels sit with the committee members on the Senate floor.

The policy committee of the party in power is of considerable importance *at times* in determining the general legislative schedule. In reality, the determination of what shall be brought up on the floor is a function of the leadership, but the policy committees may be an aid to it. There is sometimes a discussion over whether to bring up a bill at all. Quite often the floor leader simply brings in a legislative agenda for the ensuing week and asks the policy group if it has any questions. Members may then ask to have certain items included.

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[17] Senator George is sometimes present when foreign policy matters are to be discussed.

[18] The Senate had 22 different calendar calls in 1954, during which it passed 1,381 "unobjected to" bills and resolutions, of which 965 were private bills. See Floyd M. Riddick, "The Eighty-Third Congress: Second Session," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 7, p. 643 (Dec., 1954).

[19] The committee has usually been composed of three or four persons appointed by the Republican Policy Committee and broadly representative of all sections. In the 84th Congress its membership included Senators Purtell, Barrett, Hruska, and Schoeppel.

[20] Senators Erwin and Bible composed the committee in the 84th Congress.

Some have compared the policy committees with the House Rules Committee. In terms of legislative scheduling, this is not an apt comparison. The latter enjoys the status of a standing committee with authority to issue specific rules, impose limitations, and bottle up measures; none of these powers are possessed by the policy bodies. Scheduling in the real sense of the word involves discussion of strategy, decision as to sequence, consideration of timing. Neither policy committee as a committee appears to have gone into these matters with any degree of regularity. One gets the impression that the Republican Policy Committee has devoted more time to legislative scheduling than has the Democratic group, but there is neither documentary nor empirical evidence to prove it.

V. THE POLICY COMMITTEES AND THE EXECUTIVE

The Heller Report advocated policy committees as a device which would, for the majority party, "institutionalize within Congress a group with which the President or executive department heads would have regular communication without exposure to partisan politics . . . [and] serve the purpose better than informal conferences between the President and one or two Congressional leaders because the latter are not necessarily able to effect full transmission of opinion between the President and the key men in Congress."[21] Many political scientists also hoped that the policy committee would serve as an instrument for an effective liaison between the President and Congress. The LaFollette-Monroney Committee recommended that the majority policy committees of the two houses "serve as a formal council to meet regularly with the Executive, to facilitate the formulation and carrying out of national policy. . . . "[22] It foresaw that this would result in "improved understanding of each other's problems . . . ," through consultation before the introduction of legislation to carry out pledged party promises, and also that it would give congressional leaders a chance to formulate policy instead of simply acting on programs prepared by the Executive.

When the Eisenhower Administration first took office, its legislative program was formulated in a three-day meeting between administrative and legislative leaders. The Republican Policy Committee took over the residuum of the meetings and more or less accepted it as Republican policy. Under Chairman Homer Ferguson (1953–1954), there was a reasonably close relationship between the President and the Republican Policy Committee. The contact was due largely to Senator Ferguson. There is no record, however, of a single instance where either President Truman[23] or President Eisenhower ever met with all of the members of his party's policy committee.

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[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

[22] *Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress* (cited in note 8), p. 13.

[23] Senator Elbert D. Thomas, in his evaluation of policy committees, felt that President Truman should have taken the initiative to convene the Democratic committee with his

Policy committee members have usually learned of presidential or cabinet officer wishes in a second-hand way from their policy chairman. Senator Taft, and often Senator Vandenberg, for example, met with individual members of the Truman cabinet instead of bringing the latter before the Republican Policy Committee in the 80th Congress. Mr. Taft then simply reported to the committee what the officials had told him. As mentioned earlier, Senator Ferguson had numerous Eisenhower cabinet officers appear before the committee—a practice well received. Several senators admitted that the sessions were helpful in getting a detailed view on some forthcoming departmental legislative proposals. These meetings between administrators and policy members, however, have been highly exceptional.

There has been some informal relationship between the policy staffs and those of the Budget Bureau, but not as much as might be expected. In fact, most of the staff of the Budget Bureau seem to be comparatively unaware of the policy committees.

In the main, any hope that the device would serve to effectuate a higher degree of cooperation between the Senate and the President has gone unrealized. Some Democrats believe that the Democratic Policy Committee was used on a few occasions to strengthen Democratic opposition to certain of President Truman's legislative recommendations.

The Republican Policy Committee issued a 32-page memorandum giving data on guided missiles, various weapons, and the numerical strength of the armed forces.[24] The Democrats and some of the press raised the cry that this made public classified information. Defense Secretary Wilson and other officials issued a statement asserting that "no security violation" was involved but found themselves, according to the press, "in the embarrassing position of defending publication of a summary of new American weapons by the Senate Republican Policy Committee while criticizing publication of such military information elsewhere."[25] President Eisenhower said he regarded publication as a "blunder" and that he would not have given out such information.[26] The chairman of the committee, Senator Bridges, took to the Senate floor to retort that "The President's reference to the national-defense study by the staff of the Republican Policy Committee as a blunder is most unfortunate."[27] The

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cabinet and himself. "Had he done so," writes Thomas, "there would have been no need for various clashes between him and several members of Congress which have occurred." See "How Congress Functions under Its Reorganization Act," this REVIEW, Vol. 43, pp. 1179–89 at p. 1183 (Dec., 1949). Thomas remained a staunch believer in the potentiality of the policy committee as an agent of party responsibility.

[24] "National Defense under the Republican Administration—Today and Tomorrow," Supplement to Vol. 1, No. 9 of Senate Republican Memo. March 10, 1955.

[25] *Washington Post and Times Herald*, April 27, 1955.

[26] *Ibid.*, April 28, 1955.

[27] *Congressional Record*, April 28, 1955, p. 4434. Debate on the issue is found in this edition, pp. 4434–36, 4463–64, A 2879–80. When President Eisenhower expressed willingness to attend a Big Four "summit" conference a short time later, Senator Bridges again took to the Senate floor to express his skepticism if not disapproval of such a conference. See *Congressional Record*, May 11, 1955, pp. 5160 ff. See also *The New York Times*, May 12, 1955.

incident shows that there was no consultation with the executive prior to publication and is but one of several which might be cited to demonstrate that policy committee leadership may be publicly at odds with the President.

On the other side of the ledger, it should be pointed out that nearly all of the Republican Policy Committee's publications have attempted to equate Eisenhower's program with that of the Republican party. This is especially interesting in light of the fact that of the three policy committee chairmen since 1953 (Knowland, Ferguson, and Bridges) only Ferguson had the public reputation of being an "Eisenhower Republican."

VI. POLICY AND THE POLICY COMMITTEES

✓At the outset, the conclusion is inescapable that the policy committees are misnamed. They have never been "policy" bodies, in the sense of considering and investigating alternatives of public policy, and they have never put forth an overall congressional party program. The committees do not assume leadership in drawing up a general legislative program but consider certain proposals on an *ad hoc* basis as they arise or are due for floor consideration. Some important policies receive little or no discussion in the committees, and only rarely have the committees labelled their decisions as "party policies." There have been disagreements within the committees and issues are rarely put to a vote.[28] ✓Much legislation is worked out by casual groups of senators who may or may not be members of the policy committees. Party policy is made by a large number of people. "As devices for coordinating legislative policy and strengthening party leadership," says George Galloway, "the Senate policy committees have thus far failed to fulfill their potential."[29]

Chairman Lyndon Johnson, more than his predecessors, has perceived the policy committee as a strategic device and weapon. The committee is used to set up issues in a way that will permit a maximum number of Democrats to go along with the position of the leadership. Johnson's philosophy is to meet senators half way, talk with them personally, and seek to understand their problems in terms of their own constituencies.[30] This method influences the other members of the committee and they tend to operate informally the same way.

The Democratic Policy Committee is also used to shape up issues in a way to embarrass the opposition. On the censure of Senator McCarthy, for example, the committee stated that it was not a party matter but concerned the morals of the Senate and that each Democratic senator should vote according to his own conscience. This avoided giving Senator McCarthy an opportunity to build up strength among Republicans by arguing that censure had been formally made a partisan issue.

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[28] The Republicans, however, appear to have taken more votes in their policy meetings than have the Democrats.

[29] *The Legislative Process in Congress*, p. 336.

[30] Johnson seldom makes a speech on the Senate floor and seems to follow the framed motto on his office wall—"You ain't learnin' nothin' when you're talkin'." In practice Johnson has often taken a position privately and if no one appears to disagree, it then passes as the Democratic policy.

When President Eisenhower sent Congress the resolution on the Yalta agreements, it was quickly endorsed by the Democratic Policy Committee.[31] The Republicans were divided on the issue with many feeling it did not go far enough. The action of the Democrats in endorsing the Eisenhower resolution left the Republicans arguing among themselves and the resolution was finally buried in committee. Republican senators were clearly put on the defensive in the matter.

In talking with senators and their assistants, one finds widely varying views about the accomplishments and utility of the committees in the field of policy. This is undoubtedly due to the absence of criteria and standards for judging what the committees are *supposed to do* and what they *can do*.[32] Some believe that the committees, particularly the Democratic committee, do very little, while others purport to see a few real achievements. A few senators would like to see the committees turned into real policy bodies with all that that connotes, but there is no great sentiment for strengthening them in terms of tightening party discipline. The desirability of developing more party cohesion is sometimes admitted in the abstract but not in the concrete. While there is little evidence that a majority of Congress was enthusiastic about policy committees prior to their adoption, a number of representatives and senators publicly testified in 1945 in favor of their establishment and only one member of the LaFollette-Monroney Committee, Representative Cox of Georgia, registered dissent to the recommendation for their creation. All in all, however, it is probably correct to conclude that the majority of senators today are not disappointed that the policy committees failed to become effective instruments of party responsibility and discipline.

The decentralization and fragmentation of power, the prerogatives of individual power and seniority, the habits of individualism and independence are so well-entrenched in the Senate that few senators are interested in placing power in the hands of a policy body. Many senators wish to obtain support if not sponsorship of important legislation from senators of the opposite party. This would be difficult to do if either party declared a measure to be party policy. Further, the environment of Congress is not conducive to delegating to a party committee the authority to lay down a party line which could serve as a public yardstick to judge a lawmaker's vote on an issue and to embarrass him at election time. If the party line is unknown or obscure, a senator has more latitude.

As noted earlier, the composition of the committees leaves much to be desired if "policy" is to be a major preoccupation of their efforts. Senator Walter George, the generally recognized spokesman for the Democrats in foreign policy, has never been on the Democratic Policy Committee and Senator

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[31] House Doc. No. 93, 83rd Cong., 1st sess.

[32] A role-perception study among nonmembers of the policy committee, if it could be facilitated, would be highly interesting. In the writer's judgment, such a study would show that in general the role is not clearly perceived and that there is comparatively little insight into the committees.

Arthur Vandenberg served only two years on the Republican Policy Committee. Some of the most influential committee chairmen and ranking members are not on the policy bodies. Should the Republicans continue to place half of their membership on the policy committee, including those up for reelection, they would thereby virtually disavow any attempt to make their committee an effective policy instrument.

Heller, Galloway, and others express disappointment that all committee chairmen were not placed on the policy committees. They believe that failure to take this action, plus the absence of analogous House bodies, are the major reasons for their weaknesses in the realm of legislative policy. Without minimizing the importance of this point, it is the writer's belief that changes in the committees' composition would not now make a material difference. Too many senators remain unenthusiastic about a more centralized legislative policy arm, no matter how that body might be constituted.

Nevertheless, in the realm of policy there are some modest achievements which can be claimed for the policy committees. In the 83rd Congress, the Democratic Policy Committee forged what might accurately be termed a party position on the proposal to tie together Alaskan and Hawaiian statehood, on the recommitment of the Atomic Energy bill to conferees, and on certain tax proposals. It actually formulated a compromise on the $20 deduction per dependent on the income tax in 1955 and was able to obtain the votes from all but five Democrats on the measure.[33] The Republicans were able to get an almost unanimous vote (one dissent) on the same tax question.

The Republican Policy Committee tried, with some success, to reach an acceptable party compromise or substitute on the Bricker Amendment. In the spring of 1954, the Republican Policy Committees undertook to exercise leadership concerning rules of conduct for committee investigations. Committee chairmen met with the policy committee to discuss the matter at length. Although nothing officially came out of this meeting, it was a significant recognition of an important policy matter and of public criticism of the way some investigations were being conducted. The discussions put the various Republican committee chairmen on notice that the leadership was concerned with the problem.

In many cases both party committees have looked at proposals before the Senate and decided that no party policy was involved. At other times they have reaffirmed a policy because it appeared in the party platform. On occasions committee chairmen have obtained help from policy committee members on legislation.

These examples of dealing with policies are not likely to impress advocates of party government and discipline either in number or in scope. But neither are they negligible. To an undetermined degree policy discussions in the committee have helped to accommodate factionalism and to etch, for the party leadership, the areas of agreement and disagreement.

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[33] Senator Johnson received unanimous support from the Democratic Policy Committee to bring out this bill as a substitute for Speaker Rayburn's bill, which had passed the House. See *The New York Times*, March 10, 1955. Toward the end of this same session, Johnson issued a statement that the policy committee members were prodding legislative committee chairmen to complete their work on major bills looking toward a July 30 adjournment. See *The New York Times* June 29, 1955.

To be sure, the committees can bind no one. They can only consider, recommend, and attempt to persuade.[34] Yet some cohesiveness, especially in the Republican party, has been obtained through the preparation of staff memoranda and statements of the record of performance, and through the shaping up of issues. In a few instances a definite stand on a policy has been taken which has commanded nearly unanimous support. Both committees have issued a number of broad statements of party policy.

Policy committee members try to make a distinction between program and policy—possibly a distinction without a difference. The committee members maintain that they do not make policy but take a program submitted by the executive or someone else and decide if it will be adopted as party policy. Democratic members in particular emphasize that they attempt to interpret programs and policies in line with historic Democratic policy. To the extent that this is the role of the policy committees, it is a function of sifting, evaluating, and ratifying rather than of originating and creating. In terms of Senate tradition, however, the role of reviewer is more acceptable than that of drafter and formulator of party policy.

There is a certain intangible psychological influence which is not easy to measure. The label "policy" gives the appearance of leadership. When a pronouncement is made and presumably has the support of all or nearly all of the members of the policy committee, it creates a psychology of a party position. There are some pressures for conformity in the Senate notwithstanding the extreme individualism of its members. Policy committee members include many of the most respected and most powerful men in the Senate. The views of a Millikin, a Taft, a Russell, or a Hill are not lightly regarded by his colleagues. When such men speak as members of the "policy committee," one will not oppose them without important reasons. Emulation as well as individualism is a vital part of the totality of the Senate. To the extent that policy committees can be worked into this fabric of personal interaction, prestige, and interpersonal relationships in the Senate, they can achieve successes.

VII. CONCLUSION

Experience with the Senate policy committees has led to very little public understanding of their role and indeed of their existence. Their immediate ancestors were the steering committees, and in a genetic sense the policy committees are steering committees, which probably connotes but little. They have been useful in monitoring the consent calendar, in considering certain matters of legislative scheduling and strategy, and in performing routine and other services needed by the floor leadership. Policy committee sessions are meetings of some of the men of power in the Senate at which political strategy, policy, program, and diverse other matters are discussed. Taking the views of senators both on and off the committees, evaluations of the committees' influence on party discipline and unity range from "negligible" to "perceptible," with no one claiming impressive accomplishment. Unfortunately, there is no way to measure whether there would have been even less party cohesion had the committees not existed.

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[34] William S. White in a pictorial article writes: "The functions of the Senate Democratic Policy Committee . . . are roughly those of the board of directors of a powerful corporation." *The New York Times Magazine*, July 10, 1955, p. 10. This analogy suggests powers which neither of the committees possesses.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the role of the policy committees is the apparent difference between the Republican and Democratic committees. The former appears to be much more highly developed and somewhat more institutionalized, and to perform many more functions than the Democratic Policy Committee. It has a larger staff, which turns out a large volume of memoranda and publications for use by Republican senators. Although neither policy group gets much play in the press, the Republican committee has given the newspapers far more to write about.

It is interesting to speculate on the reasons for this difference. Simultaneously with the creation of the first policy committees, the Republicans came into control of the Senate after a long period of being in the minority. Senator Taft and other leaders recognized the practical necessity for organization and were spurred on by ideological considerations to arrest the spread of the Fair Deal. There had been a growing recognition in the Senate, as there had been in the Republican National Committee, that the party unable to command the great staff resources of the executive branch needed a strong staff of its own and a broader basis of organizational leadership strength. The Republican Policy Committee possessed utilitarian value, at least in these terms. By contrast, Senator Barkley found the Democrats in very little need of this type of organization. It should be noted that Republican representation in the Senate was so marginal in 1953 that there was no disposition to curtail the staff or diminish activities.[35] Party splits over foreign policy and certain other Eisenhower proposals, moreover, made it desirable to keep intact any instrument which might help to accommodate and compromise the internecine differences. At the same time the Republicans, to a greater extent than the Democrats, appear to be more concerned with attacking the opposition and providing their officeholders with appropriate ammunition.[36] This spirit was inculcated in part by Senator Taft and is characteristic of a party of opposition.

Democrats, by contrast, have had control or near control of the Senate for a quarter of a century. Due in a large measure to the long tenure of Southerners, the Democrats have possessed a highly experienced group of skilled parliamentary and political operators. The Republicans have seldom had more than a handful of such competent politicians at any one time.[37] The "old pros" in the Democratic party have had their own methods of doing things in the Senate and are reasonably well satisfied with both methods and accomplishments.

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[35] Republican representation in successive Congresses, beginning with the 80th, was 51, 42, 42, 48, and 47.

[36] The Democratic Policy Committee has been more restrained in attacking President Eisenhower than has been the Democratic National Committee.

Notwithstanding this apparent larger role of the Republican Policy Committee, there are reasons for regarding the Democratic Committee as potentially a more important device than its Republican counterpart. This is because it somehow fits better into the "field" or into the totality of co-existing facts about the Senate. The Southerners who dominate the Senate do so by reason of experience and political sagacity, and not by seniority alone. They use personal negotiation and agreement to cut through the maze of obstacles to get things done, or to set up barriers to keep things from being done, as the case may be. Personal operation is used to supply the correctives and mutations when needed. The Democratic Policy Committee under all its chairmen, but especially under Lyndon Johnson, has used the *modus operandi* of personal contact with a view to keeping the party together, doing those things helpful to it, and trying to prevent activities and public statements harmful to the party record. The committee is useful in this connection for appraising political realities and rendering political judgments.

To a considerable extent also the device of a policy committee is compatible with customs and traditions associated with Democratic control of the Senate. The Republican Policy Committee has met well some of the needs of a party accustomed to being in the minority. To some Republican senators, however, the committee seems a bit superimposed and synthetic in terms of the overall needs in the management of the Senate. Senate rules of the game and traditions are so encrusted that they soon swallow up and absorb attempts at innovation. The political scientists and senators who hoped that the policy committees would work some changes in the Senate found that the Senate was unprepared for party policy leadership by a group so designated. But with statutory sanction and appropriations, the policy committees were forced to find a justification for themselves and have done so. There seems to be no sentiment or disposition to eliminate them.

The policy committees cannot be accurately evaluated until the real operation and management of the Senate are understood. This is a challenge to the researcher that will never be fully met, for it involves an analysis of hundreds of interpersonal relationships as well as the more apparent power structure. Explanations of the legislative process in Congress are often too mechanistic. Even the political interest group approach may have unintentionally resulted in some over-simplification. Personal friendships in the Senate are more important than is generally realized and are too often left out of the frame of reference by those attempting to conceptualize congressional behavior. As more is learned of how the Senate really functions, the true role and potentiality of the policy committees may be appreciated. Probably more than any other institutions and agencies of the Senate, the policy committees cannot be studied as an isolated abstraction but only in terms of the unit of which they are a part—the Senate.

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[37] Those serving on the Republican Policy Committee in 1954 had served an average of 9½ years in the Senate, while Democratic members averaged over 14 years.

Several impressions, propositions, and assumptions concerning the Senate policy committees may now be summarized. Each of these provides a challenge for further research and speculation.

First, the Democratic and Republican policy committees are substantially different in outlook, operation, and activity. The reasons for this remain a matter for additional investigation but a major cause appears to be the minority party status of the Republicans, difference in committee composition, and the greater experience of Democratic senators in managing the Senate. A minority party probably has greater need for a policy committee, and especially staff work, than has the majority party.

Second, the Republican Policy Committee receives more publicity, is more institutionalized, and much more is known of its staff and work. Probably as a result of this, it is widely believed on the Hill that the Republican Policy Committee is a more useful and effective body than its counterpart. But this assumption is open to question. In terms of influence and effectiveness with its own membership in the Senate, the Democratic committee may be the superior. This is perhaps the most intriguing paradox—if it is a paradox—of party control in the Senate.

Third, the policy committees serve to broaden the base of personal leadership. In the Democratic party the floor leader uses the policy committee and its staff to aid him in his duties. In the Republican party the policy committee chairmanship provides an additional leadership post for some prominent party member and the committee itself assists both the chairman and the floor leader in certain policy matters. One of the untested hypotheses of party control is that when the leader is strong and influential, he needs a policy committee less; a weaker leader or one lacking power needs a committee more than does a stronger one. Senators Taft and Johnson exemplify strong leaders in their own right, while Senators Ferguson and Lucas were less influential and the latter two appear to have made more of the policy committees *per se*. Likewise Senator McFarland appeared to need and consequently used the Democratic Policy Committee more than did Senator Barkley.

Fourth, the policy committees have not even provided overall legislative clearance for the parties, let alone for the Senate as a whole. Decentralization of the consideration of policy appears about as great as it was before the committees were established. Joint policy committees offer a potential agency for party clearance of legislation but, tradition being what it is, there is little prospect of their creation.

Stated another way, the policy committees have left unsolved the problem of integration of party policy in Congress. Both parties and the Congress try to assert an institutional identity and unity at times, but the centrifugalism brought about by seniority and the intensely personal character of the operation of the Senate make this difficult of accomplishment. There is little prospect that either policy committee will become a centripetal force or an institutional leadership device such as the House Rules Committee. Policy bodies in the Senate must function in a different way than their name implies and must find their niche and level of performance. Since 1947 the margin of party control in the Senate has been relatively small and such may be the case for several years. With this prospect, the need for some group which can influence even a few votes on crucial legislation is apparent. Perhaps this is the role which the policy committees, maybe unconsciously, are finding for themselves.

COHESION OF BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES

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In the perspective of those political scientists who would reform American parties so as to make them more "responsible," British parties are familiar prototypes. Prominent among the admired qualities is the cohesion displayed in parliamentary voting by the members of each major British party. That this cohesion is greater than that of American legislative parties has been generally observed at least since the work of A. Lawrence Lowell.[1] And it is common enough, though not universal, to regard British parliamentary solidarity as a virtue particularly because it permits a victorious party, after an election, to enact the program behind which a majority of voters have presumably been rallied.[2] Correspondingly, the relatively low cohesion among Republican and among Democratic congressmen is taken as a defect of American politics.[3]

The purpose of this article, however, is not primarily to discuss value judgments concerning parliamentary cohesion. Rather it is to examine the nature of that cohesion and the ways in which it is maintained. But regardless of the disputed merits of British practice, it is still reasonable to ask after such an examination whether the cohesion of party members in the House of Commons is the product of devices which the United States could adopt, or whether it is the result of underlying factors alien to the American environment. In other words, even if desirable, would parliamentary cohesion of the British type provide a useful parallel for the United States?

Attention is to be focussed on recent developments within the two major parties—that is, within the *parliamentary* parties. For the most part, the mass organizations outside of Parliament are not discussed. Their role, as has been amply demonstrated by recent British scholarship, is not crucial in establishing or enforcing national party policy.[4] Some of the implications for comparative analysis of this limited role of mass memberships are presented elsewhere.[5] Here it is sufficient to say that the cohesion of British parliamentary parties cannot be explained in terms of the pressure of an outside membership.

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[1] *Government of England*, 2 vols. (New York, 1908), Vol. 2, Ch. 35.

[2] A less favorable view of British parliamentary parties has been expressed by J. Roland Pennock, "Responsiveness, Responsibility, and Majority Rule," this Review, Vol. 46, pp. 790–807, at p. 801 (Sept., 1952).

[3] However, it has been contended by Julius Turner that the critics of American parties underestimate the degree to which those parties are now "responsible" in the sense of presenting clear alternatives to the voters. "Responsible Parties: A Dissent from the Floor," this Review, Vol. 45, pp. 143–52 (March, 1951).

[4] This is the theme of the careful and systematic work by R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties* (London, 1955). My own debt to his scholarship is very great.

[5] In the author's "British Mass Parties in Comparison with American Parties," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 71, pp. 97–125 (March, 1956).

I. THE M.P. AND HIS PARLIAMENTARY PARTY

Since cohesion is unlikely to be spontaneous or automatic in a parliamentary party numbering between 200 and 400, leadership is bound to be of great import. The position particularly of *the* leader is strong because he is either prime minister or a potential prime minister. As such, he bestows the ministerial offices without which an ambitious M.P.'s career is a failure, financially and politically. This is an enviable means for rewarding the faithful and punishing the rebel because the M.P. has no other route, like that of congressional seniority, by which he can achieve power. Yet, in spite of the well-understood potency of the leadership, it must be noted that in the final analysis it is the parliamentary party as a whole which possesses authority. Even if the leadership, especially of a cabinet, ordinarily counts on the parliamentary party's consent, nevertheless the consent of that party (or at least of a majority of it) is essential to the continuity of leadership.[6] Consequently, it is fair to regard the M.P.'s relationship to the majority of his parliamentary party as much the same thing as his relationship to the party's leadership.

The individual representative. In submitting generally to the will of the parliamentary party, the M.P. sacrifices much less of political substance than would an American congressman who similarly subjected himself. The British representative is not expected to trim his legislative votes to the wishes of local interests, whether in the form of local party organizations or economic pressure groups. Therefore, he can afford much more readily than his American counterpart to support his party even if it means overriding the particular desires of his constituents. British custom is such that he need hardly fear strictly local reprisals against his subsequent candidacy.[7]

Although the M.P.'s subordination to national leadership is thus politically feasible, he does make an important sacrifice of his own freedom of action. Since this is contrary to the independence often characteristic of M.P.'s until late in the nineteenth century and contrary to the still lively traditions of British liberalism and non-conformism, it is understandable that back-benchers are not always happy about their present status. Few, however, have been so bitter about their lot as Christopher Hollis, an intellectually restive Conservative M.P., who has said flatly: "The member is the obedient servant of the party machine." In Hollis' view, most members, far from making decisions themselves, "must live a life in which it is peculiarly apparent to them that the decisions are taken by other people. The man in the street may think that the ordinary member of Parliament is an important person and has power. The member of Parliament himself cannot possibly think so."[8] At least he cannot think himself important, according to Hollis, as he regularly joins his fellows in trooping in and out of the division lobbies in response to party orders as transmitted by the whips.

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[6] Pressure from M.P.s of the majority party has certainly been known to influence government decisions. A recent instance was provided in 1953 by Conservative back-bench pressure on the Churchill Government to raise the level of pensions provided to retired officers of World War I. For a discussion of the policy-making role of Labor M.P.s, see James M. Burns, "The Parliamentary Labour Party in Great Britain," this REVIEW, Vol. 44, pp. 855–71, at pp. 870–71 (Dec., 1950).

[7] This holds for party re-adoption as well as for the election itself. In a rare instance where a constituency association actually sought to reject its sitting M.P. for at least partly local reasons, it is significant that the national party intervened in such a way as to prevent the result. The case was that of Mrs. E. M. Braddock, Labor M.P., whose difficulties with her Liverpool Exchange constituency party were described in *The Times* (London), April 29, 1955, p. 12.

The M.P. does, it is true, receive psychological compensation from the question period in the House of Commons. Then the back-bencher has the privilege of trying to embarrass ministers (but not often if they are of his own party) by raising troublesome political and administrative questions. Also the M.P. may be flattered by the attention accorded his occasional debating speech by his audience of fellow-members and, to a lessening extent, by the quality newspapers. Both the debates and the question periods afford opportunities for M.P.s to display their own opinions, and they are also used occasionally to air the grievances of constituents.[9] These seem unsubstantial substitutes for the sense of power and individual responsibility which go with the quasi-independent decisions of American congressmen.

Increasingly British M.P.s are complaining about their humble individual positions. Often what is wanted is a more frequent use of the free vote—which only the leadership has the prerogative to allow.[10] A particularly strong argument against the subordination of the individual member to the whips was made in 1954 when the Conservative Government sought and secured parliamentary approval of the boundary changes recommended by the commission charged with drawing election constituency lines. The changes were opposed by Labor M.P.s in their voting as well as in their thinking, but many Conservatives had also made known their objections without intending to defy the government whips by voting their convictions. These individual Conservative convictions, stemming from historical devotion to old constituencies or from dislike of the frequency and method of boundary changes, were occasionally reinforced by political disadvantages which certain changes caused to incumbent M.P.s. Yet all of these reasons for objection were not enough to cause Conservative M.P.s to refrain from supporting their party's government. It was this which was called "the debasement of the position of the Private Member" by one exasperated Labor opponent—who would undoubtedly have been as debased himself if his party's government had been in an analogous situation. Actually this particular Labor M.P. was candid enough to include his own party in his broad charge against the submergence of individual convictions.[11] However, what is to be discussed here is not whether this submergence is to be deplored, but why M.P.s have permitted it to take place.

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[8] Christopher Hollis, *Can Parliament Survive?* (London, 1949), pp. 64, 71.

[9] A particularly clear instance of an M.P. addressing the House on behalf of a local interest group may be found in a speech by Barbara Castle concerning the Lancashire cotton industry, 530 *H. C. Deb.* 1743–52 (July 22, 1954).

[10] Note the explanation by Herbert Morrison, *Government and Parliament* (London, 1954), p. 163. A free vote was allowed on the question of raising the salaries of M.P.s, 528 *H. C. Deb.* 30–158 (May 24, 1954).

Relevance of dissolution. The first and traditional answer of political science is to point to the power of parliamentary dissolution at the disposal of the prime minister. True enough, British constitutional practice does permit the use of this power by a government which wants to establish or strengthen its legislative majority. However, this holds only for the government party. In and of itself, the power of dissolution cannot account for the fact that the opposition is almost as effectively disciplined as are members of the government party.

Indeed, it is doubtful whether the power of dissolution can in any appreciable way account for the cohesion of parliamentary parties. That power, even in the form of threat, is simply not used in order to discipline M.P.s. It was so used in the nineteenth century, when governments lacked the solid majorities which party loyalties provide today, but there is a strong *prima facie* case that dissolution became obsolete as a weapon against M.P.s precisely when they ceased to be independent followers of their leaders. Nowadays dissolution remains the government's weapon, to be sure, but a weapon to be used against the opposition. The fact that the prime minister decides when to call an election is no small party advantage. To maximize its effectiveness, a government may be expected to dissolve Parliament, not when discipline is required because its own ranks are divided, but rather when its supporters can present a united front to the electorate and, if possible, embarrass the opposition should it happen to be disunited at the moment. The dissolution and election of May, 1955 illustrate this neatly.

Nevertheless, the idea that the power of dissolution is a deterrent to revolt by the parliamentary majority remains in the vocabulary of British politics. So experienced a hand as Herbert Morrison mentions it, but adds significantly that the government "must seek to retain the support of a parliamentary majority by persuasion, goodwill, mutual understanding, and, upon occasion, must make concessions, because the consequences to itself and to its electoral support are likely to be damaging if it goes to the country with its ranks divided."[12] In fact, in such a situation it is likely that the party leaders who form the government have more to lose by a dissolution than have many of the back-benchers. If an open division in the parliamentary majority should damage the party's electoral chances, as Morrison suggests, then the most important result would be the loss of enough marginal seats to destroy the party majority which permitted the leadership to hold ministerial positions.

While this result is also serious for individual back-benchers who lose the marginal seats, they often have some chance (though admittedly less than that of the leaders) of obtaining new seats in by-elections. But even without such an opportunity, a defeated back-bencher has lost less by way of salary, power, and prestige than has the former minister (and certainly much less than the former prime minster). Furthermore, it must be emphasized that for the bulk of the

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[11] Harold Lever, 535 *H. C. Deb.* 1867–71 (Dec. 15, 1954).

[12] Morrison, *Government and Parliament*, p. 94.

M.P.s who occupy safe seats, a general election ordinarily involves no risk at all. Sure of renomination and sure of re-election, many non-ministerial M.P.s can face an election with considerable equanimity. It is hard to believe that they could be seriously threatened by a dissolution. Campaigning is probably a bore and a nuisance, but it is a three-weeks' affair and in these days not always very expensive for the candidate personally. His organization is not a personal one as the American congressman's so often is. The party, or in some cases a trade union, picks up the check and does most of the electioneering. The candidate has to make local speeches and appearances, but it must be assumed that an M.P. has a high tolerance for politicking of this sort or he would have chosen some less extroverted occupation in the first place.

In order for a dissolution to be used effectively for disciplining the majority party, the leadership would have to be willing and able to eliminate its recalcitrant M.P.s during the general election. That is, the national leadership would have to persuade constituency parties to adopt candidates who, if elected, would be more loyal and obedient than some present M.P.s. In extreme cases, individuals have been purged in this way, but only incidental to the general election. Since 1918, at any rate, no party government has called an election principally to replace some of its own M.P.s with a more loyal crop. Nor has any recent party leadership threatened, even implicitly, to operate on such a basis. On the contrary, what happens with a general election in the offing is that the party draws its own dissidents (if they are appreciable in number) closer to the fold so that the opposition may not profit by an appearance of disunity. The relationship of the rebellious Bevanites to the Labor party at both the 1951 and 1955 elections is a case in point. Although the Labor leaders disliked the Bevanites no less at election time, they did not choose to hurt their party, and thereby themselves, by attacking the erstwhile rebels during the campaign. When the Labor government called the 1951 election, it was assuredly not for the purpose of disciplining the Bevanites.

Not only does it seem unrealistic for a party leadership to seek to discipline its followers by threatening to call new elections, but it is doubtful that individual M.P.s would adhere to the party line because of any such threat. This is not to say that the prospect of elections is unimportant in influencing parliamentary parties. Ordinary M.P.s, along with their leaders, do have good political reasons for maintaining their solidarity so long as the electorate regards that solidarity as a virtue. But the unity which flows from a respect for the British belief in the value of a cohesive parliamentary party is very different from a unity inspired by a fear of the leadership's power of dissolution.[13]

Isolated revolts. Freedom of action is not much of an alternative to party loyalty in the British system. No substantial rebellion like that of the Bevanites seeks freedom of action as its end. What the Bevanites as a group want is to convert the Labor party to their policies and their leadership. For this purpose, the Bevanites sometimes find it useful to exercise more freedom than is usual within a British party. On the other hand, an individual M.P. may genuinely

[13] See R. H. S. Crossman's explanation for his vote in favor of the German rearmament agreement which he "passionately" opposed. 533 *H. C. Deb.* 477 (Nov. 17, 1954).

prefer to act independently of his party, but he must then be willing to enter a political wilderness. The contemporary British House of Commons has no place either for an independent (completely without formal party affiliation) or for an independent Laborite or an independent Conservative. The parties have a practical monopoly, and their hold is strengthening, not weakening. The inglorious careers of some postwar independents will illustrate the point.

Best known is the case of the four M.P.s ousted from the Labor party during the 1945–50 Parliament. All four had broken party solidarity by repeated stands in opposition to the foreign policy of the Labor government, and at least three of the four were widely believed to follow the Communist line. Undoubtedly it was the latter belief that made it feasible for the party to resort, as it rarely does, to the formal disciplinary weapon of expulsion. The four lost the official Labor designation, and (together with one earlier rebel) they called themselves "Labour Independents" and as such sought to retain their parliamentary seats in the 1950 election. Defeat was the lot of all the Labor Independents, including one, K. Zilliacus, who was personally popular in his constituency and who by 1950 was no longer accused of following the Communist line.[14] Nevertheless, not too much should be inferred from this very successful example of formal party discipline. Laborites as well as the Conservatives, as will be observed later, are often inhibited from conducting purges by doubts concerning the support of local constituency associations. If the relevant constituency's support is doubtful, the national leadership might want to avoid a full-fledged ouster because the price for its success might be too high in terms of local disaffection. But what the case of the Labor Independents does illustrate is the formidable difficulty which the leadership, in favorable circumstances, can raise for the purged member who tries to get re-elected without major party support.

A different kind of example is that of Ivor Thomas. The Labor party did not expel him; he resigned in 1948 because of his disagreement with the leadership. And this disagreement was related to Thomas' position to the right of the official Labor policy. There may also have been some non-ideological background to the resignation. Thomas, who had been active in the prewar Labor party, was elected to Parliament in 1942 and re-elected by the same constituency (Keighley) in 1945. In the 1945 Labor Government, he first became parliamentary secretary at the ministry of civil aviation and then in 1946 was promoted to the post of parliamentary under-secretary of state for the colonies. Since Thomas was a relatively young man, he seemed to have a bright ministerial future until October of 1947 when, during a cabinet reshuffle, he was dropped entirely from the Government.[15] The cause of this turn for the worse in Thomas' career is by no means clear. Nor, for that matter, is there any certainty about the reasons for Thomas' resignation from the Labor party in the following year.

The first indication Thomas gave of a public break with Labor was in a letter to *The Times* in mid-October, 1948. In that letter he proposed that the Labor Government abandon in the approaching parliamentary session all contentious legislation, meaning the nationalization of steel and the limitation of the delaying power of the House of Lords.[16] No one was surprised that the government ignored this suggestion and showed its intention, at the beginning of Parliament, to introduce the legislation to which Thomas objected. Thomas then took the floor of the House to announce his resignation from the Labor party, to attack its leadership for "a wanton and reckless act," and to declare his general objection to the socialist "concentration of power in the hands of the State."[17] In thus cutting himself off from the Labor party, Thomas was, in effect, surrendering a safe seat in the House of Commons. Or at least he was surrendering the seat as of the next general election. Thomas refused to comply with his constituency Labor party's request that he resign the seat immediately. But he was entirely aware that he held the seat only until the current Parliament was dissolved.[18]

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[14] H. G. Nicholas, *The British General Election of 1950* (London, 1951), pp. 251–52. Zilliacus was later re-admitted to the Labor party and elected as an M.P. in 1955.

[15] *The Times* (London), Oct. 8, 1947, p. 4.

His action in subsequently joining the Conservative party was understandable. He had obviously taken up its policy and its ideological position, and he had no political future in any other direction. As it turned out, neither did Thomas have much of a future with the Conservatives. The best that they did for Thomas was to adopt him as a 1950 candidate at Newport, in Wales, where Labor regularly had a substantial majority.[19] The expected defeat in the 1950 election appears to have ended Thomas' political career. In 1952 he changed his surname to Bulmer-Thomas, and under this name wrote a book on the party system.

"Crossing the aisle," as Bulmer-Thomas did, is not a likely way to political survival in the present stabilized, or perhaps rigid, state of British parties. Even in times past it has been a very risky proposition, and it may have required the quality of a Winston Churchill to pull it off successfully. Today, at any rate, no M.P. concerned with his political future would risk a rebellion on the assumption that he could find a suitable place among his party's opponents. Since 1945 one can point to no instance of an M.P. who has shifted from one major party to the other and then been re-elected to the House.

Another but no more promising course of rebellion was pursued by Sir Richard Acland, also a Labor M.P., in 1955. Disturbed by religious and humanitarian scruples over his party's support of the Conservative Government's decision to manufacture hydrogen bombs in Britain, Sir Richard resigned not only from the Labor party but also from the House of Commons. It was his intention to force a by-election in his constituency of Gravesend and to stand as an Independent candidate on the issue of the hydrogen bomb.[20] Whatever chance he had of winning against the Conservative and the official Labor candidates was lessened by the fact that the general election supervened before a by-election was called. Labor voters could then vote for Acland only if they were willing to split the party's strength and so help elect a Conservative majority in the House of Commons. In fact, less than one-quarter of Labor's normal electorate voted for Acland, but this was more than enough of a break in the previous Labor majority to allow the Conservative to capture the seat. More significant for present purposes, however, is that Acland ran a poor third. Thus the result demonstrated the overwhelming attraction which major party candidacies retain for the British electorate when it is faced, as it always is in a general election, with the choice of alternative governments.

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[16] *Ibid.*, Oct. 15, 1948, p. 5.

[17] 457 *H. C. Deb.* 108–13 (Oct. 27, 1948).

[18] *The Times* (London), Oct. 29, 1948, p. 4. Incidentally, the executive council of the Keighley constituency Labor party claimed that it had decided to recommend that Thomas not be re-adopted as a candidate even before his letter to *The Times*.

[19] *Ibid.*, Jan. 4, 1949, p. 4.

[20] *Ibid.*, March 12, 1955. For an excellent sketch of Sir Richard Acland, see "Bart Errant," *New Statesman and Nation*, Vol. 49, pp. 468–69 (April 2, 1955).

So individualistic and futile a proceeding is possible only for an M.P. who, like Sir Richard, places a higher value on the display of moral righteousness than on the future of his party or his own career in that party. This personality type is rarely successful in the politics of any time or place, and its presence in contemporary British politics seems either accidental or residual. The Acland dash for freedom is hardly indicative of a course which would or could weaken the hold of the parliamentary parties on their members.

Tolerated deviations. Instead of being moved by principles to the point of resigning or of forcing one's party to resort to expulsion, an M.P. may occasionally take individual positions and yet remain within the fold. In the process, he probably stamps himself as unlikely material for ministerial posts and otherwise makes his party relationships difficult. But still both parties do tolerate some deviations or eccentricities. They almost have to make some allowance for an odd quirk here and there. Otherwise party unity would be a good deal more brittle than it is in fact. The Labor party goes so far as to formalize its toleration in a standing order which "recognizes the right of individual Members to abstain from voting on matters of deeply held personal conscientious conviction."[21] In practice, abstention has been allowed on issues touching the pacifism or the alcoholic temperance of Labor members.

Without so explicit a provision, the Conservative party nevertheless tolerates an occasional deviation more complacently than does Labor. Perhaps this is because the Conservatives have less reason to fear open rebellions and because they have fewer habitual or congenital non-conformists in their ranks. One of the most interesting cases is that of Lord Hinchingbrooke. Never the most orthodox of Conservative M.P.s and fortified in his individuality by a distinguished ancestry, Hinchingbrooke openly took issue with his party's government in 1952. For rather special reasons, he announced during the Commons debate on the German peace treaties that he would abstain from voting in support of the German rearmament, to which his Conservative Government and party were committed.[22] However, then and subsequently, Hinchingbrooke remained a loyal member of the Conservative parliamentary party. His personal deviation would have been almost unnoticed except for the fact that the executive council of his constituency association was sufficiently aroused by

[21] *53rd Annual Report of the Labour Conference* (1954), p. 202.

[22] 504 *H. C. Deb.* 1905–13 (Aug. 1, 1952).

Hinchingbrooke's defiance of the national party to attempt, unsuccessfully, to initiate a purge.[23]

A more substantial deviation tolerated by the Conservative Government was that of the "Suez group" in 1954. The background for the incident was the widespread unpopularity within the Conservative party of the Government's plan to evacuate Britain's Suez canal base. For many back-benchers the plan represented another detested step in "scuttling the Empire." While the great majority of Conservative M.P.s did finally accept the cabinet's policy, there were about 40 who voiced open objections. Twenty-six of the 40 went so far as to vote against their government when the Suez evacuation agreement was presented to the House of Commons.[24] But except for one M.P. who temporarily resigned from the party, neither the back-benchers concerned nor the party leadership took any overt action. The loss of 26 votes happened to be something which, in the circumstances, the Conservative Government could afford. Although its majority over the opposition was still very narrow in 1954, the government knew that on the Suez issue the 26 Conservative rebels would be voting alone. Labor was thoroughly committed to evacuation and could not reasonably vote against the evacuation agreement. Thus the Suez group of M.P.s could deviate without risk of bringing the government down.

Yet this type of deviation must remain occasional, or even rare, if it is to be tolerated at all. Repeated breaks in party solidarity would give public notice of a disunited party which lacked the capacity to govern. This is the kind of reputation that British parties generally, and their leaders in particular, seek to avoid.

General perspective. What emerges from this review of some exceptional cases is not just that an individual M.P., or a group of M.P.s, may survive an infrequent deviation from a party position, but more significantly that survival is dependent on remaining within the bounds fixed by the party. Rebel M.P.s have not operated successfully either by asserting a full-fledged independence or by joining the opposing party. Remaining within the fold is all-important, and this requires a course defined by the party. It is not enough for an M.P. merely to declare that he is of a given party and then vote as he pleases. Exactly how far an M.P. can deviate from the line of his parliamentary party and yet remain a member depends on his personality, the particular constituency association, the significance of the issue, and the party to which he belongs. But, in general, there is no doubt that an individual's own convictions are ordinarily expected to yield when at variance with the position of the parliamentary party.

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[23] The executive council did adopt a resolution of no-confidence in its M.P., but Hinchingbrooke saved himself by getting a general meeting of the constituency association to overrule the executive council. This was a very considerable achievement, attributable to a unique personality in a largely rural constituency, and it is doubtful whether many other M.P.s could similarly survive after offending both national and local leaders. Hinchingbrooke's constituency troubles were related in *The Times* (London), Oct. 6, 1952, p. 2; Oct. 10, 1952, p. 3; and Oct. 31, 1952, p. 6.

[24] 531 *H. C. Deb.* 495–504 (July 28, 1954), 724–822 (July 29, 1954).

II. THE LIMITATIONS OF DISCIPLINE

The power of a parliamentary party to remove a rebellious member from its ranks is real enough, and in the Labor party the procedure for doing so is most specific.[25] But whether the possession of this power is the crucial element in maintaining cohesion is most doubtful. Obviously, expulsion can be effective only insofar as a party values its solidarity enough to countenance such drastic discipline. Therefore, even if expulsion (or threat of expulsion) were to be regarded as the decisive weapon, the explanation for its effectiveness would lie in the nature of the party loyalty which supported its use rather than in the nature of the weapon. The fact is, however, that such drastic discipline is very limited in its applicability. The Conservatives can hardly be said to expel, or threaten to expel, any of their M.P.s. And the recent experience of the Labor party indicates that withdrawal of the parliamentary whip is reserved for isolated and extreme cases involving no more than about a half-dozen M.P.s at a time, and that actual expulsion from the external organization (which prevents campaigning as an official candidate) is even rarer. The limited scope and efficacy of the formal disciplinary weapon is illustrated by two well-publicized breakdowns in Labor unity, one over German rearmament and the other concerning Aneurin Bevan personally.

German rearmament. This issue requires some explanation of its background in Labor party affairs. Before Labor's defeat in the 1951 election, the party's government had indicated its agreement, quite possibly under American pressure, to the proposal to arm West Germany within the framework of European defense. At that time, however, German rearmament had not yet emerged as a prominent subject of controversy. Only after the Conservatives were in office, in mid-1952, was an actual rearmament agreement (the ill-fated European Defense Community) submitted to Parliament. By then Labor's general doubts, plus Bevanite agitation, were sufficient to cause the party leadership to oppose approval of the treaties providing for German rearmament unless certain "conditions," among them another attempt to negotiate with the Russians over Germany, were first fulfilled.[26] Thus any parliamentary revolt within the Labor party was avoided. Neither Bevanite nor non-Bevanite opponents of German rearmament had anything to revolt about on this occasion. The whole party could follow its leadership in voting against German rearmament—even if the leadership's reasons for opposition were different, and less fundamental, than those given by the left wing.

If other European parliaments had moved as rapidly in approving the European Defense Community as did the British Parliament, with its Conservative majority, the Labor party might have been saved a great deal of agony. But with German rearmament unsettled for so many years, Labor could not very well avoid a showdown. Through 1953 the party leadership was able to cover the rift in its ranks on the basis of a conference resolution that "there should be no German rearmament before further efforts have been made to secure the peaceful reunification of Germany."[27] This resolution did not suffice as a compromise after the Berlin meeting of early 1954, when Western ministers actually met with the Russians in the requisite effort "to secure the peaceful reunification of Germany." The failure of that effort caused the Labor leaders to assume, quite logically, that they were now under an obligation to accept German rearmament within a Western defense organization.

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[25] The Labor party's disciplinary procedure is established in its Standing Orders. The parliamentary party has the power to withdraw the whip. The National Executive Committee (of the external Labor organization) is to be informed of such action and to decide whether expulsion from the party as a whole is appropriate. *53rd Annual Report of the Labour Conference* (1954), p. 202.

[26] 504 *H. C. Deb.* 1699–1840 (July 31, 1952) and 1869–1960 (Aug. 1, 1952).

The problem was to obtain party support for this position. And on this score, Clement Attlee, as party leader, encountered difficulties at the outset. His resolution in behalf of German rearmament was approved by so narrow a margin (less than 10) in the parliamentary Labor party that it was obviously difficult for Attlee to unite his followers for any vote in the House itself.[28] The Executive Committee of the external Labor organization was also closely divided on the issue.[29] Plainly there was not enough wholehearted Labor support for German rearmament to counter both the outright left-wing opposition and the widespread non-ideological misgivings within the party.

The leadership's difficulty was compounded by the French Parliament's rejection of the European Defense Community and the subsequent development, in 1954, of the Paris Agreement as an alternative means of rearming the Germans. This meant that the issue of German rearmament would again be presented to the British Parliament. While approval by the Conservative majority could be assumed, the parliamentary Labor party would nevertheless be expected to take a united position, which on this issue it found so hard to achieve. Much of the disunion to be expected in the parliamentary party was foreshadowed by the debate at the Labor conference in the early Fall of 1954. Attlee's very conciliatory statement indicating support for German rearmament won the conference's approval by the barest of margins—3,270,000 to 3,022,000.[30] This paralleled the slender majority in favor of German rearmament within the parliamentary ranks, and indicated that the rift was substantial in both organizations.

The anticipated showdown came in November, 1954, when the Conservative Government asked the House to approve the policy of the Paris Agreement (of that October). Until nearly the last moment, it was assumed that the Labor leadership would impose its desire for an affirmative vote on the parliamentary party as a whole. There was no doubt that the top leaders themselves were convinced by the case for German rearmament, and that they were supported by a majority of Labor M.P.s who outvoted 71 opponents in a party meeting which "accepted" the Paris Agreement. However, rather than risk many defections in an open parliamentary division, the leadership decided that Labor should not vote at all in the House of Commons. By making abstention on the Paris Agreement the official party line, Labor would at least save itself the embarrassment of having little more than half of its members in the "Aye" column and some of the others defying the leadership by voting "No." Labor's face could not be fully saved, since its general abstention policy was itself a patent confession of an inability to unite on any positive position. But this would not look so bad, it was calculated, as a split between two division lobbies.

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[27] *52nd Annual Report of the Labour Conference* (1953), p. 151.

[28] *The Times* (London), Feb. 24, 1954, p. 8.

[29] *Ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1954, p. 6.

[30] *53rd Annual Report of the Labour Conference* (1954), pp. 92–108.

Consequently Attlee, among others, accepted the anomaly of speaking in favor of the Paris Agreement and yet not voting for it. And Aneurin Bevan, for example, spoke against the Agreement and also abstained. But there were seven Labor M.P.s who refused to find unity in abstention.[31] One of these, John McGovern, was a supporter of German rearmament and did the completely unexpected by joining the Conservatives in voting "Aye." He had, as he is supposed to have said, the strength of Mr. Attlee's convictions. The other six rebels were bitter-end opponents of German rearmament, for pacifist or other reasons, and they insisted on voting "No" instead of abstaining. Clearly all seven had exposed themselves to party discipline because, even if motivated by pacifist convictions, they could not claim that such convictions entitled them, under Labor's Standing Orders, to vote against the party's collective decision to abstain. The most that the party conceded to pacifist scruples was the right to refrain from voting altogether when Labor supported an arms program. In the present circumstance, it was hard to see how the parliamentary party could avoid disciplining the seven rebels if its authority to discipline was ever to have significance. And the understandable reluctance to deal with the special case of McGovern became submerged in the political necessity of treating all rebels alike.

The Labor whip was withdrawn from the seven M.P.s almost immediately, but this comparatively mild action was upheld by a parliamentary party vote of only 131 to 93.[32] The sizable opposition to discipline, plus the fact that 70 or so Labor M.P.s did not vote at all in the party meeting, indicated a high degree of sympathy for the six opponents of German rearmament. This sympathy, or agreement with the six, was so great that many Labor M.P.s obviously wanted no discipline at all. Yet the consequences of withdrawing the whip were really not very serious for the rebels. All had already so established themselves as mavericks that they could hardly have been entertaining any ministerial ambitions. And so long as they were not ousted from the external Labor party organization they could be readopted as official party candidates for Parliament. About all they lost because of the withdrawal of the whip were the privileges of attending parliamentary Labor party meetings and of receiving information on how to vote in parliamentary divisions. Two of the rebels also lost their places, as Labor members, on Select Committees of the House, but these places involved only interesting duties and not power.[33]

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[31] 533 *H. C. Deb.* 695–96 (Nov. 18, 1954).

[32] *The Times* (London), Nov. 24, 1954, p. 8.

What seemed really significant about Labor's handling of the seven rebels was the absence of anything like substantial punishment. This cannot be explained entirely as a matter of soft-hearted goodwill on the part of the leadership. The rebels (or at least six of them) represented so popular a point of view that their punishment almost had to be limited. Not only did the six rebels have considerable support within the parliamentary party; they also had the sympathy of a very large section of the external party. At least three of the six opponents of German rearmament received specific assurances of support from their own constituency associations.[34] And there was every reason to believe that the other three did not lack such support. In the face of this, the Labor leadership, even if it wanted to go farther, could hardly manage a successful purge of the rebellious M.P.s without alienating or splitting the local organizations in such a way as to lose the constituencies altogether at a general election. It was manifestly impractical to try to read out of the party those who rebelled for what at least half (and perhaps more) of the rank-and-file zealots regarded as good and sufficient reasons. Therefore, it was understandable that only three months after its disciplinary action, the parliamentary party restored the whip to all seven M.P.s.[35] In effect, then, the Labor party had done no more than lightly slap the wrists of its rebels.

The case of Aneurin Bevan. The frustration of Labor's leadership was even more evident in the abortive effort to discipline Aneurin Bevan in 1955. As the leader of a fairly well-defined faction which had openly disagreed with official party policy off and on since 1951, Bevan had more than once given his right-wing opponents cause to seek his ouster. Finally, during a parliamentary debate on defense in March, 1955, Bevan exposed himself in a way that seemed to afford an especially propitious opportunity for disciplinary action against him. The particular issue concerned the Conservative Government's motion to approve its policy of British manufacture of hydrogen bombs. The parliamentary Labor party had followed its leaders in agreeing in general to this policy and in submitting an amendment which did little more than object to the way in which the Conservatives were administering the defense organization.[36] But it was hardly surprising that Bevan and most of his followers found fault with the position adopted by a majority of their fellow Labor M.P.s. During the debate, Bevan himself showed that he was dissatisfied with both the government statement and the Labor amendment because they failed to make clear that nuclear weapons were to be confined (as he preferred) to retaliation against the kind of aggression which itself employed such nuclear weapons. Also he repeated the familiar Bevanite demand for a policy that emphasized peaceful negotiations with the Soviet Union.[37]

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[33] Nevertheless, the exclusion of the rebels from essentially non-party posts does illustrate the domination of the parliamentary machinery by the party whips. 536 *H. C. Deb.* 802–54 (Jan. 31, 1955).

[34] *The Times* (London) carried stories about favorable constituency resolutions concerning Victor Yates (Nov. 29, 1954, p. 5), Ernest Ferneyhough (Dec. 13, 1954, p. 4), and George Craddock (Dec. 14, 1954, p. 4).

[35] *Ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1955, p. 8; March 11, 1955, p. 8.

[36] 537 *H. C. Deb.* 2066 (March 2, 1955).

These statements by themselves would not have been enough to expose Bevan to the full wrath of the leadership. He was not alone among Labor M.P.s in raising such objections during the course of the debate. And Bevan did not go so far as the Labor member who was against British manufacture of hydrogen bombs in any circumstances. But Bevan committed a less pardonable act against the party leadership when he openly challenged Clement Attlee during the latter's speech. Bevan addressed Attlee, as though he were questioning a Conservative opponent, to ask—or very nearly demand—that his leader explain whether the official Labor amendment meant support for the use of "thermo-nuclear weapons in circumstances of hostilities, although they were not used against us." Incidentally, Attlee gave no specific answer to the question, and no doubt he thought it odd as well as rude that another Labor M.P. should seek to embarrass him in this way.[38] This was much more flagrant disrespect for party authority than was the behavior of Bevan and 61 other dissidents when they abstained from voting on the Labor amendment.[39] However great the latter offense, it could not effectively be punished anyway. Sixty-two rebels were too many to discipline.

Aneurin Bevan himself seemed to be another matter. His offense against Attlee was singled out for discipline even though it was appreciated that Bevan had spoken the sentiments of his followers and perhaps of some others as well. The apparent objective was to try to separate Bevan from the lesser rebels on the basis that his offense was of a special nature. Within a week of Bevan's "insult" to Attlee, it was known that Labor's shadow cabinet was going to recommend that the parliamentary party withdraw the whip and that this was considered only a prelude to Bevan's eventual ouster from the party at large. The withdrawal of the whip did take place after a week's delay occasioned by Bevan's influenza. However, by this time it was clear that any thoroughgoing discipline of Bevan would be achieved at a very high cost. The parliamentary party voted for withdrawing the whip by the margin of 141 to 122, and defeated a milder substitute resolution of censure by the still narrower vote of 138 to 124. Even these marginal victories might have been impossible if Attlee had not gone so far as to announce that he considered the votes to be questions of confidence in himself as leader.[40]

Attlee now appeared unwilling to push such questions of confidence any further and to be looking for some kind of compromise with Bevan. Indeed,

[37] *Ibid.*, cols. 2116–22.

[38] *Ibid.*, col. 2176. Attlee's discomfiture was indicated by the first sentence of his response: "My right hon. Friend is asking me that question."

[39] The number of abstainers is arrived at by noting Labor M.P.s who *did* vote against the government's motion but who did *not* vote for the official Labor amendment. *Ibid.*, cols. 2189–2200. For a refinement introduced into this method of calculation, see the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, March 10, 1955, p. 5.

[40] *The Times* (London), March 17, 1955, p. 6.

earlier there were rumors that Attlee had been persuaded, against his own inclination, to support the ouster because it was favored by his right-wing lieutenants and by the principal trade unionists. At any rate, when the National Executive of the external Labor party first met to consider what it ought to do about Bevan after the parliamentary party's withdrawal of the whip, Attlee (an *ex officio* member) succeeded in amending the right-wing's expulsion motion so that before any action was taken a special committee would meet with Bevan to seek assurances as to his future conduct. Among other reasons for this conciliatory step, it is significant that Attlee and his supporters "pointed to the effect which his expulsion would have on the constituencies. . . ."[41] This was recognition of the considerable sympathy which had already been aroused in Bevan's behalf by the action initiated against him and of the unpleasant consequence of further alienating large numbers of Labor militants by expelling their champion. That consequence might ordinarily have been accepted, but in the Spring of 1955, with a general election anticipated, there was an urgent political reason to mend party fences. Thus the National Executive, despite its clear anti-Bevanite majority (like that of the parliamentary Labor party), adopted the tactics of conciliation rather than discipline. The great purge of Aneurin Bevan was called off.

All that Bevan had to do was to state to the Executive's special committee that during the intra-party discussion (which he regarded as entirely legitimate) he had not intended to "create difficulties for Mr. Attlee" or cause him "embarrassment in his position as the leader of the party." If, Bevan added, "my actions or speech could lend themselves to the interpretation that such was my motive then I am sincerely sorry and I apologize to Mr. Attlee for any pain I may have caused him. I ask for nothing more than the opportunity to serve our party under his leadership."[42]

This was neither a straightforward confession of wrong-doing nor much of an assurance that Bevan would trim his future conduct to the wishes of the party leadership. Whatever prestige the National Executive could now maintain had to be asserted in its own resolution rather than in anything it obtained from Bevan. Over the opposition of seven Bevanites, or pro-Bevanites, on the Executive, a majority of 16 supported an unusually sharp resolution approving the withdrawal of the whip by the parliamentary party. And the Executive warned that it would take "drastic action against future violations of party discipline."[43] The right-wing might take some comfort from these strong words, but Bevan's supporters had more cause to feel that the triumph was theirs. The Bevanite paper ran its story of the affair under the headline, "The Plot that Failed," and claimed that expulsion was halted because the "protest against this step had been so strong that those who started on this mad manoeuvre have been compelled to beat a retreat."[44]

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[41] *Ibid.*, March 24, 1955, p. 8.

[42] *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, April 7, 1955, p. 2.

[43] *Ibid.* [44] *Tribune*, April 1, 1955, p. 1.

One does not have to accept the view that expulsion was a "mad manoeuvre" in order to agree that the Labor leadership had beat a retreat. Whether the leadership was compelled to do so is a nice question of language. Certainly Attlee found it expedient to persuade his cohorts to stop short of the expulsion which seemed to have been the original intention. He did not persuade all of the leadership that retreat was necessary, but he secured the requisite majority. The leadership's retreat became complete late in April, when the parliamentary party restored the whip to Bevan. The rebel had suffered no more than a month of partial banishment from Labor councils. No doubt the speed with which Bevan was restored to parliamentary Labor status owed a great deal to the scheduling of the general election for May. Labor meant to present the voters with as much appearance of unity as it could muster.

Implications for unity. These two instances, involving German rearmament and Aneurin Bevan himself, do not indicate that formal party discipline is altogether useless. Its effectiveness with respect to relatively isolated rebels was previously observed. But it is apparent that the efficacy of discipline is decidedly limited when a party's leadership, though backed by a majority, is faced with parliamentary dissidents representing a substantial body of opinion. This is another way of saying that when there is a real and continuing factional division, the leadership cannot compel obedience. The Labor party has happened to have such a division, and the right-wing majority has lacked the means of bending the left to its will. The nearest thing to a solution—arrived at for the sake of appearances—has resulted not from the use of disciplinary weapons, but rather from statements of policy that make sufficient verbal concessions to the left without abandoning the substance of the leadership's position.

Perhaps the Labor rifts which party discipline has been incapable of resolving may be taken to mean that Labor no longer has the degree of solidarity supposed to characterize a British party. That interpretation, however, seems unwarranted. For one thing, the cases of German rearmament and of Aneurin Bevan are really exceptions, though significant ones, to the day-by-day parliamentary unity which Labor displays on almost all issues. And, secondly, the important breaks in the party's voting have come only during a period of opposition. It should be stressed that the Bevanites, whose policy differences with the Labor leadership were manifested in April, 1951, never voted against their party majority so long as Labor constituted the government. Of course, it is true that parliamentary disunity even in an opposition party is regarded as outside the regular scheme of things. And, most relevant to Labor's situation, disunity openly displayed is considered damaging enough to the party's cause so that the leadership seeks compromises which the dissidents can accept. Such compromises, it ought to be added, almost have to be sought if Labor is to be counted as an effective political force. Factional voting, by Bevanites no more than by others, can hardly be accepted as normal in the way it so often is by American congressional parties.

III. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The import of this study is that there appear to be no British party devices which provide a sufficient explanation of parliamentary cohesion. In the absence of such an explanation, it is tempting to turn to general features of the national setting for an understanding of why British parties are more cohesive than American. At least, it is possible to offer some suggestions.

First, there is the nature of the British constitutional system. While parliamentary government has itself been continuously shaped by the parties, the basic conception of executive responsibility to Parliament antedated modern parties and provided the constitutional mold in which these parties have operated. As we now know them, British parties developed around the principle of securing a legislative majority in order to gain control of the executive. Parliamentary parties were not always as cohesive as they are today, but their growing sense of unity in the last century has been conditioned by the desirability of such unity for the maintenance in office of an increasingly important executive authority. The British constitutional system adds to the importance of cohesiveness in a parliamentary party (or as we might say of "party responsibility") in a way that the American Constitution, with its separation of powers, does not. To be sure, there is some political advantage to be gained by an American party, be it a majority or a minority, in maintaining a high degree of solidarity among its legislators, but the stimulus is not nearly as great as it is for a British party, which *must* maintain its solidarity if it is to govern at all, or claim to be able to govern.[45] In this circumstance, it is understandable that cohesion has been made a political virtue.

Another consequence of the British constitutional system which bears on the maintenance of party solidarity is the concentration of power and prestige in ministerial offices. Without the important congressional committee positions which, under the American separation of powers, are awarded independently of executive authority, the British M.P. who is interested in political promotion has to concentrate on obtaining one of the ministerial positions at the disposal of the party leadership when it constitutes the government. This provides a strong personal incentive for some members to demonstrate their party loyalty, although it cannot account for the equally strong loyalty of other M.P.s who, because of advanced age or temperament, are unambitious for ministerial offices.

Second, some attention ought to be given to the "nationalization" of British politics, and thus to the fact that M.P.s are not expected to vote in response to the pressure of their local constituents. Although conceding that the parties themselves, once established nationally, have played a role in subordinating local issues and interests, it seems more plausible to stress the importance of Britain's relative smallness and homogeneity in facilitating the centralization, not only of governmental authority, but also of political parties. In Britain, party centralization appears to involve the subordination of a less substantial diversity of interests than would be the case in the United States. Parliamentary representatives, in accepting their party's national positions, do not have to run counter to a strong political localism and regionalism which, despite our growingly pervasive industrialism, remain matters of American tradition and habit. And, of course, the British do not have power centers comparable to American states.

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[45] Compare the view of American politics expounded by D. W. Brogan. He holds that the United States Constitution is designed to make difficult an effective (that is, a unified) party system. *Politics in America* (New York, 1954), pp. 91–94.

The effective freedom of the M.P. from his own constituents may also be facilitated by the fact that British politics have remained largely uninfluenced by the conceptions of direct democracy, whose impact on American parties was so overwhelming in the Jacksonian era and again in the progressive period of the 1900's. Subjecting representatives to the vicissitudes of the direct primary, to take a leading example, has never appealed to the British. Nor have other aspects of American-style direct democracy made much headway against Britain's residual respect for a governing class especially trained for public life. It seems, therefore, that there may be less localism in British parliamentary voting not only for geographic reasons, but also because of a different attitude toward the relationship of the representative to the popular will.

Third, there is the possibility that cohesive parliamentary parties have resulted, in part, from an ideological division which has been assumed, at least until recently, to be much sharper in British politics than in American. If this assumption is warranted, it can be argued that an M.P. would be restrained from joining the parliamentary opposition on any given issue by a loyalty to his party more deep-seated than that felt by an American congressman. For an M.P. to desert his party might seem nearly equivalent to deserting his class. Ordinarily this kind of class-conscious politics is attributed to the rise of the Labor party, and so indirectly to the factors which have produced a large-scale socialist movement in Britain but not in the United States.[46] But it should be noted that British parliamentary parties were already more cohesive than American before Labor became a major political force. The most that might be said is that the solidarity of parliamentary parties has increased since the development of the Labor party.

All three of the above observations, it may be granted, are mainly speculative as to the cause of the relatively high cohesion of British parliamentary parties. Each observation involves general historical and social circumstances about which it is difficult to be definitive. What remains to be pointed out is that insofar as such broad environmental explanations are accepted, there seems little likelihood that American legislative parties can be made to resemble their British counterparts. Unlike devices of party organization, the conditioning factors of constitutional tradition, political history, geography, and socioeconomic background cannot be recommended for another country.

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[46] The significance of this difference is discussed in the article on British mass parties referred to in note 5.

CASTE AND THE ANDHRA COMMUNISTS*

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The primary raw material of Communist power in economically less developed regions of the world is neither the landless peasant with outstretched rice bowl nor the intellectual in search of a cause. Even more basic than these frequently summoned symbols, the *realpolitik* of social tensions determines political events where economic scarcity aggravates the particularisms dividing man from man.

This contention gains strength from a study of Communist fortunes in a representative Asian setting. With little or no industrial economy to ease population density and underemployment, Andhra State on the southeast coast of India bears the familiar marks of Asian poverty. Here has emerged the most successful regional Communist movement in India. Yet the explanation for Andhra Communist strength does not lie in economic factors. The postwar decade in Andhra demonstrates that social factors can relegate even unusually powerful economic factors to a position of secondary importance.

A comparative analysis spanning three elections in Andhra shows that Communist success has depended primarily on the effective manipulation of social tensions. In Andhra these tensions have been twofold: the rivalry between two rising peasant proprietor caste groups, and the struggle of all Andhra, a Telugu-speaking region of 20,507,801 people, to win linguistic identity as a separate province within the Indian Union. Communist candidates have won their margins of victory most often when they have been able to exploit allegiance to caste and to language region. They have made the most of economic despair, signs of decay in the governing Congress party, and the reflected glory of international communism, but these alone do not get to the bottom of the Communist roots in Andhra soil.

The present study seeks to establish the crucial importance of caste manipulation as a source of Andhra Communist strength.[1] This is not to say that Communists monopolize exploitation of caste. Inevitably the institution of caste, so peculiarly integral to all Hindu social organization, pervades the entire political system in predominantly Hindu India. Whether caste in India lends itself more readily to political manipulation than do social factors elsewhere has not yet been explored. But Hindu caste discipline clearly wields a measure of political influence in India that cries for serious study. While the non-Hindu who presumes to assess this influence cannot escape his own limitations as an outsider, he sees at the same time that those in the fold who could speak with greater authority rarely do so by the very fact of their personal position.

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* The field research for this study was conducted during the author's three years in India as Associated Press correspondent, 1951–54. Research was completed as a consultant to the Modern India Project, University of California (Berkeley). Statistical data were compiled with the assistance of the Littauer Statistical Laboratory, Harvard University, where the author was a Nieman Fellow in 1954–55.

[1] A forthcoming full-length study by the author to be published by the Modern India Project, University of California (Berkeley), seeks to analyze the challenge presented by regional particularisms throughout India to the development of Indian nationalism.

As an example of Hindu caste discipline in political motion, the postwar decade in Andhra merits special attention. Caste has played so fundamental a role during this period that this examination becomes in effect a case history in the impact of caste on India's representative institutions.

The accident of three free elections within a decade in Andhra—1946, 1951, and 1955—makes Andhra a uniquely convenient unit of study. The first of these elections came only a year before independence. The British Indian regime conducted a limited franchise ballot to choose provincial legislatures which, in turn, named the constitution-writers of India's first Constituent Assembly. By 1951, Prime Minister Nehru's government had launched nationwide direct elections on a basis of general adult franchise to select new members both of the lower house of the Indian Parliament and of state assemblies. The 1951 balloting set a relatively stable political pattern throughout India, with the notable exceptions of Andhra, Travancore-Cochin, and the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU).

In the case of Andhra, the legislators elected in 1951 were seated alongside deputies speaking Tamil, Malayalam, and Kannada, in the legislature of multilingual Madras State, a sprawling political Babel carved out by British mapmakers with little regard to south India's cultural differences. It was only after Potti Sriramulu, a prominent Gandhian advocate of provincial autonomy, fasted unto death in 1952 that the Nehru government demarcated Andhra as a separate state. When the new unit was inaugurated in October, 1953, the 160 Telugu members of the Madras legislature, including a 41-member Communist bloc, became the new Andhra legislature. A Congress cabinet took office, but factionalism within and Communist harassment from the outside brought its collapse on a no-confidence motion by November, 1954. New elections had to be conducted in February, 1955, the third in less than ten years.

For all Andhra political groups, this decade of near-deadlock was a rigorous exercise. Where else in Asia has a major Communist bid for power faced so intensive a testing process at the polls? Moreover, the checkered course of Andhra Communist strategy during the period under study enhances the significance of this examination. For the primacy of caste and language manipulation in Andhra Communist success has persisted through the gamut of a wartime united front, four bloody guerrilla years, and the present parliamentary phase of Indian communism.

By focusing on caste and language it is possible to discover why the Andhra Communists, while successively increasing their popular vote from 258,974 (on a limited franchise in 1946) to 1,208,656 (1951) to 2,695,562 (1955), were able to win a significant number of seats in the legislature only in 1951. To add to this seeming discrepancy, not only did the popular vote increase—it increased without disturbing the localized concentration of Communist power.

In all three elections Andhra communism demonstrated its greatest strength


1951 ELECTIONS
⊚ CONGRESS SINGLE VICTORY
● COMMUNIST SINGLE VICTORY
ϕ DOUBLE CONSTITUENCY
ORISSA
MADHYA PRADESH
GODAVARI
HYDERABAD
KISTNA
KRISHNA
OR
RAYALASEEMA
PENNER
MYSORE
MADRAS
MADRAS
ANDHRA
INDIA
DISTRICTS
1. SRIKAKULAM
2. VISAKHAPATNAM
3. GODAVARI EAST
4. GODAVARI WEST
5. KRISHNA
6. GUNTUR
7. KURNOOL
8. ANANTPUR
9. CUDDAPUR
10. NELLORE
11. CHITTOOR
12. BELLARY (PARTLY IN MYSORE)

in the fertile rice delta where the Krishna and Godavari rivers empty into the Bay of Bengal. Contrary to the theme that poverty above all breeds communism, arid Rayalaseema in west Andhra has consistently failed to produce a significant Communist response.

I. "KULAK PETTAMDARS"

To find the keys to this puzzling situation it is necessary first to establish the major caste contours of the Andhra political landscape. As the Indian government's recent report on rural credit warned:

> It is necessary to place the operational picture against the social background of rural India. This is more important than almost anything else for a true understanding of the working of rural credit, cooperative, governmental, or other, just as indeed it is also indispensable for the proper appraisal of the effects of any particular measure of policy or

legislation or administration as they shape themselves, or sometimes fail to take shape at all, in the actualities of the Indian village.[2]

In the case of the Andhra Communists, the effective use of caste does not arise full-blown out of a bottomless tactical armory but rather out of the caste homogeneity of the Andhra Communist leadership itself. Since the founding of the Andhra Communist party in 1934, the party leadership has been the property of a single subcaste, the Kamma landlords, who dominate the Krishna-Godavari delta.[3] This fact carries enormous importance in view of the rising influence of the Kammas in Andhra life. The war and postwar years were a boom period for the Kamma farmers,[4] who own an estimated 80 per cent of the fertile delta land.[5] High prices for both food and cash crops made many Indian peasant proprietor castes newly rich, but for the Kammas, presiding over land as productive as any in all India, the boom was especially potent.

Kamma funds have made the Andhra party better able to support itself than any other regional arm of Indian communism. In fair political weather or foul a virile, expensively produced Communist press in Andhra's Telugu language has been kept alive by a Kamma publisher, Katragadda Rajagopal Rao,[6] whose family also operates one of India's largest Virginia tobacco plantations and virtually monopolizes the fertilizer market in Andhra.[7] As "the people who count"[8] in the villages of the delta districts, even relatively modest Kamma landholders have been in a position to put decisive influence on the side of the Communist party.[9]

Aruna Asaf Ali, a member of the Indian Communist Central Committee, has said that "a distinguishing feature of the Andhra party is its social content. The rural intelligentsia [numerically stronger and politically a great deal more mature than in the rest of India] has provided the party with a leadership that knows its mind and is unmistakably competent."[10] Three wealthy Kamma intellectuals have maintained for at least the past 15 years key control of the Andhra Communist party: party secretary Chandrasekhar Rao, former national Indian Communist party secretary Rajeshwar Rao, and M. Basava Punniah, a member of the Indian Communist Central Committee.[11] As a result, an Andhra Communist dissident has coined the epithet *kulak pettamdar* to attack the Andhra leadership, coupling the Russian word for rich peasant with the Telugu word for head of a caste or tribe.[12]

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[2] *All-India Rural Credit Survey*, Vol. 2: *General Report* (Bombay, 1954), p. 54.

[3] G. S. Bhargava discusses this in *A Study of the Communist Movement in Andhra* (Delhi, Siddhartha Publications, 1955), pp. 2, 14, 22–34; see also K. B. Choudary, *A Brief History of the Kammas* (Sangamjagarlamudi, Andhra: published by the author, 1955), pp. 98, 123.

[4] Choudary, *A Brief History of Kammas*, p. 124, notes that "the Second World War and the years that have followed have once again seen rocketing of the prices of paddy, pulses, turmeric, tobacco, and fruits. These have been very prosperous years for agricultural communities like Kammas."

[5] This is the private consensus of members of different Andhra castes. No official figures exist showing caste land ownership in Madras.

[6] Katragadda Rajagopal Rao's role is noted in "The Future of Andhra," *Thought* (New Delhi), Oct. 3, 1953, p. 4.

[7] The holdings of the six Katragadda brothers are described in P. C. Joshi, *Among Kisan Patriots* (Bombay, People's Publishing House, 1946), p. 4. This pamphlet reviews the Vijayawada, Andhra, session of The All-India Kisan Sabha.

[8] Kamma status in the delta is so described in "How Red is Andhra?," *The People* (pro-Congress weekly, New Delhi), March 4, 1952, p. 8.

[9] For an excellent description of the manner in which a dominant caste can mold village behavior, see *All-India Rural Credit Survey*, pp. 56–58.

In sharp contrast to Kamma control of the Communist party, stands the power of the rival landowning Reddi caste in the Congress party.[13] This posture of political competition between the two caste groups is only a modern recurrence of an historic pattern dating back to the fourteenth century.[14] In the past century[15] the rivalry has sharpened to the point where the Kammas have felt themselves an excluded "out" group in social and political life—a sociological fact which has figured prominently in the strategy of both major parties in the elections under study.

Kamma lore nurtures the image of a once-proud warrior clan reduced by Reddi chicanery to its present peasant status. Reddi duplicity, recounted by Kamma historian K. Bhavaiah Choudary, was first apparent in 1323 A.D. at the downfall of Andhra's Kakatiya dynasty. Reciting voluminous records to prove that Kammas dominated the Kakatiya court, Choudary suggests that the Reddis, also influential militarists at the time, struck a deal at Kamma expense with the Moslem conquerors of the Kakatiya regime. The Kammas lost their noble rank and were forced into farming.

In his research Choudary frankly has an axe to grind: he seeks to establish

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[10] In an interview with an editor of the *New Age*, Feb. 13, 1955, p. 7.

[11] These three have remained members of the secretariat of the Andhra Communist Committee in all reshuffles announced in the Communist press. The most recently declared (1954) membership of the Secretariat also included in its eight names four other Kammas: M. Hanumantha Rao, a member of the Indian Communist Central Committee; G. Satyanarayana; K. Gopal Rao, a member of the lower house of the Indian Parliament; and Krishna Rao.

This caste breakdown and the tables in this study showing castes of Congress and Communist candidates and legislators have been compiled through the cooperation of members of major Telugu castes. The compilation has included a cross-check test of the designations made by each cooperating informant by other persons of different castes.

[12] *Kulak pettamdar* recurs throughout C.V.K. Rao, *Rashtra Communist Navakathwapu Bandaram* [Bluff of the Andhra Communist Leadership] (Masulipatnam, Andhra, 1954). Rao is a member of the Devadasi caste. Partially translated from Telugu for the author.

[13] Reddi power in the Congress figures in D. V. Raja Rao, "Election Lessons," *Swatantra,* Feb. 15, 1952, p. 13; Choudary, *A Brief History of the Kammas* (cited in note 3), p. 97; and an earlier article by the author, "How Nehru Did It in Andhra," *New Republic,* March 21, 1955, p. 7.

[14] See Choudary, *A Brief History of the Kammas* (cited in note 3), p. 55, and his earlier three-volume history, *Kammacharitra Sangraham* (Sangamjagarlamudi, Andhra: published by the author, 1939), Vol. 1, p. 20. Partially translated from Telugu for the author.

[15] Bhargava, *A Study of the Communist Movement in Andhra* (cited in note 3), p. 14, traces the present degree of Kamma-Reddi enmity to the turn of the century.

Kamma claims to Kshatriya (warrior) rank, second in the traditional Hindu caste hierarchy, rather than their present Sat-Sudra status.[16] His main outline of Kamma and Reddi history, however, does not differ essentially from the consensus of more disinterested scholars.[17] Both Kammas and Reddis were probably warriors in the service of the early Andhra kings. Later they became farmers, some feudal overlords and others small peasant proprietors who to this day take part in the cultivation of their land. Between them they dominated rural Andhra, leaving Brahmans beyond the pale of economic power in the countryside.

For five centuries the Kammas have centered in the four mid-Andhra delta districts, which Choudary says were once known as "Kamma Rashtra" or "Kamma Land." The 1921 census[18] shows 600,679 Kammas congregated in the delta districts, with another 560,305 scattered in other Andhra districts and in pockets in neighboring Tamil territory.[19] The extent of Kamma dominance in the delta is exemplified in Guntur district, where all other peasant proprietor castes together totalled 149,308, less than half the Kamma figure.

The Reddis[20] gravitated to the five Rayalaseema districts of west Andhra. Here Kammas are in the minority; in Cuddapah, for example, Reddis numbered 211,558 to 20,171 Kammas, and in Kurnool, Reddis were 121,032 to 14,313 Kammas. Today in popular Telugu parlance the region is called "Reddiseema."

This geographical separation of the two powerful castes had a tribal logic; in any one local area, only one or the other caste group with its patriarch could be dominant. When British tax-collectors came onto the scene, they formalized the *status quo*, extending the sway of leading landholders in each caste over vast zamindari estates. Fourteen Kamma zamindars became the biggest estate owners in the delta country.

Despite their wealth, the Kammas and Reddis as a village-centered rural gentry lagged behind the traditionally education-minded Brahmans in gaining the English literacy that was the entry to political leadership in the early years of the independence movement. For example, the 1921 census showed that out of 79,740 literate Kammas, only 2,672 were able to read English, while out of 159,730 literate Telugu Brahmans, as many as 46,498 were literate in English.[21]

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[16] Sat-(Good) Sudra status is accorded to Kammas, Reddis, Velamas, and other Telugu peasant proprietor subcastes to distinguish them from less prosperous Sudra subcastes, according to W. Francis, *Census of India, 1901*, Vol. 15: Madras, Part I (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1903), p. 136.

[17] See Edgar Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*, 14 vols. (Madras: Government Press, 1909), Vol. 3, p. 94; G. MacKenzie, *Manual of Kistna District* (Madras, 1883), p. 53; *Census of India, 1901*, Vol. 15, p. 159; J. H. Hutton, *Caste in India* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 11.

[18] The last in which district caste tables for Madras are available.

[19] *Census of India, 1921*, Vol. 13: Madras, Part II, by G. T. Boag (Madras: Superintendent of Government Press, 1922), Table XIII, p. 119.

[20] Reddis are also referred to by anthropologists as Kapus. However, this terminology is confusing in contemporary Andhra; Kapu is loosely applied to other non-Brahman peasant castes.

[21] *Census of India, 1921*, Vol. 13, Table IX, p. 77.

Choudary explains this in the following way:

> Shorn of their principalities, commanding officer's posts, and choudariships, Kammas had to content themselves with the lot of peasants and husbandmen. Learning only Telugu, they looked after their ryotwari [holdings]. Only about 1900 A.D., Kammas awakened to the fact that without English education they cannot better their position. The few educated Kammas who joined government service had to struggle hard to come up due to lack of patronage and the opposition of Brahman vested interests.[22]

It was inevitable that Kamma-Reddi competition would increase with the educational advancement of the two castes, and that the Brahman politicians who controlled the Andhra Congress party would gradually lose their actual—if not titular—party control to others exercising greater local power in Andhra. This is precisely what happened between 1934 and World War II. Both Kammas and Reddis, pushing forward with the anti-Brahman movement that swept all South India, supported the Andhra branch of the short-lived Justice party.[23] Then Reddi power lodged itself in the Congress behind a Brahman façade at the same time that a clique of young Kamma intellectuals was founding the Andhra Communist party. Choudary notes that Kamma youth were attracted by "the Communist Party, with its slogans of social equality," but he does not seek to explain why the party in Andhra became "predominated by Kammas" rather than Reddis.[24]

The circumstances explaining the polarization of Kamma-Reddi warfare on a Communist-Congress basis deserve further study. The consensus in Andhra points to geographical accident: the Kammas happened to be in the delta. There political activity of every stripe had always been greater than in Rayalaseema. From the beginning of the independence movement Gandhian Congress leaders found their liveliest Andhra response in the delta rice trading towns of Vijayawada and Guntur, centers of the region's intellectual and political ferment. Thus, just as the then Brahman-dominated Congress drew its leadership from the delta, so the challenge to this leadership emerged within the strongest non-Brahman caste group in the delta. In addition, in the delta's legions of landless laborers there was the grist of a mass movement plain to any young Marxist intellectual looking for a cause.

The young Reddi intelligentsia in the Rayalaseema hinterlands was politically quiescent by comparison with the Kammas. The young Reddi who did desire a political career could best seek it in the Congress, where his caste group, gravitating almost by default, had cornered the market on the bulk of the party's non-Brahman patronage. Some young Reddi leaders were a part of the Communist party from its inception, but they have always been outnumbered by Kammas. Only one has held his own in the party hierarchy, Puchalapalli Sundarayya, whose real name is Puchalapalli Sundar Rama Reddi.[25] He is in a position comparable to that of the Kamma Congress veteran, N. G. Ranga, a nationally prominent Congress figure and another notable exception to the rule of caste politics in Andhra. Both of these politically displaced persons enjoy wide personal popularity, but both strike discordant notes within the otherwise relatively homogeneous leadership cliques of their respective parties.

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[22] Choudary, *A Brief History of the Kammas* (cited in note 3), p. 122.

[23] A coalition of aggrieved non-Brahman castes throughout South India.

[24] Choudary, *A Brief History of the Kammas* (cited in note 3), pp. 97–98.

[25] A brilliant orator in Telugu, Sundarayya is the party's most popular mass leader in Andhra.

II. THE ROLE OF LANDLESS LABOR

Against this historical backdrop it is now possible to examine the course of political events surrounding the 1946, 1951, and 1955 elections in Andhra in an effort to explain the consistent concentration of the Communist popular vote in the delta as well as its special potency in 1951.

In 1946, Andhra was the only region in India where the Communists felt strong enough to enter a bloc of candidates across one large contiguous group of constituencies against the candidates of the Congress—recognized champion of independence at a time when India remained under foreign domination. In Bengal, Malabar, and parts of north India, where the Communist party was also an election factor, Communist entries were pinpointed in scattered centers of industrial or farm labor, but in Andhra they were massed solidly over the delta. Of the 62 constituencies in areas now forming Andhra,[26] the Communists contested 29, all virtually side by side. Twenty-four were located in Krishna, Guntur, East and West Godavari districts, the delta belt commonly called the "Circars."[27] This concentration in the delta was no momentary accident of tactics but a reflection of the basic character of Andhra communism. The pattern of 1946 remains the pattern of 1955.

With Communist candidates almost exclusively centered in the delta in 1946 (see Table I), it was not surprising that most Communist votes were recorded there. Even in 1955, however, with only 57.4 per cent of the Communist candi-

TABLE I. LOCATION OF COMMUNIST POWER IN ANDHRA, AS SHOWN IN 1946, 1951, AND 1955 ELECTIONS

Year	Votes Cast in Four Delta Districts:* Per Cent of Total Votes Cast	Communist Votes Cast in Four Delta Districts: Per Cent of Total Communist Vote	Communist Candidates Contesting in Four Delta Districts: Per Cent of Total Communist Candidates
1946	55.1	94.7	89.2
1951	54.3	85.5	72.2
1955	56.2	72.8	57.4

* The four Andhra districts in the Krishna-Godavari delta are Krishna, Guntur, East Godavari, and West Godavari.

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[26] "Delimitation of Madras Constituencies," *Government of India (Provincial Legislative Assemblies) Order, 1936*, cited in Jagat Narain, *Law of Elections in India and Burma* (Calcutta: Eastern Law House, 1937), pp. 250–58.

[27] *Return Showing the Results of Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and Provincial Legislatures, 1945–46* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1946).

dates running in the delta districts, 72.8 per cent of the Communist vote still went to these delta contestants. In 1951, 31 of the 41 successful Communist candidates were in delta constituencies; in 1955, 11 of 15. In all three elections, the delta has provided an average of 55 per cent of Andhra's total vote.

View this concentration in the delta alongside the failure of the Communists in 1955 to win more than 15 seats in a 196-member chamber[28]—at the same time that they were increasing their share of the popular vote from 18.6 to 31.2 per cent. Congress quarters reason hopefully[29] that the increased vote resulted naturally from the greater number of Communist candidates in 1955 (169 out of a total 560) than in 1951 (61 out of 614). Yet this explanation ignores the fact that the Communists retained their high proportion of the vote in their delta heartland. While their ambitious "shotgun" strategy helps explain why the Communists won comparatively few seats in 1955, other factors must be found to explain the consistent concentration of the Communist popular vote as well as its special potency in 1951.

Certainly one feature distinguishing the delta scene from other parts of Andhra is the high population density—especially the high percentage of landless laborers. Density runs from 900 to 1200 persons per square mile in the delta, as compared with 316 in the rest of Andhra. Thirty-seven per cent of the total agricultural population in the delta is landless labor, a concentration second only to Malabar District on the West Indian coast.[30]

Andhra Communist leaders have from the outset attempted to organize the Adi-Andhras, an untouchable subcaste comprising the bulk of the region's landless migrants.[31] Their success has been conceded by Communist leaders outside Andhra who granted that "the organized strength of agricultural workers in Andhra is by far the biggest in any province."[32] The likelihood that the votes of landless laborers have been a bulwark to Communist strength gains further support from an analysis of the concentration of Communist votes alongside the irrigation map of the delta. The same extensively irrigated delta rice country which, as a focus of farming, has dense settlements of landless labor, such as Tenali, Gudivada, Bapatla, and Bandar taluks (subdivisions) in Krishna District, is also the site of consistently high Communist voting.[33] After the 1951 elections, the Congress publicly acknowledged that Communist "canalization" of agricultural labor votes had played an important part in the election.[34] There is no evidence to suggest that this factor was absent in 1955. On the contrary, the Communists themselves claim that "the most oppressed and exploited strata of the people in the rural areas, the agricultural workers and poorest peasants, stood firmly by the party."[35] Independent press comment has accepted this as a fact.[36]

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[28] The legislature was increased from 160 to 196 members before the 1955 elections in a new delimitation of constituencies.

[29] For example, *The Hindu*, March 10, 1955, p. 4. This issue also contains detailed election statistics.

[30] Thomas Shea, "Agrarian Unrest and Reform in South India," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 23, pp. 81–88, at pp. 84–85 (June, 1954). See also *District Census (1951) Handbooks* (Madras: Government Press, 1953), Tables D-III: Krishna, p. 183; West Godavari, p. 168; East Godavari, p. 292; Guntur, p. 206.

[31] For the history of the Andhra Communist party, see P. Sundarayya, *Vishalandralu Prajarajvan* [People's Rule in Vishalandhra] (Vijayawada: Vishalandhra Publishing House, 1946), Ch. 6. Translated from Telugu for the author.

[32] "The Struggle for People's Democracy and Socialism, Some Questions of Strategy and Tactics," *The Communist*, Vol. 2, pp. 21–90, at p. 35 (June–July, 1949). This was formerly the monthly organ of the Communist party of India.

For additional references to Communist organization of agricultural labor in Andhra, see N. Prasada Rao, "Agricultural Laborers Association," *News Bulletin of the All-India Kisan Sabha*, Oct.–Nov., 1952, p. 22, which terms agricultural labor "the rock-like base of the [Communist] movement in Andhra"; and "Second Andhra Agricultural Labor Conference," Aug., 1953, p. 6, setting organized strength in the region then at 94,890.

In 1946, however, the Communists could not have derived much benefit from this source of strength. Franchise limitations excluded all but 13 per cent of the population. In addition to a literacy requirement, only registered landholders owning, in addition to their homes, immovable property valued at the rupee equivalent of $10 or more were permitted to vote.[37] Therefore, landless farm laborers were unable to take part in the election.

In any case, the support of landless labor would not explain the two subsequent elections. To be sure, six of the 31 seats won by the delta Communists in 1951 were reserved for scheduled castes (untouchables). These seats, by their very nature, hang on the support of landless labor. In addition, these six reserved seats were in double-member constituencies in which the Communists also won the six non-reserved seats. In these double constituencies both general and scheduled caste voters can vote twice, each influencing the outcome in both seats; landless labor thus clearly played a role in the six non-reserved seats in these double-member constituencies. In the remaining 19 of the 1951 Communist victories, landless labor votes must also have been an important prop to Communist candidates. But if dependable landless labor support alone explains Andhra communism, why then could the Communists not win as many seats in 1955 as in 1951?

It is the contention of this study that Communist victory margins in 1951 stemmed from a timely confluence of events, favorable to the manipulation of social tensions, which did not recur in 1955. In 1951 the movement to carve a separate Andhra State out of Madras had reached a high emotional pitch. The Communists surcharged the election atmosphere with propaganda keyed to Telugu patriotism, while in 1955, with Andhra State a reality, the Congress could make Indian nationalism the issue. Furthermore, at the same time that they were exploiting Telugu solidarity in 1951, the Communists made the most of a bitterly tense moment in Andhra's caste rivalries—a crisis which the Congress was able to surmount in time for 1955.

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[33] *Imperial Gazeteer of India*, Provincial Series, Madras I (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1908), p. 309. See canal locations in frontispiece maps in *District Census (1951) Handbooks;* note also S. W. Cushing, "The Geography of Godavari," *Bulletin of Geographic Society of Philadelphia*, Vol. 9, pp. 2–3 (Oct., 1911), reprinted.

[34] *The Hindu*, March 3, 1952, p. 1.

[35] Ajoy Ghosh, "The Andhra Elections and the Communist Party," *New Age*, March 4, 1955, p. 1. *New Age* is the weekly organ of the Communist party in India.

[36] For example, see "Andhra Victory," editorial in *Times of India*, March 10, 1955, p. 4.

[37] *Public General Acts and Measures*, Vol. 1. Sixth Schedule, Part II: Madras (London, 1935–36), pp. 256–57. H.M.S.O.

III. THE 1946 ELECTIONS

At the end of the war, with the polarization of Andhra politics on caste-party lines almost complete, the Kamma Congress leader, N. G. Ranga, was on the far fringes of the Andhra Congress power structure. Inside, a personal rivalry raged between two prominent Telugu Brahman politicians: Pattabhi Sitaramayya, official historian of the Indian National Congress, and Tanguturu Prakasam, "Lion of Andhra," a mass idol, who won a legendary reputation in the independence movement when he bared his chest before British police, daring them to shoot. Sitaramayya typified the Brahman façade behind which Reddi power made its appearance. In 1946 he held firmly onto the Andhra Congress machinery, though Prakasam maneuvered many of his own choices into election nominations. N. G. Ranga was, then, part independent operator, part Prakasam satellite.

Frankly building his political career on a Kamma base, Ranga had articulated a "peasant socialist" theory[38] gingered by Western class slogans but boiling down in concrete terms to a defense of peasant proprietorship as opposed to land nationalization. In Andhra he organized a compact political striking force, bent on increasing Kamma influence in the Congress while at the same time fighting the Communists by reciting the story of Stalin and the peasant. In 1946, however, with Congress activity only beginning to regain momentum after the war, there was little time to put a striking force into action before the elections. Relatively few Kammas won Congress nomination and election, even in Kamma strongholds (see Tables II and III).

The Kamma Communist leaders were in a more favorable position. During the war the Andhra Communists fattened handsomely on the official patronage accorded all-India communism for support of the defense effort. The Congress, demanding freedom first, protested when Britain decided that India was at war. Thus, while Congress leaders spent the war in British jails, Communist leaders not only had a clear field to organize but actually had government support to popularize rationing and talk down strikes.[39] In parts of India where the Communist movement had gained a foothold before the war, this favored position presented a rare opportunity for rapid expansion. The Andhra Communists could take full advantage of the situation. Besides the wealth and influence of their Kamma leaders, they had capitalized as much as any regional

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[38] For example, N. G. Ranga, *Outlines of National Revolutionary Path* (Bombay, Hind Kitabs, 1945), pp. 109–10.

[39] The Communist role during the war is summarized in *The Communist Party of India*, Publication No. 2681, Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services, August, 1945, p. 21; note also P. Sundarayya, *op. cit.*, Ch. 6, where it is estimated that Andhra Communist membership rose from 1,000 in 1942 to 8,000 in 1945.

TABLE II. NUMBER OF CANDIDATES BY MAJOR CASTES IN ANDHRA DELTA DISTRICTS, IN 1946, 1951, AND 1955 ELECTIONS

Year	Communist				Congress			
	Kamma	Reddi	Brahman	Other	Kamma	Reddi	Brahman	Other
1946	9	—	1	1	4	3	4	7
1951	22	2	3	15	17	7	2	20
1955	32	4	6	24	28	7	7	25

Note: Constituencies reserved for scheduled castes and tribes have been omitted. In the case of 1946, when certain constituencies were also reserved for urban as distinct from rural voters, and on the basis of labor union membership, religion, and sex, these figures apply only to general rural constituencies.

Communist party from the prewar united front with the Congress Socialist party, walking off with almost the entire Andhra Socialist organization in 1939.[40]

The Andhra Communists waged a vigorous campaign in the 1946 elections, putting their major effort into Kamma strongholds. Because the sole successful Communist contestant won in a labor stronghold,[41] the dominantly rural nature of the Communist effort in 1946 has been overshadowed. Of the 24 delta seats for which the Communists contested, 17 were entirely in rural areas. Of these 17, six were reserved seats for scheduled castes. In each of the 11 remaining "general rural" constituencies, the per cent of the vote polled by the Communists was surprisingly high—ranging from a low of 11.5 to a high of 31.9, with the

TABLE III. NUMBER OF ELECTED LEGISLATORS BY MAJOR CASTES IN ANDHRA DELTA DISTRICTS, IN 1946, 1951, AND 1955 ELECTIONS

Year	Communist				Congress			
	Kamma	Reddi	Brahman	Other	Kamma	Reddi	Brahman	Others
1946	—	—	—	—	4	3	4	7
1951	14	2	3	6	3	3	—	4
1955	1	2	3	3	24	7	7	25

Note: Constituencies reserved for scheduled castes and tribes have been omitted. In the case of 1946, when certain constituencies were also reserved for urban as distinct from rural voters, and on a basis of labor union membership, religion, and sex, these figures apply only to general rural constituencies.

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[40] Jayaprakash Narayan, *Towards Struggle* (Bombay, Padma Publications, 1946), pp. 171, 174.

[41] P. Venkateswarulu in West Godavari-cum Kistna-cum Guntur (Non-union) Factory Labor constituency.

median falling just above 20.[42] When the franchise property restriction in 1946 is kept in mind, this figure assumes its proper importance. These were not to any substantial degree the votes of agricultural labor. Rather they were votes drawn from the general landed caste Hindu population in the countryside and from propertied voters in small rural centers.

Here a caste analysis of candidates highlights the Kamma base of the Communist leadership. Omitting the six constituencies set apart for scheduled castes, a caste breakdown of the 11 Communist caste Hindu entrants shows nine Kammas, while of 18 caste Hindu Congress entrants for rural seats in the four delta districts only four were Kammas (Table II).

IV. THE KAMMAS AND MAO'S "NEW DEMOCRACY"

After the 1946 elections, events in India led quickly to the final withdrawal of British rule and the establishment of the new Nehru government. The Indian Communist party, caught in the wartime united front spirit of world communism, was swearing its love for Jawaharlal Nehru as a leftist force in the Congress when the Cominform made its celebrated switch to a terrorist line in Asia in late 1947. Party secretary P. C. Joshi became the scapegoat, and a new insurrectionist strategy was launched under the leadership of B. T. Ranadive. In different parts of India this strategy took different forms. Acid bombs were hurled in the streets of Calcutta as Ranadive talked of urban proletarian uprisings. But in Andhra a revolutionary form then distinctive in Indian Communist experience was taking shape. It combined in a paradoxical fashion the power of the Kammas in the countryside with the land hunger of the migrant untouchables in the delta and in neighboring Telengana, the Telugu-speaking southeast corner of Hyderabad State.

This was the so-called Telengana movement, organized along standard Communist guerrilla lines with wholesale land redistribution and parallel village governments. Clusters of villages in the delta and nearly all of Warangal and Nalgonda districts in Hyderabad went under Communist control from 1948 through 1950. Andhra and Telengana Communist leaders directed a two-way offensive, north into Telengana and south into the delta, from a 40-village base of operations in Munagala Jungle in northwest Krishna District.[43] Communist squads raided villages by night, police battalions by day. When Indian Army troops conducted their 1948 "police action" against the Nizam of Hyderabad, they stayed on in Warangal and Nalgonda to drive the Communists out. It took them until 1951 to restore normal local government.

In all the tumult in the delta, most Kammas with their valuable paddy lands went unscathed. So long as the middling-rich farmers, who make up the bulk of the caste, stayed above the battle, they were classified in Communist strategy as "neutralized."[44] This was outright deviation, not only from the Ranadive line, which saw all landowners as equally villainous, but also from the Moscow-Zdhanov line decreeing unequivocal guerrilla offensives throughout Asia. B. T. Ranadive, attacking the Andhra Secretariat, publicly charged that in Andhra Communist ranks "it is the rural intellectuals, sons of rich peasants and middle peasants, that preponderate in important positions. The party politically based itself on the vacillating politics of the middle peasants and allowed itself to be influenced even by rich peasant ideology." He contrasted Andhra's "wrong social base" with the working class base of the Tamilnad party and the "poor peasant" base in Kerala.[45]

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[42] Ellore, 19.3; Bhimavaram, 19.4; Narsapur, 21.4; Bandar, 28.4; Bezwada, 31.9, Guntur, 26.9; Narasaropet, 17; Tenali, 16.6; Ongole, 14.4; Rajahmundry, 11.5; and Amalapuram, 18.4.

[43] The designation of Munagala as headquarters during this period is part of a colorful description of the Telengana movement as seen by delta Congress leaders in *Charges against the Madras Ministry (by Certain MLAs)*, published by A. Kaleswara Rao, (Madras, Renaissance Printers Ltd., 1948), p. 28.

The Andhra Communists had made no secret of their "rich peasant" policy within the party. They explicitly declared themselves on this point in a 1948 program report for the Indian Communist Politburo which stressed two major tactical rules of thumb:

> 1. In delta areas the pressure of population would be heavy, and as such slogans should be raised for the distribution of lands belonging to rich ryots among poor peasants and laborers . . .
>
> 2. Propaganda should be carried on to convince the ryots about the just demands of the workers, and we should also effect compromises with such of those ryots who would follow with us. Assurance should be given that we should not touch the lands of rich ryots.[46]

B. T. Ranadive singled out for special attack another statement of this position in a 1948 Andhra Secretariat document discussing tactics toward government rice procurement for rationing:

> In the matter of procurement of paddy, the Secretariat believes that it is possible to neutralize the rich peasants as the government plan goes against the rich peasantry also. Though the rich peasantry as a class is not standing firmly in the fight, it is parting with paddy with dissatisfaction.

This, Ranadive charged, "constitutes the real practical gist of the document, a program of class collaboration in rural areas, of bowing down before the rich peasant."[47]

Ranadive and the Andhra Secretariat waged unabashed open warfare that may have reflected a larger struggle in world communism. For then, in mid-1949, Mao Tse-tung did not yet control the Chinese mainland. Soviet policy still belabored Mao for his "New Democracy" with its expansive welcome to "patriotic" capitalists and rich peasants. The Andhra document specifically justified its "rich peasant" policies by pointing to Mao. But, Ranadive declared, Mao's "horrifying" departures from accepted Stalinist dogma "are such that no Communist party can accept them; they are in contradiction to the world understanding of the Communist parties." Ranadive scolded the Andhra comrades, who "should have thought ten times before making such a formulation."[48]

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[44] An example of this characterization is in *The Communist*, Vol. 2, p. 71 (June–July, 1949).

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[46] The 1948 report appears in part in *Self-Critical Report of the Andhra Communist Committee, January 1948–February 1952*, Part Two, March 1949–March 1950, a party document not intended for publication.

[47] *The Communist*, June–July, 1949, p. 72.

John Kautsky has pieced together intricate details of international Communist publications during the period of the Andhra-Ranadive exchange to show that in their controversy they "reflect in an extreme fashion the uncertainty between the 'left' and 'Maoist' views then prevailing in Moscow." Kautsky, describing the disorganized state of Indian communism, also notes the "peculiar internal cohesion and individual character" which makes the Andhra party a striking exception. "As a result, while other regional CPI organizations were at Ranadive's mercy, the Andhra Committee seems to have remained relatively immune from his interference."[49]

By January, 1950, the Cominform journal had endorsed the "path taken by the Chinese people,"[50] and by the summer of 1950 the Indian Communists were apologizing profusely to Mao.[51] They praised "New Democracy" as a model for India to follow, and replaced B. T. Ranadive with the Kamma Andhra Communist leader Chandra Rajeshwar Rao, whose family rice plantation sprawls over 290 acres of fertile delta land.

V. COMMUNIST CHANGE OF FRONT FOR THE ELECTIONS

National Indian Communist policy under Rajeshwar Rao's leadership proceeded to misread the Cominform editorial by "assuming that it had been asked to pursue the Chinese path by adopting armed struggle."[52] The Telengana struggle was thus stepped up at the very moment when the Nehru government was bearing down on the movement with all its military might. By the Spring of 1951, the superior power of Indian government forces had crushed guerrilla strength in Telengana and the delta. At the same time, a factional split was growing between Rajeshwar Rao and forces led by S. A. Dange, the veteran Bombay Communist labor leader. Dange saw the plainly increasing stability of the Indian political scene and favored participation in the general elections scheduled for the end of the year. To resolve the crisis, Moscow summoned Rajeshwar Rao, his Andhra Kamma colleague Basava Punniah, S. A. Dange, and party stalwart Ajoy K. Ghosh to the Soviet Union to put a Kremlin imprimatur on a peace settlement. The result was the selection of Ajoy Ghosh as party secretary and a new, moderate policy.

As its first peace overture to the government, the Communist party sent out feelers in mid-summer offering to behave as a legal party in exchange for the release of imprisoned *detenus*, many of whom were the strongest Communist election contenders. At first, the Communist press complained that the government of Hyderabad, where the initial overtures were made, "did not even bother to reply."[53] In a Parliament speech August 14, the then Home Minister Chakravarti Rajagopalachari declared that "the party cannot have it both ways, delivering speeches and carrying on other election activities while killing and terrorizing." As late as November 19, the official Congress party organ said that "it would be unprecedented for any government to release men convicted by courts or reasonably detained as enemies of the state.[54] Still, in spite of these declarations, the government had an historic last-minute change of heart,[55] and released most of the Madras Communist prisoners.

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[48] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

[49] John H. Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India* (Cambridge, Mass., Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1954), pp. 124, 128.

[50] Editorial in *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*, Jan. 27, 1950.

[51] "Statement of Editorial Board on Anti-Leninist Criticism of Comrade Mao-Tse-tung," *The Communist*, Vol. 3, pp. 6–35, at pp. 6–7 (July–Aug., 1950).

[52] M. R. Masani, *The Communist Party of India* (New York, 1954), p. 110.

Communist leaders hurried from South Indian jails to their home districts with all the martyr's aura reserved in Indian society for those who suffer privation at the hands of authority. A notification in the *Gazette of India* dated August 11, 1951 showed 202 Communist prisoners in Madras, most of them—although district by district breakdowns are not available—from Andhra. Month by month figures in Home Ministry files show the Madras total of its *detenus* dropping to 86 in December and four by February, 1952. These figures do not include an almost equal number placed on parole at this time and later declared free. Thus, most of the Andhra Communist high command were freed in time to map election strategy for the January balloting. They campaigned feverishly to make up for their late start, well aware that the deep factional crisis then gripping the Congress camp presented a rare opportunity.

VI. 1951 ELECTION SETTING: DECAY IN THE CONGRESS

In the years between the 1946 and 1951 elections, Andhra Congress leaders were locked in a factional war, in which the fortunes of N. G. Ranga went first upward and then to rockbottom. The three-way tussle between Ranga, Pattabhi Sitaramayya, and T. Prakasam was complicated by the multi-lingual nature of Madras politics during that period. To score a point at any given moment, each Andhra faction could reach across not only caste but also regional lines, striking at its rival by aligning with Tamil-speaking factions in the Madras government.

Prakasam, having helped his own lieutenants win Congress seats in the Madras Assembly, could command powerful support in the first skirmish of this period. In the 1946 wrangle for ascendancy in the multi-lingual Madras Legislature Congress party, Prakasam emerged with the prize of the Madras

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[53] "For Settlement in Telengana," editorial in the then national weekly of the Communist Party of India, *Crossroads*, Aug. 3, 1951, p. 1.

[54] "Reds' Threat," *Congress Sandesh*, Nov. 19, 1951, p. 4.

[55] The decision to release the Communist *detenus* is generally attributed to Prime Minister Nehru. A high Indian official with responsibilities in this matter told the author at the time that Nehru felt the Communists would prosper more if permitted to increase their martyrdom behind bars than if out in the open where, given enough rope, they might eventually be their own undoing.

Chief Ministership. But his majority was perilous, for Tamil members of the Assembly had joined in electing him for factional reasons of their own. The ruling Tamil Congress bloc, predominantly non-Brahman, used Prakasam to head off Tamil Brahman Chakravarti Rajagopalachari in his bid for the Chief Ministership. Once successful, they hurried to hunt allies to replace Prakasam. Caste loyalties on both the Andhra and the Tamil sides thus vanished at the linguistic border. The 20 Andhra supporters of Brahman Sitaramayya lined up with the non-Brahman Tamil bloc and half of the Malayalam-speaking members of the legislature to unseat Prakasam.

To save his political position in his home territory, Prakasam joined forces with Ranga. Together they took control of the Andhra Congress machinery from Sitaramayya. Ranga won the Andhra Congress presidency, defeating N. Sanjiva Reddi, nominee of the Sitaramayya group.

In the bitter ensuing warfare, both sides aired charges of corruption which the Communist propaganda network carried into remote rural regions. As a result, the Congress leaders soon lost the prestige of their independence movement days. Prakasam followers charged Sitaramayya members of the new Madras regime with trafficking improperly in commercial permits and transport franchises, blackmarketing, and rampant nepotism. They also contended that the Communists enjoyed an unholy alliance with the active leader of Sitaramayya forces in the Madras government, Revenue Minister Kala Venkata Rao. Prakasam cited chapter and verse to allege that Rao, later a national general secretary of the Congress, helped arrange facilities for Red Flag meetings, looked the other way when Communists staged illegal squatter movements, solicited and received Communist help to defeat Prakasam candidates in local elections, and fed anti-Prakasam propaganda to Communist leaders.[56]

With the Kamma Ranga at the head of the Congress, the opposition to Prakasam and Ranga had strong caste overtones. Reddi forces were a part of the maneuvering that brought Ranga's downfall in April, 1951, when N. Sanjiva Reddi won the Andhra Congress presidency in a close 87–82 decision. Ranga and Prakasam, charging that the Reddi victory hung on "irregularities," walked out of the Congress. Fifty of their sympathizers on the Andhra Congress Committee followed them out of the party. Then came the final blow to Congress unity, a Ranga-Prakasam split. Prakasam announced that his candidates in the general elections would carry the symbol of the new Kisan Mazdoor Praja (Peasants Workers Peoples) party led by Acharya J. B. Kripalani. Ranga formed a Kamma front, the Krishikar Lok (Farmers') party. Therefore, in delta election constituencies where Kamma influence counted, the three-way Congress split meant that at least two Kammas, a Ranga candidate and a nominee of the official Congress, and in many cases other Kammas named by Prakasam, the Socialist party, or independent local groups, all competed for the campaign support of their wealthy caste fellows.

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[56] *Charges against the Madras Ministry* (cited in note 43), pp. 6–7, 30–31.

VII. KAMMA SUPPORT DECISIVE IN 14 COMMUNIST VICTORIES

It was into this inviting situation that the Andhra Communists strode from prison in the fall of 1951. Already on good terms with their Kamma brethren because of their sweet reasonableness during guerrilla days, they warned that the Reddi-dominated Congress was out to get them. Ridiculing Ranga's KLP as a splinter group, they argued that he could not possibly emerge with a majority. The Communists presented themselves as political comers who would soon be able to protect the caste from the citadels of government power.

They had the issues on their side. Not only could they promise five acres and a cow to their traditional supporters, the Adi-Andhra landless laborers; they could also put the Congress on the defensive in the Andhra State issue. Then too, they could inflate popular discontent with food shortages and blackmarketing that grew worse while ruling Congress politicians seemed too busy feuding to take action—or, as the popular image had it, were knee deep in the trough of corruption.

The Kammas could well have been impressed with the apparently rising star of their caste fellows at the helm of the Communist party. Even the Kamma historian Choudary, outspokenly anti-Communist in his writings, recites with obvious pride a long list of Communist Kamma notables, adding that "many other young Communist legislators have turned out to be able debaters and formidable opponents."[57] The Kammas must certainly have considered how desirable it would be to crystallize friendly relations with a revolutionary leadership that had already shown it could be reasonable about whose land was confiscated.

Whatever the understanding[58] between the Communists and Kamma patriarchs, a significant section of the Kammas plainly put their funds, influence, and votes behind the Communist Kamma candidates (see Table IV). This factor appears to have tipped the scales in the delta. While the Kamma vote was divided, the share of Kamma support won by the Communists provided the margin of victory in 14 of the 25 delta general constituencies where Communist deputies were elected.[59] Three of the six Communist members of the lower house of Parliament elected in 1951 from the delta are Kammas.

The victorious Communist in 1951 drew on the numbers of the landless laborers and protest votes of erstwhile Congress supporters, but powerful Kamma backers gave him in a substantial number of cases even more decisive support—identification with village-level authority. In a society hardly out of feudalism, this is an intangible which should not be underestimated.

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[57] Choudary, *A Brief History of the Kammas* (cited in note 3), p. 98.

[58] C. V. K. Rao, *op. cit.* (in note 12), says that Dharma Rao, a brother-in-law of Basava Punniah, has enrolled hundreds of Kammas as actual party members on the promise that the caste group would benefit when the CP came to power. As an example of specific allusions to Communist Kamma support, see also "CPI May Win More Seats in Madras," *The Statesman*, Jan. 8, 1952, p. 1.

[59] The figure of 25 excludes six reserved constituencies in which Communists won in the delta.

TABLE IV. COMMUNIST KAMMA STRONGHOLDS IN ANDHRA* AS SHOWN IN 1951 AND 1955 ELECTIONS

Constituency	1951				1955		
	Per Cent of Total Vote				Per Cent of Total Vote		
	Congress	CP	KLP	Others	Congress	CP	Others
Krishna							
Kanchikacherla	31†	52†	13†	4†	50†	47†	3†
Kankipadu	30†	54†	11†	5†	51†	49†	—
Divi	20†	44†	—	36†	59†	41†	—
Gudivada	14†	48†	—	38	—	42†	58†
Guntur							
Chilakaluripet‡	19†	55†	11†	15	56†	43†	1
Bapatla	32	36†	25†	7	56	40†	4
Mangalgiri	14	51†	23†	12	57	43†	—
Repalle	34†	52†	9†	5	60	40†	—
Ongole	12	40†	20†	28	54	46†	—
Ponnur	15	37†	21†	27	65†	35	—
East Godavari							
Rajahmundry	27	40†	—	33	59	41	—
West Godavari							
Kovvur	23†	30†	—	47†	63†	32†	5
Eluru§	26†	40†	—	34	62†	37†	1
Chintalapudi	32†	46†	—	22†			

* Constituencies shown represent all those in which Kamma Communist candidates were elected in 1951. The outcome in the same constituencies is shown in 1955, though it should be borne in mind that new delimitation of constituencies prior to the 1955 elections makes the 1955 constituencies not exactly congruent with the originals under comparison. These constituencies do not necessarily represent the sites of greatest Kamma Communist success in 1955. The site of one 1951 Communist victory—Chintalapudi (West Godavari)—cannot be compared meaningfully with any 1955 constituency.

† Candidates designated in this manner are members of the Kamma subcaste.

‡ Renamed Paruchur in 1955.

§ Renamed Denduluru in 1955.

Note: Percentages have been rounded to the nearest decimal. Communist-supported Kamma candidates running on other party tickets or as independents in other constituencies are not included in this analysis in view of the author's inability to gain a precise picture of the division of support in the constituencies concerned. A Communist-supported Kamma won election on the KMP ticket in Narasaropet (Guntur) while a CP-supported candidate lost on the KLP ticket in Tenali (Guntur) and another lost as an independent in Nuzvid (Krishna).

To a great extent the 1951 results in the delta can be explained simply by the multiplicity of candidates, which enabled the Communists to capitalize on a divided opposition. But it is necessary to examine the nature of this multiplicity.

The telling strength of the Communists in this opportunity came from the fact that they were uniquely situated to exploit the divisions in the Kamma camp. Their leaders were Kammas on Kamma ground. Kamma influence is spread evenly enough over the delta so that even in those delta constituencies where non-Kamma Communist candidates were successful, the Kamma population must have played an important role. Furthermore, a glance at the votes polled by the winning Communist Kammas places the factor of multiplicity of candidates in proper perspective. The average Communist Kamma winner polled 44.6 per cent of the votes. In only two constituencies, Eluru and Chintalapudi, did the combined vote of non-Communist Kamma condidates exceed that of the Communist Kamma victor. Even in defeat, Communist Kamma candidates in 1951 polled 33.1 per cent of the votes (see Table V), with their margin of defeat a matter of from one to four percentage points in every instance where the successful candidate was also a Kamma. In sharp contrast, other defeated Communist candidates in the delta polled only an average 22 per cent. Thus the multiplicity of candidates alone cannot explain the large number of Communist victories. The fact that the Communists could compete strongly for the support of the caste group most strategically placed in delta politics was the key to the Communist sweep.

TABLE V. DEFEATED 1951 COMMUNIST KAMMA CANDIDATES IN ANDHRA DELTA DISTRICTS

Constituency	Per Cent of Total Vote			
	Congress	CP	KLP	Others
Krishna				
Kaikalur	37†	36†	—	27
Guntur				
Guntur	24†	23†	—	53
Duggirala	42	38†	13†	7
Prathipadu	26	25	22†	27
East Godavari				
Pamarru	49†	46†	—	5†
West Godavari				
Tanuku	29†	25†	—	46†

† Candidates designated in this manner are members of the Kamma subcaste.

Note: Percentages have been rounded to the nearest decimal. Communist-supported Kamma candidates running on other party tickets or as independents in other constituencies are not included in this analysis.

Outside the delta, too, in constituencies where the Kammas were a potent minority but not dominant, the Communists chose to rely on Kamma support. For example, in the Chittoor parliamentary contest, the Communists unsuccessfully supported a Kamma independent against a Reddi Congress candidate. In Nellore, a coastal district adjacent to the delta where the Kammas have only half the numerical strength of the Reddis,[60] the Communists lost out to Congress Reddis in three constituencies where they nominated Kammas.[61] Where they won in Nellore it was with Reddi candidates in two solidly Reddi constituencies,[62] and with a Brahman in another.[63] The two Reddis elected on the Communist ticket in Nellore may owe much of their strength to the prestige of the sole major Communist Reddi leader, Sundarayya, in his home district. Where scattered Reddis were elected in other districts,[64] the result appears to have hinged on local and personal factors. The only other Communists elected outside the delta were four Brahmans and one Velama, a petty landlord subcaste.

It was in Nellore that Kamma-Reddi bitterness in 1951 reached its high point in the defeat of the prominent Andhra Congress leader B. Gopala Reddi, Finance Minister in the Madras government, by a KMP Kamma candidate in Udayagiri constituency. Reddi, who once remarked lightly in the Madras Assembly that his was "a Reddi government for Reddis,"[65] told reporters that Kammas had "wreaked vengeance" on him.[66] His supporters explained that a would-be Kamma candidate in Chingleput had been refused a Congress nomination by Congress leaders there. The Kammas in Udayagiri blamed it on backstage maneuvering by Reddi. This was one of the rare episodes in which Kamma-Reddi enmity had ever burst into the open.

VII. THE RANGA-CONGRESS ALLIANCE IN 1955

After the 1951 elections and the formation of the Andhra State in 1953, open Kamma-Reddi warfare increased with the two rivals now pitted directly against each other. No longer was there the intervening presence of non-Andhra elements in a multi-lingual legislature. Even Jawaharlal Nehru could not bring N. G. Ranga under the wing of Sanjiva Reddi's party leadership.[67] The controversy over the choice of the new state's capital once again polarized Andhra politics on what was now widely conceded to be a regional-caste basis, the Reddi-dominated Congress winning the selection of Kurnool in Rayalaseema over the bitter protests of the Communists and Ranga's KLP as champions of the delta.[68]

Puchalapalli Sundarayya charged that the Congress:

> . . . wanted to rouse regional feelings: it wanted to rouse communal feelings, and that is why it selected Kurnool as the capital . . . . The Congress raises the slogan of Reddi vs. Kamma. It says: if you want to change from Kurnool to any centralized place, then

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[60] *Census of India, 1921*, Vol. 13, Table XIII, p. 119, shows 109,969 Kammas and 208,018 Reddis in Nellore.

[61] Venkatagiri, Gudur, and Rapur.

[62] Kanigiri and Darsi.

[63] Kovur.

[64] Nandikotkur in Kurnool; Kamalapuram and Rajampet in Cuddapah; and Anantapur in Anantapur District were the sites of other Communist Reddi successes.

[65] Quoted by D. V. Raja Rao, *op. cit.* (in note 13), p. 13.

[66] "Congress Reverses in Madras," *Hindustan Standard*, Jan. 14, 1952, p. 8.

[67] "Ranga Keeps Out," *Times of India*, Oct. 2, 1953, p. 1.

[68] For example, see "Andhra Election Scene," *Times of India*, Jan. 10, 1955, p. 6.

> Kamma domination will come and Reddi domination will go. These are facts that cannot be controverted by anybody who knows anything about Andhra.[69]

A newspaper correspondent reported during this episode that:

> In recent years the rivalry between the Reddys of Rayalaseema and rich Kammas of delta districts has grown to alarming proportions. Congressmen have tended to group themselves on communal lines, and the Sanjiva Reddy-Ranga tussle for leadership which finally resulted in Ranga's exit from the Congress is a major instance in this regard. And rightly or wrongly the choice of Kurnool is looked upon by the Kammas as another major triumph for the Reddys.[70]

Ostensibly, the Congress stand for Kurnool in the capital dispute honored a 1937 commitment by Congress leaders from the delta that the underdog Rayalaseema area could have first claim in the location of the capital or High Court of the future Andhra State, with the delta getting the one left over. But in the 1953 wrangle there was more at stake. Both the Communists and the KLP were voicing not only the local pride of the delta communities seeking the capital, but real estate and mercantile interests as well.[71]

By the time the first Andhra Congress ministry had collapsed in November, 1954, a scant year after its installation, Congress leaders in New Delhi had come to realize that firm intervention from outside would be necessary to forge a united front for the new elections in February, 1955. From Jawaharlal Nehru down, there was a determination that the history of the 1951 Kamma defection should not repeat itself. For N. G. Ranga this was an important political moment in which his whole future as a Kamma spokesman lay at stake. Nehru summoned the forces of Ranga, T. Prakasam, Sanjiva Reddi, and assorted other anti-Communist Andhra leaders to map a united election campaign. Working closely with such Kamma Congress powers as Kotta Raghuramaiah, India's delegate to the U.N. Trusteeship Council, Ranga emerged from the negotiations with control over nominations in 38 constituencies as part of a Congress United Front, enough to assure a single Kamma entry by Congress forces in all Kamma strongholds. The regular Congress organization received 136 constituencies and the People's party, a Prakasam rump group comprising Andhra remnants of the defunct KMP, won control of nominations in 20 constituencies.

Although Sanjiva Reddi, leader of what by then was popularly called "The Rayalaseema Junta," sulked in protest against the very principle of alliance with Ranga,[72] the pressure for a joint front against the Communists was too much for him. The Congress high command assigned Bombay Congress strong man S. K. Patil to enforce factional unity. With the Congress camp united, independents shunned battle. There were 78 straight contests between the Congress and the Communists, 65 more with only three contestants, and in only the remaining 53 was there the dispersion of 1951. The Communists, confidently dashing into the fray, had announced their candidate lists in the first week of December to place themselves squarely on the offensive. But this cut two ways: the Congress had time to match caste with caste in selecting candidates. The upshot was that in their delta stronghold the Communists won only 11 seats, two of these in reserved constituencies, as opposed to their 31 delta seats in 1951. A solitary Kamma was elected on the Communist ticket.[73]

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[69] "We Demand Free and Fair Elections," Parliament speech by P. Sundarayya, cited in *For Victory in Andhra*, CPI publication (Delhi, 1955), p. 13.

[70] *Times of India* (Bombay), June 16, 1953, p. 7.

[71] In "The Future of Andhra," *Thought*, Oct. 3, 1953, G. S. Bhargava reports that Kamma property owners in Vijayawada had confidently based land investments on the expectation that the capital would be there, and suffered heavy losses.

[72] "Rift in Andhra Congress," *Times of India*, Jan. 1, 1955, p. 10.

Ironically, in 1955 their caste may in certain cases have been a liability to Kamma Communists. The defection of C.V.K. Rao, a Communist leader of the Devadasi caste, was openly trumpeted in anti-Kamma terms by Rao's election-rump "Communist Unity Centre." Handbills ridiculing Communist leaders as "Red landlords" sufficiently nettled them to elicit a special campaign appearance by Rajeshwar Rao. Announcing that he and his brother had donated the equivalent of $40,000 over the years to Communist coffers, Rajeshwar Rao added: "I do not say that all our property is exhausted; there is still something left. We shall spend it, along with our lives, in the service of the people."[74]

The Communists made every bit as intensive an effort in 1955 as in 1951 to capitalize on the Kamma "social base"[75] in the delta, running Kamma candidates in 29 delta constituencies. Underscoring the Kamma orientation of Communist tactics is the fact that in nine of these 29 constituencies, the Communist candidate was the only Kamma in the field.

With anti-Communist Kamma forces consolidated in the Congress, however, the Communists could not make their Kamma support a decisive factor in 1955. Confronted with a single Kamma opponent (see Table IV), the Communist Kamma candidate was in a defensive position. N. G. Ranga had recaptured the initiative in the contest for Kamma support by showing he could drive a hard bargain for the caste within Congress councils. The 28 Kamma Communist losers still won substantial support in their caste strongholds—an average 38.7 per cent of the votes. But this was a drop from an average 44.6 per cent polled by the 14 Kamma Communist winners in 1951.

Despite this six per cent decline in their Kamma strength, the Communists increased their popular vote in most of the delta just as in the rest of Andhra.[76] This is explained by the even distribution of their 1955 vote over a wide range of constituencies, in contrast to spotty 1951 voting concentrations in constituencies where they then enjoyed strong Kamma support. Unlike 1951, when the Communist Kammas fared better than other Communist candidates, the Communist Kammas in 1955 were on a par with the 34 other defeated Communist candidates in the delta. Defeated non-Kamma Communist candidates in the delta in 1955 averaged 38.3 per cent, while in 1951 non-Kamma Communist losers had polled only 22 per cent, and even defeated Kammas had polled only 33.1 per cent.

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[73] V. Visweswara Rao in Mylavaram constituency, Krishna District.

[74] *New Age*, Dec. 26, 1954, p. 16.

[75] This phrase is attributed to the Communists in "Caste Factor," *Times of India*, Feb. 1, 1955. p. 6.

[76] While the popular vote increased in Krishna, for the Communists their increase did not keep pace with the overall increase; the Communist percentage of the total in the district dropped from 48 per cent in 1951 to 44 in 1955.

The Communist share of Kamma support went a long distance with the Congress Kamma camp divided in 1951, but the Ranga-Congress alliance made Communist inroads on Kamma backing less significant in 1955. Nor did the issues fall on the Communist side in 1955 as they had in 1951. The Kammas responded to the general strength of the Congress cause, coupled with a successful appeal to the caste's economic stake in keeping the Communist party out of power. The Congress election platform stressed agricultural price support. The Communist press bitterly complained that propertied interests had ganged up against them. In a reference to Divi, the home constituency of the Kamma Rajeshwar Rao, the Communist weekly *New Age* declared that "all quarrels of caste or community have been forgotten. They [the landlords] have united to face the common people. They are all in the Congress now."[77]

While Congress leaders such as S. K. Patil deluged all Andhra with effective anti-Communist propaganda, the body blow to the delta Communists came from the fact that the veteran anti-Communist ideologian, N. G. Ranga, now had the prestige to make an effective appeal in the Kamma constituencies, the central arena of the contest. G. S. Bhargava reported from Andhra that credit for delivering the telling punch in the delta "must go to the KLP leader, Mr. N. G. Ranga, who for the first time carried the fight against communism into villages hitherto regarded as impregnable Communist fortresses."[78] A. Kaleswara Rao, a Grand Old Man of the Andhra Congress, wrote the author at the time polling was about to take place: "The Congress United Front formed by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, roping in Sri Ranga . . . is very successful in the Communist-infested districts, e.g. in central Andhra. The Kamma community, which is predominant in this area, have joined the Congress United Front with patriotism."[79]

The reference to patriotism is important, for undoubtedly the fact that a procession of respected national Congress leaders came to Andhra to denounce the Communists in unequivocal terms of nationalism played an important election role, not only in rousing Kamma support, but throughout Andhra. Jawaharlal Nehru attacked the Communists as "professional maligners of the Indian people."[80] Congress president U. N. Dhebar warned Andhra voters that "if one Communist state in India is established, our international strength will be lost."[81] S. K. Patil's posters and pamphlets blasted the Communists as outright traitors, painting gruesome pictures of horror in China and the Soviet Union.[82] The fall of Malenkov on February 8, just as polling was getting underway, was a convenient reminder of past purges. Moreover, the Congress had dulled the ideological edge of the Communist appeal at its national session at Avadi in January by announcing a "socialistic pattern of society" as its goal. What hurt even more, the Communists were denied the support of Russian policy and its propaganda machine. *Pravda* published an historic editorial on the eve of India's Republic Day, January 26, marking the end of seven years of attacks on the Nehru government and confounding the Communists' election strategy. How could the Communists parade the banner of an international big brother who praised "the outstanding statesman, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru,"[83] at the same time they were waging an election campaign against his party?

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[77] *New Age*, Jan. 17, 1955, p. 3.

[78] G. S. Bhargava, "Verdict on Communism," *Ambala Tribune*, March 15, 1955, p. 4.

[79] Analysis prepared for the author, dated Feb. 19, 1955, Vijayawada. Rao has served on the All-India Congress Committee for over 30 years. He was elected a member of the Andhra legislature from the Vijayawada constituency in the 1955 election.

[80] *Times of India*, Jan. 16, 1955, p. 4.

[81] *The Hindu*, Feb. 8, 1955, p. 4.

VIII. WILL THE KAMMAS AND REDDIS WORK TOGETHER?

By successfully making Indian nationalism a live issue in a state election, the Congress, still for all its sins a symbol of independence, was calling forth its trump card. The resultant election-time atmosphere was a complete reversal of 1951, when the Communists had been able to wrap themselves in the banner of the Andhra provincial autonomy movement and make Telugu patriotism a live ballot box issue.

But Andhra's formation as the first frankly linguistic state in India, while relaxing the tension between the Telugus and the central government, only heightened the political struggle among Telugu castes. The newly intimate confrontation of Kammas and Reddis in Andhra typifies one of the less obvious consequences of linguistic provinces in India. By and large, the endogamous group or subcaste in India is bounded on a linguistic basis.[84] Thus, the power relationship of castes to each other in a multi-lingual political unit with its many caste groups differs radically from the reality of their relationship in the smaller linguistic unit. The Kammas and Reddis were part of the welter of castes in the old Madras State, but in Andhra they face each other as titans.

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Nehru's former Law Minister, sees this through the eyes of an outcaste when he warns that the formation of linguistic provinces "means the handing over of Swaraj to a communal majority."[85] Switzerland, Ambedkar said in a Parliament debate, "has no difficulties as a multi-lingual state because linguism there is not loaded with communalism. But in our country linguism is only another name for communalism."[86] "Take Andhra," he wrote, "there are two major communities spread over the linguistic area. They are either the Reddis or the Kammas. They hold all the land, all the offices, all the business. The untouchables live in subordinate dependence on them. Take Maharashtra; the Marathas are a huge majority in every village in Maharashtra. . . . In a linguistic state what would remain for the smaller communities to look to?"[87]

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[82] See "Nehru's Congress Filth," *New Age*, Feb. 6, 1955.

[83] Cited in *Times of India*, Feb. 1, 1955, p. 3. The editorial also stated that the Indian Republic was "a peace-loving state upholding its national independence," which has "set itself to the grim task of gradually eliminating colonialism."

[84] Irawati Karve, in *Kinship Organization in India*, Deccan College Monograph Series (Poona, 1953), discusses the conjunction of caste and language region at length (esp. pp. 1–24); G. S. Ghurye, *Caste and Class in India* (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1950), p. 23, says that "in the beginning of the 19th century, the linguistic boundaries fixed the caste limits." See also pp. 19 and 32; and J. H. Hutton, *Caste in India* (cited in note 17), p. 10.

[85] B. R. Ambedkar, "Linguistic States—Need for Checks and Balances," *Times of India*, April 23, 1953, p. 4.

The broad implications of the conjunction between caste and language region and, more specifically, of the change in the vantage of castes which is likely to result from the formation of new linguistic provinces, deserve searching study. In the case of Andhra, it is already clear that political stability will depend to a great extent on the ability of Reddi and Kamma leaders to work together in a united government.

Developments since the 1955 elections suggest strongly that the future Kamma-Reddi relationship remains to be decided. At first, N. G. Ranga announced that the KLP, which had kept its party identity intact as a member of the election front, would return unconditionally to the Congress.[88] It was generally understood that Ranga had been promised the presidency of the Andhra Congress, with B. Gopala Reddi to be named Chief Minister. Reddi did become Chief Minister, but in the election of the party president, the forces of Deputy Chief Minister N. Sanjiva Reddi successfully fought N. G. Ranga with a Kshatriya candidate, Alluri Satyanarayana Raju. Ranga's defeat was a setback not only to Kamma-Reddi amity but also to the personal prestige of Gopala Reddi, and a signal for Sanjiva Reddi to assail him as a Kamma stooge.

A breakdown of Congress legislators elected in 1955 shows 85 out of the 146 deputies divided between the three major peasant proprietor subcastes, with Reddis the largest group (45), Kammas next (24), and the Telagas a newly-active political force (16) to be reckoned with. The Gopala Reddi cabinet reflected the Kamma and Reddi strength in the party's legislative ranks with two Reddi ministers (Gopala Reddi and Sanjiva Reddi), two Kammas (K. Chandramouli and G. Latchanna),[89] and two Brahmans (Kala Venkata Rao and Nageswara Rao). The Telagas, not yet able to make their weight felt, received no representation in the ministry; here may be the makings of a new "out" group. Further, subcaste divisions within both Kamma and Reddi ranks could harden into a still more complex array of political battle lines.

The Indian Government's announced intention to merge Andhra and Telengana in a "United Andhra" poses the prospect of a basic realignment in the power balance between Telugu castes. If this merger takes effect, the delta Kammas in the new larger unit would confront not only the Reddis of Rayalaseema, but also the politically distinct Telengana Reddis—whose rivals on their home ground have been the Telengana Brahmans. Already the Reddi-Brahman rivals in Telengana and the Kamma-Reddi antagonists in Andhra can be seen each jockeying to establish ties across the border. To complicate matters still more, the Telengana Communist leadership lacks caste homogeneity. Ravi Narayan Reddi and a Brahmin, D. V. Rao, lead rival factions. How will these rivals adjust to their new common relationship to the delta Communist leaders?

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[86] "Ambedkar's Plea for Amendment of Constitution," *Hindustan Times*, Sept. 3, 1953, p. 3.

[87] B. R. Ambedkar, "Linguistic States—Need for Checks and Balances" (cited in note 85).

[88] "KLP to Join the Congress," *The Hindu*, March 1, 1955, p. 4.

[89] Latchanna is a member of the Sree-Sainas, a Srikakulam subcaste group kindred to the delta Kammas and organized politically by Ranga's KLP.

Whether or not the solidarity of their leadership suffers in a United Andhra, certainly the Communists, in their efforts to make a comeback, will exploit caste disaffection wherever they can. In 1955 their campaign manifesto showed a new interest in such politically strategic Andhra artisan castes as the Kammari (blacksmith), Kummari (potter), Vadrangi (carpenter), Rajaka (washermen), Mangali (barber), and Ganda (toddy tappers).[90] As an opposition playing its main role outside the legislature, the party will be in a free-wheeling tactical position, able to step in wherever there is an opening in the Congress flank.[91]

The failure of the Andhra Communists to win strong legislative representation in 1955 is by no means a final political verdict. In doubling their popular vote, not only did their strength remain concentrated in their demonstrated stronghold, but also in two of the delta districts, West Godavari and Guntur, they increased their poll by as much as 16 per cent and 10 per cent respectively.[92] Furthermore, as *The Hindu* has pointed out,[93] "in a large number of constituencies they missed success by very small majorities."[94] These facts spell a clear warning against "underrating the threat to peace and progress that the Andhra Communist Party is still potentially capable of offering."

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[90] A Communist-backed toddy-tappers' agitation in the summer of 1954 is noted in Marshall Windmiller, "The Andhra Election," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 24, pp. 27–28 (April, 1955).

[91] The Congress government in Andhra appears to be assured its tenure until 1960 under Article 172 of the Indian Constitution, providing for five-year duration of state legislative assemblies. Under this provision Andhra need not elect a new legislature when the next general elections are held throughout India, probably in 1957. The formation of a united Andhra, incorporating Telugu districts now in Hyderabad state, could necessitate earlier elections.

[92] West Godavari, 195,024 in 1951 to 265,193 in 1955; Guntur, 289,932 to 392,268.

[93] "Andhra Verdict," *The Hindu*, March 9, 1955, p. 4.

[94] While the Congress margin of victory averaged 13 per cent in Krishna and West Godavari district constituencies, 16 per cent in Guntur, and 21 per cent in East Godavari, these margins do not represent crushing defeat when it is kept in mind that these were straight fights pitting a three-party Congress coalition on one side against the Communists on the other.

Moreover, the per cent of voting in delta constituencies for Communist candidates shows an average decline in Krishna only, from an average 48 per cent of the constituency vote in 1951 to an average 43 in 1955. In Guntur, it increased from 40 to 41; in East Godavari, from 38 to 39; in West Godavari, from 32 to 41.

Outside the delta, where the Communists made virtually no effort in 1951, they emerged in 1955 with an average 22 per cent of the votes in 18 Vizagapatnam constituencies where they contested; 23 per cent in 12 constituencies, Srikakulam; 35 in 13, Anantapur; 26 in 8, Cuddapah; 30 in 11, Kurnool; 37 in 19, Nellore; and 34 in 11, Chittoor.

CANADIAN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE: A CHARACTER STUDY

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Were evidence to be drawn only from very recent American experience, a strong case could be made for the notion that the status of business enterprise owned and operated by the government tends to be rather anomalous in a "free enterprise" country. Whatever may be said about the existence of a "mixed economy" in the United States, the philosophy of the Eisenhower Administration is plainly one which casts doubt on the legitimacy of public enterprise.

With American experience in mind, this article attempts to characterize the status of public enterprise in Canada, a country whose economic system is also based on private enterprise. In the Canadian "free enterprise" garden, how should the public enterprise plant be described—as a creeper vine, a hothouse flower, or a hardy but unspectacular perennial? To what extent has it affected its surroundings and in turn been affected by them? The study proceeds on the assumption that specific examples of public enterprise furnish the best basis for generalization about its character. The examples are confined to the national government in order to keep the study within manageable limits and to facilitate reference to American experience (although no extensive comparison is intended).

I

On the surface, Canadian public enterprise resembles its American counterpart in several ways. In each country government-owned enterprise has been created in answer to the needs of the moment rather than in response to long-range plans or considerations of organizational symmetry. Too, markedly different purposes have been served by public enterprise in both Canada and the United States. A recent compilation indicates that there are in the Canadian government five credit and financial agencies, eight commodity trading and procurement agencies, a dozen producing and business agencies, and 16 management and research agencies.[1] Within each of these categories a similar diversity exists. The first category, for example, contains agencies whose respective functions are to lend to farmers, insure exporters against non-payment by foreign buyers, carry out a variety of activities in the field of housing, make loans to small industry, and perform all the functions of a central bank.

Equally familiar to Americans and Canadians is the virtually automatic use of the corporate form for government-owned enterprise. As in the United States, this organizational form has benefited from the respect in which it is held (for different reasons) by both businessmen and reformers. This phenomenon, in turn, has been perpetuated by the absence of a systematic attempt in either country to nationalize industry, using the corporate form as the vehicle. As a final point of similarity, haphazard employment of the public corporation for a number of purposes, variety in organizational attributes of different corporations, and concern about maintaining democratic control over corporations have combined to produce remedial legislation in each country. The Canadian counterpart of the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 is the Financial Administration Act of 1951.[2] It attempts to classify "Crown corporations" into three categories on the basis of general purpose and degree of financial independence. "Departmental" corporations, at present 10 in number,[3] are described by the statute as "responsible for administrative, supervisory or regulatory services of a governmental nature." In terms of financial treatment, the Act lumps them with departments, and the only apparent reason for retaining the corporate form is to simplify processes of litigation.[4] The financial treatment accorded "agency" and "proprietary" corporations—the other groupings established by the statute—is similar to that ordinarily associated with corporations. By the terms of the Act, agency corporations are given somewhat less fiscal freedom than proprietary corporations,[5] but one observer has noted that "there is apparently no single factor determining into which category a corporation will be placed."[6] In differentiating the two groups according to purpose, the Act describes agency corporations (now 10 in number)[7] as engaged in trading, service, procurement, construction, or disposal activities, and proprietary corporations (now 14 in number)[8] as engaged in lending, financial, commercial, or industrial operations. Unlike agency corporations, proprietary corporations are "ordinarily required" to conduct their operations without appropriations, but in practice this description does not fit all of them.

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[1] J. E. Hodgetts, "The Public Corporation in Canada," in *The Public Corporation*, ed. W. Friedmann (Toronto, 1954), pp. 56–58. Two of the second group of agencies are now being liquidated.

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[2] *Statutes of Canada*, 15–16 Geo. VI, c. 12 (2nd sess., 1951). Part VIII applies to corporations. It should be noted that the operation of this part of the Act is limited by (1) the supremacy of other statutes in case of conflict; and (2) the exclusion of five corporations. Two of the excluded agencies are joint Dominion-provincial boards, and the other three (the Canadian Wheat Board, the Bank of Canada, and its subsidiary, the Industrial Development Bank) are excluded for reasons which pertain to their respective attributes.

[3] Agricultural Prices Support Board, Atomic Energy Control Board, Canadian Maritime Commission, Director of Soldier Settlement, The Director, the Veterans' Land Act, Dominion Coal Board, Fisheries Prices Support Board, National Gallery of Canada, National Research Council, and Unemployment Insurance Commission.

[4] H. R. Balls, "The Financial Control and Accountability of Canadian Crown Corporations," *Public Administration*, Vol. 31, pp. 127–43, at p. 130 (Summer, 1953).

[5] Proprietary corporations escape from the following provisions: "Each agency corporation shall annually submit to the appropriate Minister an operating budget . . . for the approval of the appropriate Minister and the Minister of Finance." (Section 80 [1].) "The Governor in Council may make regulations with respect to the conditions upon which an agency corporation may undertake contractual commitments." (Section 83.) Proprietary as well as agency corporations are required to submit capital budgets for approval.

[6] Frank A. Milligan, "Financing the Canadian Crown Corporations: General Financial Provisions," Seminar Paper No. 67, Seminar on Organization and Administration of Public Enterprises in the Industrial Field, Rangoon, Burma, March, 1954 (mimeo), p. 5.

[7] Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Canadian Arsenals Limited, Canadian Commercial Corporation, Canadian Patents & Development Limited, Crown Assets Disposal Corporation, Defence Construction (1951) Limited, Federal District Commission, National Battlefields Commission, National Harbors Board, and Park Steamship Company Limited.

In all likelihood, the most obvious difference between public enterprise at the national level in each country is the far greater scope of Canadian operations in the fields of transportation, communication, and (to some extent) production. Public corporations operate one of Canada's two large railroad systems (with such subsidiary services as express, telegraph, and hotels), and the only transcontinental systems in civil aviation, radio, and television (the last-named not fully completed). They conduct commercial operations at seven important harbors, mine and refine uranium, produce atomic energy and synthetic rubber, operate shipping lines, and furnish transportation and electric power facilities in areas of northern Canada.

The significant fact about the substantial scope of Canadian public enterprise in certain important economic areas, however, is that it does not justify automatic inferences about a pro-government ownership sentiment any more than Canada's reputation for financial conservatism justifies automatic inferences about its choice of private enterprise for each and every task. This will be more apparent after a review of the factors which delimit public enterprise territory in Canada.

II

The operational area for government enterprise is bounded at its extremes by two familiar Canadian landmarks: (1) the tradition that the national government should act aggressively to establish and maintain national economic unity; and (2) the tradition of an economic system anchored on private enterprise. The first factor argues for the creation of sufficient government enterprise to assure accomplishment of the national goals; the second signifies the absence of an ideological drive to place industry in the government's hands.

The vital part played by the state in developing Canada has been noted often by the country's economists. "The role of the state in the economic life of Canada," Professor Alexander Brady has remarked, "is really the modern history of Canada. . . ."[9] Confederation itself, another economist has argued, "can be interpreted as a political adaptation to the unfavorable impact of the first industrial revolution in Canada."[10] At the very least, the Confederation document—the British North American Act—obligated the national government to undertake a commercial venture in order to bind the Maritime Provinces to Quebec and Ontario. Soon after satisfying this obligation by building the Intercolonial Railway, the government heavily subsidized the Canadian Pacific in order to reinforce British Columbia's links to the nation and to provide the first transcontinental railroad. The government also built canals, provided protective tariffs and bonuses for secondary industry, and opened the western lands to settlement. These actions performed the vital function of supplementing the inadequate efforts of private capital. Generally speaking, they were popular, as Sir John A. MacDonald's "National Policy" in particular demonstrated.[11]

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[8] Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Canadian Farm Loan Board, Canadian National Railways, Canadian National (West Indies) Steamships Limited, Canadian Overseas Telecommunication Corporation, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Eldorado Aviation Limited, Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited, Export Credits Insurance Corporation, Northern Transportation Company Limited, Northwest Territories Power Commission, Polymer Corporation Limited, St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, and Trans-Canada Air Lines.

[9] Alexander Brady, "The State and Economic Life," in *Canada*, ed. George W. Brown (Berkeley, 1950), p. 353.

[10] Maurice Lamontagne, "The Role of Government," in *Canada's Tomorrow*, ed. G. P. Gilmour (Toronto, 1954), p. 122.

The stimuli which made the state take an active role—"the pioneer nature of the country, the physical structure of the half-continent, the imperial sweep of settlement after 1867, the influence of the interacting ideas and instruments of Britain and the United States, and the quick response of the whole society to the advance of western industrialism"[12]—retain much of their force today. Partly this is so because it has been characteristic of Western society, in whose dynamic nature Canada shares, to advance constantly its concepts of minimum requirements. Thus, an old field of concern for the state—transportation and communication—has continued to challenge the government as new inventions have come along. In the case of transcontinental aviation and radio broadcasting, for example, the government chose to create public corporations in the 1930's to operate these services rather than to allow chaotic private development. As examples of relatively recent actions designed to bind the nation together, the reasoning involved is worth considering briefly.

The swift advance in the commercial possibilities of air travel—as demonstrated by private air lines in the United States—had caught Canada by surprise. Private enterprise, in the opinion of the Liberal Government, was not up to the task of providing the nation with efficient transcontinental air service. Lamenting the fact that a "score or more" of private companies had ended on the financial junkheap, C. D. Howe, Minister of Transport, told the House of Commons in 1937: "Our task in Canada is to set up this service without all the lost motion that has been expended during the past ten years."[13] The creation of Trans-Canada Air Lines, a corporate subsidiary of Canadian National Railways, followed. At a later date, in reviewing the airline's remarkable progress, Howe tied T.C.A. into the tradition of national development in the following words:

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[11] The term was popularized by MacDonald and the Conservatives in the campaign of 1878. Its meaning is generally restricted to the institution of the protective tariff, but cogent arguments have been made for subsuming the entire group of policies named above under the title. See V. C. Fowke, "The National Policy—Old and New," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 18, pp. 271–86 (Aug., 1952), and Brady, "The State and Economic Life," in *Canada*, pp. 358–59.

[12] Brady, "The State and Economic Life," in *Canada*, p. 353.

[13] *Debates*, House of Commons, Canada (hereafter referred to as *Debates*), 1937, p. 2215.

> Facilities for transportation and communication have been among our most powerful tools in the fashioning of Canadian unity . . .
>
> T.C.A. serves in the same high tradition. . . . Canadian distances have already lost much of their old significance . . . and a new sense of nationhood is being fostered by Canada's new accessibility to its citizens. In particular, Canadian industry and business have received a major stimulus from air transport . . . [14]

The creation of the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission (predecessor of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) in 1932 demonstrated that government ownership for the sake of national development was not a monopoly of the Liberal party. Radio broadcasting had to be under government auspices for three reasons, Conservative Prime Minister R. B. Bennett told the House:

> First of all, this country must be assured of complete Canadian control of broadcasting from Canadian sources, free from foreign interference or influence . . . so that national consciousness may be fostered and sustained and national unity still further strengthened . . .
>
> Secondly, no other scheme . . . can ensure . . . equal enjoyment of the benefits and pleasures of radio broadcasting . . .
>
> [Thirdly] . . . the air itself . . . is a natural resource over which we have complete jurisdiction . . . I believe that there is no government in Canada that does not regret today that it has parted with some of these natural resources for considerations wholly inadequate and on terms that do not reflect the principle under which the crown holds the natural resources in trust for all the people.[15]

The years since the onset of World War II have witnessed a merger of the national development theme with that of national defense. Each reinforces the strength of the other. Does it aid defense or development more when, for example, public corporations mine and refine uranium or build transportation and electric power systems in remote, primitive areas of the country? The pace of events still outruns the capabilities of private interests in conquering Canadian geography alone, even if business wished to devote its efforts to relatively unprofitable projects. In view of world events and Canada's own ambitions, it is evident that continued government action of this sort will be needed in the foreseeable future.

The second familiar Canadian landmark that affects the scope of public enterprise is the prime role of private enterprise in the economy. The logic which gave an active economic role to the state has never been extended (except in platforms of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, the democratic socialist party) to the nationalization of industry. No huge existing industries have been taken over by the government, unless one includes the acquisition of the bankrupt railroads during World War I.

In the instance of the railroads, not only was the prosperous Canadian Pacific left intact, but the reasoning by which the other private railroads were acquired demonstrates the limited role of sentiment favoring public ownership. The onset of war had abruptly shut off the flow of immigration and of foreign

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[14] *Debates*, 1945, p. 1358. A member of the Opposition responded with further words of praise "for what they [T.C.A.] have done in helping to develop the country" (p. 1359).

[15] *Debates*, 1932, pp. 3035–36.

capital, a situation which immediately threatened the solvency of several railroads that had just reached a period in their development when earnings might offset the heavy initial expenditure of capital and begin to repay extensive government loans made in the developmental period. The *Debates* of the House of Commons reflect the shock of the members at the grim turn of events —a shock made all the greater because of the rosy vision of Canada's future entertained especially by members from the Prairie Provinces. Although much time and energy were spent in recriminations and attempts to fix the blame for the "needless duplication" and "costly overbuilding" of railroads, the problem of what to do remained. Public ownership was arrived at only after a painful canvass of various alternatives. To let the railroads go into receivership was not considered a viable alternative because foreign investors had relied on the guarantees given by the national and provincial governments in connection with bonds issued by the railroads.[16] Default on the guarantees, it was felt, would affect Canada's credit adversely at the very time it was fighting a great war. Further loans to the railroads were out of the question because it was suspected that public opinion would not tolerate them, a feeling summed up by the Conservative Minister of Finance when he declared: "If the public does the financing, the public should enjoy the ultimate reward.[17] Government leaders were certain that public opinion would not allow the bankrupt roads to fall into the hands of the gigantic and prosperous Canadian Pacific.[18] Finally, once a segment of a transcontinental road was acquired from a bankrupt company, it was financially necessary to take over the rest of the line.[19] Thus, the acquisition of the Canadian Northern was followed by that of the Grand Trunk and the Grand Trunk Pacific.

In emphasizing that the Canadian government more or less "backed into" ownership of the railroads, it is not intended to imply that public ownership sentiment was non-existent. As a matter of fact, the *Debates* contain considerable evidence that the House was well aware of popular sentiment, especially in Ontario and the West, favoring government ownership.[20] Nevertheless, it is apparent that this sentiment did not govern the situation. The Borden Government drew a sharp line between taking over bankrupt railroads and wholesale nationalization, rejecting the latter as highly detrimental "to the credit of the Dominion and to our prospects for future financing."[21]

Just as pragmatic considerations outweighed public ownership sentiment in the acquisition of the bankrupt railroads, so they have prevailed in subsequent ventures in public enterprise. In fact, freed of the elements of surprise and reluctance manifest in the railroad situation, the government has appeared to weigh practical aspects even more deliberately. One of the best illustrations is found in a debate on the government's proposals for liberalization of credit to small businessmen, farmers, and fishermen in 1944. The flexibility of the Liberal Government's approach was demonstrated by the fact that an Industrial Development Bank was proposed to handle loans to small businessmen, while the commercial banks were to be agents in making government-backed loans to farmers and fishermen. Highly practical reasons were offered for employing public enterprise in one instance and rejecting its use in the other.[22] In the course of debate government spokesmen were called upon to defend their stand against nationalization of all commercial banks, which had been demanded by the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. The Minister of Finance took the position that:

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[16] *Debates*, 1917, p. 4218.

[17] *Debates*, 1917, p. 4015.

[18] *Debates*, 1919, p. 1741.

[19] *Debates*, 1919 (2nd sess.), p. 1054.

[20] *Debates*, 1917, pp. 4275 and 4384, and 1919 (2nd sess.), p. 1057.

[21] *Debates*, 1917, p. 4015. It is true that the M.P.s' awareness of public ownership sentiment produced an almost ludicrous jockeying to gain credit for public ownership measures while denying a doctrinaire bias toward the principle. (See pp. 1811 and 2115.) Furthermore, several prominent Conservatives seem to have expected public ownership to play an increasingly important role as the industrialization of Canada proceeded.

> The question of nationalization of an industry or a specific firm should not be one of ideology. We should neither shrink from nationalization because of an economic philosophy based on fear, nor embrace it rashly. . . . We should use it only where it alone can serve the public interest or can serve it better than any alternative form of organization. Commercial banking, I am convinced, is not one of those cases. . . . [23]

In his rebuttal, M. J. Coldwell, the C.C.F. leader, recited a number of alleged inadequacies in the banking system and emphasized that "It is on these grounds then, that we call for the national ownership and control of the financial system, and particularly the banks; not, as the minister suggested, on some doctrinaire theory that their socialization will destroy the present system."[24] This denial of a doctrinaire approach, it may be noted, came from a source usually identified as one of the most doctrinaire on the subject of public enterprise.

A highly pragmatic attitude, then, has consistently demonstrated its usefulness in any situation where the traditions of national economic development and private enterprise may come into conflict. This attitude has probably been able to emerge more easily because business and government are constrained by the circumstances toward moderation. Business cannot easily boast of an exclusive role in building the economy, as it tends to in the United States, for it is faced not merely with a history of government enterprise dating back to Confederation, but with an even more vital present. Furthermore, under the brand of Keynesianism practiced by the Canadian government, it has a close working arrangement with the government in the promotion of prosperity and industrial development.[25] Probably it is also restrained by a consciousness of its own limited strength, its vulnerability to a charge that subsidiaries of American corporations are prominent in its midst, and a fear that a reactionary stand might strengthen the hand of the C.C.F. and bring on nationalization. The government, for its part, has not exhibited—under either the Conservatives or the Liberals—any inclination to push public enterprise for its own sake; in this it has but mirrored its recognition and approval of private enterprise as the foundation of the economy. Although it has not shrunk from taking action necessary to attain the goal of economic unity, even if this has meant launching a commercial venture, it has done so only in response to demonstrated need.

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[22] J. L. Ilsley, the Minister of Finance, argued as follows: "The house will appreciate, however, that unlike the industrial development bank, which will operate with a relatively few offices and a comparatively small but highly skilled staff, a similar agency to provide intermediate credit for agriculture could do its job effectively only with literally thousands of branches or offices throughout rural areas readily accessible to farmers. Some of the United States farm credit organizations were considered as possible models, but . . . the same objective could be attained more speedily and effectively and at a fraction of the cost by a comparatively simple extension of existing lending facilities. Moreover, a new set of institutions would have taken years to build up and to equip with competent and experienced staff." *Debates*, 1944, p. 2558.

[23] *Debates*, 1944, p. 2547.

[24] *Debates*, 1944, p. 2718.

This section has attempted to sketch a rough profile of Canadian public enterprise. The portrait takes fuller shape through consideration of some of the conditions under which public enterprise operates.

III

The existence of public enterprise in a predominantly private enterprise economy inevitably poses certain problems of adjustment. Are units of public enterprise to be operated as a monopoly or in competition with business? Broadly speaking, shall public enterprise furnish an operating standard for private enterprise? Should the operating conditions of public enterprise be made as nearly like those of business as possible? An examination of the Canadian answers to these questions should help to evaluate the extent to which that country's public enterprise has affected, and in turn been affected by, a "free enterprise" setting.

It is consistent with the empirical nature of Canadian economic development that monopoly and competition exist side by side on the public enterprise scene without causing any apparent uneasiness. Public corporations have a monopoly in the production of synthetic rubber, atomic energy, and certain lines of munitions. Public enterprise is in direct competition with business in railroads, telegraph, and express services. It co-exists with private enterprise but does not enter into direct competition with it in such fields as aviation, radio, and credit. The line of reasoning which backs up the existence of each of these arrangements is worth examining briefly.

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[25] See the "White Paper" issued by C. D. Howe, the Minister of Reconstruction and Development in 1945 (*Employment and Income, with Special Reference to the Initial Period of Reconstruction*, Ottawa, 1945); an article by Howe, "Industrial Development in Canada," *Public Affairs*, Vol. 11, pp. 207–13 (Dec., 1948), in which the author lists "four principles underlying our industrial development program"; and O. J. Firestone, "Investment and Economic Development in Canada," *The Statist* (Canadian Supplement), May 31, 1952, pp. 18–20. For an indication of the extent to which business regards itself as a partner of government, see John T. Bryden, "Government and Business," in *Canada: Nation on the March* (Toronto, 1953), pp. 67–74, and Howard Gamble, "The Road to Tomorrow," *Canadian Business*, Vol. 27, pp. 22–24, 50 ff. (Jan., 1954). Gamble asserts: "There is in Canada probably a greater genuine liaison and rapport between government and business than in any other country" (p. 50).

The justification for monopoly has ranged from the supposed inability of private enterprise to cope with a vital economic function to a desire to eliminate waste and duplication. The crown companies created during World War II under the auspices of the Department of Munitions and Supply[26] are the foremost examples of the first line of reasoning. The criterion used by the Minister was as follows:

> If private business was able to carry out the war objective, private business was given that opportunity. The government has created Crown companies only to undertake work that private industry was not willing to undertake.[27]

For those few crown companies not liquidated by the coming of peace, further justification had to be sought. By way of example, it was found for Polymer Corporation Limited, the country's sole manufacturer of synthetic rubber, in the argument that business was benefited at a time of uncertain supply of foreign rubber, that no private rubber industry existed in Canada, and that "We would be glad to sell the Polymer Corporation to private industry, if private industry would buy it."[28] As with Canadian Arsenals Limited, the needs of national defense also played an important part in perpetuating the government monopoly.[29]

Elimination of waste and duplication as an argument for monopoly is best illustrated by the field of civil aviation, where the government's airline is the only transcontinental operator. The lesson derived from railroad over-building and resultant bankruptcy at the time of the First World War was not lost on the Liberal Government in creating Trans-Canada Air Lines in 1937. It was set up, the Minister of Transport said later, "to avoid the duplication of services that were the outgrowth of competitive building for profit in the field of surface transportation."[30] Its exclusive franchise recognized "the principle that our small population would not warrant competition on this route."[31]

Competition between public and private enterprise—as exemplified by the railroad industry—finds its justification in the incentives it furnishes.[32] In 1917, when public ownership of all Canadian railroads was being urged on him, the Conservative Minister of Railways and Canals voiced his doubt whether "a government monopoly would be a very great improvement upon a private monopoly" because "once the incentive to service, which is brought about by competition, is removed it is not so sure that a monopoly, even if it be a public monopoly, would be the best thing for the public."[33] One of the reasons given by Acting Prime Minister Sir Thomas White in 1919 for preserving the identity of the privately-owned Canadian Pacific when other railroads were being combined under government management was that "there should be two railway systems in this country, one of which will be, so to speak, a check, in the sense of efficiency in the administration, upon the other."[34] The political virtues of this arrangement were recognized by R. B. Bennett, the Conservative Prime Minister from 1930 to 1935, when he gave a prominent place in his successful campaign of 1930 to the slogan, "Amalgamation? Never. Competition? Ever."[35] But the depth of the feeling which it evokes is perhaps best illustrated by the following statement of a leading Canadian economist:

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[26] The Minister was authorized by statute to procure the incorporation of Crown companies under the federal Companies Act, 1934, or provincial companies acts—all statutes designed for the use of private corporations. Twenty-eight companies were created under the authority given the Minister. See J. de N. Kennedy, *History of the Department of Munitions and Supply*, 2 vols. (Ottawa, 1950). A few Crown companies survived the war, and authorization to create others has been given to several agencies since the war. The word "Limited" in the title identifies this special type of public corporation (see notes 7 and 8).

[27] *Debates*, 1946, p. 2176.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 1517.

[29] See *Disposal and Peacetime Use of Crown Plant Buildings*, Department of Reconstruction and Supply (Ottawa, 1948), p. 3.

[30] *Debates*, 1944, p. 1573.

[31] Address by C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production, Los Angeles, California, October 8, 1954 (press release).

> It is the hope of democracy in Canada that both [railroads] will continue to strive earnestly but that neither will succeed, and that the impossibility of running two competitive railways will continue. . . . We may hope that the aggressiveness of the Canadian Pacific Railway will keep politics out of the Canadian National and that the aggressiveness of the Canadian National Railways will keep the Canadian Pacific out of politics and out of the Canadian Treasury, and that the results will permit the continuation of democratic government.[36]

Despite the strength of the belief in railroad competition, it would be misleading to assert that competition begins to compare with monopoly as a guiding principle for public enterprise in Canada. Granted the existence of the powerful Canadian Pacific and the absence of an ideological drive for nationalization of all railroads, nothing was left to a government which had inherited various bankrupt railroads but to compete—and to compete vigorously—if the jumble of roads was to survive. The announced determination to operate the system "as though it were a private corporation"[37] and the appointment of a daring and experienced railroad man to head it testified to the vigor of the attempt, at least. Transcontinental aviation and radio, however, offer a contrast. Here private enterprise—partly because it lacked the substantial subsidies furnished the Canadian Pacific—never succeeded in establishing transcontinental links, and, after public enterprise entered the field, was deliberately precluded from doing so by governmental policy. Competition, in short, has been highly touted only where no practicable alternative to competition was thought to exist. Outside the area encompassed by the railroads and their subsidiary services, a deliberate policy of non-competition with business is in force, according to Liberal government leaders.[38] This policy reflects political wisdom in Canada because it maintains freedom of action for those occasions when an extension of public enterprise is called for,[39] and at the same time undercuts the argument that nationalization is the inevitable consequence of such an extension.[40]

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[32] Cf. the instituting of competition between public corporations in the fuel industry by the British Conservative Government. Ernest Davies, "Government Policy and the Public Corporation," *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 26, pp. 104–16 (April–June, 1955).

[33] *Debates*, 1917, p. 4217.

[34] *Debates*, 1919, p. 2110.

[35] The words were used in a speech broadcast to the nation from Winnipeg. Quoted in *Debates*, 1932–33, p. 2800.

[36] Harold A. Innis, *Political Economy in the Modern State* (Toronto, 1946), pp. 159–60.

[37] *Debates*, 1919, p. 1018.

Despite the appeal of a policy of non-competition, signs of unrest are accumulating in the areas of the public economy that lie on the border between monopoly and competition. In radio, television, and aviation—which have been split between public and private enterprise, with the major portion reserved to the government—circumstances favor continued, and perhaps increasing, friction. As the country becomes more heavily populated, industrialized, and wealthy, the "chosen instrument" policy, established in the pessimistic 1930's, runs the risk of appearing unsuited to a young and vigorous land. The Canadian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters has long agitated for the right to form a network of private radio stations and thereby enter into direct competition with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.[41] This argument and its corollary—that the Corporation's regulatory powers over private radio stations should be turned over to an independent regulatory commission which would supervise the activities of both public and private radio—have been steadfastly resisted by the Cabinet, aided by the findings of a Royal Commission regarding the cultural needs of Canada.[42] The advent of television has intensified this basic disagreement. Television's rapid progress in the United States under private auspices, the availability of American television to certain Canadian viewers while others may not have even the single C.B.C. channel available, the caution with which applications for private television stations have been granted by the C.B.C.—these factors have brought government television, which has been plagued by the high cost of extending its services in a vast, bilingual country, under a certain amount of public disapproval. Inasmuch as the government has announced its intention to complete a transcontinental microwave television network by 1958 to add to its two transcontinental radio networks, the "chosen instrument" policy appears under no immediate threat. Whether the Corporation will lose its regulatory powers to an independent board depends in no small measure upon whether Canadians will regard more seriously in the future the contention—borrowed from the separation of powers doctrine—that the C.B.C. should not "act at the same time as both controller and competitor, nor as both judge and litigant, nor as both judge and prosecutor."[43]

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[38] For example, speaking of the successful government ventures in synthetic rubber production and uranium mining and refining, the Minister of Defence Production asserted: " . . . if they did not have monopolies they would be crown companies in a competitive field, which is contrary to government policy." *Debates*, 1951, p. 2004. See also *Debates*, 1946, p. 2176.

[39] "The government has no intention of going into business unnecessarily. Occasions have arisen in the past where it was important and, I suggest, imperative, that the government go into business on a very large scale. Such occasions may occur again, and if they do I hope the government of that day will be bold enough to meet the situation." C. D. Howe, Minister of Reconstruction and Supply, *Debates*, 1946, p. 1517.

[40] An illustration is found in a colloquy between C. D. Howe and a leading Conservative that occurred while Polymer Corporation was under discussion (*Debates*, 1944, p. 1715):

"Mr. Howe: 'With what private industry does it compete?'
Mr. Diefenbaker: 'It does not compete in the matter of manufacture, true enough, but it is actually the first move along the road to socialization.'
Mr. Howe: 'It is a wholly non-competitive industry.'
Mr. Diefenbaker: 'That is true.'"

[41] For a recent statement of the Association's case, see the *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Committee on Broadcasting*, House of Commons, Canada, Seventh Session, Twenty-first Parliament, 1952–53, pp. 252–92 and 311–17.

[42] See *Report*; Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (Ottawa, 1951). As recently as March 31, 1955, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent

In aviation—where transcontinental routes have been monopolized by the government's airline, other domestic routes have been left to private industry, and international routes have been assigned to either—there has also been pressure from private interests for a policy of competition, although the excellent reputation of Trans-Canada Air Lines minimizes this assault. The stage is set, however, for more vigorous competition with the government's chosen instrument than in radio or television, for there already exists a single powerful rival, Canadian Pacific Air Lines, offspring of the Canadian Pacific Railway and operator of all private international routes and nearly all of the private domestic routes. The government airline does not possess regulatory power over private interests, as does the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and only the timely intervention of the Cabinet has prevented at least one significant inroad on the public monopoly in transcontinental aviation. In 1953, after the Air Transport Board had approved the application of Canadian Pacific Air Lines to establish a competing air freight service across most of the continent, the Cabinet voided the action on the ground that the prospective volume of traffic did not yet justify duplicating the government's service.[44] Last year, however, the Cabinet made its first concession to competition in international routes when it approved a trans-Arctic service between Vancouver and Amsterdam, a shorter route to Europe than that used by Trans-Canada Air Lines.

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once more reaffirmed the government's policy with respect to the regulatory powers of the C.B.C. *Debates*, 1955, p. 2564 (daily edition). It should be noted, however, that in December, 1955, a Royal Commission on Television Broadcasting was appointed to consider *inter alia* "the licensing and control of private television and sound broadcasting stations in the public interest."

[43] Brief submitted by the Canadian Association of Broadcasters (as it was then called), *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Committee on Broadcasting*, House, 1952–53, p. 315.

[44] A. W. Currie, *Economics of Canadian Transportation* (Toronto, 1954), p. 544.

Reference to a current trend in the United States may bring the developments noted above into perspective. Under the so-called "businessman's administration" in the United States, the emphasis is frankly upon getting government *out of* competition with business. This was, in fact, one of the terms of reference of the second Hoover Commission.[45] At those points where Canadian business co-exists with public enterprise but is restricted in its actions (radio, television, aviation), the businessman's aim is to get *into* competition with the government. This seeming contrast yields quickly to a twofold explanation. First, it is apparent that the dissimilar aims listed above are but two different stages of a drive by business to improve its position vis-à-vis public enterprise. Second, the contrast is explainable in terms of each nation's economic development. In order to assure the nation of essential economic services it was not necessary for the American government to pre-empt certain vital areas of the economy, as the Canadian government was forced to do. Where Canadian business is confronted with pre-empted areas it naturally raises a clamor to enter the forbidden preserves. As economic growth continues, a logical expectation is that the forbidden grass will appear ever greener. Already such catchwords as the following are appearing in sections of the press: " . . . no economic or political principle in this country says that public ownership should be without competition, that it should have a right to monopoly . . . ."[46]

The second question posed at the beginning of this section—whether Canadian public enterprise furnishes an operating standard for private enterprise—needs no extensive discussion. Undoubtedly, the Canadian National Railways sets a standard for the Canadian Pacific in the sense that the latter is conscious of a need to remain efficient in order to be certain of not being absorbed by its rival. The C.N.R.'s power to set standards is greatly limited by circumstances, however. Originally it had to integrate the operations of various inherited railroads, whereas the C.P.R. has combined its natural advantage of a unified structure with a fine record of efficiency. Consequently, the Canadian Pacific, more often than not, has been the pacesetter. Doubt has also been expressed—in various quarters and for different reasons—whether even such relatively similar forms of enterprise as the C.N.R. and the C.P.R. can be truly compared.[47] Finally, direct competition as a method of setting standards for private enterprise was arrived at almost accidentally in the case of the railroads, has not served as a precedent, and therefore has no standing as current public policy. Once away from the example of the railroads, not even the milder "yardstick" form of competition, as exemplified by the T.V.A., prevails as a method of assuring that public enterprise sets a standard.[48] As in the United States, business competition is chiefly relied on for obtaining good business behavior, and government regulation ranks ahead of government ownership as a method of reinforcing this approach.

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[45] *New York Times*, March 20, 1955, p. E7.

[46] "That C.P.A. Trans-Arctic Service" (editorial), *Ottawa Journal*, Jan. 24, 1955, p. 6.

[47] See, e.g., *Debates*, 1923, p. 1616, and 1932–33, p. 2771; also R. J. Manion (a former Minister of Railways and Canals), *Life is an Adventure* (Toronto, 1936), p. 295.

[48] A fact already noted by Professor Hodgetts, "The Public Corporation in Canada," in Friedmann, *The Public Corporation*, p. 54.

To the third question—whether the operating conditions of public enterprise should be made as nearly like those of business as possible—the Canadian answer appears to be more strongly in the affirmative than might be expected. Two very different lines of reasoning support this answer: first, a concern that public enterprise should obtain a measure of business's secrecy and unity of purpose in operation, and secondly, that public enterprise should be exposed to as many of the normal business costs as feasible.

Influential in popularizing the first line of reasoning was the accident that the first major commercial venture of the Canadian government in this century involved strenuous competition with a private firm. From the start it was recognized by government leaders that the Canadian National Railways needed privacy and autonomy in its daily operations in order to compete with its able rival. Although the Liberals fought this notion vigorously as an invasion of parliamentary responsibility, they espoused it themselves after replacing the Unionist Government in December, 1921. Thus, Prime Minister Mackenzie King asserted that under the Liberals the president of the C.N.R. would always have "precisely the same degree of latitude and freedom as the shareholders of the Canadian Pacific would give to Mr. Beatty the C.P.R. president."[49] This point of view matched that of his Unionist predecessor who—exasperated at the flow of questions about the C.N.R.—asked the House: " . . . how is the Canadian National Railways directorate going to make a success . . . of its efforts to compete with the Canadian Pacific, if every day it is subject to having every action . . . disclosed to the public and to its competitor while . . . the competitor need disclose nothing at all?"[50] Business concepts, then, exerted a powerful influence at the formative stage in the development of the public corporation, even though it was always apparent that the public corporation could never attain the degree of autonomy characteristic of its opposite number.[51]

When public enterprise expands and diversifies in a "free enterprise" country, it is apt to run into a feeling that various cost factors facing business should also be charged to the operations of public enterprise. Curiously enough, this belief—which operates as a second factor in rendering public enterprise more like private—seems to have produced more tangible results so far in Canada than in the United States, despite the extremely vigorous stand of American business groups on the matter. Several bits of evidence in support of this statement may be cited.

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[49] *Debates*, 1923, p. 3674.

[50] *Debates*, 1921, p. 1182.

[51] A point amply demonstrated by the harassed Liberal Minister of Railways and Canals, when he said in the House: "Suppose Mr. Beatty's shareholders met and stayed in session four or five months every year; suppose every day a portion of his staff was compelled to be taken from their work to answer all kinds of questions; suppose that . . . among his shareholders there was a large number who made no bones about declaring him and his board of management incompetent; what would Mr. Beatty do? He would resign in five minutes." *Debates*, 1924, pp. 2632–33.

Since 1952 the government's "proprietary corporations"—the group most nearly comparable to private enterprise—have had to pay federal income tax at the same rate as private corporations.[52] Levied in response to mounting agitation since World War II,[53] the tax was justified by the Minister of Finance as designed "to make the financial statements of these crown companies more comparable with private industry, and make it easier to assess the relative efficiency of their operations."[54] Moreover, the hope was expressed by another government spokesman that the provinces would now tax their own public corporations and thereby put them "in a position where a better or more accurate comparison can be made of the relative efficiency of publicly-owned corporations competing in the same field."[55]

Two other recent tax changes may be cited in support of the contention that the Canadian government has attempted to lessen the difference in operating costs between public and private enterprise. One is the government's instructions to public corporations to conclude agreements with municipalities for the payment of grants in lieu of taxes.[56] Undoubtedly, the principal reason for the directive was to satisfy the clamor of tax-hungry municipalities.[57] The connection between this step and the one just reviewed, however, was made plain by the Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Finance, who stated that "the principle is really the same in payment by federal corporations of both municipal taxes and federal taxes . . . ."[58] A second pertinent tax change, announced in the Budget Speech of 1952, effected a substantial reduction in the federal income tax paid by privately-owned public utilities engaged in the generation and distribution of electrical energy, gas, or steam.[59] Although it was adopted chiefly to forestall applications for rate increases by these companies, the Minister of Finance agreed with a member of the Opposition that "This clause will have a tendency to bring more nearly into line the activities of privately-owned utility corporations and those of publicly-owned corporations . . . ."[60]

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[52] *Statutes of Canada,* 1 Eliz. II, c. 29 (1952). The provision was an amendment to the Income Tax Act, *Statutes of Canada* (1948), 11–12 George VI, c. 52, which had provided in section 57 (1) (d) for exemption of "a corporation, commission, or association not less than 90% of the shares or capital of which was owned by His Majesty in right of Canada or a province or by a Canadian municipality."

[53] See, for example, *Debates*, 1946, pp. 1517, 2129, and 2150.

[54] *Debates*, 1952, p. 1253. The amounts paid by each eligible corporation can be ascertained quickly from their financial statements, which are published annually in Volume II of the *Public Accounts of Canada.*

[55] *Debates*, 1952, p. 2093.

[56] In November, 1949, Minister of Finance Douglas Abbott announced to the House that "in general the policy of the government will be to authorize its Crown corporations to work out fair and equitable agreements with the municipalities in which their properties are situated." *Debates*, 1949 (2nd sess.), p. 1706. In June, 1951, the Minister used stronger language to describe the situation, saying that the corporations had been "instructed" to negotiate agreements. *Debates*, 1951, p. 4217. The reason given by the Minister for permitting each corporation to work out its own "fair and equitable" agreements was that "the character of the operations of these Crown corporations varies a good deal" (p. 4224).

[57] See *Debates*, 1945, p. 1424 and 1946, pp. 1517, 2129, 2148, and 2163. The cities have no legal recourse if a corporation refuses to conclude such an arrangement. There has not been complete satisfaction with the size of the payments. See, e.g., *Debates*, 1951, p. 4226.

[58] *Debates*, 1952, p. 2092.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 1253. The relief granted "will take the form of a deduction from the tax otherwise payable of an amount sufficient to reduce to 43 per cent the tax payable under

IV

Canadian public enterprise, as the foregoing pages demonstrate, is complex in character. It occupies only a modest segment of the economy, but it literally links the nation together. Although it has had a long history, it has never won the emotional allegiance of Canadians. Without an ideological drive to sustain it, it has achieved a vital place in the economy because of its decisive importance in the continuing task of nation-building. Exceedingly pragmatic as Canadian public enterprise appears to be, the consistency with which it is used in situations involving challenges to national economic unity virtually gives its motivating factor the status of a theory. Though this in turn renders public enterprise relatively uncontroversial, the four parliamentary parties do not hesitate to express varying notions about it, ranging from a reduction in its scope to nationalization of industry. In the face of this activity by party orators, however, "The average Canadian has something less than enthusiasm for arguing the merit of private versus public enterprise."[61]

Complex though its character may be, Canadian public enterprise generally obtains more candid and dispassionate treatment than is customary in the United States. Wholesale approval or condemnation of the principle of public ownership frequently yields to honest attempts to judge the performance of individual units of public enterprise.[62] Neither the extension of public enter-

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the Income Tax Act on that part of a corporation's taxable income that is derived from such distribution or generation." At the 1952 corporate income tax rate of 50 per cent, the reduction amounted to 14 per cent.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 2645. Earlier, in response to complaints that provinces with privately-owned public utility companies were being discriminated against because publicly-owned companies in other provinces paid no federal income taxes, the federal government had arranged to turn over to a province half of the income tax collected from such private companies within its borders. This step and the 1952 reduction were regarded as parallel moves.

[61] W. A. Mackintosh, "The People and Their History," in *Canada: Nation on the March*, p. 18.

[62] For example, in commenting on the loss of 28 million dollars suffered by the Canadian National Railways in 1954 under Liberal auspices, a Conservative newspaper pointed to the reduction of 32 million dollars in operating expenses as proof that the loss "was not helped by failure on the part of management to economize." Falling revenues were blamed, and it was acknowledged that "it is not always possible to match falling revenues with cuts in costs." The railroad's plans for meeting competition were noted. Editorial, *Ottawa Journal*, March 23, 1955, p. 6. Earlier, in referring to the anticipated loss, the president of the C.N.R. was reported as viewing it as a "crushing disappointment," particularly because making a profit is essential for a public corporation. "Exhortations from an executive officer are a poor substitute for the discipline of a profit and loss account." *Ottawa Journal*, Nov. 4, 1954, p. 38.

prise nor, on the other hand, its taxation, appear to have aroused major displays of public emotion. When such contrasting developments can occur almost simultaneously and in a relatively calm atmosphere, the explanation must go deeper than the difference between Canadian and American temperaments or forms of government, significant as these matters may be. Judging from the picture which has been sketched in these pages, the principal explanation may be that in Canada *laissez faire* never had the opportunity—through force of circumstances—to reach the status of a dogma or of an emotional catchword. It became neither a folk myth to which eternal allegiance was due nor a *bête noire* to be overcome at all costs. Consequently, to a very real extent the guiding criterion in Canada is that expressed by C. D. Howe, who is, fittingly, both a prolific launcher of public corporations and a highly successful businessman: " . . . there is only one test of the strength and weakness of either private operation or government operation, namely, which can best serve the need of the public of Canada."[63] The reservation which must accompany this statement —and which points up Canada's basic economic conservatism and kinship to the United States—is found in another quotation, this one by Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent: " . . . I think we are all most happy when free enterprise does what is required to be done and public authorities do not have to intervene."[64]

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[63] *Debates*, 1945, p. 1397. Behind this statement is another made by Howe on a different occasion: "We in Canada have always had to live by compromise. . . . " Address at Case Institute of Technology, Cleveland, April 10, 1953 (press release).

[64] *Debates*, 1952–53, p. 4764.

EXECUTIVE POWER IN VENEZUELA

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Throughout most of its national history, Venezuela has been the victim of long and tyrannical dictatorships, broken only by brief spells of semi-democratic government. Constitution after constitution has fallen before the whims of self-made generals. Numerous major revolts and countless minor civil uprisings have scarred the country, all having the twofold objective of acquiring for their leaders national power for power's sake and the privilege of organizing Venezuela as a private economic and political domain.

In almost all instances the politicians have travelled a bloody road to national power. Having once established themselves in the presidency, they demonstrated considerable reluctance to observe the functional separation of powers decreed by the constitution. As a result of this attitude the legislature and judiciary were weakened to the point of impotency. The *raison d'être* of these branches thus came to be the legalization of the programs and activities of the executive, even if this meant, as it often did, violating the constitution. The purpose of this article is to examine the evolution and application of executive power.

I. UNDERLYING FACTORS AND FORCES

The periods of dictatorship to which the Venezuelan people have been subjected have helped to condition them to the principles of authoritarianism in the organization and application of political power. It can be argued that the Venezuelan people themselves have encouraged and cultivated the development of *ejecutivismo* in government, for the struggle for personal power has been aggravated by a clearly-defined tendency of the people to associate themselves with powerful personalities rather than with programs and issues.[1] It has not been difficult in the past for any political aspirant, once having demonstrated his leadership abilities locally,[2] to acquire a sizeable following willing to support him in almost any political endeavor. The Venezuelan people, moreover, have been disposed to turbulence and excitement in their political life, and they have always been ready to utilize force and violence to achieve their ends.[3] Psychological factors such as these have been partly responsible for creating a political climate conducive to the growth of executive supremacy.

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[1] This tendency is by no means peculiar to Venezuela. See William L. Schurz, *Latin America* (New York, 1949) and Cecil Jane, *Liberty and Despotism in Spanish America* (Oxford, 1929) for a discussion of the trait as it appears generally in Latin America. The Venezuelan sociologist, Carlos Siso, in his *La Formación del Pueblo Venezolano,* 2 vols. (Caracas, 1951), Vol. 2, argues that even in the bloody struggle that marked the federal war in the middle of the 19th century thousands of men, identifying themselves only with leaders, died without being aware of the cause for which they were fighting.

[2] See William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," *Western Political Quarterly,* Vol. 5, pp. 445–68 (Sept., 1952)

[3] Ramón David León, *Hombres y Sucesos de Venezuela* (Caracas, 1952), p. 15.

An examination of the milieu in which the acquisition and manipulation of national political power operate reveals three important elements: military influence, *caudillismo*,[4] and the philosophy of the democratic caesar (*cesarismo democrático*). All three were present as early as 1830 and were epitomized in a statement made at that time to the Venezuelan patriot, General Paez, by partisans who were advocating secession from the union with Colombia. "General," they said, "you are the fatherland." This declaration reflects as faithfully today as it did a century ago the outstanding characteristics of the attitude which has distinguished the relations between those who rule and those who follow in Venezuela.

The first of these factors, military influence, has been predominant in politics in Venezuela since the nation achieved independence in 1821. In the majority of cases the successful contender for the presidency was a man who had first demonstrated his power in regional military affairs. The roster of Venezuelan executives is notably lacking in men of a non-military status. Although it is true that in the 27-year rule of General Juan Vicente Gómez (1908–1935) several civilians occupied the presidency, they did so only with the acquiescence of Gómez, who tolerated no deviation from his wishes. Indeed, since 1894, only one civilian president has possessed real power in his own right. In 1947 the Venezuelan people elected Rómulo Gallegos to the presidency, by a plurality of 600,000 votes over the closest opposition candidate. Less than a year later the electorate saw him forced from office by a dissatisfied military clique, which announced that its greatest honor would be ". . . to demonstrate to the country that we know how to rule. . . ."[5]

Military affiliation and rank are still the most important assets in the politics of modern Venezuela.[6] The incumbent President, Marcos Pérez Jiménez, continues the strong military tradition. By a recent action of the Venezuelan Senate, he was promoted from the rank of Colonel to that of Brigadier

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[4] Derived from the Spanish word *caudillo*, the term encompasses all the phenomena associated with the *caudillo*. Roughly equivalent to our political boss, the *caudillo* is a person who possesses the real authority in a given area. He may be a government official, but as often as not he has no official connection with the government. See Stokes, *op. cit.*

[5] *Gaceta Oficial*, Jan. 3, 1949.

[6] The Venezuelan constitutionalist Ernesto Wolf, in his *Tratado de Derecho Constitucional Venezolano*, 2 vols. (Caracas, 1945), Vol. 1, p. 401, asserted that the title of general had come to be a necessity for the discharge of the duties not only of the presidency but also of most other high offices. From 1945 until June of this year, however, the highest active military rank was that of colonel. Military rank is no longer essential for "other high offices" and in Congress, at least, a change of emphasis from military to academic rank has occurred. In the Congress of 1873, for example, 19 of the 30 senators and 50 of the 70 deputies were generals. In the present Congress (1953 figures) there are no generals. Fifty-five per cent of the Senators and 32 per cent of the members of the Chamber of Deputies carry the academic title of Doctor. See *Gaceta Oficial*, April 17, 1953.

General.[7] He rose to power with Army support and remains in power today because of it, despite his "election" by the Constitutional Assembly in April, 1953.

The second important power factor is the concept of *caudillismo*. Prior to the Gómez era, the presidents of Venezuela were able to exercise power only by placating, conciliating, or destroying the numerous petty provincial and regional rivals. Skill and diplomacy backed by force were necessary prerequisites for men striving to become *el presidente*. Each of these men saw himself in the role of national redeemer, fighting a righteous war to release the people from the iniquities of those who governed. The political machine of Guzmán Blanco (1870–1888) was enduring and effective because he was astute enough to come to understandings with local chieftains instead of ignoring their demands or fighting them.[8]

Regional leaders received different treatment at the hands of Gómez, who made it a practice to subsidize the *caudillos* by providing them with sinecures, thereby cementing their loyalty to him personally. The virtual disappearance of strong local leaders does not mean that *caudillismo* is dead in Venezuela. It means merely that provincial chieftains have been replaced by men who owe their eminence in national politics to their ability to placate and juggle the various power groups within the Armed Forces. The best evidence of this new trend in politics can be found in the documents released by the Military *Junta* in 1949 in an attempt to justify its overthrow of the government the preceding year.[9]

The documents clearly show that all segments of the Armed Forces were represented in the conclaves that preceded the revolution. Following the successful outcome of the revolt, the military forces collectively assumed the sovereign power of the people and vested it in a military committee or *junta*. The power distribution in this instance was effected not on regional bases, but rather on national military bases. The three men who exercised power did so by formal agreement with and the tolerance of the other national military leaders. Subsequent events brought about various changes in the composition of the *junta*, but the power remained firmly in the hands of the Armed Forces, represented by the person of Marcos Pérez Jiménez.[10]

Although regionalism no longer plays the significant role in politics that it did prior to the Gómez regime, nevertheless one element of it lingers on in the dominant position of the Andean states in the national power structure. In the last half-century, military elements in the Andean state of Táchira have furnished almost all of the rulers of Venezuela. Generals Castro (1903–1908), Gómez (1908–1935), López Contreras (1935–1941), and Medina Angarita (1941–1945) were natives of this state. It does not seem coincidental that the incumbent President is also a native son of Táchira.

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[7] Under Venezuelan law only the Senate may promote officers of the Armed Forces above the rank of Lt. Colonel.

[8] See Charles C. Griffin, "Regionalism's Role in Venezuelan Politics," *The Inter-American Quarterly*, Vol. 3, pp. 21–35 (Oct., 1941).

[9] *Documentos Oficiales Relativos al Movimiento Militar de 24 de Noviembre de 1948* (Caracas, 1949).

[10] In December, 1952 Pérez Jiménez dispensed with the committee form of government altogether and proclaimed himself Provisional President, even though his own newly-elected Constitutional Assembly, scheduled to meet in January, 1953, was charged with the task of electing a Provisional President.

The importance of the Andean region in politics is suggested in an interesting document ascribed to former President López Contreras.[11] In that paper a definite procedure was outlined for pressing the presidential candidacy of Pérez Jiménez in the elections of 1952. In the alleged opinion of López Contreras, Pérez Jiménez was the logical candidate for the high office. His election, Contreras argued, would fittingly round out 50 years of Andean rule. To this end he advised the candidate to launch his campaign in some central state and to end it in Táchira. He was cautioned, furthermore, to include prominent Andeans in his cabinet.

Andean pre-eminence in national politics has naturally given rise to bitterness and jealousy in the Venezuelan people, but so strong has been the power of that region that the people have been unable to take corrective action.[12]

The third factor that must be considered in an analysis of power factors in Venezuela is the philosophy of the democratic caesar, a doctrine made popular by Vallenilla Lanz during the regime of Gómez. In this era of "sonnets and sociology," it was only one of a number of efforts made by the supporters of Gómez to rationalize and justify his harsh dictatorship. The philosophy revolves around the premise that for Latin America dictatorship is not a necessary evil, but the ideal and appropriate form of government. The nature of the Venezuelan people, so the argument ran, excluded every system of government that was not a presidential dictatorship. Vallenilla Lanz asserted that the authority of the *caudillo* was founded on the "unconscious suggestion of the majority." He viewed Venezuelan society as made up of an unstable people who grouped themselves instinctively around wise, strong, and valiant men.[13]

The desire of Venezuela to separate from the Colombian union in 1826 was caused, Lanz says, by the attempt to substitute the impersonal prestige of the law for the personal prestige of the *caudillo*. The true character of Venezuelan democracy, according to the sociological school that espoused Lanz' doctrines, manifests itself in the predominance of a single individual sanctioned by the collective will of the people. In Venezuelan theories the democratic caesar always represents the popular sovereign. He is " . . . democracy personified, the nation made man. In him are synthesized those two antagonistic concepts: democracy and autocracy, that is to say, equality under a chief."[14] The democratic features of the various constitutions were the targets for the followers of this doctrine, who were for the most part contemptuous of the constitutions of the country because they contained republican principles. Lanz agreed with Bolívar that Venezuelan society did not contain the elements necessary for the success of such principles.[15] Another disciple of the school called democracy a "mystic doctrine" and declared it was giving way to a national desire to make one's country great by " . . . utilizing all its forces, organized to function harmoniously through the control which can be exercised only by a Supreme Dictator."[16]

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[11] *Hispanic World Report*, Vol. 2, pp. 17–19 (Dec., 1949).

[12] Ramón David León discusses this subject in his *De Agro-pecuario a Petrolero* (Caracas, 1944). See also the dedication in his *Hombres y Sucessos de Venezuela* (Caracas, 1952).

[13] *Cesarismo Democrático* (Caracas, 1929), p. 283.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 307.

In the more liberal political period which followed the death of Gómez, the influence of the philosophy decreased. There is today, however, a resurgence of the *cesarismo* doctrine in Venezuela. It does not take much imagination to read into the actions and methods of the present government much of the political dogma of the philsophy.[17] Certainly the cult of the hero is not dead, for evidence of it can be seen everywhere. Huge posters of the President are conspicuously displayed and constant adulatory references are made to him in the press and radio.[18] The complete absence of press criticism of the President and his government can be traced in part to stringent censorship and in part to the sedition law of 1926 making it a crime to offend the President in any manner either orally or in writing.

II. ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

Constitutional provisions dealing with the selection of the President of the Republic have varied. Since the turn of the century, however, the duty of choosing the chief executive has usually fallen to the Congress sitting as an electoral body. Congressional election of the President became an integral feature of the seven constitutions drafted under Gómez. His complete control of the Congress and the state legislatures insured his election year after year, either to the presidency or to the office of his choice. His repeated nomination and election by the Congress was possible because he had eliminated the constitutional prohibition against re-election.

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 220.

[16] Pedro Manuel Arcaya, *The Gómez Regime in Venezuela* (Washington, D. C., 1936), p. 59.

[17] In a recent interview noted in *Time* (Feb. 28, 1955), p. 29, President Marcos Pérez Jiménez said, "I make every effort to give Venezuelans the kind of government adapted to them. . . . We are still in our infant years and we still need halters. . . . There must be a leader who shows the way without being perturbed by the necessity of winning demogogic popularity."

[18] It is extremely difficult to learn from public utterances what the people really think about their President. While he is in office, the outward attitude toward him is one of abject servility. But experiences of the past have taught the Venezuelan leaders that fame is fleeting when they have been relieved of their command. The memory, statues, and properties of Gómez were reviled, destroyed, and confiscated in an outbreak of violence following his death in 1935. Yet earlier in the same year a member of Congress referred to him in the following terms: "There always surges from the bosom of the people a superior man, a light who illumines the way to the promised land, a Moses who, with his magical wand can cause not only the water to gush from the rock, but the spirit of love and fraternity to spring from the human heart. For us this man, with a soul as lofty as the clouds of his native Andes, is Juan Vicente Gómez." *Diário de Debates de la Cámara de Diputados* (Caracas, 1935), No. 1.

During his long regime attempts were made to justify most of his activities. Thus it was asserted that his favored principle of indirect election of the President was the most suitable method for Venezuela, taking into consideration the backward conditions of the masses. Supporters of indirect election argued that the people were not capable of exercising suffrage intelligently because, easily influenced by their natural instincts and lacking the power to distinguish or appreciate superior spirits, they were prone to elevate to power persons of their own level.[19]

Methods of indirect election other than the traditional one involving the Congress have been experimented with in Venezuela. They include election by a Federal Council, by municipal councils and state legislatures, and by an Electoral Body. Influenced by his study of the Swiss Council, Guzmán Blanco in 1881 had his Congress draft a new constitution to create a permanent Federal Council. Each of the nine states of the Union was represented in the Council by a senator and deputy who were elected from the membership of Congress. It was further stipulated that the Council would select one of its own members as President for a two-year term. Casually ignoring these precise constitutional instructions,[20] the Council proceeded to choose Guzmán Blanco, who was neither senator, deputy, nor member of the Federal Council, to succeed himself as President.

In 1901 the election of the President was removed one step further from the people when the electoral prerogative went to the municipal councils and the state legislatures. Under this arrangement the official state candidate was the person who received a majority of votes in the various municipal councils of the state. The duty of the state legislature was to ascertain who this person was and to transmit his name to the national Senate, where the state votes were counted. The man who received an absolute majority of these votes was declared President.

Still another variation of the council idea was the Electoral Body of 14 members, established by the Constitution of 1904. Each of the states (whose number by now had been arbitrarily increased to 13), as well as the Federal District, was represented by delegates chosen by Congress from its own membership for the express purpose of naming the President. The Electoral Body was free to name one of its own members, or it could look elsewhere. The Body was dissolved following the discharge of its task.

Election of the President by Congress was embraced as a principle in 1909 and continued to be standard procedure until 1947, when direct popular election was introduced.

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[19] Luís Acosto Merlo, *El Poder Ejecutivo* (Caracas, 1917), pp. 24–25.

[20] *Constitution of 1881*, Article 62: The Federal Council elects the President of the United States of Venezuela from its own membership. . . . The election of any person not a member of the Council is null and void.

Although the constitutions of Venezuela repeatedly have affirmed that the governmental system is based, among other things, on the alternative principle, the history of Venezuela demonstrates that real alternative government, that is, change of leadership, has been generally achieved, not through peaceful means, but through force and violence. The Supreme Court in 1940 finally brought theory into line with practice when it said that " . . . in our public law renovation or *alternabilidad* of the public powers implies renovation of command and not of persons."[21]

The bloody revolution of 1945 stemmed in some measure from the widespread feeling among the political opposition that President Medina Angarita would resort to *imposición* or the presidential practice of exerting subtle pressure on Congress to elect as his successor a man of his own choice. In view of the fact that Medina's political party completely controlled the Congress, the opposition was rightly pessimistic about the possibility of electing its candidate.[22] It was under these circumstances that the major opposition party, *Acción Democrática*, turned a willing ear to Army overtures and joined in the revolt against Medina's government. It was a foregone conclusion that the Constitutional Assembly elected in 1946 under the auspices of the *Junta Revolucionaria* (the committee of military officers and *Acción Democrática* men who ruled Venezuela following the revolt) would eliminate the provisions which had prevented their bringing about a change of leadership by legal peaceful means. The Assembly duly wrote the principles of direct, universal, and secret suffrage for public officials into the constitution. In 1947, therefore, Venezuela elected a President directly for the first time in its history. The result was an overwhelming, but shortlived, victory for *Acción Democrática* and its candidate, Rómulo Gallegos.

The same principles of election were reaffirmed in the 1953 constitution. Yet the members of the Constitutional Assembly, acting under a transitional clause appended to the constitution, reverted once more to indirect election to name Provisional President Marcos Pérez Jiménez as Constitutional President.[23] The transitory provisions, under which the Constitutional Assembly assumed the right to organize the public power for a five-year period in violation of the document it had just written, gives evidence of what can happen when a strong executive is backed by a subservient majority party.

It would be foolish to predict the future of the direct election principle, in view of the fact that the will of the people, clearly expressed in the 1947 election, was set aside in such a short time. The opportunity to test its application will not arise again until 1958, if the present constitution and regime endure that long. Meanwhile, Venezuela is governed completely by men who owe their election, not to the electorate, but to an Assembly selected for the express purpose of writing a constitution.[24]

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[21] *Memória de la Corte Federal y de Casación*, 2 vols. (Caracas, 1941), Vol. 1, p. 195.

[22] Medina's party and *Acción Democrática* had both agreed on the same man, Señor Escalante. When illness forced Escalante to retire from the race, Medina nominated Angel Biaggini, former Minister of Agriculture. This man was totally unacceptable to *AD*.

[23] The Constitutional Assembly also chose all the members of the National Congress, the state legislatures, and the municipal councils, a total of 1,602 men, plus an equal number of substitutes.

III. THE INFLUENCE OF THE EXECUTIVE IN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Venezuela has had 24 constitutions since independence. They have been written and discarded with such frequency that Venezuelans cynically refer to them as "little yellow books which are made every year and broken every day."[25]

This large number of constitutions can be attributed in part to the resort to violence to bring about political change. The fundamental laws of 1858, 1864, 1901, 1904, 1947, and 1953 were produced by constitutional assemblies convoked by the victors following the successful outcome of a revolt. The remaining number, and even those mentioned above, were motivated to some extent by the personal wishes of the strong man in government. Indeed, one of Venezuela's most eminent historians declared that the principal weakness of the Venezuelan constitutions lay in the fact that they were nothing more than responses to the whims of *el presidente*.[26]

The present pattern for amending the constitution was established in 1893. The document of that year stipulated that either Congress or three-fourths of the state legislatures in ordinary session could take the initiative in proposing amendments. Prior to this time, only states could initiate amendments. The procedure to be followed was that used in enacting laws. When the initiative came from Congress, approval by three-fourths of the states was necessary. If, on the other hand, Congress acted favorably on a matter proposed by the states, ratification by two-thirds of the states would suffice.

When one considers the dominant influence of the executive in government, it becomes clear that the provisions which permitted the Congress to initiate amendments lent themselves readily to manipulation by all-powerful presidents. The requirement of ratification by the states presented no real obstacle to frequent executive tampering with the constitution. The 1874 document, for example, was drafted by the national Congress upon the request of all 20 states. The Congress in 1881 submitted a draft project of a new constitution to the states at the request of President Guzmán Blanco. The states in turn unanimously requested the Congress to adopt all the amendments suggested by the dictator. The 1922, 1925, 1928, 1929, and 1931 constitutions of Gómez were approved unconditionally by all of the states of the Venezuelan union.[27] The unanimity with which the states have repeatedly accepted presidentially-inspired reforms clearly indicates that they have been powerless to check the impulses of the executive.

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[24] The office of the vice-presidency has had a chequered history in Venezuela. Abolished by the constitution of 1864, the institution was later reintroduced in 1904, when two vice-presidencies were created. Vice-President Juan Vicente Gómez soon demonstrated how the post could be used as a springboard to power, when he seized control of the government in 1908 during the absence abroad of the legal President. As Chief Executive, Gómez took immediate action to eliminate the office through which he himself had illegally come to power. Later, however, possessed by dynastic ambitions and feeling himself in absolute control of the government, he instructed his docile 1922 constitutional congress to restore the dual vice-presidency and to elect to the posts his brother and one of his many sons. Following the assassination of the brother and the disgrace of his son, he abolished the institution once more. It has never been restored.

[25] Wolf, *Tratado de Derecho Constitucional Venezolano* (cited in note 6), Vol. 1, p. 315.

[26] José Gil Fortoul, *Filosofía Constitucional* (Caracas, 1940), p. 12.

The proliferation of Venezuelan constitutions does not mean that they have differed radically from one another. Indeed, with one or two exceptions, notably that of 1947, they are greatly similar. It is customary in Venezuela to promulgate a new charter each time an amendment, however minor, takes place. The new document therefore differs from its predecessor only in the deletion or addition of certain sections or perhaps in new wording.

Within this framework of constitutional development, it is instructive to examine more closely the influence of the President in the process of amending the basic law of the land. A subservient Congress and controlled state legislatures have given the executives a blank check for all the changes they desire. Gómez, in his capacity either as Chief of the Army or as President, was personally responsible for seven constitutions. Following the *gólpe de estado* of December 19, 1908, by which he ousted the legal President, he shrewdly used his powers as Chief of State to dictate a new constitution. In this way he forced the Congress and state legislatures to legalize his regime and caused the Congress to install him as Provisional President. During the four-month interval between his seizure of power and his election as Constitutional President, Gómez set about organizing the Republic in his own interests. A serious challenge to his power occurred in 1913, when deposed President Castro made an attempt to regain his office. Gómez personally took the field against him and defeated him.

Perhaps it was Gómez' desire to remain free to combat such insurgents and at the same time to retain his hold on the presidency that led to the curious performance in 1914. In that year Gómez discarded the 1909 constitution and presented his Congress of "plenipotentiary deputies" with a Provisional Constitutional Statute, which they promptly adopted. Such a singular method of amending the constitution was without precedent in Latin America. A puppet of Gómez, Márques Bustillos, was elected Provisional President under its terms. The Statute suppressed the Council of Government[28] and created in its stead the office of Commander-in-Chief of the National Army for the duration of the provisional government. The Commander-in-Chief was entrusted with powers ordinarily vested in the President, such as those dealing with the reorganization and command of the Armed Forces. The Congress elected Gómez to this post. The purpose of this wily maneuver became clear when the same body proclaimed a new constitution two months later in which the clause against re-election was eliminated. The Congress was then free to re-elect Gómez for a seven-year term. Appended to the constitution was a transitory provision which revealed a more subtle purpose of the Provisional Statute. Two articles are in point:

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[27] See Ulíses Picón Rivas, *Indice Constitucional de Venezuela* (Caracas, 1944) for a discussion of the various constitutions and their backgrounds.

[28] The Council of Government had been established in accordance with the constitution of 1893. It was composed of nine members, one from each state, elected by Congress for four-year terms. It had both deliberative and consultative functions.

> Art. 137. The Provisional President of the Republic . . . will exercise his office until the new constitutional officers take possession of their posts . . .
>
> Art. 138. The Commander-in-Chief of the National Army will continue in his office until the Constitutional President of the Republic takes possession of his office and meanwhile the Provisional President will exercise in accord with the Commander-in-Chief the powers set forth in Articles 22, 23, 24, 25 and 70 of this constitution.

Under the terms of these articles, Gómez, who had been elected Commander-in-Chief under the Provisional Statute and Constitutional President under the 1914 Constitution, was free to choose which office he cared to exercise. Instead of assuming the presidency, however, he continued in his military post and vigorously set about organizing the defenses of the country. During the next seven years, therefore, Venezuela had the unique experience of having a Provisional President performing the functions of a Constitutional President-elect who did not choose to assume the office, but who nevertheless exercised all of its powers. In 1922 Gómez resumed open control of the destinies of the nation as President under a new constitution which combined once more the office of the presidency with that of Commander-in-Chief.

Presidentially-inspired changes are abundant in his 1925 constitution. Previous charters had forbidden presidential absences from Caracas for more than 25 days. This restriction irritated Gómez, who preferred to live in the city of Maracay. It was therefore deleted. In part, the 1925 document stemmed from the dictator's desire to find a formula for presidential appointment of state governors without destroying the form of a federal system. The solution appeared in clause 27 of Article 100. In that section the Chief Executive was empowered to exercise those state powers which the states in their several constitutions might delegate to him. The states thereupon obediently and docilely delegated to Gómez the right to appoint their governors. In spite of several attempts since then, they have never recovered the prerogative of electing their own executives.

Alterations in the fundamental law in response to presidential orders are not restricted to the Gómez constitutions. They can be found in almost all Venezuelan constitutions. The 1857 changes were occasioned by the desire of President José Tadeo Monágas to extend his term beyond the legal limit. Under his tutelage the 1830 prohibition against re-election was eliminated, and the President's term of office was extended from four to six years. It has been alleged that this act initiated the custom of legalizing usurpations of power through the simple device of revising the constitution. Certainly it has caused Venezuela to fluctuate ever since between "anarchical tumult and despotic order."[29]

Still further evidence of *personalismo* is contained in the 1874 revision modifying the federal document of 1864. The reforms of this period were written into law at the express suggestion of President Guzmán Blanco. Although the term of office was reduced from four to two years, the principal reason for amending the constitution appears to have been the institution of the controlled vote, whereby electors were obliged to sign and deposit their ballots in the presence of election officials.

The most recent example of presidential influence in bringing about constitutional change can be found in the drafting of the 1953 document. The only draft brought before the Constitutional Assembly was that written by the leading members of the President's party in cooperation with the executive branch of the government. This party, the Independent Electoral Front, and its affiliates dominated the Assembly and were instrumental in strengthening the powers both of the President and of the central government. One result of the labors of the Assembly was to end once and for all the fiction that the states possessed the right to elect their own executives, a right which passed unconditionally to the national executive. Powers of the state legislatures and municipal councils were curtailed and their sources of revenue drastically reduced.

This recitation of presidential influence in constitutional development does not exhaust the list by any means, but it is long enough to lend support to the thesis that many of the changes have had their origin in nothing more than the individual will of the President.

IV. PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

Extent of Presidential Powers. The powers which the President of Venezuela has exercised in the past and may exercise today in an almost unlimited fashion are indeed extensive. Chapter III of the 1953 constitution, which deals with executive powers, divides them into three categories: those which the President possesses in his Council of Ministers; those exercised by him through his individual ministers; and those which belong exclusively to him. This is a purely formal division which has little practical meaning because the President has complete control over his ministers. It may be said, therefore, that he is in unrestricted possession of all three categories of powers.

In his Council of Ministers, the President may call extra sessions of Congress; issue and revise administrative regulations; create, suppress, or modify public services; conclude treaties, contracts, or agreements with other states; decree additional credits to the budget; and initiate actions against officials in the government who give cause.

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[29] Ambrosia Perero, *História Orgánica de Venezuela* (Caracas, 1943), p. 147. See also W. S. Robertson, *History of the Latin American Nations* (N. Y., 1922), p. 410, and Picón Rivas, *Indice Constitucional de Venezuela* (cited in note 26), pp. 45–46.

Through his individual ministers, the President's power extends to the administration of the national fiscal system; the direction of foreign relations; the nomination and removal of state governors and all other national employees whose appointment is not entrusted by the Constitution to other officials; the administration of territories and national dependencies; the establishment of standards for the utilization of the income of the states and the coordination of state budgets with that of the national; the negotiation of loans and the making of contractual agreements.

By himself the President may name and remove the ministers of the Cabinet; reserve any portfolio for himself, and delegate his powers to the minister of his choice; attach to his executive office any public service he deems convenient; declare war and negotiate peace when Congress so decrees; direct war, exercise those state powers delegated to him by the states in their respective constitutions, and exercise all other powers which the constitution and ordinary law vest in him.

In times of national or international emergency, moreover, the President, together with his ministers, may suspend the constitutional guarantees, either totally or in part, with the exception of the prohibition against the death penalty.

These powers taken in the aggregate bestow a tremendous grant of authority on the President and completely overshadow the paltry grants to the Congress. If there is any one section of the constitution which can be said to reflect the reality of modern Venezuelan politics, it is that dealing with executive powers.

Exercise of the Presidential Powers. In the abnormal situation brought about by the suspension of a constitution and the automatic dissolution of state and national legislative bodies which this entails, the executive has resorted to decree law to carry on the functions of government. In times of institutional normality, the President does not have to rely on decrees for ordinary law because his control of Congress is such that his legislative proposals encounter no resistance. In most matters he prefers to demonstrate his respect for the precepts of the constitution by working through his Congress. Even the strongest dictators of Latin America " . . . generally share the colonial Spaniard's awe of the letter of the law."[30]

Although the main body of Venezuelan law rests upon legislation duly passed by Congress, the President has been able to effect far-reaching and major governmental changes without consulting Congress. His power to do so comes from such constitutional clauses as those giving him the right to establish or abolish new public services. He has had a free hand in such important matters as the creation of new executive departments.[31] The Ministries of Agriculture and

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[30] Schurz, *Latin America* (cited in note 1), p. 122.

[31] Other matters which seem more properly within the scope of the legislature have also been subject to executive action. Specific examples include the organizational laws

Livestock and Health and Social Assistance were created by executive decrees of López Contreras in 1936, just as the Ministries of Justics and Mines and Hydrocarbons were established by decrees of the *Junta* in 1950.

Apart from the more common use of the decree as a regulatory and implementing device, the power is frequently used by the President to provide additional credits to various sections of the departmental budgets.[32] In practice, the discretional power which the executive enjoys with respect to the expenditure of public funds depends solely on whether the revenue received during the year is larger than that anticipated in the budget. Through his power to decree additional monies, the President in 1936 and 1937, for example, authorized additional expenditures totalling 40 per cent of the original budget. Similar figures can be cited for almost every year since that time.

Until 1945 the major portion of the additional funds was assigned to Chapter Seven of the budget of the Ministry of Interior Relations. Chapter Seven was devoted to "extraordinary expenditures of public service as they occur." This extremely elastic clause was allegedly used by Gómez as a source of generous gifts to his family and friends. Concerning the use of the Chapter, one Venezuelan authority critically comments that, although governments of every country provide secret funds for extraordinary expenditures, Venezuela exceeds them all. Chapter Seven, he argues, served to cover inadmissible expenses of public funds for purposes and ends that had no official justification.[33] The Technical Economic Commission supported this contention when it concluded that "without a doubt, a considerable part of the program to which these large sums were destined was formulated hastily, planned insufficiently and extravagantly, and thus did not reach their proper end."[34]

In the period 1914–1942, a total of 1,714 additional credits were decreed by the President in the amount of approximately 362 million dollars. This sum represents a 20 per cent increase over the budgeted figures during the same period. Of this amount, 579 credits totaling about 41 million dollars were allotted to the account of Chapter Seven. It has proved impossible to account for the money spent, since it was customary to credit the funds in a lump sum without specifying details relative to their expenditure or control.

In numerous instances the executive made additional funds available to various departments within a matter of days after Congress had enacted a new budget.

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of the newly nationalized judicial system and the social security system. The vast *Centro Bolivar* project in the Center of Caracas and the fantastically expensive superhighway from Caracas to La Guaira both owe their existence to executive decrees.

[32] Additional credits to the budget began in 1914, when Gómez included the power in the constitution of that year, presumably because of the disturbance and emergencies which he thought World War I would bring to Venezuela. The power was not discontinued when the war ended.

[33] Ramón Davíd León, *De Agro Pecuario a Petrolero* (cited in note 12), p. 142.

[34] A. M. Fox *et al., Informe presentado al Sr. Ministro de Hacienda de los E.E.U.U. (Venezuela por la Misión Técnica y Económica* (Caracas, 1941), p. 42.

Chapter Seven had become so notorious by 1945 that one of the first acts of the *Junta Revolucionaria* was to abolish it. There seems to be no reason to conclude, however, that conditions have changed much. Indeed, a Special Reserve Fund has replaced the infamous Chapter Seven as an instrument of executive power.

Large cash surpluses accumulate in the Venezuelan treasury as a result of the governmental practice of underestimating the national revenue. Since 1944 the President, acting upon data supplied by the Minister of Finance, has had the power to transfer these surpluses from the Treasury to the Special Reserve Fund.[35] It is from this Fund that the President may now decree expenditures of sums not authorized in the budget. At the present time the power of the executive in this respect is less fettered than at any other time in the past. Although the 1945 constitution specified that money had to be available and the expenditure necessary, the 1953 constitution does not impose these conditions. Nor does it specify that the expenditures have to be submitted to Congress for its approval, as was the case in preceding documents.[36] The Congress therefore possesses no effective power of the purse.

The limitations on the ends to which the Special Reserve Fund may be used are those which the executive himself sets up in his budget decrees. Article Four of the 1953–54 budget stipulates that the money of the Fund can be applied only to financing extraordinary works of public utility, to increasing the tempo of works already underway, and "for ends of fiscal compensatory policies when they may be considered beneficial to national interests." In view of the fact that the sole judges of these conditions are the President and his Council of Ministers, it would appear that the restrictions exist only insofar as these officials choose to respect them. It is clear, too, that the Special Reserve Fund is a source of tremendous power for the President and that in the hands of unscrupulous men it could be the means of great personal enrichment.

Because the government steadfastly adheres to the principle of a balanced budget and because it always spends more than it plans, recourse to the constitutional power of the President to decree additional credits has been necessary. Discussing the use of the device, the Technical Economic Mission saw no justification for the practice of consistently underestimating national income and expenditures. In the opinion of the Mission " . . . all the ordinary and periodical expenses are well known at the very moment the budget is prepared."[37]

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[35] See, for example, the *Gaceta Oficial* for April 4 and June 7, 1952 for transfers of 30 million and 70 million bolivars, respectively.

[36] In practice the requirement of congressional approval for additional credits was of no importance. Congress, in recess the greater part of the year, was prevented from giving previous authorization. When it reconvened, it was presented with accomplished fact. The obligation of the President to prove the need for the additional sums was met by his sending the Congress the *Gaceta Oficial* in which the decree granting the credit appeared. See Wolf, *Tratado de Derecho Constitucional Venezolano*, Vol. 2, p. 275.

[37] Fox, *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

Another common use of the decree power of the President relates to the creation of the organisms known as "autonomous institutes." These are institutions established and regulated by federal law, possessing definite legal personalities and their own property, distinct and independent from the national Treasury. The presidents of Venezuela have made repeated use of their legal power to create these institutes.[38] The establishment of these quasi-governmental bodies involves an initial investment of large sums of public money and the appointment of administrative personnel. Given the nature of the government in Venezuela, there can be no doubt that the personal influence and power of the President increase each time he adds a new service to the executive branch of the government.

One further use of the decree power should be noted. Like many other Latin American executives, the Venezuelan President has the constitutional power to suspend individual guarantees, either totally or in part, when in his opinion and that of the Council of Ministers situations arise which create or could create national or international emergencies. The 1947 constitution limited the President in this respect insofar as it required him to submit the suspension decree with his reasons to Congress within ten days of its promulgation. The 1953 charter does not bind him with such a limitation. It must be assumed, therefore, that legal requirements are satisfied when the President discusses the matter in his annual report to Congress.

The power to suspend individual rights is an effective political weapon in the hands of the presidents who have used it to protect their regimes from possible overthrow. Limitations placed on the guarantees in times of unrest and revolt or following violent changes in power have had a paralyzing effect on the political life of the nation. The curtailment of civil liberties in 1926, 1942, 1943, 1945, 1948, and 1950 affected, among other things, the inviolability of home and mail, records and account; liberty of travel; freedom of speech, press, and assembly; freedom from arbitrary arrest and the right not to be held *incomunicado*. In spite of the fact that the 1953 constitution contains ample guarantees of civil liberty, the citizens of Venezuela do not at present enjoy it in full measure, for the restrictive decrees of 1948 and 1950 have never been completely rescinded.

V. EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS

Vis-à-vis the President, the Congress has been called an "assembly of employees" whose initiative extends mainly to erecting statues or approving degrees of honor or additional titles to the President, " . . . in other words to proclaim[ing] to the face of the earth their absolute submission to him who names them, gives them lucrative employment, and humors them when they ask for something."[39]

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[38] Among those recently established are the Venezuelan Development Corporation, the National Institute of Sanitary Works, the Venezuelan Airmail Line, the National Agrarian Institute, the Institute of University City, and the Central Institute of Social Insurance.

Wolf elaborates on this theme and offers as a partial explanation for the failure of Congress to achieve its rightful place in the scheme of government the fact that it is composed largely of public officials. In spite of clear constitutional prohibitions, public officials of all categories run for office in the national Congress. Senators and deputies circumvent the restriction by resigning temporarily from their other government posts. Their replacements clearly understand, of course, that these officials will return to their jobs when the sessions are over.[40] Taking into consideration the fact that the President appoints employees of the national government, and that state workers are named by the governor, who is himself an appointee of the President, it seems reasonable to conclude that any claim to independence on the part of the legislature is meaningless as long as this situation exists.[41]

The subservience of Congress to the executive is said to date from 1848, when President Monagas, in answer to a congressional attempt to impeach him, instigated mob action that led to the death of three deputies in the halls of the Capitol. It has been asserted that as a result of this action " . . . constitutional government in Venezuela was sacrificed, the legislature was made subservient to the executive, and law became dictatorial fiat."[42]

Venezuelan students of government generally agree that the main role of the legislature has been to enact into law, speedily and without modification, all proposals that come to it from the executive branch. Gómez' proposals were always translated into law exactly as they came from the dictator.[43] Since then, the power to initiate legislation has become almost exclusively an executive function. Although most of the recent constitutions have said that "laws may be initiated in either of the two legislative chambers by members of either or by the national executive power," the majority of bills originate in the executive departments. Recommendation by the President is enough to insure their passage. In the formulation of bills and particularly in the preparation of the budget, little attention is given to the wishes of individual legislators.

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[39] R. Seijas, *El Presidente* (Caracas, 1891), p. 53.

[40] Wolf, *Tratado de Derecho Constitucional Venezolano* (cited in note 6), Vol. 1, p. 316.

[41] An effective civil service system does not exist. In the absence of standards and criteria for the selection and employment of personnel, the possibility of an individual's obtaining a government job varies in direct proportion to the strength of his kinship or friendship with the employing official. Or, as the Venezuelans say, "Fulano es amigo." The *personalismo* which pervades the government creates an atmosphere in which personal loyalty to the President or to his immediate subordinates constitutes the prime requirement for securing and holding a job. See Enrique Tejera, *Los Empleádos Públicos* (Caracas, 1945), *passim*.

[42] W. H. Pierson, "Foreign Influence on Venezuelan Political Thought, 1830–1930," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 15, pp. 3–42, at p. 18 (Feb., 1935).

[43] One *Gomecista* member of Congress, after the death of the dictator, was stung by criticism on this point. "Everyone knows," he said, "that orders accompanied every bill not to change so much as a comma." Cited in Wolf, Vol. 1, pp. 315–16.

This state of affairs led the Senate in 1945 to instruct its Committee on Public Finance to study ways and means by which the senators could compel the President to consider their financial wishes when the budget was being prepared. The Senate resolution went so far as to demand that the President give his reasons for failing to consider congressional recommendations in the budget. The Committee was astute enough to recognize the demand as unrealistic and informed the Senate that no way could be devised to fasten such an obligation on the President. The budgets are passed year after year with no modification or with very insignificant changes. In the light of the evidence, it appears that Congress can neither collaborate effectively with the executive nor control his expenditures. Indeed, the 1953 constitution specifies that the budget submitted by the President will go into force on July 1 of each year whether or not it has been approved by Congress. Such a provision makes a complete mockery of congressional control of the purse.

Further evidence of legislative deference to the executive lies in the automatic approval which the Congress unfailingly gives to the annual administrative reports which the President, his Cabinet, and the Supreme Court are required by the constitution to deliver to it. These officials appear in person before a joint session of Congress. The tremendous size of some of the reports and the speed with which they are approved indicate that for the Congress approval is a mere formality.[44] Certainly it makes no effort to analyze the contents, and almost never are the reports criticized. On the contrary, extravagant and flowery praise is usually heaped upon the President. The approval accorded to the report of Provisional President Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 1953 is typical. Doing little more than rephrase the contents of the President's message, the Assembly declared that it had reached the conclusion that Armed Forces overthrow of the government in 1948 was fully justified. The Provisional President was congratulated upon his conduct of the affairs of the nation during the four-year period in which Congress was not in existence.

The Veto Power. The veto power of the President of Venezuela is in many respect similar to that of the President of the United States. It is more extensive, however, in that it includes the item veto. The pocket veto, on the other hand, is unknown in Venezuela. In the extremely unlikely event that Congress should defy the President by passing a bill over his veto, the President must promulgate the law within five days or raise the issue of constitutionality and send it to the Supreme Court. The Court has ten days in which to rule on the validity of the law. If the statute is upheld, the President has no choice but to sign the bill into law within five days. Such an elaborate procedure has no practical meaning whatever, since the Congress rarely acts on any legislation that does not have its origin in the executive branch of the government. In any event, the Congress does not pass legislation which would displease the President.

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[44] The 1953 Constitutional Assembly, in the midst of preparing a new constitution, approved the entire lot, some of which ran to five bulky volumes, in two weeks.

VI. ADMINISTRATION

Presidential powers are formally exercised through the media of two executive institutions: the Cabinet and the Council of Ministers. Actually, these bodies are practically identical in personnel. "Cabinet" is the term used to designate the heads of the executive departments in their individual capacities.[45] The Council of Ministers, on the other hand, refers to the formal meeting of these officials under the chairmanship of the President. As has been mentioned above, the chief executive may use certain of his powers only with the concurrence of the Council of Ministers.

Rightly or wrongly, one may surmise that a legal limitation of this kind indicates a desire by the constitutional assemblies to restrain the executive in the use of the extensive powers granted to him. A closer scrutiny of the pertinent articles, however, reveals an inconsistency which, it can be argued, defeats the purpose of such an arrangement. Two articles are in point:

> Article 111. The Ministers are the legal organs of the President of the Republic.
> Article 115. The written order of the President of the Republic will not excuse a Minister from personal responsibility which he incurs through the illegal use of his powers.

If these stipulations mean anything, it is that the ministers are completely under the control of the President and have no more discretionary authority than he wishes to give them.[46] He does not countenance contrary opinions of his ministers, and members of his Cabinet who offend in this respect are quickly eliminated. The device by which this is accomplished is the well-established custom of mass resignation of the Cabinet. This action is always publicly held to be a voluntary and patriotic move designed to give the President a free hand to make the changes he deems necessary.[47] The dismissal of a minister is never made openly. In the majority of instances Cabinet resignation en masse has been followed by reappointment of most of the ministers, either to their former posts or to different portfolios.

Such changes in Cabinet personnel have been fairly frequent since 1936, over thirty reorganizations having occurred since January of that year. Only ten have involved major changes, however.[48] Wolf's complaint that a minister scarcely had time to familiarize himself with his job before he was removed is less valid today than it was in 1945. Since that date the tendency has been to retain capable ministers for an increasingly longer period of time.

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[45] In 1954, for the avowed purpose of promoting greater administrative efficiency, the Congress authorized the President to divide the highest official agencies into three groups: National Policy, Production, and General Service. The National Policy Group includes the Office of the President, and the departments of Defense, Foreign Relations, Interior, and Treasury. Production comprehends the Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock, Mines and Hydrocarbons, Public Works and Labor. General Services is in charge of Justice, Health and Social Welfare, Communications and Education. Under this division the National Policy Group is responsible for general administration; Production concerns itself with the national development of the country's physical conditions; and General Service has the responsibility of advancing the moral, intellectual, and material wellbeing of the people. See *Venezuela Up-to-Date*, Vol. 5, p. 3 (June, 1954).

[46] *Time*, Feb. 28, 1955, p. 28 alleges that Pérez Jiménez "demands plenty of action, but he rarely needs or wants suggestions from his cabinet. He treats the ministers as a team of technicians; their two-hour Saturday sessions are brisk and businesslike."

[47] Wolf, Vol. 1, p. 415.

Although the 1953 constitution does not specifically declare that ministers must enforce presidential decrees (as had been the case in previous charters), the existence of such an obligation is clearly implied in Article III. Constitutional restrictions on the employment of various presidential powers except through the medium of the Council of Ministers give rise to the ambiguous situation in which the minister is technically the colleague of the President in the Council of Ministers, but his subordinate in the Cabinet.

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The institutional authoritarianism which has characterized Venezuelan politics during its independent life continues in full force and vigor today. The concept of executive dominance expressed in such ideas as *cesarismo democrático* and the hierarchical structure of the executive branch make it possible for the influence and power of the national executive to extend to all levels of government and facilitate the implementation of the wishes and orders of *el presidente.* The Congress elects the judges of the Supreme Court from among men known to be sympathetic to the President and his program. The Supreme Court in turn selects the inferior judges from lists presented to it by the President. District attorneys and prosecutors are appointed solely by him. The function of presidentially-appointed state governors is to see that nationally-determined policies and programs relating to the states are carried into effect in as efficient a manner as possible.

In all instances policy originates with the President. His Cabinet and Council of Ministers are in fact subordinate to him and act mainly in a consultative capacity. Nevertheless, their concurrence in decisions made solely by the President is useful in the sense that it gives the appearance of multilateral consideration to a unilateral decision. This is particularly true when a measure is contemplated about whose popularity there is some doubt.

The intimate connection between the Armed Forces and the government has contributed greatly to the growth of heavy-handed presidential control of all government activities. Army circles have always been extremely influential in Venezuelan politics, and military methods in reaching a decision and in implementing it have been utilized almost exclusively in designing governmental policy. Orderly development toward democratic government has been seriously retarded by the interference of the military in the governmental process. Indeed, it was dealt a severe blow when the Armed Forces in 1945 and 1948 abolished the Congress, state legislatures, and municipal councils.

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[48] Four have occurred since the revolution of 1945. The changes in administration from López Contreras to Medina Angarita brought about completely new cabinets, of course. López was responsible for 12 more shuffles, in which he shifted men from one post to another. In a four-month period one minister occupied three different ministries before being eliminated altogether. López moved at least ten men from one portfolio to another. Reshuffling the Cabinet was most common during the terms of López and Medina Angarita. It was used infrequently by the provisional governments of 1945–47 and 1948–52. The present regime has made several changes.

Almost continuous military control of the government during the past 50 years and the fact that the present regime responds to the orders of a military President justify the prediction that the establishment of civil, responsible government in Venezuela is remote. It seems inconceivable that the Armed Forces, in their self-appointed role of saviors of Venezuela, will voluntarily relinquish their great political power. They may possibly permit some relaxation, but one may be sure that no regime will endure in which they do not have a weighty voice.

At the present time the Venezuelan military President and his political party control the national, state, and local units of government, and presumably they will remain in control until the expiration of their five-year term in 1958. At the end of that time a new electoral statute will almost certainly be promulgated. It seems probable that if the present regime is able to maintain its firm control, the provisions of the statute will be liberal. If there is political agitation in the country, it is altogether likely that an excuse will be found for not having elections at all. In any event, it appears highly unlikely that within the foreseeable future the Venezuelan people will be able to go to the polls in the expectation that their wishes will be respected. The orderly elections of 1947 and 1952 demonstrated that the people were ready for free, fair, and untrammeled elections and that they were both eager and capable of going about the process of choosing their leaders in peaceable fashion. It has therefore been discouraging for them to see their will flouted by men who, while proclaiming their steadfast devotion to the principles of democracy, have yet to demonstrate their respect for the democratic process. Violations of promises to honor the electoral results have disillusioned the Venezuelan people. The fiasco of their 1952 election endeavor and the alleged executive manipulations of the results have, without a doubt, dealt a blow to the growth of political maturity in Venezuela.

RESPONSES TO PLANNED POLITICAL CHANGE IN A TANGANYIKA TRIBAL GROUP*

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The rapid succession in which independence or a large measure of self-government has been achieved by dependent territories in Africa has been one of the more striking political phenomena of the postwar period. It would be rash indeed to prophesy the total eclipse of colonialism in the modern world, for the situations obtaining in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, as well as the fears expressed by the Ashanti in the Gold Coast and the southern tribesmen in the Sudan regarding the shape of the independent state, can be indications that political dependency can be reasserted in new forms. Nevertheless, the brand of Western colonialism which reached its zenith prior to World War I appears to be drawing to a close, and in a number of instances the metropolitan power concerned is actually planning the liquidation of its empire.

The causes of this vaporization of colonialism in Africa are complex. In some cases the significant factor is rooted in international politics, as in the military defeat of Italy or the encouragement given by Arab and Asian states to rising nationalist groups. In other instances the financial position of the metropolitan country or the anti-colonial policy of a major political party has been the crucial factor. Of equal standing with these causal factors have been the developments taking place within the dependencies themselves since the beginning of World War II. A number of forces leading to the disintegration of the existing social order have been intensified in this period, and frequently the basis for reintegration has been found in a demand for self-government. Some of the forces of disintegration, such as the impact which Islam or Christianity has made on the traditional value system, have been long in developing. In this category, too, would belong the mixed reactions of the Africans to the presence of European settlers: on the one hand, imitating the new techniques in agriculture and animal husbandry, and on the other, resenting the alienation of relatively fertile land. It has, however, been the impact which the large-scale governmental programs in economic and social development have made on the dependencies that has accelerated the process of social disintegration.

The disintegration has had a number of common manifestations. In the first place, there has been a shift from the predominantly subsistence economy characteristic of most African dependencies to one approaching a cash economy. This has broken into the parochialism of the peasant cultivator, turning his attention from the economic unit based on the village or the kinship group towards larger units of economic organization—trade unions and cooperatives—and larger territorial units in which to dispose of his crops or services.

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In some instances the new cash economy has upset social rankings by permitting peasant cultivators to purchase bicycles, pay their children's school fees, or acquire other benefits which had in the past been symbols of superior social rank. Moreover, the cash economy may also threaten the social station of those traditionally in control of the land. It does this either by emphasizing the importance of new forms of property, such as merchandizing, transport, and salary-earning skills, or by creating demands for private ownership of land.

A second feature of this disintegration has been the intensifying of role differentiation in the communities concerned. In many East African societies, for example, community role differentiation—apart from that which exists in the kinship groups—has been relatively slight. There may be a few individuals occupying distinct roles as chiefs, court elders, rain-makers, or blacksmiths; however, the majority of the people could be classified as "those who do the work of all," that is, cultivation, hunting, and animal husbandry. Under the impact of Christianity, formal education, and the recent development programs, new community roles have been added and old ones intensified. Thus, we witness the emergence of a new elite composed of teachers, priests, clerks, and medical assistants who are capable of granting or withholding community services and who have been anticipating a share in the respect, wealth, and political affairs of the community. Their emergence, in turn, has brought about a reaction from the traditional elite, which recognizes a threat to the existing order.

A third feature of postwar social disintegration has been the areal disparities in economic and social development within a given dependency. Thus, at the same time that the introduction of a cash crop is leading to the attainment of social cohesion within a larger territorial unit, it may also be contributing to the dissolution of historic tribal or regional cohesion or to the hardening of historic separatisms. Furthermore, just as individual Africans often regard their less-educated fellows with disdain, so also can a disparity in educational programs tend to result in a pejorative attitude on the part of a tribal group of superior education towards a tribal grouping which is largely illiterate.

While much of the social disintegration leading to demands for political reform has its roots in economic change, one must be wary of mono-factoral explanations. It may be that the economic changes in a territory are such that they (1) do not intensify community role differentiation but merely add the alternative generalized role of unskilled wage laborer, and (2) do not upset social rankings, because the benefits of economic change are largely retained by the existing elites. Cases in point might be the Portuguese territories in southern Africa and—outside Africa—the oil-rich Arab territories. Furthermore, even where the benefits are widely distributed in the form of health services and improved housing, and where the imparting of skills does lead to increased role differentiation, it may still be possible to control the type of education and external influences available to the new elites and thereby forestall demands for alteration in the political order. With many qualifying remarks about the overt use of force, motivations, and the nature of the control apparatus, this is substantially what has been happening in the Belgian Congo until recently and in the Communist dependencies of Europe and Asia.

It would appear that economic and social changes are more apt to lead to demands for alterations in the political order when the administering authority either actively encourages, or at least does not take effective steps to prevent, the occurrence of certain activities. These activities vary from case to case, but a tentative list might include: the formation of popular associations; the establishment of Western-type universities; permitting students and others to travel abroad or have easy access to foreign visitors; the introduction of a legal system which stresses protections for the individual; the purchase of radios; relatively uncontrolled distribution of foreign books and periodicals; and the introduction of representative political institutions at some level or for some group within the territory. Admittedly, the above list "stacks the cards" in favor of conditions usually met in British and, to a lesser extent, in French territories; however, it is precisely in the dependencies of these two powers that African independence movements have been succeeding. Nevertheless, the policies of these two powers present some sharp contrasts. France rejects independence as a goal for the African dependencies in favor of immediate equal membership in the French Union; yet, she refuses to take the steps necessary for making that political equality a reality. Britain, on the other hand, holds out the prospect of eventual membership in a Commonwealth of independent states and has been actively engaged in planning for that eventuality. One may question whether British motives are based on altruism, self-interest, financial necessity, or a combination of these. One may also question whether the plans undertaken are best calculated to achieve the stated ends. However, one can hardly question that plans are being put into operation in Tanganyika and other areas of British Africa which are making significant alterations in the political order of the dependencies concerned.

The degree of success which a metropolitan power may achieve in planning political change in a dependency is conditioned by a number of factors. One of these is the character of the dependency relationship itself; that is, whether the relationship was established and sustained through the use of overt force or through the acceptance by the dependent peoples of certain benefits accruing from the relationship. There is, furthermore, the question of whether the political goals sought are actually obtainable in view of the economic conditions or certain cultural values prevailing in the dependent society. Closely related to this is the problem of how the transformations are to be brought about: through the gradual modification of existing institutions or through a rapid introduction of new institutional patterns. The former approach may in certain cases be better calculated to capitalize on existing loyalities in securing adherence to the new goals. In other cases, however, the existing institutions may constitute enormities which are repudiated by the new elites and which thwart the attainment of new goals.

A further consideration involves the character of the agents who are to effectuate the change. Questions arise concerning their number, racial origins, familiarity with the local culture, and experience regarding the political system they are attempting to introduce. Much depends upon personal relationships, such as whether an attitude of intimacy or aloofness is required in dealing with the dependent people and whether the living style and social life of the agents divorce them from the local community. There is also the question of whether other individuals, such as settlers, priests, merchants, and private persons identified with the agents and the situation of dependency, may complicate the task of the agents in establishing rapport.

Finally, and probably most significant of all, there are the unplanned and—from the point of view of the goals sought—undesired responses on the part of the dependent people to the political alterations planned. Some of these responses may be the product of incompatibilities in the overall program of the administrators. Equally important, however, are the resistances which may be presented by the existing elites to the changes envisioned and the pressures of the new elites to accelerate the rate of change and divert the character of the change to forms more acceptable to them. It is this manifestation of selectivity that presents some of the greatest problems for political planners.

I. THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN SUKUMALAND

The area selected to illustrate the problems of political planning is Sukumaland, which embraces five districts of the Trust Territory of Tanganyika. It includes within its confines over one million inhabitants, most of whom are Wasukuma. Although the Sukuma is the largest of Tanganyika's tribal groups, it constitutes only one-eighth of the Territory's total population and is but one of a polyglot mixture of over one hundred such groupings enumerated in the recent census. Consequently, events in Sukumaland can best be considered in the context of economic and social change and the administrative policy of Tanganyika as a whole.

During the period of German rule in East Africa (1885–1916), a certain amount of economic development had been carried out by way of rail and road construction and the introduction of cash crops. There was, however, a great areal disparity in development, with major efforts being concentrated on the accessible coastal strip or the fertile and healthful highlands areas around Kilimanjaro and Meru. Sukumaland, which occupies an inland position south of Lake Victoria and which had sleeping sickness, malaria, and recurrent periods of drought to offer the potential settler, missed many of the early effects of European contact. Moreover, unlike the Wachagga and other groups who resisted German rule and thus experienced closer administration during the period of pacification, the Wasukuma chiefs were in many instances openly friendly to the Germans. Consequently, the simple requirements of administration disturbed but slightly the existing social system. A similar paucity of contact obtained with respect to the activity of Christian missionaries, even though the White Fathers Order, the Moravians, and the American pastors and lay workers of the Africa Inland Missions early established themselves in Sukumaland. Here the extent of medical services was small and the educational facilities were open primarily to the sons of chiefs and others who could afford the expense.

The rate of economic development slackened considerably after the Germans surrendered the Territory in 1916. In fact, during the first three decades of British administration Tanganyika was referred to as the "Cinderella" of the Empire. Many officials attribute the lack of private or governmental investment to the uncertain political status of Tanganyika as a League of Nations Mandate. Whatever the reason, administrative efforts in that period constituted little more than holding operations, with available funds having to be diverted to combat the famine which followed the recurrent seasons of drought and locust invasions or to alleviate disruptions during the depression.

During the Second World War, despite the reductions in European staff, the economic situation in Tanganyika began to alter considerably. The increased demands of the armed forces for cotton, sisal, cattle, and other products of Tanganyika led to an increase in the cash character of the Territory's economy. Economic changes were further intensified in the postwar period by the programs undertaken with funds from the United Kingdom's Colonial Development and Welfare Act. For the Sukuma economic system these events constituted somewhat of a "shock treatment," with the acceleration of cotton production being the prime factor. Prior to the war, agricultural production was largely subsistence in character. Cattle, of which the Wasukuma have close to a million head, played a significant role in neither a subsistence nor a cash economy; rather, as is true of many other groups in East Africa, cattle were a feature of the prestige economy and figured prominently in rites connected with birth, marriage, and burial. The attitude towards cattle has resulted in a mixed reaction on the part of the Wasukuma to the administration's economic programs. With regard to cotton, legumes, and other cash crops, they have needed only slight encouragement to increase cultivation, and it is from these sources that the bulk of the new prosperity is derived. One increment in the new prosperity, however, is received largely with reluctance. This is the income derived from the sale of cattle, many of which are sold as part of the compulsory destocking program. From a technical standpoint, destocking can be justified as a soil conservation and animal husbandry measure; nevertheless, the cultural values associated with the ownership of cattle persist, and destocking has presented a source of discontent among the more conservative peasants which has been utilized by popular leaders in their campaign against the existing political order.

Concomitant with changes on the economic front which were adding new groups of wealthy cotton growers, small traders, and transporters to the Sukuma communities, changes were also taking place with regard to educational and social service programs of the government. Again leaving aside the question of British motivations, it can be noted that these programs have done much to raise the standard of living of the people of Tanganyika. In Sukumaland, for example, good progress has been made in the eradication of malaria, bilharzia, and other endemic diseases. Through grants to local authorities or the missions, the government has come close to achieving its ten-year target of having 28 per cent of Sukuma children enrolled in primary schools. Furthermore, although they are in many instances highly unpopular with the Wasukuma, a number of programs have been introduced for conserving or developing water, soil, forests, and other natural resources. These programs have further intensified community role differentiation by increasing the ranks of teachers, agricultural instructors, rural medical aides, and other natural resources personnel.

The new elites have in fact been insisting upon a greater share in the political order of Sukumaland, but it is a matter of question whether they would have been demanding this as early as they did had it not been that the administration has actually been insisting upon the inclusion of these new elites in the political affairs of Tanganyika. Furthermore, since the administration is planning the political changes, it is evident that they would prefer to have the new elites participate in the evolution towards self-government in accordance with plans devised by the government.

Political planning in postwar Tanganyika has had three main features. The first of these concerns the level at which political reform is to begin. While it is true that much has been done by way of reconstituting the legislative and executive councils and other territorial institutions, the main burden of political reform has taken place at the local level. In part this tendency may be attributed to the value which the British themselves place upon local government in the United Kingdom. A more telling reason, however, seems to lie in the fact that "Tanganyika" is a term which has political significance to Europeans, Asians, and a small, although growing, number of African civil servants and members of such organizations as the Tanganyika African National Union. The overwhelming majority of Africans have their political interests attuned to a much smaller unit, approximating the tribal group. Even the tribal group may be beyond the political horizon of many Africans, for the fact is that in pre-European times the Sukuma, Nyamwezi, Ha, Chagga, and other large groups each lacked centralized political authority. In the case of the Wasukuma, the tribal group was divided into more than 50 autonomous chiefdoms. The term Wasukuma merely designated a group of people who lived in the northern part of the cultivation steppe, who spoke a common language, observed similar customs and laws, and had social links based on the spread of kinship ties throughout the hinterland chiefdoms. Inter-chiefdom hostilities within tribal groupings have persisted even where the British have created tribal-wide councils, and inter-tribal hostilities are even more evident, as in the armed clashes which the Wasukuma have on their borders with young Masai warriors. Tribal separatist attitudes, even among the emergent elites, have been manifest in the reluctance of the powerful tribal-based political associations in Buhaya and Uchagga to affiliate with the territorial-wide Tanganyika African National Union.

The second broad feature of postwar political planning is the vehicle through which the reforms are being introduced. Under the influence of Governor Sir Donald Cameron, who had served under Lord Lugard in Nigeria, the system of indirect rule was introduced into Tanganyika in the middle 1920's. Under this system an attempt has been made to utilize traditional authority systems as vehicles for local administration. Some of the difficulties involved in the application of this policy will become clear in subsequent comments upon the traditional authority system of the Wasukuma. The general policy in the postwar period still looks to the utilization of chiefs in local administration even though in some areas indirect rule has been completely abandoned and in other areas substantial modifications have taken place with regard to the authority of the chief and the creation of representative institutions.

The third feature of postwar planning concerns the nature of the new political institutions. Although the reforms were initially subject to a great deal of experimentation, it became apparent by about 1950 that the general pattern of local government sought for Tanganyika was one based on the English system, with the multi-purpose local council being the cardinal feature. Depending upon the area and population of the unit, as well as historic associations, the local government of a unit may actually consist of a pyramid or tier of councils serving levels from the village to the district or even a county. It is only at the higher levels, however, that financial responsibility is granted with respect to levying rates and cesses and to planning and spending for social service and natural resource development programs. The lower-echelon councils are largely electoral bodies and inter-communication forums for ascertaining grass-root sentiments and disseminating information regarding the work of the superior councils. These councils are to be representative bodies, including traditional authorities as well as members of the new elite groups, and including councillors chosen from the diverse tribal and racial groups resident within the unit. For Sukumaland, the crucial problem has been whether these and other political innovations can be acceptable to both the emergent groups and the traditional leadership.

II. THE TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY SYSTEM OF THE WASUKUMA[1]

The lack of centralized political authority among the Wasukuma in the pre-European era meant that there was not one authority system but rather 50 or more parallel systems; however, the similarity of political institutions throughout Sukumaland justifies one's speaking of "the" traditional authority system. Each chiefdom was in large measure a politically autonomous unit, although temporary military alliances among chiefs who belonged to the same royal clans were often arranged. There was no subordination of one chiefdom to another, even though a number of chiefdoms originated by "hiving off" from larger units and even though chiefdoms suffered defeat in war. In the latter case, a victorious chief might ravage the fields and carry off slaves or cattle, but he was afraid to risk the vengeance of the ancestors of the defeated chiefdom by incorporating the area within his own domain.

The dominant feature of the internal political system was the prominence of the hereditary chief, who on cursory examination might appear to have exercised autocratic powers. His role as supreme magistrate in his chiefdom extended to judgments involving the death penalty and confiscation of all the property of the convicted party. Moreover, the payment to the chief of annual and extraordinary tribute in the form of cattle, grain, or labor; his collections from court fines and fees; and his share in the distribution of the product of a tribal hunt made him the only truly wealthy person in the chiefdom. He was able to use his wealth to reward the faithful and withhold benefits from the obstinate. Furthermore, although few chiefs appear to have been military field commanders, it was, nevertheless, the chief who decided the issue of peace and war and distributed the spoils. Much of his success in warfare depended upon the strength of his elite guard, which was composed of specially trained slaves who stood in a client relationship to the chief. In exchange for a high share in the spoils, they provided protection for the chief against external invasions and against internal threats to his authority. An additional client relationship existed between the chief and the headmen, who assisted him in hearing minor court cases, collecting tribute, and allocating land in their areas. Since many of the headmen were sons of chiefs and thereby excluded from the succession under the prevailing matrilineal system, they constituted no threat to his authority.

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[1] In addition to my own findings, I am indebted here to the writings of Hans Cory, especially *The Ntemi* (London, 1951) and *The Indigenous Political System of the Sukuma* (Nairobi, 1954).

It is not merely the multiple roles of the chief and the institutionalization of group supports for his authority which give one the impression of autocracy. The basis for this impression is the fact that one of the main supports for chieftaincy authority is his putative magico-religious powers to secure success in battle, the arrival or abatement of the rains, a good harvest, or the termination of an epidemic or a locust invasion. This semi-divine character of chieftainship was made manifest to the people in the ceremonies performed at the time of his enthronement and in the rituals connected with the annual agricultural cycle and in times of crises. The consequence of this is that responsibility for the performance of chiefly duties appeared to lie not so much with the people as with the tribal ancestors, who indicated their approval by bringing good fortune to the chiefdom.

In probing more deeply into the character of the traditional system, the impression of autocracy is considerably diminished. The dependence upon magico-religious supports was a precarious one at best in a land where drought and pestilence are recurrent phenomena. It was in times of "failure" in the chief's powers that responsibilities to empirical sources internal to the social system became evident. In a minor crisis, banishment of the witch-doctor who acted as the chief's intercessor might be a sufficient remedy in appeasing the people. In more serious crises, when famine was threatening, the true character of the chief's tribute, as a tribal bank, was clearly revealed in the distribution of meat and grain to the people. If the crisis persisted, only the past successes and benign character of his rule were sufficient to save a chief; and the remembered histories of a number of Sukuma chiefdoms are replete with cases of deposition of chiefs who "failed" in their magico-religious duties.

In addition to this vague responsibility to "the people" manifest in times of crisis, there were institutionalized checks on chieftaincy autocracy that were in operation at all times. One of these was the authority of the Banang'oma, or royal courtiers. The Banang'oma were the brothers and maternal uncles and cousins of the chief, who were eligible to succeed him. They thus had a proprietary interest in preserving the reigning dynasty equally against external attack and from internal disintegration, which might result from an injudicious use of chieftaincy authority by the incumbent. In many respects the courtiers acted as a council of state, shielding the chief in public and thereby enhancing the impression of divinity, controlling his public and private affairs, attending to his burial (which included hurrying the process along if a wasting disease threatened the notion of divinity), and electing his successor from among a host of candidates.

In addition to the royal institution, popular organizations in the Sukuma villages, such as the dance societies and those based on the age-grade system, also served as counter-balances to the exercise of chieftaincy authority. This was manifest in several respects. In the first place, many political functions in Sukumaland were performed independently of the chief. The regular provision of assistance to the aged and distressed, for example, was a function of the dance societies. One of the age-grade groupings, the *elika* (or young men's societies), played an essential part in the maintenance of social order in the chiefdom through establishing and enforcing codes of good conduct upon its members. Moreover, the chief relied heavily on the *elika* in recruiting warriors, organizing collective labor turn-outs, and assisting new immigrants in their planting and house construction. In these matters the leaders of these associations, the *basumba batale*, were far from being in a position of subservience to the chief. Their organizations worked on a contract basis, securing a portion of the chief's tribute for their services, and the contract was secured through the process of "collective bargaining" between the chief and the *basumba batale*. Moreover, it was the *basumba batale*, acting jointly, who demonstrated before the chief's hut and demanded his abdication when it was evident that his religious powers had "failed" him.

Finally, it must be understood that the roles of supreme magistrate and distributor of the spoils of the chase did not come to the Sukuma chief as a right secured through conquest of his people. It came, rather, through his popular acceptance as an impartial arbiter who was above the inter-clan and interpersonal frictions of the chiefdom. The first chiefs were Hamitic strangers who appeared on the scene at a time when the increasing density of settlement made it difficult to resolve conflict by a resort to blood vengeance or by flight into the bush. The Hamites were accepted because the original Bantu regarded them as being superior in bearing, intellect, and mode of economy—namely, cattle herding; however, the acceptance did not constitute total submission. The settlement of intra-clan disputes and even of certain categories of inter-clan controversy was excluded from the jurisdiction of the chief's court. Moreover, the chief arrived at his judicial decision only in the presence of clan elders, who were concerned not only with the preservation of Sukuma law and custom but also with the interests of their clan members. Moreover, in extreme cases, clan members suffering at the hands of a chief who had abused his authority or who had failed in other respects to protect lives and property could still remove themselves to a neighboring chiefdom. This withdrawal of allegiance thereby deprived the tyrannical chief not only of a warrior and laborer but also of a source of tribute.

III. MODIFICATIONS IN THE AUTHORITY SYSTEM UNDER EUROPEAN RULE

After almost 70 years of European administration in Tanganyika, the modifications in the traditional authority system of the Wasukuma have been substantial, notwithstanding the fact that the British administration during a great part of this period has been committed to the policy of indirect rule. The authority system of the Wasukuma has been altered with regard to at least five general categories: the external political system, the bases for political authority, the relationship of the internal units to each other, the content of political activity, and the delineation of chieftaincy roles.

The External Political System. Under the impact of the European ban on tribal warfare and the requirements of the European administration, the relationship of the Sukuma chiefdoms to each other has been reconstituted. For efficiency of administration, a number of minor chiefdoms have been consolidated or brought under the jurisdiction of a larger neighbor. Also under the rubric of improving administrative control, the autonomy of the remaining chiefdoms has been diminished by the fact that the British have created federations of chiefs. These occurred first on the district or sub-district level and then, in 1947, on the tribal level. Although the chiefdoms remain as administrative and judicial units for the purposes of general legislation, administrative policy, financial affairs, and the definition of Sukuma tribal law and custom, it is the supra-chiefdom federations which have greater significance. Even more important than the alteration in the inter-chiefdom relationship has been the fact that a new external relationship obtains: namely, that between the chiefdoms and the European administrations. The consequences of this relationship become apparent in the examination of other alterations in the traditional authority system.

The Bases for Political Authority. In the traditional period the basis for chieftaincy authority lay partly in the chief's responsibility to an external, nonempirical source as well as to certain empirical sources internal to the system. To a certain extent that external basis for chieftaincy authority has not disappeared even though Christian and Moslem beliefs in monotheism and secular teachings regarding the character of natural phenomena have partially undercut the belief in his magico-religious powers. It is surprising, however, to find that most of the better-educated Christian and Moslem chiefs I interviewed still regularly observe the annual rituals connected with the agricultural cycle. Although several of these chiefs stated that they perform these rites only for the "entertainment" of their people, it is obvious that the signs of obeisance made to the chiefs by commoners on these and other occasions are not those accorded the ordinary mortal in Sukumaland. Moreover, the religious role of the chief may appear in new forms. Two recent cases, for example, have occurred in which Roman Catholic chiefs have attempted to use their official position to aid in the collection of funds to build a church and a new school.

Under European rule the mainstay for chieftaincy authority is still external to the system, although the non-empirical element is substantially reduced. I refer to the fact that, in the final analysis, the question of whether an individual exercises chieftaincy authority depends upon his acceptance by the European administration. This was so under the German administration, as is evidenced by the fact that a number of chiefs were deposed and in some chiefdoms the hereditary system was abandoned entirely in favor of the appointment of *akidas*, who were central government servants. Under British rule the factor of recognition has been explicit in both the Native Authority Ordinance of 1927 and the African Chiefs Ordinance of 1953. True, the administration has permitted the Wasukuma to follow hereditary succession in electing chiefs and has required as a basis for continuance in office that the chiefs act in a responsible manner towards the interests of their people. Nevertheless, these responsibilities exist, not because they were present in the traditional authority system, but because the British administration accepts these things as part of its policy. The supremacy of the European administration is evident in the fact that a duly-elected claimant must secure recognition from the Governor before assuming office. Moreover, the right of deposition of a chief remains the prerogative of the Governor, and any individual or group (such as the *basumba batale*) who attempts to usurp this function would be tried for sedition. Finally, the responsibility of the chief to the central government has been manifest in the abolition of tribute and the introduction of a central government tax, part of the proceeds of which have gone to pay the salary of the chief. Unlike tribute, which was used for the benefit of the whole chiefdom in times of famine, the chief's salary may be used entirely for his personal benefit.

The concomitant feature of the chief's responsibility to the European administration has been the fact that he has at his command the power of the European administration to carry out his duties. This power may in extreme cases be made manifest in the arrival of armed police to put down threats to the chief's authority; but the surprising thing is that the overt display of force is seldom required and even murderers in Sukumaland seldom make an effort to flee or resist an unarmed messenger who comes to arrest them. It may be that the occasional displays of force or the remembrance of European might in two wars have been factors in this compliant attitude; however, the persistence of cultural attitudes towards authority is probably also a significant item.

Relationship of the Internal Units. The relationship of the internal units of the traditional authority system was affected by the alterations in the sources of political authority. Despite the intent of the advocates of Indirect Rule to utilize traditional systems, the fact is that in Sukumaland they concentrated largely upon one part of the system, the hereditary chiefs. In part this can be attributed to the lack of knowledge or indifference of individual administrators the hereditary chief, who on cursory examination might appear to have exercised autocratic powers. His role as supreme magistrate in his chiefdom extended to judgments involving the death penalty and confiscation of all the property of the convicted party. Moreover, the payment to the chief of annual and extraordinary tribute in the form of cattle, grain, or labor; his collections from court fines and fees; and his share in the distribution of the product of a tribal hunt made him the only truly wealthy person in the chiefdom. He was able to use his wealth to reward the faithful and withhold benefits from the obstinate. Furthermore, although few chiefs appear to have been military field commanders, it was, nevertheless, the chief who decided the issue of peace and war and distributed the spoils. Much of his success in warfare depended upon the strength of his elite guard, which was composed of specially trained slaves who stood in a client relationship to the chief. In exchange for a high share in the spoils, they provided protection for the chief against external invasions and against internal threats to his authority. An additional client relationship existed between the chief and the headmen, who assisted him in hearing minor court cases, collecting tribute, and allocating land in their areas. Since many of the headmen were sons of chiefs and thereby excluded from the succession under the prevailing matrilineal system, they constituted no threat to his authority.

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The supremacy of the chief within the system was also enhanced by the delineation of chiefdom boundaries. This diminished the freedom of action of the headmen, who in the past were able to achieve a certain degree of political autonomy through threats of "hiving off" from the chiefdom. The appointment and salary of the headmen, moreover, have been under the control of the chief. Clan and individual mobility have been thwarted also by the delineation of boundaries and by the power granted the Native Authorities to restrict movement of persons during famine and other emergencies. Finally, although one group of chieftaincy clients, the elite guard, has vanished with the ban on tribal warfare and slavery, a new group committed to supporting the authority of the chief has emerged in the form of Native Authority messengers and clerks. In the appointment of the lesser officials, nepotism has played a major part. There was some justification for this in the past inasmuch as only relatives of chiefs were likely to have had the required education, and the personal responsibility which the chiefs bore for financial matters made it seem reasonable that he should have about him those over whom he had some personal control.

With the appearance of an emergent elite in the postwar period there have been two diverse tendencies at work seeking to restore internal checks upon chieftaincy authority. One of these—the appearance of popular associations—will be discussed subsequently. The second tendency has been the efforts of the administration to bring to the operation of local government the talents of teachers, traders, and other individuals who were excluded under a system based on royal birth and nepotism. These leaders were, however, brought in as individuals and not as representatives of a group. It was hoped that by meeting with the chiefs and headmen in councils they would begin to accept some of the responsibility for initiating and planning local programs, suggesting new sources of local revenue, and formulating legislation for the development of natural resources. The councils constitute a comprehensive system which covers the village, chiefdom, district, and Sukumaland levels. Each council consists of the Native Authorities concerned, a number of councillors nominated by the District Commissioner, and a number of councillors elected initially at the village level, with each superior council drawing part of its membership from the council subordinate to it. It should be stressed that the chiefs and nominated members on the higher councils constitute a majority of the membership, and that in any case, all decisions of the council require administrative approval.

Content of Political Activity. Several of the political functions performed within the traditional Sukuma system have now been pre-empted by the European administration. This applies especially to the maintenance of external defense and the preservation of social order; to a great degree it also applies to the functions of regulating internal relationships within the system and the provision of material security. With regard to these latter functions, much authority has been left to the chiefs, and the postwar tendency has been to entrust authority to the people themselves acting through their councils. The provision of social services in the European period has not only been intensified, but has also had three features which differentiate it from the performances of the traditional period. In the first place, while road construction, the provision of markets, and malaria control have provided benefits to the people, these measures were often initially introduced to increase the efficiency of administrative control. Second, although public health services and education are readily accepted by the people, the necessity for other services—especially those dealing with natural resources conservation—are neither understood nor readily accepted. Third, the methods employed for securing benefits for the people are based largely on scientific knowledge, whereas in the traditional period great emphasis was placed on methods based on the putative value of magico-religious performances.

The Roles of the Chief. As we have seen, the religious role of the chief has been diminished under the impact of Christian and Moslem teachings, while his position as controller of tribal wealth and his role in military affairs have been eliminated by the European administration. In their stead, the administration during the period between the wars concentrated on the legislative, judicial, and executive roles of the chief.

The legislative role of the Sukuma chief is actually a European innovation. Formal law-making had not been a distinct performance in the traditional system even though a chief might establish precedents in hearing court cases or in the process of administering his chiefdom. Under the Native Authority Ordinance, however, one of the main duties of the chiefs, or chiefs meeting in councils, was to issue rules and orders for the governing of their chiefdoms. There has been a certain unreal quality in the legislative role of the chiefs: in most cases the chiefs did not initiate the legislation, nor were they always in sympathy with its purposes. The plain fact is that in many instances the term "Native Authority" was a legal fiction meaning "District Commissioner." This has been especially true with regard to the preparation and approval of the annual financial estimates by the Native Authority. The discussions in the council have constituted more of an educative process, looking towards the future acceptance of responsibilities, than of an actual wielding of authority. The substance of the rules and regulations also calls to mind Plato's *Laws*, for they attempt to set up standards of moral conduct regarding drinking and gambling and standards of technical performance with regard to animal husbandry, disease control, and cultivation; usually these standards are quite alien to those prevailing in the existing value system.

This spirit of educating the people to new standards also has pervaded the executive and judicial roles of the chiefs. Much of the executive work of the chief and his natural resources assistants is devoted to teaching the people new methods of cultivation or of detecting disease in livestock. The teaching aspect, however, has often assumed the characteristics of police enforcement; in many years, over half of the court cases heard by the chiefs have dealt with infractions of the Native Authority rules and orders—legislation which they had been parties to issuing and enforcing. In other aspects of his judicial role the chief may actually be performing a service similar to that of his ancestors, for the administration has accepted customary law as a part of the legal system of the Territory. Murder and other more serious crimes, however, have been removed from the jurisdiction of the local courts.

In the postwar period the roles of the chiefs have been subjected to further manipulation by the administration in view of the dual goals of increasing local responsibility for development programs and of increasing the democratic character of political institutions. To meet this latter goal the chiefs, as already noted, have been required to share their legislative role with elected and nominated councillors. Furthermore, in line with the territorial policy of separating the judiciary from the executive, the Sukuma chiefs have been required to appoint deputies, who have gradually been assuming the greater burden of court work and will eventually emerge as independent magistrates.

To meet the problem of increasing local responsibility, the administration has decided to concentrate on the role of the chief as a tribal executive in charge of the administration of social and economic programs. It was felt by administrators at the end of the war that the corps of chiefs then holding office was poorly qualified to accept this new responsibility. Consequently, without eliminating the form of hereditary succession, District Commissioners have taken a greater hand in the selection of new chiefs as vacancies arise through death, retirement, or deposition. Although in some instances a District Commissioner actually searches for a possible claimant with the qualifications of superior education, experience, and modern outlook, the usual process is for the administrator to indicate beforehand that certain candidates, because of their previous histories, would never receive the Governor's recognition as chiefs. While such procedures may be questionable methods for introducing popular control over the appointment of chiefs, they have achieved the effect of raising the level of the group with respect to education and general training. Moreover, after their elevation to chieftainship, chiefs have been required by the administration to take short courses in agriculture, veterinary services, and general administration. Thus, without abandoning the criterion of royal birth the Administration has attempted to bring the political system into line with the new economic and social system, where intelligence, education, and experience are criteria for leadership. It was hoped that in this way the Administration could bridge the gap separating the chiefs from the new elite.

IV. SUKUMA RESPONSES TO PLANNED POLITICAL CHANGE

A number of Sukuma chiefs have taken quite readily to the British conception of the duties of a modern chief. Prepared by education or previous experience and assisted further by maintaining close liaison with administrative and technical officers, they have seized the initiative in organizing local councils at all levels or in initiating new programs in water development or sanitation. By lecture and by example they are attempting to convince their people of the benefits to be derived from following new techniques in agriculture or animal husbandry. In most cases these chiefs have attempted to combine their modern approach to local government with a continued reliance upon traditional ritual and their hereditary position to carry along the less educated citizens.

Enthusiasm by the Sukuma chiefs does not, however, appear to be the typical reaction. Most Sukuma chiefs seem to find it genuinely impossible to pursue both the goal of being responsive to the wishes of their people and the goal of educating or coercing them into accepting new standards. The District Commissioner might convince the chiefs that cattle destocking, contour cultivation, or a cess on cotton might be in the interests of Sukumaland; it is another matter for the chiefs in turn to convince the cattle owners or cotton growers. Moreover, it is questionable whether the chiefs are actually convinced of the efficacy of the new programs; in one district the chiefs and headmen were among the worst offenders of the Native Authority soil conservation rules. Regarding the problem of finance, furthermore, the chiefs are beginning to consider the problem of relating expenditures on social services to sources of local revenue; however, for the most part the "Native Treasury" still remains a substitute term for "District Commissioner."

Comments made by a number of chiefs indicate that they regard the addition of popular councillors to local government bodies and the diminution of their judicial authority as a not-so-thin edge of a wedge which will eventuate in their becoming tribal relics. They have been especially alarmed by the formation of a multi-racial county council in the Lake Province, which for most purposes is superseding the authority of the Sukumaland Federal Council. There is no guarantee that the chiefs need be represented on the county council at all and in any case only a minor fraction of the 47 Sukuma chiefs could be represented in view of the government's intention to limit the size of such deliberative bodies.

The reactions of the illiterate mass of "commoners" to the new political developments were also mixed, but by far the most prevalent reaction seemed to be one of lethargy. The peasant cultivator is dubious about the value of the new standards of technical performance the chiefs and the administration are encouraging him to adopt, and he is dubious about the form of local government institutions as well. He prefers to have his court case heard by the chief rather than the deputy; and he feels it to be presumptuous of a "commoner" to attempt advising a chief or headman even when they genuinely solicit advice in council meetings. Lethargy, however, is not the sole response of the illiterate "commoners." In a number of rural areas the newly-formed village councils have taken upon themselves the task of constructing new schools and dams by community effort instead of waiting for Native Treasury funds to be made available; and they have been enthusiastic in helping the headmen distribute famine food, pass on information about new soil conservation measures, and collect taxes. At times the enthusiasm runs so high that the councillors attempt to take over the judicial and executive work entirely, and it is necessary for the administrators to restrain them. Although the British administrators seem to regard a response of this character as being a welcome, albeit misguided, sign of advancement, it would appear that the responses on the part of the more educated Wasukuma to modification in the political order do not always meet with the same approbation. I refer especially to the postwar emergence of popular political associations and of cooperative societies with a politically-oriented leadership.

Producers cooperatives have emerged in a number of areas of Sukumaland. Some, like an association in Kwimba District based on the marketing of clarified butter, limit their activities to predominantly economic questions and have no noticeable antipathies towards the local chiefs and headmen. The same cannot be said, however, for the much larger cooperatives based on the cotton industry. Almost from the inception in 1949 of the Lake Province Growers Association (since enlarged and renamed the Victoria Federation of Cooperation Unions), political and racial questions have been in the forefront. In part this stems from the fact that the cooperative movement arose from feelings on the part of the African growers that they suffered badly at the hands of the Asian businessmen who controlled much of the marketing system. Moreover, it was not until 1951 that the government was willing to recognize the validity of the grievance and to register the cooperatives as legal societies. The administration then took hurried steps to faciliate loans for the purchase of capital equipment and in other ways ensure the orderly entry of the societies into the marketing system.

To a great extent the Association thrived on the government's opposition, and it became a rallying point for varying types of discontented elements in Sukumaland. In some of the activities of the Association's leadership—for example in the protest over the controlled price of cotton and the levying of a local government cess on raw cotton—they differ hardly at all from those associated with farm groups in England or America. The leadership of the Association, however, has also expressed itself publicly on a range of other political questions less directly concerned with cotton production. These include attitudes of opposition to the cattle destocking program, the use of communal labor turn-outs for dam construction and bush clearance, the agricultural bias of the new curriculum for the middle schools' tie-ridge cultivation, and variations in standards of hospital facilities for Europeans, Asians, and Africans. Some of the most vigorous complaints on the part of the Association's leaders have been reserved for the chiefs and the new system of councils. Individuals I interviewed seemed to regard the chiefs as either ignorant of the real sympathies of the people or mere "puppets" of the administration. Where the attitudes of these leaders were not clearly in favor of the abolition of hereditary chieftainship, they were at least in favor of divesting the chiefs of all but their ceremonial roles.

With regard to the system of local councils, the leaders of the cotton cooperatives felt that the idea was sound but that the system had failed in its application. They felt that the councillors were usually the "cooks and houseboys" of the chiefs, that discussions were devoted to trivial matters, that items of consequence were decided beforehand by the chiefs and the District Commissioners, and that decisions of the councils were seldom communicated to the people in the villages. The thin line separating economic and political associations in Sukumaland is perhaps evidenced by the fact that some of these leaders felt that the Growers Association or the local societies should be permitted to elect councillors to these new local government bodies.

It is not unusual for an economic organization to engage in political controversy; indeed, they do so often enough in America and Britain. Nevertheless, administrators have regarded this tendency in Sukumaland with double misgivings. In the first place, it was felt that continued political activity had distracted the leadership of the Association from its primary concerns: developing the cotton industry and establishing the societies on sound cooperative principles. Second, District Commissioners have often felt that the leadership of the Association considered that as the head of a large organization it was better qualified to speak for the people than were the chiefs or the newly-created councils. They ignored the fact that many of the members (which include about 20 per cent of the estimated male taxpayers in Sukumaland) joined the societies merely for economic reasons and do not endorse the political views of the leadership. It is obvious that the government would much prefer to have political issues discussed in the new local councils, making these bodies the primary arena for political activity in Sukumaland.

Much of what has been said above with respect to the political grievances of the leaders of the Growers Association also applies to the leaders of the manifestly political bodies in the area, the Sukuma Union and the branches of the Tanganyika African National Union. The activities of political associations, however, have actually resulted in open conflict with the chiefs. This is especially so with regard to their campaign urging people not to participate in communal labor turn-outs or to observe destocking and soil conservation orders. The character of the Tanganyika African National Union's activities was such that in 1954 the government felt justified in disbanding several of its chapters, on the grounds of maintaining public order. The Sukuma Union has refrained from activity of a violent character thus far, limiting itself instead to defending in court individuals who have allegedly been abused by the chiefs or attempting to get its members elected to village and chiefdom councils. With regard to the last enterprise, they have not as yet succeeded, which is not surprising in view of the fact that over 40 per cent of its membership of 8,000 resides in Zanzibar and scattered areas of Tanganyika. The Tanganyika African National Union differs from the Sukuma Union in several other respects. The latter is composed largely of Wasukuma or the related Wanyamwezi, appeals to rural as well as urban elements, and confines itself mostly to problems of development within Sukumaland. The National Union, on the other hand, has a polyglot tribal membership and appeals mostly to the class of township clerks and traders; its leadership in Sukumaland takes stands on broad questions such as East African federation, the Meru land controversy, and independence for Tanganyika.

In a small but selective sampling in Sukumaland, I was able to obtain data on the background and attitudes of the leadership of the economic and political associations, which provide some clues to the origins of their antagonism to the existing political system. Histories of employment and travel in other parts of Sukumaland, as well as the fact that their main ties were now with an urban area, indicated that these individuals have no particular loyalties to an individual chiefdom. Economically, they were almost on a par with the chiefs, deriving their income from salaries, merchandizing, income from rents on buildings or fishing boats, and income from the cotton fields which were tended by the families left behind in the rural areas. With regard to education as well, the emergent leadership felt that it could claim equality with the chiefs, and a surprising number of the new political leaders are ex-school teachers. A further interesting comment on their educational background is the fact that a preponderance of these leaders were educated by the American Africa Inland Missions or the Seventh Day Adventists. Thus, some of the anti-chief attitudes may be a manifestation of conflict with Roman Catholic chiefs, who are in the majority in Sukumaland. There may also be a more deep-seated reason for the Protestant character of the leadership, such as the traditional Roman Catholic acceptance of authority as opposed to the fundamentalist—and especially American fundamentalist—emphasis on individual initiative and a vague distrust of governmental activity. One further factor in the background of the political and economic leaders interviewed was the fact that three-fourths of them were related to chiefs, sub-chiefs, or headmen. A few actually had histories of being claimants to a chieftainship, and their grievances in some cases appear to date from the rejection of their claims by the District Commissioner, the Banang'oma, or the people meeting in assembly.

Some interesting attitudes were voiced regarding other races in Sukumaland. It was almost unanimously felt that European administrators and missionaries (who make up the bulk of the European population outside of the self-contained mining settlements) were doing a commendable job of educating the Africans; however, the statements were usually qualified with remarks about the rate at which the Africans were being permitted to advance, the observance of the color bar, and the fact that "it will be better when Africans can do the job themselves." With regard to the Asians, who are the ubiquitous shopkeepers of East Africa, the attitudes were almost unanimously pejorative of the contribution Asians were making to the development of the Territory. Both of these racial groups were treated alike, however, when it came to the matter of the multi-racial county council in the Lake Province. The African leaders interviewed felt that Africans at this stage could not compete effectively with Europeans and Asians in debate, and consequently they would find that real authority was going to the other races.

V. APPRAISAL

If the attainment of self-government is taken as a goal which all dependent people have a right to expect (and the United Nations Charter seems to accord it that status), then something by way of commendation should be said for the fact that Britain acknowledges this as a goal for Tanganyika and has been taking steps to achieve it. Moreover, although critics in Tanganyika or in the United Nations may disagree over the methods employed or the rate at which political developments are taking place, there is seldom criticism of the general plan of achieving self-government through representative bodies, which are entrusted with the responsibility for the social and economic development of the people. Something also by way of praise may be said for the character of the agents introducing political change in Tanganyika. It is the opinion of this writer that the calibre of administrators in the Territory is outstanding. For the most part administrators exhibit an enthusiasm for their work, employ a great deal of tact and friendly humor in their relations with the people, are well versed in Swahili, are conscientious about getting about the districts and seeing things at first hand, and are generally regarded by the Africans as being personally honest and fair in their performance of judicial and administrative duties.

Nevertheless, it is apparent that the implementation of political change has met with some serious obstacles. One of these might consist of the very enthusiasm of administrators which was praised above. One sometimes feels that the personal zeal of the District Commissioner in establishing new councils and introducing new programs is often well in advance of the enthusiasm of the chiefs and people to make these councils operate effectively or to achieve the ends of the program. As a consequence the councils and programs may stagnate, or, in the interest of "getting the job done," the District Commissioner himself may attempt to run council meetings and personally oversee the details of a program. In either case these alternatives win only contempt from the leaders of the popular associations.

A further difficulty consists in the resistances offered by both the chiefs and the new economic and political leaders to the substance and procedures involved in the political changes. Resistances might be encountered in any situation of planning in a dependency; however, when the task set for the administrators consists in no less than the rebuilding of political institutions which have taken several generations to develop, the resistances are bound to be of greater magnitude. Moreover, the administrators are expected to perform this task with a relatively small staff, without frequent resort to the use of overt force, and in a milieu in which the mass communication media, the educational system, and the triennial United Nations Visiting Mission are subjecting to question almost any action taken by administrators in dependent territories. Furthermore, the very system of democratic values and representative institutions the British are attempting to introduce in the area inculcates the idea of open discussion and choice. Consequently, a selective attitude on the part of the chiefs or the new elites should not be surprising.

Regarding the reaction of the British administrators to the selectivity of the emergent elite, several comments might be made. One can agree that the economic goals of the cooperative societies might be better attained if the leadership devoted itself primarily to those ends; nevertheless, I find it difficult to agree that local councils should constitute the only legitimate channel for political activity in Sukumaland. The generally hostile attitude obtaining between the government and the popular associations, the ban on certain categories of central government and local government personnel joining political associations, and the disbanding (although with much justification) of chapters of the Tanganyika African National Union would indicate that the administration does indeed want to limit political activity to the new councils. It may also be acknowledged that the attitude of the popular leaders, in respect of the goals of the administration, makes it an "irresponsible minority." Such minorities, however, have a way of thriving on governmental opposition and becoming majorities. Moreover, in according these minorities certain genuine responsibilities in political affairs, the character of their attitudes may be altered. Both of these last statements are borne out in recent events in the Gold Coast and in the Chagga area of Tanganyika.

The question remains: "What will become of the chiefs?" In view of the attitudes of the Sukuma peasants towards their chiefs, the continued utilization of these traditional authorities would seem to be a justifiable policy—at least until it can be demonstrated that some other group is better qualified to speak for the best interests of the people. It may be, however, that emergent leaders in Sukumaland will take the same course pursued by the Baganda and the Wachagga. This course consists of finding in a modernized hereditary chieftainship the institution through which the various strands of Westernization and Sukuma heritage may be brought together, and a new sense of unity of purpose achieved in Sukumaland.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF MEDIEVAL THOUGHT TO THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION*

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That there was a continuity between medieval political thought and the body of systematic theory that surrounded the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution is by now a commonplace. But when we speak of the medieval contribution to the American political tradition, it is important to avoid the implication that what medieval thought contributed was identical with what American thought received. Between the close of the fifteenth century and the latter part of the eighteenth lie some two and a half centuries of crowded thought and experience, which more or less profoundly changed the meaning of concepts continuously in use. The more we learn of medieval theory, the clearer it becomes that it must be interpreted in its own terms rather than in terms of its derivatives. And the American political tradition, of course, cannot be fully understood in terms of its historic roots. Perhaps the chief service which the history of ideas can offer to political theory lies in providing material for the sharpening of concepts through a comparative analysis. For the full understanding of the meaning of an idea, one needs to know not only what it is, but also, I suggest, what it is not. Thus there may be value in an attempt to define the medieval meaning of some concepts that were a significant part of the medieval contribution: in particular, sovereignty, natural law and natural rights, and consent.

Medieval political thought was a response to a special historical situation. In contrast to the states of classical antiquity, the medieval state was comparatively distinct from other social institutions; it was a late-comer in a society already organized by feudalism and by the church—a society, however, still characterized by constant violence and injustice. Thus political thought was oriented toward topics that had not aroused much interest in the closely-interwoven societies of Greece and Rome: on the one hand, an examination and defense of the powers necessarily implicit in government; on the other hand, an examination of the bases and limits of governmental authority and of the juristic relationships between government and other institutions. Moreover, the expanding theory of the state had to take into account the ideas of right implicit in feudalism, and the ideas of right explicit in the teachings of the church. Thus medieval political thought developed an extremely complex character; this complexity was enhanced by the variety of intellectual sources, from different cultures, on which it drew.

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* This article is a slight revision of a paper read at the American Political Science Association meeting in Boulder, Colorado, September, 1955. The paper was intended only to suggest a tentative interpretation as a basis for further discussion; a treatment of medieval thought on this scale and in this perspective necessarily involves extreme simplification and a dogmatic assertion of some points that may well be controversial. The footnotes now added are, of course, not exhaustive, but they call attention to some of the material that supports, illustrates, or opposes my general contentions here.

In the context of the medieval problem, one of the most important strands of thought was that which supported and clarified the gradual concentration of coercive power in the king and the gradual emancipation of an effective public authority from the bonds of feudal traditions. Roman law provided medieval thinkers with a basic distinction between private law and public law, and with suggestive phrases—phrases which medieval interpretation sometimes stretched far beyond their original meaning: e.g., "the prince is not bound by the laws,"[1] which became the nucleus of the medieval recognition that, if the essence of rulership lay in its control of the coercive machinery of law enforcement, one could not logically expect that machinery to control the ruler.

I cannot trace here the whole story of the medieval enunciation of the public-law principles that gradually defined the implicit character of public authority: e.g., that public power is inalienable; that the ruler can have no peer, and no superior; that subordinate offices are delegations of the supreme power; that in the area of government the ruler can finally be guided "solely by the judgment of his own mind"; that judicial authority includes authority to promulgate, interpret, and dispense from the law; that from the decision of a supreme judge there can be no appeal to another court.[2] These principles might still construe the ruler as a discretionary administrator and judge within the framework of a static private law, and many medieval thinkers stopped at approximately this point. But as early as the thirteenth century one can find instances of the recognition that human law might properly be changed to meet men's changing wisdom or changing needs.[3] This idea, interwoven with the idea that the ruler concentrated the public force of the community, and with the concept of legislation to be found in Roman law, led steadily to its corollaries: that the ruler could make and change positive law; that the validity of custom rested on his tacit consent; that legislation was the supreme act of public authority, from which all other powers flowed; even, occasionally, the extreme claim that, although the ruler continued subject to natural law, he was its only competent interpreter.[4] These principles were by no means all accepted by all medieval publicists, but they represent a developing body of thought which, as recent scholars have pointed out, left very little for Bodin to do.[5]

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[1] *Digest,* 1, 3, 31; *cf.* John of Salisbury, *Policraticus,* Bk. 4, Ch. 2; Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae,* q. 96, a. 5.

[2] Many of these ideas were suggested by John of Salisbury, from whose *Policraticus,* Bk. 5, Ch. 6, the quoted phrase is taken; in the thirteenth century, they are explicit in, e.g., Bracton, Aquinas, or Aegidius Romanus: see C. H. McIlwain, *The Growth of Political Thought in the West* (New York, 1932), pp. 320–33, 373–82, and *Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern* (Ithaca, 1940), Ch. 4; Ewart Lewis, *Medieval Political Ideas* (London and New York, 1954), Vol. 1, pp. 244–54; their medieval formulation owed much to the study of Roman law: see, e.g., Fritz Schulz, "Bracton on Kingship," *English Historical Review,* Vol. 60, pp. 136–77 (May, 1945).

[3] E. g., Aquinas, *op. cit.,* q. 97.

[4] Note the relation between ruler and positive law, *ibid.,* qs. 90–97, *passim;* in Aegidius Romanus, *De Regimine Principum,* Bk. 3, Pt. 2, Chs. 12, 29; cf. Lewis, *op. cit.,* Vol. 1, pp. 20–23; for the thirteenth-century civilists, see R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, *A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West* (London, 1903–36), Vol. 2, Pt. I, Ch. VII, and Gaines Post, "The Theory of Public Law and the State in the Thirteenth Century," *Seminar,* Vol. 6, pp. 42–59, at pp. 51 ff. (1948). The dominant trend in medieval thought was that which insisted that the king's promulgation or changing of law should be associated

The significance of the process, I suggest, lies in an increasingly clear perception that the government of laws cannot eliminate the government of man; that government by its very nature includes large areas of discretion which must be areas of decisive authority. The point has been by no means obvious in societies whose traditions have remained—as medieval customs did not—a roughly adequate basis for their practical and moral demands, but in Western civilization the medieval recognition and acceptance of some of the juristic implications of the rule of man have been the necessary premises for everything that has since happened in political thought.

By the time of the Founding Fathers, a chief problem of political theory was to mitigate the dangers inherent in the rule of man; the American adaptation of Montesquieu's separation of powers was an attempt to neutralize the dangers of discretion by dividing it. While separation of powers has some medieval roots, it is not a medieval idea. The characteristic medieval conclusion from the recognition that government was a matter of discretion was that all kinds of discretion must be combined in a single sovereign to insure unity of authority. The complex of powers which made up supreme authority might, as in the old Roman republic or the medieval Italian commune, belong to the community; but in the larger and looser units to which such government was unsuited, the inescapable alternative was the concentration of authority in the king. In matters where basic private rights were involved, royal authority might be qualified by a characteristically medieval device: the insistence that it be exercised through formal procedures—through due process of law or through "consultation and consent." But this qualification did not imply a balance of mutually independent agencies with distinct functions and powers. In proportion as the medieval agencies through which royal authority was partly channeled developed their own self-consciousness and claims to autonomy, the Middle Ages provided the institutional basis for the later doctrine.[6] But in the context of medieval

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with the consent of the weightier elements of the community, as, e.g., in Bracton, *De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae*, intro. and Bk. 3, Ch. 9, sec. 3, and, two centuries later, in Fortescue, *De Laudibus Legum Angliae*, Chs. 9, 18; but the king's monopoly of legislative sovereignty was defended by one group of jurists: see Walter Ullmann, *The Medieval Idea of Law as Represented by Lucas de Penna* (London, 1946), esp. pp. 48–55, 94 ff., 104; Lucas himself held that the ruler might specifically derogate from natural law, but that a law intrinsically unjust or unreasonable was invalid; in the fifteenth century, Aeneas Sylvius insisted that every action of the ruler must be presumed to be just: *De Ortu et Auctoritate Imperii Romani*, Chs. 16–23; see also Otto Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, tr. F. W. Maitland (Cambridge, 1927), pp. 84 ff. and notes 290, 292.

[5] See Max A. Shepard, "Sovereignty at the Cross-Roads: A Study of Bodin," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 45, pp. 580 ff. (Dec., 1930); Ullmann, *op. cit., passim*, points out resemblances of Bodin's thought to that of Lucas de Penna, which he knew.

[6] By the end of the Middle Ages, this had been reflected in the notion of mixed monarchy, which appears particularly in conciliarist thought and in Fortescue; see Shepard, "The Political and Constitutional Theory of Sir John Fortescue," in *Essays in History and Political Theory in Honor of Charles Howard McIlwain*, ed. C. Wittke (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), pp. 289–319; Lewis, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 271–75.

thought, such a doctrine would have seemed an illogical negation of the unity of decision which was of the very essence of the role of government, and in the context of medieval fact, it could only have produced an anarchic play of private interests.

Another American remedy for the dangers of discretion was based in the conviction that certain natural rights of man lay completely outside the area of public authority; and this idea derived, chiefly through Locke, from two quite distinct medieval ideas. A pre-governmental law protecting private rights was for medieval men no flight of speculation but a fact of crude experience. In feudal thinking, the customary law and the rights that it protected were absolute limits to royal power. But the customary law was not the law of nature, and the rights of status and property that it protected were not the rights of man, but simply the rights of those men who happened to have them. The more sophisticated medieval idea of a supreme natural law was a very different concept. One of its most important functions was to undermine the prestige of the customary law and to reconstrue its pattern of absolute rights into a more flexible pattern of rights based on and qualified by their utility to man. Natural law also helped to develop the theory of royal authority. And, finally, the medieval theory of natural law was the vehicle for the church's insistence that the political order was a part of the moral order and must be tested, not only in its general structure and tendencies, but in its specific actions, by the standards of a reasoned morality.[7] Thus, in contrast to Lockian natural law, which balanced the rights of individuals against the rights of the state but provided no norms for the guidance of either within their separate spheres, medieval natural law purported to be a "rule or measure" for the whole area of positive rights and positive law: it provided general criteria for the qualification of private rights and for the judgment and validation of commands admittedly within the scope of the ruler's competence. The application of natural law to specific circumstances was not, of course, a matter of simple deduction; where it allowed possibilities of choice, that choice must rest upon authority. But the broad principles of natural law defined the goals and limited the range of licit means.

The theories of natural law with which the American Fathers were familiar had been formed partly in emulation of contemporary science and mathematics. They dealt in absolute statements claiming a universal validity and purporting to be rigidly deducible one from the other. Medieval natural law had a much more flexible character—vividly illustrated by the fact that one of the principles most frequently cited by medieval men was the maxim, "Necessity has no law."[8] While medieval writers continually insisted that the first principles of natural law were universal and permanent, they also insisted that its bearing on positive institutions might vary, as changing circumstances affected their intrinsic justice or their utility to human needs.[9] The ruthless application of general moral criteria to a world of varying circumstance inevitably leads to contingent rules and to a final casuistry.

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[7] A. P. d'Entrèves, *Natural Law* (London, 1951), Ch. II, particularly analyzes this aspect of medieval natural law as illustrated by Aquinas; I am indebted to his whole discussion of the changing meanings of natural law.

[8] Gratian, c. 11, D. I *de consecratione;* used at first by canonists and civilists in the equitable interpretation of private law, this maxim was applied to public law in the thirteenth century; it might or might not be labelled a principle of natural law, but its use always implied a rational appeal to the fundamental order of justice whose self-evident cogency over-ruled more contingent principles of right.

One will look in vain in medieval writings for any codification of the principles of the natural law to which civilists, canonists, theologians constantly appealed. Aquinas's justly celebrated analysis[10] is only a suggestive outline—and it was by no means generally accepted. One may detect the medieval appeal to natural law in a whole spectrum of phrases: "natural law dictates," "evident reason shows," "it is natural to man," "it is just," "it is useful," even "it is expedient." Usage varied, but any one of these phrases might mean that positive laws or institutions were being tested by the criteria of reason, with the assumption that their general or immediate validity depended upon their passing the test. The appeal to natural law might be an appeal to certain maxims that classical or patristic writers had labelled as axioms of natural law: e.g., "it is licit to repel force with force"; or to statements that medieval thinkers nosed out for themselves, apparently because they had a sort of natural-law smell about them: some statements from Aristotle, for instance, or the famous "what touches all should be approved by all," whose medieval career could never have been predicted from its modest origin in a section of the *Corpus Juris* on the testamentary rights of co-heirs.[11] The appeal to natural law might take the form of an analogy with the non-human world: e.g., "the common natural rule is by one." It might take the form of an appeal to Scripture—though with a clear understanding that many Scriptural precepts applied only to given conditions.[12]

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[9] This is clearest in Aquinas or Occam but is latent or apparent in most medieval discussions of the relations of natural law, *jus gentium*, and civil law, especially as focussed on questions of the legitimacy of property and servitude or of the bases of equity, the dispensing power, the emergency powers of a ruler or of a general council: see Lewis, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 6–15, 96–98, and "Natural Law and Expediency in Medieval Political Thought," *Ethics,* Vol. 50 (Jan., 1940), pp. 144–63; Max A. Shepard, "William of Occam and the Higher Law," this Review, Vol. 26, pp. 1005–24 (Dec., 1932), Vol. 27, pp. 24–39 (Feb., 1933); Charles C. Bayley, "Pivotal Concepts in the Political Philosophy of Ockham," *Journal of the History of Ideas,* Vol. 10, pp. 199–218 (April, 1949).

[10] *Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae,* q. 94.

[11] *Codex,* 5, 59, 5; on the early evolution of this maxim, see Post, "A Romano-Canonical Maxim, 'Quod Omnes Tangit,' in Bracton," *Traditio,* IV (1946), 197–251. Here again, this rule might or might not be called a principle of natural law, but it was used as such.

[12] Canonist thought did not usually follow Aquinas's distinctions between divine and natural law but rather insisted on their ultimate identity, conceiving natural law as a sort of epitome of Christian morality, which had its fullest revelation in the Scriptures. But the canonists' sophisticated interpretation of the Scriptures in terms of a continuous and rationally systematized ethical tradition avoided many of the difficulties of this approach. When Protestantism and the printing-press had thrown open the Scriptures to miscellaneous amateur use, a continuing identification of natural and divine law bred considerable confusion, which may well have contributed to an ultimate weakening of the prestige of both. On the other hand, in proportion as rationalist natural law cut loose both from the Scriptures and from systematic philosophy, it inevitably took on a somewhat arbitrary and partisan appearance.

Deduction from simple maxims, from analogies, or from generally respected principles of right might lead to a dilemma or to an unacceptable conclusion; reason went on from there to distinguish, to explain, to qualify. Or the appeal to natural law might be a direct appeal to reason: through an analysis of the self-consistency of a rule, of its justice, of its suitability to the ends it purported to seek, of its general utility to human nature, of its expediency in a given factual context.[13]

The important part played by the concept of utility in the medieval theory of natural law contrasts with the eighteenth-century separation, and even conflict, between utilitarian theories and theories of natural rights. One reason for the conspicuous role of utility in the medieval theory, and for its constant concern with the context of circumstance, lies in the varied forms in which the idea of natural law first came to the attention of medieval scholars. Classical sources offered them at least four distinct definitions of natural law; to these Gratian added a fifth when he identified natural law with divine law, and therefore with the Scriptures. So far as the content of natural law was suggested, it obviously varied with these definitions: the natural law that had prescribed for the state of innocence "the common possession of all things and the equal liberty of all men" was clearly at odds with the natural law that now endorsed slavery and the payment of debts; "the repelling of force with force" was not easily harmonized with "turning the other cheek"; "the law that nature has taught all animals" was surely different from "right reason applied to commands and prohibitions." Medieval treatments of the problem varied,[14] but on the whole the solution was found in the view that the more concrete prescriptions of natural law were related to its ultimate norms as somewhat variant means to constant ends. This appears most clearly in Aquinas's solution, or in Occam's concept of "natural law in the third sense,"[15] but the same tendency pervades all medieval theory.

Thus the medieval theory of natural law was not, primarily, a theory of natural rights but of what, under given circumstances, was naturally right. Into the notion of what was naturally right there entered, indeed, the concept of common human claims based on common human characteristics. More or less explicitly, medieval thinkers tended to find in man a natural need for self-preservation; for family relationships; for social communication; for order, peace, and justice; for opportunities of rational, moral, and spiritual development. But such claims did not stake out an area of individual competence from which the state was clearly barred; they were claims upon the state as well as claims against it. They dictated no clear-cut Bill of Rights[16] but rather a delicate and variable adjustment among the several institutions, private and public, that served man's various needs in varying ways.

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[13] For examples of some explicit appeals to natural law, see Lewis, *Medieval Political Ideas*, Vol. 2, Index, "natural law: content of." But it is impossible to assess the full meaning of natural law in the Middle Ages if one looks only at the instances in which natural law is specifically cited: note, e.g., the common-law concept of "reasonableness," which, as Sir Frederick Pollock pointed out in *Essays in the Law* (London, 1922), pp. 54–59, played the same role and was part of the same system of ideas; note also the civilist approach from the concept of a basic justice which could be equated with natural reason.

[14] Carlyle, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, Chs. I–III, Vol. 2, Chs. III, IV; Dom Odon Lottin, *Le droit naturel chez saint Thomas et ses prédécesseurs* (Bruges, 1926); Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism* (London, 1949), Ch. II; also references in note 10 above.

[15] Georges de Lagarde, *La naissance de l'esprit laique au déclin du moyen âge*, Vol. 6 (St.-Paul-Trois-Chateaux, 1946), pp. 143–58, argues that Occam's "natural law in the third sense" was a mere rational construct, without relation to primary natural law on the one hand or to human law on the other; but cf. Shepard, "William of Occam and the Higher Law" (cited in note 9); Richard Scholz, *Wilhelm von Ockham als politischer Denker und sein Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico* (Leipzig, 1944), pp. 18–28; Lewis, *Medieval Political Ideas*, Vol. 1, pp. 14 ff. and notes.

In contrast to the Lockian system, which placed the sanctity of private property among the first imperatives of human nature and treated government as a kind of afterthought, medieval thought typically regarded both property and government as essential instruments of human needs and purposes. Thus they were coordinate in origin and validity. Both were institutions of human construction; both were rooted in natural law because both were necessary to man, or at any rate to sinful man; but the specific rights of both were subordinate to, and limited by, the purposes they must serve.

For Locke and Jefferson, liberty was one of the natural rights of man. The idea that some sort of claim to freedom was inherent in human nature flickers through medieval theory, but it remained ambiguous and undeveloped. Serfdom was a recognized part of the medieval structure of property; any coercive government seemed an infringement on liberty; thus "the equal liberty of all men" was usually interpreted as fully applying only in the state of innocence; the freedom with which political theory was practically concerned was the freedom of those who were free—an incident of private-law status. Moreover, in typical medieval thought, the concept of freedom did not include a claim to a share in political self-determination; this idea appeared occasionally—notably in Cusa—but the implications of liberty could also be defined in Aristotelian terms: the free man, unlike the serf, could not rightfully be subordinated to any interest narrower than the common good.[17]

These considerations, increasingly explicit as medieval theory developed, led typically to the view that the customary private law and the rights of status and property embodied in it were normal boundaries to the rights of government, but that, on occasion, those boundaries could be infringed "for a just cause," or for "the common necessity or utility." Here medieval thought found room for equity, for the dispensing power, for the forfeiture of liberty or property as a penalty for crime, for the occasional change of laws which time had rendered obsolete. But the issue that particularly focussed this conception was, of course, the issue of taxation.[18]

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[16] One may suggest that Holmes' decision in *Schenck v. United States* (249 U. S. 47 [1919]) is, in structure and method, a neat instance of the sort of thinking that in the Middle Ages would have implied an appeal to natural law, issuing in the conclusion that natural law prescribed both the general right and the limitation upon it. The fact that the absolute prohibitions of the Bill of Rights still have a sort of natural-law aura about them, while their qualifications may seem to rest only on judicial interpretation, is an index to the shift that has occurred in the meaning of natural law. In the field of civil liberties, the practical gain may well outweigh the loss in theoretical clarity; in the case of property-rights, the balance-sheet is less clear.

[17] Cf., e.g., the varying implications of freedom in Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 96, a. 4, and *De Regimine Principum,* Bk. 1, Ch. 1; Tholommeo of Lucca, *De Regimine Principum,* Bk. 2, Chs. 8 f.; Marsiglio, *Defensor Pacis, Dictio* 1, Ch. 12, sec. 6; Occam, *Dialogus,* Pt. 3, Tr. 1, Bk. 2, Ch. 6 and Tr. 2, Bk. 2, Ch. 20; Cusa, *De Concordantia Catholica,* Bk. 2, Ch. 14.

In the scholarly theory of taxation, as expressed by civilists, canonists, and theologians, the custom-law conception that private rights were an absolute boundary to public authority yielded to the conception that "the welfare of the commonwealth" was among the basic interests of men—that the state was no mere convenience, but a necessary condition, and a part, of the common good. This conception did not imply a personification of the state or the balancing of a separate *raison d'état* against the interests of private men; it rather implied that the common interest in the maintenance of the state took precedence, on occasion, over the common interest in the maintenance of the private law. Thus, in the "case of necessity," the private rights which were a normal barrier to the area of discretion were temporarily dissolved. "Necessity has no law": in this instance, no private law.

Now there were lawyers and publicists who said simply that it was the ruler's function to determine when this situation existed, but the more typical medieval answer was that, in this admittedly abnormal situation, the king's finding of a "case of necessity" should be combined with the consent of the private men whose normal rights were thereby affected. The maxim, "What touches all should be approved by all," came to be cited as the rational principle on which this procedure was based.

I need barely mention the tremendous historical consequences that followed from the medieval application of this principle. But I want to emphasize that the medieval theory that originally rationalized the participation of subjects in the decision of certain public questions was very different from some theories later associated with those consequences. It did not, of course, imply popular sovereignty. What sovereignty there was in the medieval kingdom belonged to the king. Nor did it imply an appeal to self-determining wills, each with an irreducible right to grant or to refuse. As theory saw it, the problem of taxation was not primarily a dilemma in the realm of subjective will, an issue between what the king wanted and what his subjects wanted, to be solved by persuasion or dickering. It was a dilemma in the realm of objective rights, to be solved through a formal procedure in which all relevant rights were recognized as relevant, and in which the question requiring consent was presented as a rational question to be determined through consideration of the objective nature of the situation—like the question that a judge puts to a jury. Given this procedure, the issue of right hinged on an issue of fact. If the king could present a valid case for his claim of manifest necessity or utility, the rights of the subjects automatically dissolved; they had no rightful alternative except to consent; if they refused, it could be argued that the king had a right to go ahead anyhow. But if the king did not have a good case, he had no right, for the authority of a king evaporated wherever it was misused.

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[18] The following section leans heavily on Gaines Post's analysis of the legal theory of taxation and consent in the articles already cited and "*Plena Potestas* and Consent in Medieval Assemblies," *Traditio*, Vol. 1, pp. 355–48 (1943), and "The Two Laws and the Statute of York," *Speculum*, Vol. 29, pp. 417–32 (April, 1954). The legal theory described by Post seems to me to be partly reflected and supported by theologians: e.g., Aquinas, *De Regimine Judaeorum;* Tholommeo, *op. cit.*, Bk. 2, Ch. 9; John of Paris, *De Potestate Regia et Papali*, Ch. 7; Occam, *Dialogus*, Pt. 3, Tr. 2, Bk. 2, Ch. 23; cf. Bayley, *op. cit.*

The emphasis here is obviously a departure from the familiar emphasis, e.g., in McIlwain, *Growth of Political Thought in the West* (cited in note 2), pp. 370–73, 382–85: that the dominant trend of medieval thought was that which set the private law as an impermeable limit to royal right and thus balanced the absolute authority of the king in government against the absolute proprietary rights of his subjects, construing grants of supply as "in the main voluntary with the subject" (p. 373) and making the whole taxation process essentially a bargain between two mutually independent centers of right. McIlwain recognizes the existence of an alternative "Romanist" tradition; evidence seems to be accumulating that the influence of "Romanist" ideas on medieval theory was both earlier and more extensive than was once supposed.

Now this whole view had certain implications worth discussing. It assumed, for one thing, that an assembly of subjects could unite in a rational recognition of the imperatives of the common good because it was *their* common good. This assumption did not always work, but where it did, it began to chip at the edges of the argument that unity demanded the concentration of all decisions in the one will of the king. The assembly that had at first been conceived primarily as representing private men began to seem more and more like a public institution. The English parliament, in particular, was able to insist that it be associated with the king in the changing of the customary law and in determining major questions of public policy. In the actual course of this development, the clash of wills and the discovery of techniques of bargaining played, of course, a considerable part. But through the Middle Ages—and, I suggest, considerably beyond—the assumption continued that the considerations on which decisions were made by "the king in parliament" should be and would be objective considerations of the common good.

Just when and how the primarily objective and rationalist medieval view of the common good was transformed into the primarily subjective and voluntarist modern view is not for me to say. But I suggest that some of the muddleheadedness with which Locke is charged was due to the fact that he was looking at things in a somewhat medieval way; and even the Founding Fathers were a couple of centuries nearer the Middle Ages than we are. By the time one gets to *The Federalist*, one finds, I think, a continuing confidence that there is an objective common interest that rational men can and will find, combined with the different idea—not present in medieval thought nor, for that matter, in Locke—that a common interest has to be integrated from the diverse interests of factions. Curiously enough, in spite of their reverence for Aristotle, medieval thinkers were almost completely obtuse to the side of Aristotelian theory that starts with the notion that the opposition of class interests is a first datum of politics;[19] so far as I know, that idea first clearly re-enters political theory with Harrington. Clinging to the conviction that the larger imperatives of justice and natural law were based in universal reason, and that the interests of all classes were objectively harmonized in a common good, medieval thinkers could assume that, while authentic differences of opinion could appear on questions of practical detail, any wilful deviation from what was "manifestly" necessary, just, or useful must be an instance of perversity or ignorance—neither of which, of course, could constitute a claim to right.

In this conviction lay the bases of the medieval principle of the nullity of misused authority, which issued in various and complex doctrines of private disobedience and resistance, public deposition, or the nullification or reinterpretation of the king's ordinances by the king's officers. These doctrines did not typically assume that the individual, the community, or the magistrate was superior to the king, still less that he was responsible to their wills; they implied simply that the king's right lapsed when it was definitely abused, and that rational men could see when that had happened.

Another result of the objective and rationalist medieval approach was to ease the medieval transitions from personal consent to the consent of representatives and from the rule of unanimity to the majority rule. From the time of Rousseau, people have been scolding Locke for the sleight-of-hand with which he made these transitions. But, from a modern voluntarist point of view, the really shocking transformations occurred in the Middle Ages, when the principle, "What touches all must be approved by all," was used to describe the consent of a majority of representatives—and, be it observed, of representatives equipped with "full power"[20] and unrestrained by any of the modern devices for securing responsibility to their constituents. We know a good deal about the immediate interests and the institutional and ideological context that facilitated the revolutionary acceptance of consent through representatives and of the binding power of a majority,[21] but we shall look in vain in medieval writings for any extensive or fundamental defense of this revolution. And I suggest that one reason was that the people who were concerned with theory were not looking at it from a modern voluntarist point of view. The representative was there to represent not so much the wishes of his constituents as the rational acquiescence that they would be bound to give to a rationally-compelling case. And, in a matter which had really nothing to do with separate interests or desires, a majority could be assumed to be what canonists called "the greater and wiser part," whose decision could plausibly be taken as the perception of what was right.

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[19] The nearest one comes to this seems to be in some of Marsiglio's arguments, *op. cit.*, *Dictio* 1, Chs. 12, 13, for the inclusion of all classes of citizens in the *legislator;* but note that Marsiglio was not sufficiently concerned about the possibility of deadlock between opposing classes to provide any precise rules for the computation of votes, and that he seems to have taken for granted that the process he rather vaguely describes would result in almost unanimous consensus on "a proper and true ordination of just things"; cf. Alan Gewirth, *Marsilius of Padua* (New York, 1951), Vol. 1, pp. 182 ff. The argument from the difficulty of securing agreement in a group was, of course, one of the standard arguments for kingship, but this argument typically proceeded without any allusion to class interests.

[20] On this phrase, see Post, "*Plena Potestas* and Consent in Medieval Assemblies" (cited in note 18).

[21] M. V. Clarke, *Medieval Representation and Consent* (London, 1936), Chs. XII, XIII, traces the role of some of these factors in thirteenth-century England.

The assumption that a community could unite in the recognition of its common needs supported the late-medieval development of the doctrine, already long present in medieval thought, that the customary law and the authority of rulers had been originally established by the people. This doctrine was not necessarily connected with a doctrine of popular sovereignty; it did not issue in an argument that rulers should be responsive to mandates from the popular will; nor was it designed to vindicate the rights of individuals against the state. Its development was partly a defense of the autonomy of the state against some of the more extreme claims of papalist theory, and partly an attempt to define a legal basis for some specific public functions exercised by representative bodies: e.g., consultation and consent, election, deposition. In most instances, it was a juristic or historical doctrine rather than a moral one: it was not an attempt to answer Rousseau's famous question, to which medieval thought had already replied. Thus the typical discussion could proceed mainly by the assertion of a plausible hypothesis which required no great effort of abstraction: one simply postulated, in the distant past, a community which needed laws and a government, which did not have any, and which was capable of sufficient consensus to provide for its needs. It could then be assumed that the constituent community had retained for itself certain non-governmental rights which came into play in special circumstances.

Occasionally, however—certainly in Cusa, perhaps in Marsiglio or Occam[22]—one finds the suggestion that the consent of the community was an essential factor in the legitimacy of authority itself, on the grounds of the natural freedom of men. But this suggestion still occurred within the framework of the characteristic medieval conviction that government was necessary to man—that it was, as James of Viterbo had put it, "from God through the mediation of nature, which tends thereto, and through the mediation of reason, which carries out the tendency of nature.[23] "Voluntary servitude," Cusa said, "was bound to that necessity, on account of the necessity itself."[24] Thus the consent of man to coercive authority was a step in the implementation of a rational dictate, an active cooperation in the carrying out of a moral imperative, rather than a decisive act of self-determining will. The discretion of the community appeared only in its more concrete decisions: its choice of a ruler, its embodiment of the general rules of natural law in "the laws of the lands," adapted to its special needs and circumstances.

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[22] Cusa, *op. cit.*, Bk. 2, Ch. 14; Marsiglio, *op. cit.*, *Dictio* 1, Ch. 12, sec. 6; Occam's strongest statement is in his *Breviloquium* (ed. L. Baudry), p. 121; cf. Gewirth, *op. cit.*, pp. 219 ff.; Lagarde, *op. cit.*, Vol. 6, pp. 183–92; Lewis, *Medieval Political Ideas*, Vol. 1, pp. 26, 159–62, and notes.

[23] *De Regimine Christiano*, Pt. 2, Ch. 3.

[24] *Op. cit.*, Bk. 3, preface.

Thus, although the idea of an original contract appeared at times in medieval thought, it did not play the pivotal role that it played in later systems.[25] It was not needed to explain the moral obligation of obedience, which followed directly from the fact that government was necessary to man. It was not needed to explain the moral limits of obedience, for the government that was necessary to man was inherently limited by principles no human will had made. The contract, in medieval thought, was little more than a convenient symbol for a contingent, reciprocal relationship, whose particular form might well have been shaped by human agreement, but whose essential obligations were far more deeply based.

When Jefferson said that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," the principle he enunciated was derived from medieval thought, but his meaning was surely not the medieval meaning. Just how far the reinterpretation of inherited concepts had gone by this time, I am not competent to decide, but I shall try to point out the general directions of change.

Between the fifteenth century and the eighteenth the idea of freedom had moved into a central place in political theory and developed implications that had been scarcely rudimentary in medieval thought. The idea that reason could discover what, objectively, was right had been complicated by the pervasive growth of the idea that the objective rights of man included a considerable right to determine what he wanted, and this idea had given a new significance to the notion of consent. The discussion of the basis and limits of political authority had given a larger place to the role of will—with at least a suggestion that men might have chosen to remain in a quite tolerable state of nature. Legislation and taxation and economic regulation had come to be part of the regular business of government; the area of discretion increasingly involved matters that affected all men deeply, and on which men deeply disagreed. The Reformation, the constitutional struggles of seventeenth-century England, and the long-continued Anglo-American experience with representative institutions had accumulated evidence that, even within a common ethical tradition, the specific, day-to-day formulation of the common good would involve a clash of factions, and that it could not safely be entrusted to any single will or group of wills. The governmental agencies that in the Middle Ages had appeared as projections and qualifications of the king's will had come to be more clearly differentiated in function and to be construed as distinct in origin and power. Detached from the single person of the king, the notion of sovereignty had become more complex, its location uncertain; it might even be asserted that sovereignty could be divided. The concept of rational consensus on questions of "manifest" right had been shrinking back from the realm of governmental action, to protect all the more rigidly the matters on which no government should act. Within the realm of action, appeals to reason and, especially, the appeal to utility were becoming appeals to public opinion, disconnected from the theory of natural law. And, although the concept of a supreme natural law still lingered, natural law had changed: it had lost much of its flexibility and its claim to pervade all issues of social right; it was congealing into dogmatic rules stated without qualification; its chief concern was the arrangement and maintenance of invariable rights. The experience of seventeenth-century England had suggested that a right that varied with circumstance too easily became no right at all. In the course of that experience, the English common-law had been assimilated to the law of nature; and the permanent inviolability that medieval natural law had attached to the moral needs of man had come to adhere to certain institutional means, and notably to the structure of property. In general, the attention of political theory had been shifting from the recognition of discretionary authority and the definition of the moral principles that qualified it, to a search for techniques to limit discretion, to direct it, and to keep it responsible to the subjects' will. For, in proportion as the medieval idea of the intrinsic sovereignty of government was being confronted with the younger idea of the intrinsic sovereignty of the individual, the chief problem of practical and theoretical politics was becoming the problem of how to reconcile the two. But this was a question that medieval political thought had never had to face.

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[25] Contrast the central role of the contract in Locke with its peripheral role in, e.g., Aquinas's several discussions of the limits of political obligation (he mentions a contract only once, and then at the *end* of his discussion in *De Regimine Principum*, Bk. 1, Ch. 6); or in the analysis of the limits of obedience by the "voluntarist" Occam, *Dialogus*, Pt. 3, Tr. 3, Bk. 2, Chs. 20, 26–28. Altogether many medieval writers agreed in the belief that government had originated through an act of the community, and although medieval writings are sprinkled with references to Augustine's "general compact of human society to obey its kings" (*Confessions*, Bk. 3, Ch. 8, q. Gratian, c. 2, di. 8), discussions of the obligations of ruler and subjects could, and often did, proceed quite as well without as with any reference to this compact.

Note also the shift in the significance of the contract implied in Locke's insistence on unanimous consent compared with the medieval references to the constituent consent of "the people."

POLITICAL THEORY AND THE STUDY OF POLITICS: A REPORT OF A CONFERENCE*

(*Rapporteur:* HARRY ECKSTEIN, *Harvard University*)

This is a report of a conference on Political Theory and the Study of Politics organized by the Department of Political Science of Northwestern University, thanks to a grant by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The conference was held on February 24, 25, and 26, 1955, in Evanston, Illinois.

The following papers were presented at the conference and are available upon request to the Department of Political Science of Northwestern University: "The Unity of Political Theory," by Norman Jacobson, University of California (Berkeley); "The Place of Classic Political Theory in the Study of Politics," by Mulford Sibley, University of Minnesota; "Political Ideology as a Datum for the Study of Politics," by Frederick Watkins, Yale University; "American Political Theory and the Study of Politics," by Robert McCloskey, Harvard University; "Political Philosophy and the 'Science' of Politics," by Carl Friedrich, Harvard University; "Political Philosophy in the 20th Century; An Appraisal of its Contribution to the Study of Politics," by Lindsay Rogers, Columbia University.

The following persons, in addition to the members of the Department of Political Science of Northwestern University, participated at the Conference: David Easton, University of Chicago; Cortez Ewing, University of Oklahoma; Frank Grace, University of Michigan; Pendleton Herring, Social Science Research Council; Thomas Jenkin, University of California (Los Angeles); Evron Kirkpatrick, American Political Science Association; Avery Leiserson, Vanderbilt University; Norton Long, Western Reserve University; Austin Ranney, University of Illinois; David Smith, Swarthmore College; John Stewart, Rockefeller Foundation; Kenneth Thompson, Rockefeller Foundation; and Sheldon Wolin, University of California (Berkeley). Roy C. Macridis, Northwestern University, organized the conference and acted as chairman and Harry Eckstein, Harvard University, was the rapporteur.

The report indicates the most significant aspects of the discussion and highlights the false distinction between "behaviorists" and "theorists." At the same time it meets squarely the issue of the role of political philosophy in graduate instruction in political science.

It should be pointed out that this report is not meant in any sense to be a comprehensive summary of the proceedings of the conference. No stenographic notes were kept, and Dr. Eckstein did not attempt to reproduce the individual arguments presented in the various papers. He followed and often participated in the discussions that took place, and what he wrote may be considered to be in the nature of an interpretive commentary upon the conference. In a number of instances he may have omitted important remarks made by individual participants, while in other instances he may have summarized only too briefly arguments that to some participants appeared to be important. This in a sense was unavoidable.—ROY MACRIDIS, *Northwestern University*

The issues which arose during the discussions of the conference fall fairly conveniently into three compartments.

First, we obviously had to settle, with reasonable clarity, what we were talking about: what "political philosophy" is, what "political science" is, and whether they are really distinguishable. The basic issue of the conference was to determine the relevance of the one to the study of the other, and if we had decided that they were really the same thing, there would simply have been no problems for us to discuss. On the whole, we felt that a valid, if not necessarily sharp, distinction was to be made between the "philosophical" and the "scientific" approaches to the study of politics and that we were not discussing absurd or tautological issues. We agreed, however, that all types of political inquiry involve the construction of *theory*, implicit or explicit, and that the title "political theory" has been unjustifiably appropriated by the historians of political thought.

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* Reprints of this article may be obtained on request to the Curriculum Development Project, Political Science Department, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

Second, what is the point of studying the political philosophies of the past? Why insist that they be part of the equipment of the professional political scientist? Ought we not to stop "hesitating to forget our founders" and relegate them to the general education courses, where all good obsolete Greats properly belong? Needless to say, these questions, less aggressively phrased, took up most of our discussions. Needless to say also, they resolved themselves into two categories of questions. That is to say, the utility of political philosophy might be found either in the intrinsic ability of the best of past political thought to sharpen the wits of contemporary political thinkers, much as any difficult intellectual exercise sharpens the mind and deepens the imagination, or in the ability of political philosophy to serve as a thought-saving device by providing the political scientist with a rich source of concepts, models, insights, theories, and methods.

Third, what should be the role of contemporary political philosophers in the field—not of teachers of the history of political philosophy, but of people who still devote themselves to creative political philosophy?

The conference did not reach agreement on all of these large issues, nor did we succeed in isolating all the subsidiary problems they pose. But our discussions at least touched on all of them.

I. THE END OF THE STUDY OF POLITICS

Most of the disagreements which arose during the discussions of the conference arose from certain fundamentally different ideas about the "end" of the study of politics. It is very difficult to state precisely in what sense our ideas on this subject differed; certainly we never had a sharply focussed debate on it. But there were perceptible differences in mood among the members, a certain something in the "climate of opinion" which was omnipresent, if only as an undercurrent, in the debates we did have. In sharply focussing the issue, therefore, there may be some distortion of what was actually said at the conference.

For the sake of clarity, it may be useful to deal with the various shades of opinion which gradually emerged on the subject in terms of a dichotomy of views. On the one hand, there were certain people who would probably not object to being called behaviorists if I confess to loose usage of the term; these people seemed to feel that the main task of contemporary political science (its historic mission, as it were) is to transform the field of political studies into a genuine scientific *discipline*. What this means will be discussed more concretely below. On the other hand, there were certain people (anti-behaviorists, again loosely speaking) who felt that the end of the study of politics was something they called political *wisdom*, and that wisdom about (or in) politics could not be achieved at all, or that it could not be best achieved, by the sort of discipline the behaviorists seemed to want. The vast majority of the members of the conference, however, steered a careful, even if at times ambiguous, middle course between these extremes.

What troubled the "behaviorists," of course, was the extreme eclecticism and individualism of effort in political science. The field seemed to them to lack all the characteristics of a discipline, especially the constant accumulation of tested theories, a high degree of meaningful communication among its practitioners, and a high degree of cooperative research activity. This, they felt, makes us different not only from the natural scientists (a difference which might be justified on the basis of differences in subject-matter and practicable research techniques), but also from other social scientists, especially economists and sociologists, and for this they felt there was no justification at all. But exactly why does political science have so extraordinarily little "discipline"? The diagnosis of the behaviorists is a familiar one. We do not accumulate, communicate, and cooperate sufficiently because we have no common language, no common problems, no significant methodological agreement *in the field as a whole;* and we lack these highly desirable things because we do not have a comprehensive and shared model (or conceptual scheme) of the political process which could guide our researches and give them a collectively coherent structure. Our task, therefore, is to unify and to systematize our field; at any rate, this, if not the ultimate end of the study of politics, should be our immediate goal.

Obviously, however, the behaviorists were not willing to buy discipline at the price of "wisdom." Therefore, when the "anti-behaviorists" opposed them with pleas for wisdom they clearly had something rather special in mind, something which can be roughly put as follows (and it can only be put "roughly"): (1) Wisdom is to be found not in "explanation" but in "understanding." "Explanation," the anti-behaviorists felt, involves the systematic collection of data and the rigorous application of theoretical procedures (hypothesizing and testing, presumably) to the data, generally in accordance with a set of arbitrary rules which, properly observed, result in something called "verified theory." The whole process, in short, is a mechanical sort of game rather than genuinely intellectual, speculative activity. In its most repulsive form, it is "scientism," which was defined by one member as the use of mathematical procedures for the manipulation of political data. "Understanding," on the other hand, goes to the very core of experience; it involves, presumably, some deeper, perhaps more intuitive grasp of the meaning of reality. It is more likely to grow out of a flash of insight than a long evening with the logarithm table; it is certainly more likely to be found in an aphorism than in a conceptual scheme. One can get "understanding" only from a sensitive, critical, imaginative mind, not from a mere human IBM machine. (2) Wisdom, moreover, penetrates certain kinds of experience which a "scientific" discipline either could not or would not touch and which may be the most important in our field. There is, in the first place, the field of moral speculation. Morality cannot be factored out of politics or the study of politics, if only because the very function of politics is to formulate imperatives and to back them with collective force. There is, again, the field of immediate practical activity. We cannot wait for the scientific machinery to grind out rigorously tested results before we act. Action is thrust upon us; policies have to be made, usually on the basis of something less than total knowledge and absolutely systematic calculation. Nor should the student of politics wash his hands of the chances he has to influence practical activity simply because he is not in command of a commonly shared theoretical system. At the very least, he has sufficient knowledge and experience to justify his influence. And one may even suspect that "wisdom," in the rather vague sense used here (a good grasp of data, keenness of mind, highly-developed critical power), is more likely to be useful in practical activity than any systematically formulated theories would be, even if we had them.

In a sense, all this means simply that the behaviorists wanted to *train*, the anti-behaviorists to *cultivate* people engaged in the study of politics. But the vast majority—the "Marsh" of our Assembly—felt that the distinction between discipline and wisdom is a false one. They believed that we not only could but must have the best of both possible worlds. And this feeling seemed to grow out of genuine reasons rather than equivocation or politeness toward the extremists in the group.

In the first place, the moderates agreed on the desirability of "discipline" in the field, if by discipline is meant the cooperative and progressive accumulation of tested theories and a high degree of meaningful communication among the practitioners of political science. They did not, however, agree that the field was unprogressive and inchoate now. We do make progress, even though we may not be as self-conscious of it as people in other social sciences. What, after all, constitutes progress in a field like political science? It involves: first, increasing refinement in the definition of problems (learning what sort of questions to ask and not to ask); second, increasing conceptual precision; third, the accumulation of specific hypotheses about specific political systems and political behavior in general; fourth, the systematic conceptual analysis of the field; and fifth, the application of useful concepts, theories, and techniques from other fields to our subject-matter. One can easily cite long lists of recent works which make "progress" in all of these senses: e.g., Weldon's analysis of the epistemological status of certain traditional problems in political philosophy, a whole spate of books (by Lasswell and deJouvenel, among a good many others) on "power," Goguel and Williams' analyses of the French political system, David Easton's diagnostic study of the current state of political science, the impressive use of psychological techniques by the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* (who, to be sure, are not professional political scientists), DeGrazia's use of anomie theory in *The Political Community*—one could go on for pages. And one need scarcely mention the accumulation of concepts and theories, the increasing refinement of techniques, the checking and rechecking of old theories, and the constant cross-fertilization of the field achieved by the best of the political "behaviorists" themselves.

The moderates, therefore, disagreed first of all with the behaviorists' diagnosis of the condition of the field. They disagreed also with their apparent desire for the organization of our work on the basis of some authoritarian conceptual scheme. They felt, in short, that eclecticism was desirable. No single line of approach, no conceptual map, however large its scale, could ever exhaust the richness of any field, least of all a field as rich as politics. If we all agreed on a single line of approach, we should soon find ourselves mistaking the map for reality and feel that we had progressed when we had translated familiar facts into unfamiliar jargon. The sense of being in on a mystery, which distinguishes most of the economists and some sociologists from ourselves, may not be an altogether unmixed blessing, particularly if it involves the identification of "science" with the rules of some esoteric methodological and conceptual game. The moderates felt, as Mill felt, that only pseudo-progress could be achieved by rigid conformity of any sort.

What then distinguished the moderates from the anti-behaviorists? The essential difference between them was that the moderates were unwilling to strip the field of all "scientific" pretensions and to concede that insights are superior to systems and aphorisms superior to correlations. The moderates felt simply that insights need to be subjected to rigorous analysis and that no aphorism can stand on its own two feet merely because it issues from a sensitive mind. Hence, of course, their insistence on eclecticism: the simultaneous cultivation of what the anti-behaviorists called "understanding" and "explanation," i.e., insight and discipline. They also felt that no real distinction was to be made between wisdom and science; that, in effect, the anti-behaviorists were using a value-laden term merely to conceal a profound anti-scientific bias.

These views led to three fundamentally different positions on the subject of the conference. One group felt that political philosophy probably does no one any great harm, but that it does very little good, either, so far as the condition of political science is concerned. Another group felt that political philosophy comprises all that is genuinely admirable and useful in the field. The third felt that political philosophy should have a major place in our departments precisely because it can play a useful role in political "science" itself.

II. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

What we called "political philosophy" is generally called "political theory" in the departments of political science. As I have said, we all agreed that this involves a mistaken use of the word "theory." Theorizing plays a role in all kinds of inquiries, even inquiries which pretend to do nothing more than collect data. After all, criteria of selection imply judgments of significance, and what are judgments of significance if not theories? Thus, we agreed that the theorist-behaviorist dichotomy, which seems to be taken seriously by most political scientists, is naive at best and dangerous at worst; dangerous, in the sense that a sharp separation between "theory" and "empirical" inquiry is likely to lead to both bad theorizing and bad empirical work.

What then did we mean by "political philosophy"? In the first place, we meant the great political speculations of the past, the works of people generally taught in our political theory courses. We were aware, of course, that it is arbitrary in the extreme to label as "philosophy" anything written before the First World War and to withhold the term from almost everything written thereafter. We decided on this meaning of the term, nevertheless, simply because we wanted to discuss the value of studying the Greats who had written on our subject.

Many members of the conference, however, thought that there was a more serious distinction to be made between political science and political philosophy. Political science, of course, is concerned with the analysis of actual political behavior. Political philosophy, we felt, could be distinguished from it on at least three reasonable grounds: subject, scope, and criteria of validity.

So far as subject is concerned, political philosophy is distinguished chiefly by the fact that it deals not only with matters of fact but also with matters of norm: either moral theory in the abstract or questions of immediate practical activity. Political philosophy, in short, is "concerned with ends as well as means"—one of the most frequently used phrases at the conference. In addition to moral theory, political philosophy also involves another kind of speculative activity, not strictly part of political science but highly relevant to it. This sort of speculative activity we might perhaps call "meta-theory": theory about theory. The term refers to something I have difficulty in putting very precisely, but anyone who has followed the trend in the contemporary philosophy departments will know what I mean. Modern philosophy seems increasingly to have given up the historic work of philosophy, the search for substantive truth. It seems increasingly to concentrate on commenting upon what the people who do search for substantive truth are doing: the language they use, the methods they employ, the epistemological and metaphysical implications of their activities, and so forth. Someone has said—and with some justification—that modern philosophers (in Britain and America) are "clever dilettantes who criticize the work of dull specialists." But this is not meant to poke fun at "meta-theory," which can obviously be extremely useful in the development of science. Meta-theory, in the sense the term is used here, includes analysis of the sort of problems one can fruitfully raise, the sort of language (concepts) one should or should not employ, the "ultimate implication" of substantive research findings, methodological analyses, general criticisms of research procedures and findings, and, not least, the overall programmatic analysis of a field, "programmatic" referring to the sort of analyses which are meant to lead to research rather than to present research findings. Weldon's *Vocabulary of Politics* and much of the work done by the Social Science Research Council's committees are fairly familiar cases in point.

So far as scope is concerned, political philosophy is characterized chiefly by system-building, i.e., the construction of comprehensive theories of politics. The line cannot be drawn precisely because we have no convenient measures of partialness and comprehensiveness. But one can at least illustrate the extremes. On one extreme would be, let us say, a theory explaining the defeat of the British Labor party in 1951; obviously such a theory is not likely to involve the ordering of a very great range of political experience. On the other hand would be theories like Marx's analysis of the state and the determinants of political power, which obviously involve the ordering of almost the whole of political experience and call for a judgment as to what is significant and insignificant in experience as such. Bentley's analysis of the process of government might also be cited on the Marxian extreme, despite his claim to have devised merely a basis for research, and Bentley is especially worth noting here because he is a political analyst to whom the philosophers and the scientists can clearly lay an equal claim, the former on the basis of both the scope and the meta-theoretical aspects of his work.

When we came to "criteria of proof" as a factor distinguishing political science and philosophy, we found ourselves in much muddier waters. Some of us felt that anything validated by correspondence is "science" and anything validated by anything else (or not validated at all—"above validation," perhaps) is philosophy. This would, of course, put moral theory in the realm of philosophy, since one certainly does not test moral theory by correspondence, if one tests it at all. Similarly, meta-theory would be philosophy since it, in a sense, is merely theory about testing itself.

The chief task of the conference was, of course, to discuss the utility of political philosophy in each of the two senses I have outlined: the study of the Greats, and the study of "comprehensive" political theories, theories of political obligation (moral theories) and meta-theoretical writings on political science.

III. THE UTILITY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

No one disputed that the Greats were worth studying for their *intrinsic interest.* Even the most extreme behaviorists felt that no one need apologize for being interested in the history of thought in our field. They considered the history of political thought to be as worthwhile as any other sort of history. It could no doubt give a great deal of amusement; it was probably as mentally stimulating as chess and as aesthetically pleasing as great art. We agreed that we did not want to breed philistines and that anything amusing, anything mentally stimulating, anything aesthetically pleasing needs no further defense. The question was, of course, whether the history of political thought was anything more than amusing to people who find their amusement in such things. What precisely would be lost if we surrendered our Greats to the history, philosophy, and General Education departments, as have most of the other fields? The behaviorists certainly would not have been very sad to see Plato and Locke deported to other jurisdictions, but the others felt that the loss would be both sad and harmful, most of all to the behaviorists themselves—and not only because they felt that moral theory, whatever its "scientific" status, was ultimately inseparable from political theory. The following are some other more important reasons:

1. Even if a good grasp of political philosophy cannot be immediately converted into brilliant scientific results, the majority of us felt that analysis of the Greats at least sharpens the wits, deepens the imagination, and refines one's critical powers—and that even the dullest specialist can use all the wits, imagination, and critical powers he can develop. There is no real distinction to be made between a cultivated mind and a trained mind, since some speculative ability is required in even the most routine of behavioral inquiries and practical activities. The majority of us felt that the attitude which underlies the British examination for the Administrative Class was entirely right; there were very few Ilexes and Opimians among us.[1] One member of the conference who had had a great deal of administrative experience in Washington felt that, even on the lower bureau levels, men who had a broad grounding in "liberal arts" subjects showed greater capacity and, above all, greater adaptability than men trained mainly in a specialty. Most of us agreed that if the generalizing mind is desirable in a government bureau, it is even more desirable in a scholarly discipline. And most of us felt that speculative and critical abilities are not simply natural gifts, but talents to be developed by contact with great speculative and critical works. This, however, constitutes a defense of the liberal arts in general, not of political philosophy in particular.

2. Secondly, most of us felt that there is a need in any field for people who do not fully share the assumptions and attitudes of the orthodox "scientists." Every social organization has a tendency to isolate and punish the eccentric, to compel conformity to its dominant conceptions of ultimate truth and ultimate value, and frequently for good reasons. But the majority of the conference was sufficiently of the classical liberal persuasion to feel that too much success in this respect is self-defeating. No one can be sure that the scientific assumptions of today will not turn out to be the metaphysical nonsense of tomorrow; but we can be fairly certain that it is almost always the non-conformist who breaks new ground and makes "progress." One way to prevent the over-routinization of new and temporarily dominant ideas is, of course, to keep the history of ideas constantly in mind; if nothing else, this will engender a healthy perspective to-

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[1] Miss Iles (in T. L. Peacock's *Gryll Grange*): "The poor young men . . . are not held qualified for a profession unless they have overloaded their understanding with things of no use in it. . . . "

The Rev. Dr. Opimian: "Very true. Brindly would not have passed as a canal-maker, nor Edward Williams as a bridge-builder. I saw the other day some examination papers which would have infallibly excluded Marlborough from the army and Nelson from the navy. . . . Fancy Watt being asked how much Joan of Naples got for Avignon when she sold it to Pope Clement the Sixth."

Compare, on the other hand, the remark of Mr. Flosky (in *Nightmare Abbey*), who speaks for the "wisdom" party (Flosky is a parody on Coleridge, a political philospher in good standing): "My dear Miss O'Carroll, it would have given me great pleasure to have said anything that would have given you pleasure; but if any person living could make report of having obtained any information on any subject from Ferdinando Flosky, my transcendental reputation would be ruined forever."

ward the authoritarian tendencies which generally afflict every field of inquiry at every stage of its development. Another way to prevent it is to present the student with a variety of different approaches to the analysis of the same subject; and this, in lieu of a sufficient number of eccentrics in our departments, can be accomplished by studying the eccentrics who fill Professor Sabine's book. Thus, while some of the behaviorists agreed that the study of political philosophy is useful as long as we do not have a real discipline of political science, the rest felt that it would be particularly useful when and if we ever got a discipline worthy of the name.

3. The majority felt, however, that there is a still stronger argument to be made for retaining the history of political ideas as a central part of the field. This argument rests on the very nature of the social as distinguished from the natural sciences. The study of society must be historical and "dynamic" precisely because the social sciences do not deal with a closed universe into which nothing new ever intrudes and in which a fixed mechanism plays itself out into a constant uniformity of motion. Most of us were on the side of Heraclitus and Hegel: "Everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away." Whether the natural sciences also deal with a dynamic universe the conference, unlike Engels, did not dare to discuss; but we felt reasonably certain, at any rate, of the need for dynamic models and theories in the social sciences.

Consistently with this attitude, we felt that the impression of unreality many of us get from sister-fields like economics and sociology is due to the prevalence of static models in these fields. Nor did we think it accidental that static models should be so prevalent in them. We agreed with one of the members that the emphasis on methodological rigor in these fields results in an exaggerated preoccupation with the "here and now" and hence with static analyses of static social situations. Political philosophy, even if it cannot claim the logical rigor of economic theory or the empirical comprehensiveness of the Yankee City series, at least accommodates the "intelligent" analysis of the real essence of our subject, dynamic change in time. We felt, of course, that a rigorous dynamic approach to social behavior may some day be worked out by the behaviorists. But the majority felt that the work of the economists, sociologists, and our own behaviorists offered no immediate hope of this and that there was such an affinity between systematic rigor and static analysis that there was every prospect of disappointment in the future. Hence, at least in the short run—and probably also in the long run—a healthy emphasis on dynamic analysis presupposes an equally healthy emphasis on political philosophy, as distinguished from the sort of thing the behaviorists wanted.

4. There is still another argument to be made for political philosophy on the basis of the dynamic historical nature of political science—and here we come much closer to the "cash value" of political philosophy to the behaviorists. The documents which comprise the history of political thought are simply one of the sources (many sources) on which we can construct knowledge of politics in the past. They are not absolutely reliable documents; they are certainly not

compendia of the sort of information about the past all of us want. Hence the tendency of the rigid behaviorists to neglect the past for the here and now: we simply cannot do in the past what *The Authoritarian Personality* has done in the present. But this is a fault which documents in political philosophy share with all other historical documents, and even perhaps with contemporary documents. After all, Plato's *Dialogues* and Aristotle's *Politics* may contain more information relevant to the general analysis of political behavior than all the voting statistics compiled and sifted for Erie county. The problem of checking and evaluating the information contained in the documents of political philosophy merely involves the application of historiographical techniques. That does not mean that the problem is easy to solve in every case; it does mean that a discipline for coping with it exists—a discipline, incidentally, in which most of us unfortunately have no technical training. The point is that political behavior in the past is an indispensable datum for the analysis of political behavior as such; hence we must make the best we can of the sources we have on past political behavior, and the history of political thought is one of these sources. There may be better ones, but in historical research one must use everything one can get.

5. Moreover, the history of political thought, not least because of the moral consciousness of the political philosophers, may be particularly informative on a matter of obviously central importance in the field: political ideologies. Most of us agreed that political activities and political attitudes are inseparably related aspects of the same phenomena. Conceptions of "legitimacy," the myths in men's minds, the way in which they view the world and the way in which they translate their world-views into political "directives" are absolutely fundamental to the correct analysis of political behavior. Even our behaviorists were not behaviorists in the more narrow sense of the term.

But here a disagreement emerged among the members of the conference which was never successfully resolved, even among the moderates. Do the highly refined ideologies which constitute our History of Political Thought courses really and accurately reflect ideologies which have actually influenced behavior? Do the sort of people whom Max Weber called *Kathedersozialisten* really have the same sort of attitudes as the people who actually go to the barricades? If we agreed on anything here, it was on the point that no general judgment could be made on the matter; every case must be treated on its own merits. We felt that probably all political philosophies (above all American political philosophies) reflect popular ideologies; that the consciousness of even the most free-floating intellectual is conditioned by the consciousness of his society; and that this social consciousness can manifest itself not only in conformity with an ideology but also in revolt against it. Hence, the majority of us felt that all political philosophies are potentially useful sources of politically significant ideologies.

We also felt, however, that the unsophisticated identification of political philosophy and politically significant ideology is full of dangers. The fact that Rousseau's political thought has both democratic and totalitarian implications (if it does) does not mean, *ipso facto*, that they are the sources of British socialism or that British Socialists think like Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet. Hence, positing a one-one relationship between "political philosophy" and politically significant "ideology" is, perhaps more often than not, merely a way of avoiding difficult historical research.

Many of us felt that, in most cases, we have available infinitely better sources of politically significant ideologies than the cream of political thought, and that neither the political behaviorists nor the political "theorists" have scratched even the surface of these sources—although the historians have, usually for purposes different from ours. The "behaviorists" have not extracted the juice from the sources because they are too current-events-conscious and frequently lack a decent training in historiography. The "theorists" have neglected them because they lack adquate training in empirical research techniques and because they are not genuinely interested in political behavior. There is, consequently, a vast territory of politically significant information which lies fallow, mainly because we seem unable to reach a reasonable compromise between the study of Plato and the study of local government in Illinois.

Many members of the conference felt that the priority of research in ideologies should be given to these sources (legal documents, novels, letters, memoirs, pamphlets, handbills) rather than to the Greats. Others, however, felt that the Greats were at least a source of what we want and that the evaluation of their "relevance" posed no problems intrinsically different from the problems posed by the other sources.

6. If political philosophy is valuable as a source of data, it is also valuable as a source of ideas for analyzing the data. The history of political thought is indisputably a gold-mine of concepts, models, hypotheses, and methods which may turn out to be useful even in the analysis of contemporary political behavior.

What really disturbed us on this subject was not whether political philosophy is useful but why the reservoir of potentially useful ideas in the history of political thought is not being used more. After all, if we want a "cumulative" discipline we need not begin entirely from scratch; we need only use whatever is useful in past thought on politics. The reason we rarely do this is plain and has already been mentioned: the fact that the behaviorists have a generally insufficient interest and preparation in the history of political thought and the fact that the historians of political thought hardly ever do anything but expound the history of political ideas.

This is the real core of the difficulty, and the real reason, many of us felt, why it was necessary to have a conference on the relevance of political philosophy to political science at all. Their relevance to one another seemed beyond question to the majority at the conference. And if the majority is right, the problem of the conference is ultimately a political rather than an intellectual problem: how to persuade the practitioners in the field to develop a healthy interest and to acquire a healthy preparation in both political science and philosophy. It should be added that we did not feel that this is simply a matter of persuading the behaviorists to take their Aristotle out of the basement. It would also involve persuading the political "philosophers" to stoop to the grimy work of empirical analysis occasionally. Our villain, in the final analysis, and not surprisingly, was simply the "behaviorist"-"theorist" dichotomy.

IV. THE ROLE OF THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER

But what of the contemporary political philosopher, i.e., the man who is less interested in expounding the history of political "theories" than in adding to them? What sort of work might he do? And, above all, in what special ways can he be useful to the political "scientists" other than those in which all political "theories" are useful to them?

1. The anti-behaviorists felt, on the whole, that he should perform two roles. First, he should undertake the never-ending task of ethical and moral reflection: ethical reflection toward the definition and critique of ultimate imperatives, moral reflection toward the definition of actions which can approach the imperatives in practical activity. In effect, he should address himself to the matter of ends and means, to the problems of choice in practical activity rather than the analysis of behavior as a given. His function, in this sense, is to be a source of directives for society in general. Second, he should use his critical powers, experience, and general knowledge—his "wisdom"—in commenting upon contemporary political experience: analyzing broad trends in political development, criticizing the activities of statesmen, trying to penetrate the inner meaning, as it were, of contemporary political life.

2. The moderates felt that the chief task of the contemporary political philosopher was to provide a constant flow of theoretical ideas and concepts to those more interested in empirical work; ideas and concepts, however, which have no claim to "wisdom" other than their utility and testability in "scientific" analysis. They felt that it was perhaps not entirely necessary for every practitioner in the field to possess both a highly-developed theoretical imagination and a rigorous command of empirical research methods. Instead, there might well be some sort of rational division of labor. At any rate, the moderates could not see why certain political scientists should not devote their efforts chiefly to speculation, provided that they were sufficiently aware of the problems and difficulties arising in empirical analysis to make their ideas useful to the behaviorists.

3. Interestingly enough, the behaviorists, more than anyone else, insisted on the system-building and meta-theoretical functions of the contemporary political philosopher. It is not difficult to see why they should insist on system-building. After all, if the immediate task of political science is to transform itself into a unified discipline, we need someone to perform the unifying function: someone to construct the authoritative model of the political process and program for research which would govern our future activities, to coin the interrelated concepts, to chart the map, and to base the system on the relevant work already done in detail. This would be the unique function of the political philosophers. They would be sources not of moral directives but of scientific directives. Here,

of course, the behaviorists and anti-behaviorists might join hands—as usual, the extremists turn out to be not so entirely different from one another—for the wise philosopher of the anti-behaviorists would be peculiarly fitted to play the unifying role in the field. But perhaps this is not entirely fair, since the behaviorists would vehemently insist that even the wisest of conceptual schemes is merely a program for research and can have no claim to validity in and of itself.

Even more important, the behaviorists insisted that the political philosophers should play a more constructive role as "critics" of the work of the political scientists, i.e., that they should increasingly assume the position which modern philosophy in general is assuming toward the substantive fields. There should be less expounding of the ancients and more keeping the moderns up to the mark. The contemporary political philosopher should be constantly engaged in the critical analysis of the political scientist's concepts, the methods he uses, the models which seem to govern his work, and the consistency of his findings and reasonings. He should constantly clarify the basic assumptions of the behaviorist's work and its "larger" implications. This is the service in which he can most help the work of political science and find a justifiable niche for himself in our academic departments. He should, in short, be a methodologically and linguistically sophisticated critic, in constant process of refining the products of empirical activity.

CONCLUSION

At the end of the conference, many of us felt that a real problem confronting us was revealed by our discussions. *How and why had the political "philosophers" and the political "scientists" managed to drift so far apart in their work when most of them were so eager to concede that they had much to learn from one another?* It would be tedious and not very useful to go into all the possible explanations. The important thing is not to hold post mortems—which might after all only widen the breach—but to begin making some attempts to bring the two closer together. Some of us believed that the most promising step at present would be to attempt some sort of collaborative analysis of the area in which political science and philosophy touch most closely on one another, i.e., the field of politically significant "ideologies." However this may be, it is hoped that this report will stimulate further thought in tackling this problem of collaborative work between "philosopher" and "scientist."

REVISION OF THE NOMINATION AND ELECTION PROCEDURE OF THE ASSOCIATION

A SYMPOSIUM

At the Council meeting in Boulder in September, 1955, Professor Norman J. Padelford, Chairman of the Nominating Committee in 1954–55, presented a proposal for revising the provisions of the Constitution governing the election of officers of the Association. The Nominating Committee was itself divided on the question of the recommendations and the Council, after voting down the proposals, referred them to the Executive Committee for further study.

The Executive Committee decided to ask Professor Padelford to write a brief statement setting forth the proposals and the arguments for them to be published in the *Review*. At the same time it decided to ask one member of the 1954–55 Committee, who had been opposed to the proposals, to set forth the arguments against them; Mr. Howard R. Penniman was asked to do this. The Executive Committee decided to send these statements to several people from different sections of the country for comment and to print the Padelford and Penniman statements along with the comments in the *Review*. Not all those asked to comment did so; five replies, however, were received and are printed here along with the two main papers.

It is the hope of the Executive Committee that the printing of this material will stimulate thinking and discussion on the problem and that many members will take the time to write the Executive Committee expressing their views and any alternative proposals they may have. Letters should be addressed to Mr. Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W., Washington 6, D. C.

THE CASE FOR REVISION

NORMAN J. PADELFORD

Chairman of Nominating Committee, 1954–55

I

One of the most vital aspects of any democratic organization should be the procedure by which its elective officers are chosen. For many years the elective officers of The American Political Science Association have been nominated by a select committee appointed by the President and elected by ballot at the Annual Business Meeting of the Association. An eminent succession of officers has been brought to the leadership of the Association by this process. And on the whole there has been little complaint about the persons elected to office.

Complaints have been forthcoming, however, that the present procedures are undemocratic and that there is growing apathy among a substantial portion of the membership regarding the annual elections. Specifically, objections have been voiced that (1) the present constitutional provisions afford members little opportunity for exercising a choice in the election of officers, and (2) elections are determined by the unrepresentative character of the Annual Business Meetings, where attendance is often relatively small.

II

As the Constitution stands, opportunity is afforded to every member of the Association to vote for the elective officers by attending the Annual Business Meeting. There are no qualifications or bars to voting other than being a member in good standing and not even union labels have to be shown to attend and vote. On occasion, members have turned out in large numbers for the elections when they have believed a serious issue was at stake. And they have overridden the slate presented by the Nominating Committee. But this has been highly exceptional. Furthermore, the Constitution (Article V, paragraph 2) does provide a "safety valve" in permitting additional names or a substitute slate to be brought in to the Annual Meeting, provided notice is given to the Secretary 24 hours in advance and a petition is signed by 10 members. Normally, however, the Nominating Committees' slates are voted through without challenge or the presentation of additional names giving the members opportunity to exercise any real choice.

It can hardly be gainsaid that attendance at the Annual Meetings is determined to a considerable degree by factors of location, time, academic or other conflicting duties, costs of travel, and other elements over which many members have little or no control. Many of our members, especially those teachers who are dependent upon their own salaries for travel and hotel expenses, are unable to attend each year. They are thereby denied the opportunity of registering a vote either for or against the slates presented.

Attendance at the Annual Business Meetings in the past few years has been in the neighborhood of 100–150. This is a small fraction of an association now numbering over 5,000 members. It matters little whether this ratio of attendance to total membership is larger or smaller than that of other comparable learned societies. And it is not questioned that those in attendance have elected a competent, distinguished line of officers. The point is that a large percentage of our membership is not in fact able to participate in the choice of our elective officers year after year. Under the circumstances it is more or less inevitable that a "who cares?" attitude has grown up among many and that elections are regarded as being "cut and dried," determined by a handful who are prejudiced in favor of a coterie of big-name institutions, chiefly east of the Missouri and north of the bluegrass country.

More democracy may not be a universal cure-all for shortcomings in democratic processes. But in a society of political scientists whose members are accustomed to professing the virtues of democracy and of supporting the universal—even the absentee—ballot, surely some means must be conceivable by which a considerably larger percentage of the membership of this Association may be enabled to participate in the annual election of officers. Wider and more regular participation in this respect could lead not only to removal of existent criticisms but also to an enlivened sense of responsibility for and interest in the larger aspects of Association activities. Moreover, such increased participation in elections would compensate for the accidental factors that so often govern attendance at the Annual Business Meetings.

III

Concern has been expressed lest an extension of the voting privilege would result in the election of ill-balanced groups of officers. There should be no insuperable problem in this regard, however, if the Nominating Committees discharge their responsibility properly. Long and dedicated work is required if the Nominating Committees are to weigh adequately all of the factors that should be taken into account in selecting suitable groups of nominees from the field of all possible candidates. The elective offices of the Association have always been regarded as honorary positions to be filled upon a basis of recognition of the scholarly and public accomplishments and contributions of members. It is vital that this aspect of nominations and elections be preserved if the larger on-going interests of the Association are to be advanced. At the same time, the elective officer groups should be broadly and fairly representative of the different fields of political science, of the various regions of the country and of the various types of institutions in which political scientists are located. Finally, it is essential to the wellbeing of the Association that the elective officers each year should possess such a combination of knowledge, experience, and personal qualities that they may be able to work together effectively *as a team* in furthering the work of the organization in the year that lies immediately ahead. Such a balance can be achieved only if the election stage is preceded by adequate deliberation on the part of competent Nominating Committees. It cannot be gained or preserved by reducing nominations or elections to the huckstering of political campaigning. For this reason it is desirable that the present methods of selecting slates of nominees be retained. Given adequate effort by the Nominating Committees, there is little reason to fear that elections will not turn out satisfactorily if changes are made to permit polling a larger share of the membership.

It has been customary in recent years to invite members of the Association, by means of a published notice in the December issue of the *Review*, to submit names of suggested nominees to the Nominating Committees. This has been genuinely useful to the Committees. Last year some 130 members situated in more than 80 institutions sent in suggestions. As a result 47 names were placed before the Committee for the position of President-elect. Eighty-three persons were suggested for the vice presidency; 104 for membership on the Council, and several each for the offices of Secretary and Treasurer. The very size of such a list reveals something of the range of personnel from which the Nominating Committees make their selections, as well as some indication of the magnitude of the work done by these Committees.

The Nominating Committees of the past two years have been satisfied that the existent constitutional provisions do provide a genuine opportunity for membership participation in the nomination stage and that members are taking advantage of this opportunity.

On the other hand, few departments of political science appear to discuss collectively possible nominees or send in names for the benefit of the Committee. If the departments would assume some more active measure of responsibility for discussing and forwarding nomination suggestions, this could be additionally helpful to the Nominating Committee.

IV

In contrast to the opportunities for membership participation in the nomination process, there is relatively little provision for exercising a choice in the final election of officers. And members who for any reason are unable to attend the Annual Business Meeting are denied both a vote and an opportunity to register any choice in the election. Little use has been made of the "safety valve" clause in Article V, paragraph 2 permitting additional nominations to be offered from the floor. Taken in conjunction with the timing of the annual election and the inability of most members to take part in it, the normal absence of any element of choice on the balloting contributes to lethargy concerning the election of Association officers.

It may be argued that allowing a choice on the ballot will introduce lobbying activity into the election of officers or result in denying representation to some area or field. These are conceivable risks. Statements have been made, on the other hand, by members of other professional associations having as large and as widely dispersed a membership as ours that they have been able to devise election methods giving each member a vote and a choice regardless of attendance at the Annual Business Meeting without introducing undesirable political maneuvering or the election of poorly balanced groups of officers.

In the interests of democratic procedure and of stimulating more lively concern with the business of the Association on the part of a larger circle of the total membership, it is time that two steps were taken toward liberalizing and democratizing the election procedure.

Suggestion No. 1 is to amend Article V, paragraph 2 of the Constitution to permit the Nominating Committee to name one person each for President-elect and for Treasurer, but *twice* as many nominees for the offices of Vice President, Council member, and Secretary as are to be elected each year.

Some consideration was given to this idea at the time of the Constitution revision in 1953. It was then felt that this would unduly complicate the work of the Nominating Committee, that it was unnecessary, and that it might result both in electioneering and in possibly obtaining groups of officers not representative of the society as a whole.

Having served on the Nominating Committee during the past two years, and as chairman this last year, it is my personal opinion that a suitably constituted, conscientious Nominating Committee, representing within itself a cross-section of the membership, can prepare a slate of nominees allowing the element of choice suggested above and still insure a proper balance among the elected officers. The number of competent persons recommended to the Committee last year amply testifies that there is no lack of personnel from which to make selections allowing such a choice on the ballot and yet representing all fields and regions. Maintenance of the desired balance can be easily handled by setting up categories within which choices may be made.

It has been argued that some persons would not wish to have their names appear on the ballot if there were a chance they might be defeated. This is possible. It is also true that persons defeated might be disappointed. This is hardly unique. This is a small price to pay for the general advantages that might be gained. Moreover, experience might well show that most active members would be willing to stand for election if asked to do so.

As Chairman of the Nominating Committee in 1955, I consulted with officers or active members of 12 other professional associations on their nomination and election procedures. These included such comparable groups as the American Economic Association, American Historical Association, Industrial Relations Research Association, American Statistical Association, Mathematical Association, Modern Language Association, American Chemical Society, etc. In 10 instances the multiple-choice nomination is used for officers other than the President-elect. No instance was mentioned of an organization having been adversely affected by giving the membership a choice in electing officers below that of the President. It was reported that electioneering had occurred in the American Economic Association when their Constitution provided for submission of two names for the presidency. But this is said to have disappeared to any undesirable degree since single nominations for that office have been employed. The same is said to be the case in the Industrial Relations Research Association. Most of the other Associations consulted, some with a smaller membership, others with many times that of ours, such as the American Chemical Society with a membership of 60,000, find the multiple choice for officers below that of President and for Council members altogether satisfactory and desirable. Many of these associations have a comparable multiplicity of fields represented in their memberships.

Suggestion No. 2 is to amend Article V, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution to provide for the annual election of all elective officers by means of a printed *mail ballot* to be sent to all members not later than May 15 of each year together with a post-paid return envelope.

Eleven of the twelve societies consulted employ the mail ballot, believing this to be more democratic and effective than election at the Annual Business Meetings. To conduct a postal ballot by May 15 will require that the Nomination Committee complete its work by May 1. This should present no difficulty. Moreover, a deadline should be fixed for returning the ballots, since a ballot conducted over the summer would obviously produce poor results.

If the experience of other associations is at all meaningful, it is conceivable that at least 40–50 per cent of the members of the Association would participate in the elections. Is such an enlarged participation to be dismissed as being of no consequence? If so, this is in effect saying that one does not care whether the majority of members of the Association are or are not able to take part in electing the officers of the organization. Why should the Political Science Association expect its members to journey to a remote city, at a good deal of expense to themselves or their institutions, to cast a vote for elective officers when in public affairs it is always expected that local polling facilities and a mail ballot for those who are absent and unable to cast their ballot in their own community will be provided? It would make as much sense to require all political scientists to journey to Washington every four years to cast their ballots for the President of the United States as to have to go to Washington, Chicago, New York, or Boulder to vote for the President and officers of the American Political Science Association each year. The former would be considered an outrageous requirement, even if members had business to transact in the Capital while there! Has the time not come for this Association to demonstrate that the principles of equality of opportunity and democratic choice can be applied here?

Experience in other professional societies suggests that the combination of a representative Nominating Committee, a single nomination for the President-elect and Treasurer, but dual nominations for other officers, taken together with the postal ballot, will produce a dignified election of competent members of the organization who have concerned themselves with its affairs over the years, and at the same time give every member the satisfaction, and the responsibility, of casting a vote and exercising some element of choice in so doing. This should produce no more accidents or undesirable practices than the present undemocratic method of choosing our officers.

Some other steps might be considered along with the postal ballot, such as including a place for suggesting names for the following year, and possibly sending bills for annual dues with the ballots. This is done by the American Economic Association thereby saving costs in mailing and at the same time reminding members that privileges and responsibilities go hand in hand. Members of the AEA say that there has been no substantial criticism of this procedure. On the contrary, it has been said that this has promoted regularity of payment.

V

There are problems and questions connected with such changes in the procedures of the Association. Some of these were faced by the Constitutional Revision Committee in 1953; others were not. In any event, they are worth examining anew in the light of experience in this and other associations.

When the previous Constitution was submitted to the Association in 1943, the Chairman of the Revision Committee, Robert E. Cushman, remarked that "an association which includes constitutional law among its fields of study should possess a model constitution which might well be imitated by other learned and professional societies." The present Constitution unquestionably is a model in many respects. But so far as democracy in elections is concerned, we are trailing among our peers.

No system is likely to insure 100 per cent participation in the election of officers. But it is conceivable that with care possible dangers that may seem to lurk in some of the changes suggested above can be avoided and that the present method of selecting our officers may be improved upon in such a manner that the Association will enlist a more substantial proportion of its membership in this phase of its activity. And with this, it is not unreasonable to suppose, may come broader participation in the intellectual pursuits of the Association.

THE CASE AGAINST REVISION

HOWARD R. PENNIMAN

Member of Nominating Committee, 1955

Much attention is given in Mr. Padelford's memorandum to the question of the degree of democracy existing in the American Political Science Association under existing nomination and election arrangements. I am doubtful of the relevance of that question in an organization of the character of the Association, and even more sceptical of any assertion that there is some necessary relationship between the belief of members of the Association in democracy for the state and what they ought to desire in the way of election procedures in their own Association.

The Political Science Association is a single-purpose organization established to advance the research and teaching of political scientists of the United States. The membership of the Association is to a very large extent homogeneous and is in agreement about the nature and purpose of the Association. In other words, the area of consensus within the Association covers almost all problems which come within the area of action by the Association. The above facts are of importance when considering nomination and election procedures.

Different groups and areas are represented in the Association but they are not conflicting groups and areas nor do they have conflicting or differing interests. Represented in the Association are geographic areas, various divisions of emphasis such as constitutional law, political theory, local government, etc., and large and small, private and public institutions. These differences do not represent a conflict of interest so far as the Association's program is concerned. Each area, field of interest, and type of institution needs to be represented on any governing body because each brings to the governing body information and knowledge which should be brought to bear upon a discussion of policy within the Association—policy aimed at the accomplishment of the single purpose of the Association as stated in paragraph one.

The purpose and character of the Political Science Association are unlike the purposes and character of the state. The state is concerned with many functions: it is concerned with social, economic, political problems within the state itself, and it is concerned with international affairs. On these matters, citizens hold widely different opinions. There are conflicting interests which must be taken into account. The state, certainly any large state, is composed of a heterogeneous people of differing and frequently conflicting interests. In a democratic state, we believe that it is essential to allow expression of opinion concerning the conflicting interests and that it is desirable to allow the establishment of political parties to bring about a coalition of interests in order that programs may be presented to the people for decision by majority vote at elections. The area of consensus within the democratic state may be broad or limited. All that is *required* is that there be agreement that the processes of democracy be approved by the vast majority of the people so that they are willing to have decisions determined by a majority vote of the people. If the area of consensus includes an agreement on an economic system, on social legislation, and on international relations, so much the better. So wide an area of consensus is not, however, likely or required in a state.

Note then the differences between the single-purpose professional organization like the Political Science Association and the state in composition of the membership, in the area of consensus, and in the number of conflicting interests existing within the organization. Note also that in the democratic state it is essential that we have parties and divisions in order that we may debate issues of conflict and decide those issues. By contrast, in the single-purpose organization such as the Association, to have divisions or parties is to create an artificial division based either on personalities or upon issues that have been created where issues previously did not exist.

The Association needs the knowledge of various disciplines, areas, and types of schools, but no one suggests that a conflict among these should be created or stirred up merely to satisfy a general belief in democracy applicable in another kind of situation. Indeed, it is argued by all that any system of selection of officers should assure the representation of all segments of the profession. The present system does assure that representation.

Unless one slate is placed against another slate by the Nominating Committee, with each of the slates nicely balanced to assure representation of area, subject matter, and type of school, there seems no obvious way to assure the representation of all segments of the profession on the Council. Any arrangement which provides for voting on individual candidates either by area or on a national basis makes it literally impossible to assure representation by all groups and at the same time provide a serious choice for members of the Association. Suppose we wish to assure representation of teachers of the various courses, of an area, of large and small institutions, private and public institutions, and of the bureaucracy. Do we tell the people of the Washington, Virginia, and Maryland area that no teaching institutions shall be represented from this area, or do we say that the bureaucracy will not be represented? Or must we, in California, pair a small college, basic course teacher against another small college, basic course teacher, thereby eliminating all others from possible consideration for the Council from this area? Or if the Nominating Committee decides that the best candidate is a political theorist from a large institution, then must the

Committee find another political theorist from another large institution from the same area? If one is not available, must the logical choice then be dropped or should a constitutional law man be placed in nomination against the political theory man? If the latter is the case, what, aside from luck, is to prevent the selection of a Council made up of constitutional law men or research professors in behavioral politics or a political theory group?

If it is argued that all candidates should be selected on a national rather than a regional basis, how is there any assurance that there will not be over- or under-representation of any given area, teaching division, or type of institution?

Curiously, it is argued that the presidency ought to be excluded from the proposed new system of voting. We apparently should have democracy but not in the selection of the highest office available to Association members. The president is not to be selected in competition because it is feared that a contest will create political campaigning for an office which is intended to do honor to a man for his contribution to the profession. To propose two candidates would, it is argued, invite organized campaigns for one or the other of the candidates, thus removing the sense of honor and of award in the selection of the final choice. But why is this not true for the other offices which are also offered in recognition of achievement and which should therefore be equally free from organized campaign efforts?

If I am to judge from my two years' experience on the Nominating Committee of the Association, the Political Science Association has within it a few who would gladly organize to elect a person or persons on something other than a spontaneous basis and possibly even for reasons other than the recognition of his scholarship or his contribution to research and teaching in the profession. In both years that I was a member of the committee, at least one campaign was obviously carried on for at least one candidate. Letters were mimeographed, and apparently sent to hundreds of members of the profession asking that Mr. X be suggested to the Committee.

One supporter of Mr. X. carelessly included the mimeographed letter with his own letter when writing to the Chairman of the Nominating Committee. At least one letter supporting Mr. X came from a man who had more or less ostentatiously resigned from the Assocation several years before. Other letters supporting the candidacy of Mr. X came from equally unlikely sources. The Committee was perhaps swayed by this effort but probably to resist rather than to support Mr. X. Supposing, however, that there had been a contest or mail ballot, Mr. X might well have won by a sizable margin. The kind of screening process which now shows up such maneuvering would still remain at the level of nominations, but maneuvering would be invited at the level of election by the presentation of opposition candidates. It is certainly true that an organized group would have greater effect on a nation-wide mail balloting than on a committee or business meeting where campaigning soon becomes obvious. It is difficult to see the value of opening the association for electioneering of this sort when there is so little evidence of a widespread desire for a change in the present arrangements which were developed by serious leaders of the profession after serious consideration 13 years ago.

The argument for "change" asks for democracy and at the same time argues against politics. Democracy without politics is difficult to conceive. Yet we are invited to support an amendment which it is argued would provide just that.

A word or two should be said about the concern expressed over the small attendance at the business meetings and about the infrequency of use of the so-called "safety valve" clause in the Constitution. Business meetings, it is said, are attended by not more than 100 to 150 persons out of a membership of perhaps 6,000. It is implied that the remaining 5,900 are deprived of their vote because of the difficulty of attending Annual Meetings. The facts in the matter are somewhat different. Meetings in New York are attended by about 1,800 to 2,000 people, in Washington by 1,500 to 1,800, and in Chicago by 1,000. Conventions in the Far West are attended by 600 to 700. Of this fairly sizable number of members of the Association who attend the conventions, only 100 to 150 feel that is necessary to attend the Business Meeting. The remainder of the group apparently feels that the Association is running about as they desire and therefore that it is unnecessary for them to spend an hour and a half discussing policy for the Association. Members *at the convention* are certainly not prevented from attending business meetings because of excessive travel cost or any of the other reasons that are alleged to be important in the failure of members to attend the Business Meeting. These members are already present but do not feel that the Association's affairs will suffer from their absence from the Business Meeting.

It is suggested that because the "safety valve" clause has been used infrequently, members of the Association have not been protected against capricious action by appointed committees. The conclusion does not follow. The failure of members to act under the clause may mean that the members of the Association find it unnecessary to use a device which is available to them in case the Nominating Committee commits gross errors in its selection of proposed officers. The device is simple enough, so that at any time members may avail themselves of it successfully. What seems to be involved, therefore, is a lack of desire to use this device, probably because of a willingness to accept as sound the nominations of the designated committee.

Both on theoretical and on practical grounds, there seems to be no reason for a change in the existing procedures for either nominations or elections. If real issues arise, members may avail themselves of existing arrangements to nominate candidates other than those proposed by the Nominating Committee. Certainly more than 150 members can attend the Annual Business Meetings if they wish to upset or modify the slate proposed. Until real issues arise there is little reason to create artificial divisions or to encourage conflict within the Association by changing nomination and election procedures that appear to be satisfactory to the bulk of the Association members.

I have attempted to deal with the basic argument of Mr. Padelford's proposal with only a brief note on one or two of the lesser arguments. If I had addressed myself to all the individual points he advances, I would have questioned other assumptions and other statements of facts for which there seems to be little or no evidence. For example, on the basis of my conversations with members of other associations which follow other nomination and election procedures, I doubt his implicit assumption that the other procedures really are more democratic, result in better candidates, or fully satisfy members. I would have questioned the view that a mail ballot is more democratic or would be likely to produce better results and a more satisfied membership. I would have questioned whether there is any empirical evidence that, as Padelford says, "elections are regarded as being 'cut and dried,' determined by a handful who are prejudiced in favor of a coterie of big name institutions, chiefly east of the Missouri and north of the bluegrass country." If any significant number think this is so, an examination of lists of officers and Council members in the last dozen years would provide evidence that it is not; if anything, the West and South are overrepresented in relation to the proportion of total membership from those areas. Finally, I would have questioned Mr. Padelford's reasoning in asking for a change in existing arrangements after he himself states that "an eminent succession of officers has been brought to the leadership of the Association by this [the present] process. And on the whole there has been little complaint about the persons elected to office. . . . those in attendance [at the Annual Meeting] have elected a competent, distinguished line of officers."

COMMENT BY AVERY LEISERSON

Vanderbilt University

1. Mr. Padelford's memorandum states positively and without qualification: "The Nominating Committees of the past two years have been satisfied that the existent Constitutional provisions do provide a genuine opportunity for membership participation in the nomination stage and that members are taking advantage of this opportunity." I interpret this finding of fact on the part of an uncoerced and independent political scientist to mean that *the Association is presently securing the essence of democratic consultation and participation where it counts*, namely, in the responsible nomination and selection of qualified candidates for its elective offices. The document also says concerning the election process as a whole: "An eminent succession of officers has been brought to the leadership of the Association by this process. And on the whole there has been little complaint about the persons elected to office."

2. In view of this degree of fundamental agreement with respect to the crucial matters of fact, it would appear to be unnecessary to elaborate speculative arguments as to whether the Association should be or would be made "more democratic" if (a) the Nominating Committee were to name two candidates for each elective office other than the President-elect and Treasurer, and (b) a mail ballot were substituted for the Annual Business Meeting as the final step in electing officers. What I have to say further is provoked by this example of the contemporary propensity to tinker with the Constitution in a burst of

misplaced moral energy in the name of democracy that ought to be discharged on issues that are vastly more pressing.

3. Proposal (a) is trivial, and there would be little objection to it if the author had not chosen to support it with no less than four express or implied propositions which are highly debatable in theory and extremely doubtful as premises for action: (1) increased participation in formal elections is desirable as an end in itself; (2) increased participation is desirable as long as we don't have "politics" and "electioneering"; (3) increased participation in formal elections implies "an enlivened sense of responsibility for and interest in the larger aspects of Association activities"; (4) the proposal should be supported by political scientists because they belong to a society whose members are accustomed to professing the virtues of democracy.

4. A reasonable case is made for Proposal (b), substituting a mail ballot for the Annual Business Meeting electing officers (which incidentally would require amending Article VII as well as Article V), as a purely technical device to increase membership participation in the formal voting for officers. A mail ballot would probably have this effect, but more is involved here than securing a 50 or 60 per cent participation in the annual elections. The purpose of our Association is "to encourage the study of Political Science." In my 20 years' membership I have gradually become convinced that by and large the 150 members who take the trouble to come to the Annual Business Meeting are more interested in promoting the study of politics and government than the 5,000 who stay away, including the 700–800 who attend the Convention but don't come to the Business Meeting. I am a member and officer of one of the Associations Mr. Padelford cites as an example of greater democracy than ours, and I can assure him that there is no more effective membership control of policy and officers under a mail ballot than under our convention system.

5. In summary, Mr. Padelford fails to demonstrate that a mail ballot would promote the paramount purpose of the Association, and he does not consider the possibility that a mail ballot might have the effect of further centralizing control over the affairs of the Association and reducing the widespread informal participation in the nominating process that now exists.

COMMENT BY NORTON LONG

Michigan State University

It seems to me that Dr. Padelford's paper and that of Dr. Penniman raise issues of fact and principle that cannot be resolved without further inquiry. Dr. Padelford asserts that our present procedures have proven satisfactory in producing officers of high quality and adequate representativeness. The controlling reason for changing our procedures is their alleged undemocratic character. This character is claimed to result in apathy on the part of the membership and loss of the sense of effective participation in the government of the Association. Dr. Penniman does not challenge this assertion of fact or consequence but claims that the remedy would be worse than the disease yielding all the evils of the direct primary and pressure politics. He does not rebut Dr. Padelford's evidence from the experience of comparable associations nor does his assertion of the administrative infeasibility of a responsibly-developed slate of multiple nominations seem persuasive.

Dr. Padelford's proposal appears to neglect the need for some means of supplementing committee nominations by action of the membership at large. Some provision for the right of revolution against even a multiple slate would seem desirable.

Dr. Penniman's fears of politics and pressures betray an unwillingness to face the facts of associational life that exist to an observable degree with us as with the A.M.A. and the Bar Association. The need for a Nominating Committee that will provide a well considered slate is as necessary with us as in the political arena. The need for effective means to reflect important membership sentiment that conflicts with what, from one point of view, seems an unselfish aristocracy and from another a self perpetuating oligarchy is equally clear. Finally, the need to provide all significant segments of the Association with a responsible sense of participation in its government must be met if morale is to be maintained.

There seems evidence to sustain Dr. Padelford's view that significant dissatisfaction exists. Whether his proposals will remove this ought to be explored. Dr. Penniman's fears seem either groundless or the price of some greater degree of democracy. An association of adult political scientists ought to be able to resist the dangers of anarchical pressure politics. It ought also to be sufficiently cognizant of its own teachings to realize that responsible oligarchy tempered by the contingent right of revolution is perhaps the most that we can hope for and that this is no small achievement.

COMMENT BY F. W. COKER

Yale University

I have doubts about the usefulness of Professor Padelford's first, and main, suggestion—that the Constitution be amended to permit the Nominating Committee to name one person each for President-elect and Treasurer, and twice as many nominees for the other offices. I agree that our present large membership, with the inevitably small attendance at our annual business meetings, makes our present electoral procedure "undemocratic"—or seems to make it so. And I agree that our "safety-valve" device accomplishes little or nothing in the way of changing the effects of the normal operation of our system of nomination and election.

We all agree, I believe, that a Nominating Committee should select nominees widely representative of fields, regions, types of institutional association, and types of professional achievement; and I think we agree that we should try to have presidents who are likely to show that sort of wisdom in appointing Nominating Committees—which is one of a president's most important duties. I think I agree with Howard Penniman that, if the proposed change is needed, it is needed as much in the choice of President as in the choice of other officers.

I believe that all must realize that we have so many members qualified for our elective offices that none of us can expect that all such members can hold office or care particularly about that distinction. None of us believes that holding an office in the Association is the only or the chief mark of distinction in our profession. So, obviously, there is no particular significance in the fact that some members happen not to have held any office in the Association. Yet it seems to me a little unfair to publicize annually, among our members, the names of members who are "defeated" in an election. I agree with Penniman in his view of the inadequacy of the comparison of our elections with political elections—in which nominees are voted for, or against, fully as much on the basis of policies advocated as on the basis of a candidate's personal qualifications.

I am not certain about these unfavorable conclusions on Padelford's "Suggestion No. 1." The fact that majorities of members in associations in affiliated fields (e.g., economics) have apparently found the proposed method of some use, after considerable experience with it, may well be a good argument in favor of Padelford's proposal.

In any case, I believe that a Nominating Committee should do everything reasonably possible to encourage members to send in proposed names to the Committee; and I believe that the Committee, before making its final decision on its nominations, should discuss its tentative nominations with the Executive Council. And I agree with Padelford's recommendation that the departments of political science might well assume more active responsibility in discussing possible nominees and in sending in names to the committee on nomination.

COMMENT BY CHARLES AIKIN

University of California, Berkeley

Member of Nominating Committees of 1947, 1955–1956

A number of Nominating Committees have considered the plan, or a reasonable facsimile of the plan, proposed by Professor Padelford. The Committee on Constitutional Structure of 1948, as well as the Committee on Constitutional Revision of 1953, studied proposals for multiple nominations. The basic idea back of such plans has been rejected by these Committees, or has not been received favorably by the Council. Professor Penniman's response to such proposals is persuasive. The opinion is widespread that, for an organization such as ours, there is no adequate substitute for the careful consideration that can be given to nominations by a representative Committee.

The adoption of a plan for multiple nomination of officers—including the office of President-elect or not—would lighten the work of Nominating Committees. Members of these Committees work with painstaking care in an effort to represent the Association as faithfully as possible; and their most difficult decision is the last one in which, after a series of eliminations, the candidate for each position is named. Multiple nominations would eliminate this onerous phase of the task by leaving it to a "free-for-all" at the Annual Meeting or through a mail ballot. A planned lottery at this point, while being undemocratic, would be less troublesome and less expensive, and undoubtedly would create a great deal of interest—if that is what is wanted.

The Association may decide to be democratic to the degree of presenting to the membership two or more slates of nominees. If that were done, the Nominating Committee, presumably, would emphasize divisions within our electorate; otherwise the plan of submitting multiple slates would have little utility. In such a case it would be anomalous to have both "party" slates selected by a single committee. And if any such system were followed, the danger of disrupting the fine work of the Association would become real.

Despite the strength of Professor Penniman's argument, there is a weakness in our present system. Committees on nomination are appointed, not elected, and their actions are almost always decisive. Thus, individual members of the Association have only the right to advise (exercised with some reluctance) and the power to reject (almost never exercised). The Association might well provide for the *election* of a committee on nominations rather than for its *appointment*. Members of such a committee would be elected from regions with as many candidates put forward as political scientists in each area cared to nominate and the election would be by mail ballot, administered by the national office of the Association. This committee—having faced the same exacting responsibilities Nominating Committees of the past have faced—would put its candidates for offices in nomination, following the procedure adhered to at the present time. This procedure would enable members of the Association to participate in the process of selecting their officers without having to take the drastic step of challenging a carefully prepared slate at the national convention.

This change might not "be imitated by other learned and professional societies." But yet, through such a change the strength of the present system of nominations could be retained and "a more substantial proportion of its membership" could be enlisted in the selection of officers.

COMMENT BY HARVEY C. MANSFIELD

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It does not become one who holds, for a few more weeks, the least onerous of the Association's elective offices, to argue too enthusiastically in favor of the status quo. Professor Padelford's two modest proposals, confined to the offices for which he urges them, and applied with a modicum of ingenuity, can no doubt be made to work satisfactorily, without upsetting the harmonious conduct of the Association's affairs. I would rather see them adopted than have any substantial proportion of the membership cherish a grievance chargeable to the present system.

Nevertheless, the changes look to form rather than substance, and appeals on their behalf in the name of democracy miss the mark, I think, on two counts. Wider participation in the elections would not make the system more democratic in fact, and if it did make it so in appearance, the membership would not be the gainers. We need to distinguish means from ends. The essence of the present system is the business of nominations. It is now measurably democratic. The Committee derives its authority from a Constitution freely agreed to and its members hold their places by the appointment of an elected President.

The Committee proceeds on principles of merit and geographic and professional distribution known to and desired by all, and there is ample opportunity for any member to bring any candidate to its attention. No one is excluded from consideration on any undemocratic criterion. The Committee is an efficient instrument to serve a common purpose at a minimum cost to the general membership.

To multiply, by a mail ballot, the number of those who overtly share in the ratification of the Committee's recommendations—when most members who now attend the Annual Meetings do not think it worth the bother of attending the Business Meeting in order to do so—will not add to the effectively democratic character of the process. On the other hand, to the extent that the practical choice is transferred, by the offering of multiple nominations, from the Committee to the mail ballot, the likelihood that the original goal will be as satisfactorily met, and the agreed principles be as fully applied, is diminished rather than increased. A general ballot by mail is sometimes a convenient means for securing consent to a specific proposal. It is not a handy way of deciding on the best application of a set of general principles to the complex choices involved in constructing a slate of officers.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Representative Government in Southeast Asia. By Rupert Emerson, with Supplementary Chapters by Willard H. Elsbree and Virginia Thompson. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1955. Pp. vii, 197. $3.50.)

The Formation of Federal Indonesia, 1945–1949. By A. Arthur Schiller. (The Hague, Bandung: W. Van Hoeve, Ltd. 1955. Pp. viii, 472.)

Professor Emerson's book is the first scholarly and comprehensive approach to problems of representative government in postwar Southeast Asia. As such it will be of benefit to students of comparative government as well as to those having a particular interest in the political development of the countries of this area. Not only will it prove of value to specialists in these fields; it is also admirably suited to students enrolled in courses on Asian government and politics who have had little or no previous background. (This reviewer has made it required reading in an introductory survey course on Asian governments and politics.) In addition to the competent and sometimes excellent descriptions and analyses of postwar developments in the particular countries of Southeast Asia, the book contains a lucid distillation of Professor Emerson's long study of some of their most basic common problems. (Those who have read his classic, *Malaysia,* will find that his observations on postwar developments in Malaya and Indonesia give additional poignancy to several of the important conclusions reached in this earlier work.) Separate chapters are devoted to Indonesia, Burma, Malaya (all by Professor Emerson), the Philippines (by Willard H. Elsbree), and Rural and Urban Self-Government (by Virginia Thompson). Those on Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines are particularly well done. Thailand and Indo-China are dealt with briefly by Professor Emerson in his Conclusion and also covered to some extent by Virginia Thompson in her chapter. The book's major emphasis is upon the postwar period, the discussion of events being carried up to the end of 1954.

Willard Elsbree's brief but stimulating chapter on the Philippines contains a realistic assessment of the potential of representative government there. He gives particular attention to the socio-economic environment conditioning the growth of political institutions, a setting which he notes is far from ideally suited to their development along democratic lines. Meriting special mention is his able discussion of the presidency.

Virginia Thompson, confronting a subject concerning which there is a great paucity of material, has generally done well with what is available but has been able to sketch the picture only partially. (Professor Schiller's book helps supplement this insofar as Indonesia is concerned.) In her treatment of Indonesia it would have been useful had she given more attention to the impact of the Japanese occupation upon local government. Certainly in Java, where the Japanese introduced their *tonari gumi* system, this impact was considerable and has in substantial areas left a significant residue.

The book's most important contributions are to be found in Professor Emerson's two essays, the Introduction and the Conclusion. He begins by observing that all those countries of Southeast Asia which have had an opportunity to shape their destinies freely have adopted constitutions modeled primarily on well-established Western patterns, rather than attempting to derive inspiration from earlier periods of their own culture. The leaders who are guiding the governments of these countries are almost exclusively from their new Westernized elites. The political experience and thinking of these men has been powerfully—thus far decisively—influenced by Western models, and in the course of drafting their constitutions they have been preponderantly influenced by the political systems operating in the colonial powers from which they have so recently severed themselves. Thus all of these countries have taken on at least the formal trappings of Western representative government, and in three of them, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines (with the possibility that Malaya may soon join their ranks), their leaders are conscientiously trying to make these institutions function in at least rough conformity with Western democratic norms. In these three countries there has been an abrupt transition from colonial (and pre-colonial) autocracy to a profound commitment to representative government. Yet representative democracy is a fragile plant which is not easily transplanted. Its even rare flowering in the West has been relatively recent and presumably possible only because of combinations of particularly fortunate circumstances. Moreover, in the West the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule was a slow and gradual process, and the gradual enfranchisement of segments of the population in general kept pace with the development of a new economic and social life and with the spread of mass-based education and literacy. On the other hand, "In Southeast Asia the modern world has come with a rush and there has been no time for the kind of slow adaptation to new circumstances which is generally characteristic of the West."

Having made these general observations, Professor Emerson proceeds to analyze in more specific terms some of the obstacles which confront any continuing development of the Southeast Asian countries in the direction of representative government. First of all, there is the tradition of opposition to government which inevitably developed in the countries under colonial rule, a tradition which was reinforced during the brief but harsh period of Japanese occupation. It is obvious that this tradition militates against the growth of responsible opposition parties, and there is no doubt that the roads of Indonesia and Burma towards representative democracy have been made steeper because of this obstacle. Secondly, the authoritarian tradition in all of these countries is still generally widespread and engrained, a formidable obstacle to the development of the political individualism and egalitarianism which have been so essential to the foundations of democracy in the West. Nor is there as yet in these countries the widespread sense of broad popular participation in government and the feeling that government should be responsive to the popular will which has come to characterize democracies in the West.

Whereas there is widespread agreement that in the West an important condition for democratic government has been the existence of a strong middle class enjoying a degree of economic strength and autonomy vis-à-vis the government, in most of Southeast Asia—in Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand in particular—there is virtually no such middle class. Insofar as such an element does exist, it is composed primarily of bureaucrats who are, of course, dependent upon the government. Commerce and large-scale production have been carried on in Southeast Asia almost exclusively by outsiders, either Chinese, Indian, or European. In general throughout the area the prospects for development of the sort of capitalism necessary for the growth of a substantial independent middle class are meager. This is particularly true in Burma and Indonesia, where there exists a strong tendency for many of the nationalist leaders to equate colonialism and capitalism, the only capitalism they have known having been that of either their alien colonial masters, or of Indians or Chinese whom the colonial authorities encouraged to immigrate. On the basis of the experience of the last two decades in the Philippines and Thailand, it appears justified to conclude that "if representative institutions are to have any real significance for Southeast Asia, there must be a decided broadening of the political base at least in the form of a larger indigenous middle class, which is both politically aware and politically active. Without the appearance of such a middle class, which has played so large a role elsewhere, or the coming to political maturity of wide segments of the populace, it is difficult to see how a democratic system can be expected to stand up against the pressures which are very much in evidence."

The efforts of Southeast Asian leaders to promote economic growth are also likely to have an important effect upon the course of political development in their countries. "A highly plausible case can be made for the contention that the most direct road to economic development for underdeveloped areas leads by way of an authoritarian rather than a democratic system . . . the more insistent the demands for economic advance, the greater may be the willingness to yield to authoritarianism's claim to produce speedy results." It can be argued that Western efforts to increase the economic and social well-being of Southeast Asian countries may keep them from drifting into the orbits of Moscow or Peking, but there is no assurance that such support will appreciably influence whether or not they will be attracted to democratic forms of government.

While thus analyzing these and other salient conditions for and limitations on the growth of representative government in Southeast Asia, Professor Emerson does not, explicitly at least, try to predict the course which their political development will take. Rather, he makes a number of suggestions as to the kinds of studies political scientists should make before they can begin to approach such questions with any degree of self-confidence. It is possible to infer from his analyses the expectation that these Southeast Asian countries will develop governmental systems suited to their own particular conditions which will lie somewhere in the realm between the West's definition of what is democratic and what is autocratic. But one must also observe the emphasis which he gives to his conviction that in view of the tremendous impediments they have confronted several of them have progressed a rather substantial distance towards their democratic goals.

Professor Schiller's *The Formation of Federal Indonesia, 1945–1949* is a book written for the specialist and will be far beyond those who do not already possess some knowledge of postwar Indonesia or at least a basic understanding of federalism. For those who do have such foundations this is a valuable book. It is based upon solid and painstaking research that explores with great thoroughness what has heretofore been a major void in the history of postwar Indonesia. Though Professor Schiller spent considerable time in Dutch-controlled Indonesia in 1949 making on-the-spot observations, his book represents primarily the results of a careful analysis of a great body of documentary materials. These documents were produced in very limited quantity and without his efforts would by now undoubtedly have largely disappeared.

At the outset Professor Schiller frankly disclaims concern with any political design that may have underlain the creation of the federal order which he describes or with the motivations which activated its architects. Since the architects were numerous and their motivations diverse, and since this part of the story is in general immeasurably complicated and abstruse, this may well have been a wise choice.

This book, then, is an account of the formation of a federal state in Indonesia from 1945 through 1949, placed in the context of the most relevant antecedent and subsequent developments. Thus, in his first two chapters Professor Schiller discusses the prewar evolvement of ideas concerning Indonesian federalism among officials of the Dutch East Indies government, ideas which were never put into practice, as well as the organization of the government before and after the war. The heart of his study is contained in two long chapters: "Local Government" (Ch. 3) and "The Distribution of Powers of Government" (Ch. 4). The fifth chapter deals with the administration of justice, an emphasis which he selected primarily because he believed it afforded "a typical example of the scope and tempo of alteration in administration in the new state." In the Epilogue there is a brief account of the dissolution of the short-lived federal structure, a dissolution which began almost immediately after its establishment under the name of the United States of Indonesia on December 27, 1949 and which had already run its course by August, 1950, when this federal order gave place to the present unitary Republic.

Professor Schiller observes that at the time of his study in the spring of 1949, "the new structure was still in the planning stage. A host of enactments were being promulgated, but for the most part they were not immediately being put into effect." His study, he states, is frankly one of the federal structure "as it appeared in the books." Thus, as he observes in his introduction, his emphasis is on the promulgated rules, his study being basically " a description of the organization and structure of the various units of government" and "a consideration of the distribution of the powers and tasks of government among political entities that were to make up the federal state."

However, the full significance of this book is not merely that of a description and analysis of an interesting, though transitory, experiment in federalism and of an important, though brief, period in Indonesian history. For the general problem of political decentralization remains in Indonesia today as one of the most pressing and challenging problems confronting its government. True, Indonesian leaders, convinced as they are that the Dutch effort to create a federal order was merely a refined and skillful effort at divide and rule, are unlikely to espouse a truly federal solution, or at least to call it that. They are, however, acutely mindful of the necessity of fashioning a political system wherein realistic account is taken of the substantial existing regional cultural variations and of distances as great as from New York to Seattle. Thus both the general problem discussed by Professor Schiller and his analysis of the various aspects of the pattern of federalism constructed by the Dutch are of relevance today. As he correctly notes, there is evidence that at the present time "many of the values of the federal form are being introduced into the existing unitary state." And even though the fact is not widely advertised, it is, as he suggests, true that in parts of Indonesia (notably in the eastern islands) the Jakarta government continues to maintain some of the substructure of the federal system established by the Dutch. It is logical to expect that, as the Indonesian government proceeds further in the direction of political decentralization, it will explore more thoroughly these residual parts of the Dutch-created federal structure from whose recent history it may derive guidance in constructing a more effectively decentralized unitary state. Those undertaking such an exploration will find Professor Schiller's scholarly book the fullest and soundest existing description and analysis of the only federal order that Indonesia has known, and from it they should be able to derive helpful insights.

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The Fifteen Weeks (February 21–June 5, 1947). By Joseph M. Jones. (New York: The Viking Press. 1955. Pp. viii, 296. $3.75.)

The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning. By Harry Bayard Price, Jr. Published under the Auspices of the Governmental Affairs Institute, Washington, D.C. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. 1955. Pp. xvi, 424. $5.00.)

On February 9, 1946 Stalin made a major speech to the voters of the Stalin Electoral District in Moscow. His purpose, as no doubt even his immediate audience realized, was not to sway Muscovite fence-sitters. Rather, it was to clarify the nature of Soviet relations with the capitalist world in the postwar period and to define the major internal tasks of the Soviet Union. The return to normalcy, he made clear, would be a return to what we have come to call the cold war. The prospects for peace were not bright; the Second World War had been not a "casual occurrence," but the inevitable result of the clashing forces generated by modern monopoly capitalism; in the future, as in the past, general crises and armed conflicts would be inescapable. It followed, therefore, that the Soviet Union must resume the policies of collectivization and industrialization which had made possible victory in the war and which alone could guarantee it "against all possible accidents" in the years ahead.

Against the background of events, the speech had an ominous ring, and as Soviet pressures mounted in the succeeding months, it became increasingly clear that Stalin would do what he safely could to nudge history along its "inevitable" course. By the winter of 1946–47 the outlook, world-wide, was very dark. In the Department of State the atmosphere was thick with foreboding: dispatches from Europe spoke of Communist advances in France and Italy and of widespread economic distress; from the Near East, of growing Communist pressures on Greece and Turkey; from the Far East, of the deterioration of the Kuomintang's position; from Moscow itself, of Soviet expansionist designs. Everywhere so much needed to be done and so little seemed possible!

No one then foresaw the radical transformation of American policy which was to occur within six months, and now, nine years later, the pace and scope of the change still seem breath-taking. The change was not the result of quiet deliberation and careful calculation. It just happened in response to crises which seemed to leave no alternative and which aroused in the country and its leaders a mood mixed of courage, anger, disappointment, determination, and generous impulses. By mid-1947 the United States had grown into a mature acceptance of its responsibilities. *The Fifteen Weeks* (*February 21–June 5, 1947*) by Joseph M. Jones is a lively account of how our voice in world affairs suddenly changed.

Mr. Jones set himself a limited but difficult task and he should now be enjoying a sense of accomplishment. He wished to recapture the events and especially "the atmosphere and drama" of this exceptional period and to communicate something of the excitement he felt at "the spectacle of the government of the United States operating at its very finest, efficiently and effectively, and of the American people responding to leadership in a measure equally splendid." The book is, if the phrase will not be misunderstood, an artistic success. He has succeeded in evoking the electric quality of these weeks and his story is, as he wished it to be, fresh, invigorating, and inspiring. It is also accurate. Very little escaped his eye and his report is full and well-balanced.

Although this reviewer is inclined to think that speech-writers (Mr. Jones was a speech-writer and a very good one) usually overemphasize words as compared with deeds, he does not find the present emphasis on speeches misleading. President Truman's Special Message to the Congress on March 12, stating the Truman Doctrine, and Secretary Marshall's Harvard address on June 5, inviting Europe to take the initiative in drafting a recovery program, were key events, signalling the transformation of American policy and leading to far-reaching actions. On these occasions, as too rarely in more recent years, words conformed to decisions and were an effective form of action. Mr. Acheson's initiative with respect to European recovery is properly recognized, although in this case, perhaps, the speech (to the Delta Council on May 8) was less important than the governmental wheels Mr. Acheson had previously set in motion. Mr. Jones does not attempt to describe the execution of the new policies and does not evaluate their adequacy. He is concerned with the basic decisions and throws a warm, friendly, and intimate light on the process by which they were reached and announced. The book will be valuable as supplementary reading in courses on American foreign policy and will not greatly burden the student, for it can be read as quickly and easily as an adventure story, which, in a way, it is.

A little less than eighteen months after Stalin's declaration of cold war, the two halves of the American response had been defined. Shortly, as a result of Mr. Kennan's famous "X" articles in *Foreign Affairs*, the whole was to be dubbed the "containment policy." The first half was to resist, by force, if necessary, Soviet expansion. The second half was to assist friendly countries in recovering their health and strength. *The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning*, by Harry Bayard Price, Jr., deals with the carrying out of the European recovery program (ERP) and related assistance programs by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and its successor, the Mutual Security Agency. The book was written under the auspices of the Governmental Affairs Institute, which was invited by ECA to "prepare an independent, objective history and evaluation of the ECA and the Marshall Plan." The Institute persuaded Mr. Price to take the assignment, and submits the result as "representing the best judgment of this organization, as well as of its author." Although there is, of course, no way of judging, some of the weaknesses of the book may have their origin in this multiple interest and responsibility. The Institute might consider whether in the future full responsibility might better be left to the author.

The basic fault with the argument is that the ERP is not consistently seen as a part of the unified policy of containment. There is a recurrent note of complaint that, as the emphasis shifted from economic recovery to the development of military strength, ECA was distracted from its true purpose, that "economic objectives" were "obscured" and were not regarded as "coordinate" with "political objectives": that, in short, ECA was being misused. (In this the book probably reflects a point of view held by some within the agency, but lends the view support rather than criticizing it and possibly finding in this separatist tendency a weakness of the separate agency as an instrument of foreign policy.) A case could be made, perhaps, that we over-reacted to the shock of Korea, and that by trying to push the military build-up we actually slowed it down as compared with what might have been accomplished with a different balance between economic and military programs. The case is here only asserted, not really demonstrated. In any event, it is a mistake into which the book sometimes but not always slips to regard recovery as an end in itself; ERP, like the military assistance program, should be conceived as means to ends which were always political.

The focus of the book is also somewhat surprising and disappointing, especially in light of its title. ERP and ECA were not, of course, the same thing. The book concentrates on ECA and an evaluation of its operations rather than on the Marshall Plan and its meaning. The focus is significant. Frequently one feels that recovery is being examined for the light it throws on ECA. In discussing the European Payments Union, for example, the role of ECA is stressed, not the role of OEEC. Such Europeans as M. Ansiaux of Belgium, Mr. Figgures of the United Kingdom, M. Marjolin, Secretary-General of the OEEC, and others who helped to conceive and create the EPU are not mentioned as important contributors, although space is found to name several Americans whose contributions were probably less important. In general, important developments in Europe in which ECA was not deeply involved receive short shrift. The Schuman Plan receives only a few superficial paragraphs; the German currency reform (1948) and the British devaluation (1949), events of great significance to European recovery, receive only a few sentences. (More space could have been given to these matters by eliminating the substantial sections on Asian assistance programs. Strictly speaking, these were not part of the Marshall Plan although administered by ECA. The decision to cover this ground requires a widening and crowding of an already wide and crowded canvas. Surely the subject is important enough to have justified more spacious treatment in a separate book.)

Although for this and other reasons the picture of the Marshall Plan does not emerge as sharply and clearly as one had hoped, criticism should not be permitted to obscure the value of this first effort to survey the Marshall Plan as a whole, to discern its effects, and to draw lessons for future programs. A great deal of material has been collected which might easily have been lost. A great many conclusions have been drawn about the conduct of the program which will stimulate discussion and should be helpful in the continuing task of building the foundations of security and prosperity in the free world. *The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning* helps to remind us how far we have gone in turning back the Soviet challenge and surely provides abundant evidence that the main lines of American policy have been wisely chosen. Not the least remarkable fact about this book and *The Fifteen Weeks* is that they were written by men who believe, on the whole, that Americans have reason to be proud of their accomplishments during a dangerous decade in a dangerous world.

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Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea. BY H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD. (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1955. Pp. x, 448. $6.00.)

This study of the role of the American party system in the making of foreign policy is a work of mature scholarship. It is thoughtful, relevant, and methodologically adequate. It will be of considerable value to students of political parties as well as to students of American foreign policy and international relations. Still another aspect of the study commends it. It is explicitly directed towards the understanding of an important practical problem, and employs statistical, historical, institutional, and analytical methods in a nice combination in an effort to evaluate proposed solutions.

Westerfield sets as his problem an appraisal of the alternatives of "partisanship" and "bipartisanship" as desirable and feasible roles for the American major parties in the making and conduct of foreign policy. By "partisanship" Westerfield means a situation in which each of the major parties would tend toward greater homogeneity in foreign policy attitudes than is now the case, and in which the parties would be divided on the basic issues of foreign policy. The substance of foreign policy would be a central issue in legislative debate and in political campaigns. He rejects this alternative first on the grounds that it is unrealistic, that it overlooks the fact that foreign policy cuts across present party lines, and that the situation would not be likely to be improved by any conceivable reconstitution of the major parties. He also rejects it on the grounds of its consequences for the effectiveness of foreign policy. He argues that there is a far greater need for a broad consensus, predictability, and continuity in foreign policy than in domestic policy, and that these can be achieved only through some measure of party collaboration.

He also rejects the alternative of full bipartisanship as he has defined it. This would imply full participation of the opposition party in the making of foreign policy, and the maintenance of party discipline on foreign policy questions. He argues that such full bipartisanship would come into conflict with the need for speed, secrecy, and professionalism in the making of foreign policy decisions, that it would require a degree of party discipline unattainable in the American system, and that it would dry up constructive and creative debate on foreign policy issues.

Having rejected the two extreme alternatives, Westerfield points out how the present situation, which he calls "extrapartisanship," fulfills more values in the net than would either partisanship or bipartisanship. There is a sufficient agreement between parties to guarantee continuity in the basic goals of foreign policy, and at the same time sufficient tension between the parties on foreign policy issues to maintain an active debate, and to affect electoral campaigns.

Westerfield proceeds to an analysis of the conditions necessary to maintain "extrapartisanship." One of the requirements to which he refers is the existence of a wide popular consensus on foreign policy. Another is the readiness of the executive to make concessions to cooperative members of the opposition. A third is a degree of self-restraint in the conduct of electoral campaigns, a willingness on both sides to avoid excesses in the "awarding of political credit and blame on foreign affairs," when in actuality there has been a substantial measure of collaboration in the making of foreign policy.

The greater part of Westerfield's book is taken up with an analysis of the actual impact of parties in the foreign policy-making process in the period from Pearl Harbor to Korea. This includes a careful statistical analysis of congressional roll calls on foreign affairs issues from 1943–50, a description and appraisal of party organizations in Congress for the control of foreign affairs, and an historical survey of party behavior on the major issues of foreign policy since the outbreak of World War II.

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China and the Cold War: A Study in International Politics. By MICHAEL LINDSAY. (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press; London and New York: Cambridge University Press. Pp. xv, 283. $3.75.)

With his *China and the Cold War,* Lord Lindsay changes from an ardent championship of the Chinese Communists to a savage indictment. The author's years of association with the Chinese Communists, his warm humanitarianism, profoundly democratic commitment, and uncompromising scholarship encourage us to accept his assurance that this new and unfavorable assessment reflects a change in the Chinese Communists, not in the author's standards of judgment (p. 1).

Lindsay dedicates his work "To friends in China" as being what he wants to say to help them understand how Peking's policies appear in foreign eyes (p. xiv) and how fantastic are the views which intelligent and educated Chinese entertain today about the outer world (p. 274). Nevertheless, it is not only to the Chinese Communists that this "tract for the times" is addressed. The author has undertaken to show both the Chinese Communists and their non-Communist adversaries abroad how the policies of each appear in the eyes of the other and how misguided are many of the beliefs cherished by each about the other.

As indicated by its subtitle, the volume has yet another dimension. Lindsay does more than seek to clarify issues in the relations of Communist China to the rest of the world; he also engages in the methodological experiment of applying to political inquiry the strictest standards of scientific reasoning. A similar approach is advocated for other problems in international relations. Moreover, in generalizing about the substantive conclusions of his study, Lindsay points the way towards a theory of international relations based upon "the assumption that a considerable proportion of political actions are irrational, though the causes can be understood and explained through rational scientific investigation" (p. 260). He goes on to urge re-examination of the assumptions upon which modern foreign policy is based lest with it man destroy himself in global war.

China and the Cold War begins with an analysis of Communist China's foreign policy in the light of the Peking government's professed objectives of peace and the national welfare. For the benefit of his Chinese audience (non-Communist opinion needs no such demonstration), Lindsay reviews the evidence that Peking is following policies incompatible with a genuine desire for international peace. He discusses Communist China's hate campaign against the United States and its allies, the Chinese Communists' uncritical acclaim of Soviet exploitation of East European peoples, and Communist subversion elsewhere as a movement of "national liberation"; their moral and then armed support of the North Korean aggression; the attempt at a forced repatriation of prisoners of war; and the allegations of bacteriological warfare. Discrepancies between practice and profession, it is submitted, do not fit the hypothesis that the Peking government both wants peace and is acting rationally in ways likely to achieve peace, as the Chinese Communists claim. Nor is the explanation to be found in the hypothesis that the Chinese are acting rationally but are not sincere in their claim to be seeking peace, which most non-Communist opinion holds. The only hypothesis which satisfactorily accounts for the facts is that, though sincere in their professions of peace, the Chinese Communists suffer from an emotional and intellectual confusion which makes them incapable of acting rationally to attain this objective.

For the benefit of both Chinese and Western readers, Lindsay argues a persuasive case. He then advances the proposition that the Chinese Communists' conduct derives from the Communist theory of knowledge, their rejection of empiricism and the standards of normal scientific method in judging the true and the false, their faith in orthodox Marxism-Leninism with its doctrines of democratic dictatorship and centralism and of the infallibility of the party, and the hysterical effects of their continual struggle to reconcile the contradiction between theory and observable fact.

Another section of the work analyzes contemporary international relations and concludes that today "the completely doctrinaire Communist, convinced by his system of faith that he is justified in using any means to extend Communist power, presents the same sort of menace to peace as [did] the Nazi or Japanese militarist" (p. 100). Rejecting both the Marxian theory of war (held by the Chinese Communists) and the power politics theory of war (widely held among non-Communists) as incompatible with modern psychology (p. 133), Lindsay devotes a good deal of attention to an examination of the conditions of permanent peace in Eastern Asia and to outlining a peace program both for the Chinese Communists and for their Western enemies. The prescription includes some pretty bitter medicine. In part, the Communists will have to demonstrate by scientific (and therefore non-Communist) standards their readiness to co-operate for peace with non-Communists abroad, while the non-Communists will have to accept the Chinese Communist regime as a fixture in Asia for "the next decade at least" (p. 277).

Many an original observation lights the argument along the way, *e.g.*, those respecting Korean war crimes trials (p. 36), Chinese McCarthyism (p. 74), British troops under MacArthur's command (p. 175), and retaliation against the McCarran Act (p. 250). But would it not have been fairer to ascribe General Wedemeyer's reconstruction of Chinese history to simple ignorance of the subject rather than to deliberate falsification (p. 94)?

James T. Watkins IV.

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The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity: A Critical Analysis of Polybius' Political Ideas. By Kurt von Fritz. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1954. Pp. xiv, 490. $7.50.)

The present volume is animated by the conviction that "no part of ancient political theory has had a greater influence on political theory and practice in modern times than the theory of the mixed constitution," and that "it is in the form which it was given by Polybius that it has had its greatest influence on modern political theory and practice." Despite its importance, says the author, "no major attempt seems ever to have been made to show in detail how far Polybius' analysis of the historical phenomena on which his theory, according to his own testimony, is based, is correct or what its deficiencies are, if any" (pp. v, vii). To remedy this defect, the author has made it his central concern to make a full "comparison of Polybius' theory with the actual development and functioning of the Roman constitution" (p. viii). This central theme is supplemented by a most painstaking treatment of a number of preparatory and related topics. There are chapters on Polybius' life and political experience, on the circumstances of the composition of his work, the condition of the manuscripts, his methods of writing history, his political theories in their relation to those of Plato and Aristotle (in particular). Although Polybius remains the central figure of the work, the title as distinct from the subtitle, is entirely justified. It would be difficult to imagine a more comprehensive study, or one more carefully planned and executed. Professor von Fritz is a man of vast learning, and he moves among the intricacies of the Roman (or Spartan, or Cretan) constitution with the authority and analytical skill of Corwin on the American constitution.

Unfortunately, the results of this impressive scholarship are extremely negative. In his Introduction (p. vii), Professor von Fritz notes that "Mommsen in the second volume of his Roman history expressed the opinion that nothing could be more absurd than Polybius' attempt to explain the excellent political order of the Roman Republic as an even mixture of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy." And in his Conclusions, he admits "that in a way Mommsen's judgment is not too harsh." All that is salvaged from the wreck is the following faint and barren praise: "What Polybius did see is that the greatness and power of Rome was an historical phenomenon of the first magnitude, that the greatness of Rome had something to do with its internal order, and that this internal order in its turn was in some relation to what earlier Greek theorists had had in mind when they spoke of the preferability of a mixed constitution or a mixed political order" (p. 345).

Paradoxically, it is the very thoroughness with which our author demolishes Polybius which leads one to suspect that there may be something more, or at least something different, in Polybius than has met the critical eye. Certainly it would be difficult to account for his influence upon such acute minds, and such astute politicians, as Cicero, Machiavelli, or Montesquieu, had he been carried away so completely "by the apparent intrinsic logic" of a theory that had "little relation to reality" (p. 345). Von Fritz writes in the powerful tradition of Mommsen, and he measures Polybius against the conception of political and historical reality of that school. But Cicero also knew Rome, and his Scipio, in his *Republic*, calls Polybius, with Panaetius, one of the two most politically knowledgeable Greeks of his time. And Cicero pays Polybius the high compliment of taking over, with minor changes, his theory of the mixed constitution. A key to the solution of this puzzle may be found in a passage in Book VI.5 of the *Histories*, near the beginning of the principal exposition of his political theory, where Polybius remarks (p. 359) that "Perhaps the theory of the natural transition from one type of constitution to the other is more thoroughly explained in the works of Plato and of some other philosophers." (I quote from von Fritz's extensive translations from Polybius in his appendices.) The theory as set forth by Plato and others, he says, is "very complicated" and "lengthy." "Hence I shall try to expound in a somewhat more summary fashion just so much of it as belongs to pragmatic history and is not beyond the reach of common intelligence." Now the theory of the natural transition of constitutions is the basis of the cycle theory, and the cycle theory is the basis of the idea of the mixed constitution. It would then follow that the whole of Polybius' political theory is a deliberate oversimplification, for the purpose of reaching "the common intelligence." In the section immediately following the passage quoted, for example, Polybius explains the origin of justice and morality and, according to von Fritz, does so "*exclusively* from enlightened self-interest and the ability to reason by analogy about the future" (p. 54, author's italics). Parents teach their children gratitude so that the children will take care of them in old age, and children take care of their aged parents to set an example for their children. Von Fritz justly comments that "In such a bargain there is hardly more room for a feeling of personal gratitude than in the relation of a man to his life insurance." He is puzzled that Polybius' utilitarian conception of duty should have more in common with Epicureanism than with Stoicism, when Polybius' preference for the active life of the statesman is so completely irreconcilable with Epicureanism. Yet there is a simple explanation at hand: Polybius' account of morality in terms of its utility, as distinct from its nobility, is just what fits the "common intelligence," which, as Aristotle said, has no conception of the noble.

Polybius, I suggest, regarded himself primarily as an historian. As a political theorist he seems deliberately to have borrowed and simplified. To simplify what is in its nature complex means, of course, to distort it. And to distort by simplifying is to understate the truth rather than to overstate it. Understatement is the essence of irony. Since Plato is the one thinker Polybius mentions as the exponent of the full and correct theories he adopts, it seems at least possible that the gross simplicity of Polybius' doctrines is not without kinship to Platonic (or Socratic) irony. It seems to me that an alternative treatment of Polybius might explore the question of how Platonic irony could affect the writing of history, and give us a clue perhaps as to how Cicero, for example, might have read Polybius.

Polybius, says our author, coined the expression "pragmatic history" (p. 40), of which he held himself to be a leading exponent. What he meant by it is suggested, in part, by the following striking passage: "Plato has said that human affairs will be well attended when either kings become philosophers or philosophers become kings, but I would say that everything will be well with history when practical statesmen turn to writing history . . . [or] those who wish to become historians consider a practical political training a prerequisite for their work" (Book XII.28, p. 41). Although Polybius does not endorse the famous Platonic thesis, but rather uses it as an analogue, we cannot help noticing that a conspicuous feature of the education of the philosopher-kings in the *Republic* is just that combination of theoretical and practical training that Polybius urges for the historian. How then does the pragmatic historian differ from the Platonic philosopher-king? "According to Polybius it is the task of the pragmatic historian to make history predictable and to enlighten future statesmen" (p. 351), says our author. This is certainly correct, and sounds, as well, like the program for modern scientific politics which traces its lineage to Machiavelli. According to von Fritz, this latter worthy did Polybius the honor of transcribing whole pages from the *Histories* into the *Discourses* without benefit of an acknowledgment. But whatever the resemblances, there is this difference: for Machiavelli, Fortune was a woman, who could be mastered if assaulted by a sufficiently vigorous male; for Polybius, as for all the ancients, she remained a chaste Artemis, whose power could never be brought under human control. To the ancients history, or political science, can bring within human foresight what is amenable to human intelligence, but beyond that human well-being must consist in such consolation as comes from contemplating even those causes which we realize must destroy us. Machiavelli revolted against Platonic political science, because the goal held out in the *Republic* depended for its attainment upon Fortune; for Plato, the coincidence of philosophy and political power, upon which man's salvation depends, cannot itself be brought about by human means. But Polybius, I suggest, like Cicero and like Plato himself in the *Laws*, attempted to find such an approximation to the goals of the *Republic* as fortune and circumstances permitted. The mixed constitution was only the best of possible approximations, although Cicero, as well as Polybius, took considerable liberties with what we would call facts in order to represent Rome as an example of such an approximation. The specific function of history, it would seem, is to teach what fortune and circumstances will permit, and to present these lessons in terms which will benefit non-philosophers as well as philosophers.

The theory of the mixed constitution in antiquity, which our author correctly traces to Plato's *Laws*, must, I think, be co-ordinated with the entire Platonic world-view. Machiavelli's rejection of the ancient conception of chance or fortune was tantamount to a rejection of this world-view. Machiavelli himself may or may not have grasped the full theoretical implications of this shift. But modern constitutionalism, certainly in the eighteenth century, accepting Newtonian cosmology and Newtonian mechanics, assumed that man could, through such devices as the separation of powers (which is a radically different conception from that of mixing monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) construct a political order whose success would not require or depend upon human virtue. In this sense such an order would be independent of Fortune. "The problem of establishing a state," said Kant, expressing what is also the key thought of the *Federalist*, "is solvable even for a people of devils, if only they have intelligence." We might add that the intelligence they needed was not beyond the reach of anyone with an elementary education, provided the elementary schools used the proper textbooks.

It seems to me that a future study of the theory of the mixed constitution in antiquity might take its bearings by this great gulf, which separates it from its modern counterpart. The present volume, I think, is definitive only in showing the inadequacy of the ancient doctrine by what are, essentially, modern standards.

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Nationalization in France and Italy. BY MARIO EINAUDI, MAURICE BYÉ, AND ERNESTO ROSSI. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. 1955. Pp. x, 260. $3.50.)

This latest addition to the remarkable studies on French and Italian postwar problems undertaken by Cornell University deals with one of the key problems of public policy in present-day Europe. The country reports on nationalization are provided by highly competent observers who have participated prominently in the debates on nationalization in their countries: Professer Byé of the Paris Law School, active in the liberal wing of the M.R.P., is also a member of the Economic Council who has made frequent and admirable contributions to its reports. Mr. Rossi, after having earlier participated in the work of one of the anti-fascist underground movements, has as a journalist and writer given to his fellow countrymen spirited comments on Italian industrial problems during the last decade.

Professor Einaudi's introductory comparative study on nationalization policies is excellent. With a profound understanding of the inextricable mixture of political, psychological, administrative, and economic motives present in all nationalization measures, he not only compares and contrasts experiences in the two "Latin" countries, but also makes particularly suggestive distinctions between methods of economic control on the Continent and in England and the United States. These are areas in which France and Italy offer striking parallels, which are amply documented throughout the volume. Among them are the overall distribution of ownership between the private and the public sector of the economy, the attitudes towards monopoly, competition, and technological change, the impact of family traditions, and the relationships between management and labor and business and the state. But as striking as these similarities are the contrasts existing among the British pattern of administering the nationalized sector through public corporations, the restless search for a solution in France ever since the revolutionary mysticism of liberation days has worn thin, and the resigned unwillingness to adapt the set-up of fascist nationalizations to a drastically changed situation in post-war Italy.

Professor Byé gives a balanced picture of the transformations in the administration of French public enterprises since the enactment of the nationalization measures of 1945–46. Particularly valuable is the insight he provides into the long-term consequences of the Communist usurpation during the first period:

the original perversion of tripartite management has been superseded by a host of bureaucratic control devices diluting responsibility and harmful to the ideal of businesslike management. In mere economic terms, however, the results of most nationalized enterprises are shown to have steadily improved. (It is true that the author does not discuss the reasons for the persistent deficit of the railroads, constantly put into the foreground by the enemies of nationalization in France.)

What makes Mr. Rossi's study one of the most realistic pictures of contemporary Italian politics so far published in this country is his candid discussion of the relationship between the bureaucracy and business leaders. Their collusion is obviously the most important cause of an immobilism which so far has prevented any thorough reorganization of the economic participation of the state; a parliamentary report on needed reforms has disappeared (as have many others) in the files of the civil service.

It is no accident that the reform proposals with which the French and the Italian writers conclude their exposés have much in common: both recommend a modified version of the public corporation, administrative autonomy, and rejection of all statist solutions. The problem, not sufficiently discussed by either author and which would remain even after the legal enactment of such reforms, is that of finding the "autonomous" administrators. Today the battle against nationalization has abated in both countries because the organized business interests feel that the public sector is run in a way entirely satisfactory to them. They would be the first to resist true autonomy from politics and from bureaucratic control, both favorable to them. And since workers and consumers alike have long lost interest in the issue of nationalization, there is no force whatsoever behind proposals requiring important changes in the political mores and the mental habits of the French and Italian political and productive elites.

Professor Einaudi suggests that the solution might be found in the supranational agencies that exist or have been planned for Western Europe. But while the powers of the European Coal and Steel Community are on paper undoubtedly as strong as he describes them, the real test of their efficacy has not yet been met. It might be true that national economic policies, including many nationalization policies, have become obsolescent. But at least in France and Italy obsolescent structures and practices have a capacity for stubborn survival.

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Congressional Politics in the Second World War. BY ROLAND YOUNG. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1956. Pp. 281. $4.50.)

This book tells the story of the performance of Congress during the second world war. And it tells it in a very lucid, readable, and objective manner. The author was a member of the staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in the early years of the war, and he was also a member of the APSA Committee on Congress during the war years. He writes, therefore, out of first-hand knowledge and understanding of the legislative process in Congress. This is Roland Young's second book in this field, an admirable earlier work—*This Is Congress*—having appeared in 1943.

In nine excellent chapters the role of Congress in the making of many important legislative decisions during 1941–45 is examined and described. Separate chapters are devoted to the major areas of wartime policy-making and the functioning of Congress in deciding the important issues in each area is reviewed and appraised. The problem areas covered include conversion and control over manpower, money, and supplies; labor policy, price control, monetary policy, military policy and the conduct of the war, foreign policy and postwar commitments, and reconversion to peace.

Among typical issues discussed are the efforts to achieve "equality of sacrifice," to "take the profits out of war," and to "freeze economic relationships," as well as wartime elections, the New Deal, and bureaucracy.

Generalizations regarding the behavior of Congress in wartime are set forth in an Introduction and a final chapter of Conclusions. The author reports that, far from becoming an anachronism or a mere rubber stamp in providing funds and delegating powers, the role of Congress in wartime increased rather than diminished. He portrays it as an institution which considered simultaneously many facets of the war economy.

In some areas of policy "the President emerged as the over-all planner of political and economic action, and the role of Congress was that of altering, amending, objecting, and substituting. . . . There were other areas of policy where the interests of the President and of Congress were not in harmony and where each attempted to persuade the other to follow its leadership," for example, labor and farm policy.

Professor Young concludes that Congress performed three major functions during the war: it made both broad and specific grants of power to the President; it adjusted conflicts of interest; and it supervised the execution of policy. Many difficult decisions were made by the national legislature on organizing the resources of the nation and allocating men, money, and materials among competing claimants. Alternative choices and different standards of judgment gave rise to political competition both within Congress and between Congress and the President. Partisanship continued throughout the war with recurring elections and debates over such controversial issues as price control, consumer subsidies, war taxes, and reconversion. An ingenious series of charts in the Appendix of the book shows how the party battle ebbed and flowed on the various votes and the extent of party control over voting.

With the expansion of governmental activities, Congress extended the scope of its oversight and control of administration. Various control techniques were employed, including committee hearings and investigations, amendments of the laws, restrictions in supply bills, annual review of appropriations, time limits on legislation, and prior committee clearance of administrative action.

Young reports that Congress conducted more than 100 investigations during the second world war in response both to particular grievances and to partisan motivations, as well as to find facts.

The author evaluates the congressional committee system which continued to be used during the war for developing legislation and supervising the government. He finds that "the committee system as a whole showed considerable strength, demonstrating its greatest usefulness in preparing legislation" as well as a means of consultation with administrative agencies. He adds that the committee system also revealed weaknesses during the war period because of the large number of such groups, jurisdictional conflicts among them, and lack of coordination between them in such fields as fiscal policy.

Finally, the author speculates on the interesting question whether or not the war changed the relationships between Congress and the executive branch. Although no final answer is given, it is recalled that "in due time, Congress repealed the emergency grants of power, abolished the war agencies and administrative courts, disassembled the great military machine, and reestablished a free economy. From the legal point of view, Congress may be said to have 'regained' the delegated powers and reestablished the constitutional position it enjoyed before the war. It is less demonstrable, however, that an equilibrium of power was reestablished. . . . "

And the war left some "unresolved problems" for the future relating to the control of delegated powers, the allocation of resources, the determination of fiscal policy, and the making of foreign and military commitments.

All students of the American legislative process will be grateful to Roland Young for this excellent and valuable contribution to the growing literature on congressional politics.

George B. Galloway.

Library of Congress.

The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski. By Herbert A. Deane. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1955. Pp. xii, 358. $5.75.)

There are shrewd and sharp things in this astringent book on Harold Laski, which is an able doctoral dissertation and an earnest of things to come from the author. The essential thesis is that Laski began his career with brilliance as a student of historical church-state relations and a champion of the doctrine of political pluralism, but that he bogged down in Marxian dogmatism, became in the end a rhetorician and pamphleteer, and never fulfilled his promise. Despite its hostility, it is not one of those shallow and biased attacks on Laski which dogged him in his final years and continued even after his death. It is a scrupulously reasoned analysis which, while it leaves very little standing, is obviously the work of a rigorous scholar who makes exacting demands on his subject. Any new evaluation of Laski as a political theorist will have to reckon with Deane's work, retraverse his ground, and justify conclusions different from his.

With Deane's book the worst that can be said against Laski in a responsible way has been said: that what might have developed into something valuable and viable in his thinking was never followed up but was left fragmentary; that he never made intellectual ends meet; that he was too busy as a party propagandist and organizer and wrote too profusely and spread himself too thin, so that he never had a chance for the kind of questioning of his own first premises which every great thinker requires; that he never wrestled in agony with his own thought as Jacob wrestled with the angel; that the strain of theory to which he devoted the last quarter-century of his life was rhetorical, repetitive, contradictory, and empty of any real contribution either to the Marxist tradition or to any other phase of political theory.

This is an inclusive indictment. If there is any answer to it, it must come from those who are willing to take as great pains in detail as Deane has done. (The schema of his book, examining each of Laski's periods except the last, under the captions of "The Nature of the State and of Power," "The Problem of Obedience," "Liberty, Equality, and Natural Rights," "Politics and Economics," "Marxism and Leninism," is a clumsy one and constantly halts the flow of the analysis, but it enables the reader to read the book two ways—chronologically and topically.) Laski never fancied himself, at least during the years when I knew him, as an original political theorist. He saw himself as the spokesman for the Socialist Center and Socialist Left in Western Europe during the difficult years between the emergence of the Nazi threat and the beginning of the cold war. He was in the European tradition, where political activists have been academic scholars and scholars have been political men of action. He was largely indifferent to the rough edges and the unresolved contradictions in his work, because he saw the function of the scholar-politician as one of responding to the ceaseless flow of events, always seeking to help shape them by his thinking and writing, always shifting his thinking to the shift in the events themselves. His work as a scholar was for him only instrumental to his larger work as a teacher in the broadest sense. It was to this that he devoted his most generous energies, and it is here that one must seek whatever success and effectiveness his work had. Americans saw him only through his books, and they made the demands on the books that Mr. Deane makes. Englishmen saw him as a total personality, and men like Kingsley Martin and John Strachey have accordingly viewed him from a different perspective from that of Mr. Deane.

The first thing to remember about him, which Mr. Deane misses somewhat, is that he helped break the mold of the British gentleman-scholar. He may or may not have been a great scholar, but he was certainly no "gentleman." British intellectual life in the Victorian period had been a closed corporation, a club in which you didn't talk too loudly and where the bickering was carried on politely. The first breach was made by Sidney Webb, a London cockney who studied Government White Papers and turned them into Fabian blueprints; it was widened by the cockney H. G. Wells and an outrageous Irishman called Bernard Shaw. Laski's place in British intellectual history belongs in that sequence, rather than with Mill or Maine, Maitland, Bagehot, or Barker. He somehow managed to capture the magisterial rhythms and accents of the British intellectual tradition which reflected the habits of mind of a class accustomed to command an empire, but he turned them to the uses of the new class of educated workers and trained civil servants who were seeking to transform the base of British politics.

Thus, while the kind of thing Deane does is an interesting exercise in analysis, and a very useful one, and makes absorbing reading because of his lucidity and his sense of justice, it is really rather far afield from the function that Laski cut out for himself and about which he was so deadly serious. The real question to ask is how Laski performed the job of taking the tradition of English and continental liberalism from Mill and Tocqueville, the tradition of anti-state corporatism from Figgis and Maitland, the tradition of American pragmatic individualism from William James and Justice Holmes, and the tradition of Marxism all the way from the Fabians to Lenin, and of putting this strange mixture together into a recipe which could nourish the hungry energies of the young British Labor intellectuals. I have put it this way as if Laski did it all at once, whereas actually he moved from one phase to another in a fascinating and still puzzling progression. Yet he was a little bit of a Socialist even at the very beginning and he remained a little bit of a pluralist-pragmatist and a good deal of the liberal even at the very end, despite his sometimes ghastly innocence about the Kremlin police-state. Thus his end lay in his beginning, and his beginnings survived in his end, and like all men he must be seen as a whole even while we see him as a mind in schematically periodized progress. And seeing him as a whole, the question is whether anyone performed any better than Laski, during that terrible period of the 1920's and 1930's, the task of guiding the democratic socialist movements of Western Europe through the perilous currents and shallows of history, and especially the task of bringing the British Labor party to a consciousness of its historic role.

Laski's anti-state pluralism gave him greater standing in American intellectual circles than in England, possibly because it found an echo in the American tradition of the weak state. But there remains, for all its brilliance, an air of unreality about his pluralism, as if he were practicing finger exercises. When he shifted his emphasis from a plea for governmental localism and regionalism in a society of groups where the state was only one among equals, to an effort to form a strategy of state power, he came closer to the immediate problems of our age. At first he tried to build a bridge between Mills' libertarianism and the social service ("positive") state; then he moved over into Fabianism and then finally into Marxism. Here, I fear, his flare for historical scholarship did him a disservice. What was needed was not a knowledge of the documents in the early history of the Marxist movement, but a capacity to look hard at Marxism as a whole in an unfooled way. Laski never did this. He was too deeply moved by the plight of the underdog, knew too little economic theory and cared too little about economic development, and never really threw himself into the kind of study of social theory which would have shown up the dogmatism of Marx and his followers. He was ready to be convinced, by his own life, by the circumstances of his time, and by the ideal image in which he had cast himself as a working-class leader. The result was heartbreak. Deane is quite right in pointing to one of his late books, *The American Democracy*, as a melancholy monument of what happens when you try to impose a dogma upon the living and changing material of a civilization in motion. What you get in the book is the frozen architecture of American society as it might have looked in the 1920's, but not as it was 20 years later.

Yet I wish Deane had been more generous in seeing Laski as a whole. He might have seen that half the civil servants of Great Britain today would be different men except for his influence. This applies even more strongly abroad. When I traveled through Asia at the very time when Deane's book appeared, there was scarcely a non-Communist intellectual, from Japan and Indonesia through Burma and India and Pakistan, who had not been touched by the fire of Laski's thought. One may say that they learned much from him that is not so, which is true of every teacher and every student. But the fact is that they got confidence from him, and came to feel eventually that they could think for themselves—which is what will count for the future. Deane is quite right in saying that we have not yet evolved an original political theory for our own era, which is not liberal or Marxist or Catholic. Certainly Laski didn't evolve it. But if the book suggests anything it suggests that Laski himself may have been expendable in a process which may yet produce, among some who responded to the fire of his thought, the kind of mind that is daring, critical, and architectonic at the same time.

MAX LERNER.

Brandeis University.

Security Through Freedom: American Political Thought and Practice. BY ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1955. Pp. xi, 232. $2.90.)

This is a very well-written little book—inspired, no doubt, by the obligation to deliver the Messenger lectures at Cornell, but prepared for publication with such praiseworthy care that no flavor of the impromptu survives. Whether it is also a "bold" book, calculated to "anger some and encourage others" (as the jacket summary advises), depends on one's point of view.

The first chapter, entitled "Political versus Judicial Control of Government," contrasts the disparate elements in our traditional heritage with remarkable acumen buttressed by a more judicious selection of materials for brief quotation than this reviewer has yet come across. No matter here that Mason puts Locke more confidently on the majoritarian side than seems consistent with all of Locke. Nor his, perhaps too rigid, juxtaposition of the views of Waite and Bradley on the exposure of property affected by a public interest to unlimited legislative control. On the whole, the treatment is sober and the argument sound: there is, at least, a significant sense in which inspired judicial construction of the due process clause constituted a "retrograde step in the rear of democracy"—to use the phrase borrowed by the author from Chancellor Kent.

In the two chapters which follow, however, the story of freedom becomes a little too frankly partisan to sustain the level of philosophical insight which the first promised. To be sure, the author's subtitle for the book hardly commits him to avoid the cliches of party struggles as data for analysis. Nevertheless, it would be gratifying to hear some one discuss "Freedom and the New Deal" who had not obviously either voted for F.D.R. all four times or not at all! While, therefore, one must welcome the attention Mason gives to some revealing correspondence between the protagonists of the period, as well as to such previously little emphasized political interconnections as the translation of the Association for the Repeal of the 18th Amendment into the American Liberty League, only fellow partisans will be stimulated by the familiar campaign refrain in which Hoover is still the villain of the plot.

The author gets back on more solid ground in Chapter 4. This chapter (and it is very good) depicts "The Supreme Court in Search of a Role." Here the significance of the 1937 judicial retreat is subjected to keen and sympathetic analysis. Mason's admiration for Stone palpably helps him to maintain a judicious balance in his treatment of the "preferred freedoms" issue, and he is at his best in dealing with the Flag Salute cases. In fact, this issue is so fully documented that one hesitates to enter even the smallest criticism. I had been under the impression, for example, that Learned Hand was substantially right in dissassociating Stone from the preferred freedoms doctrine as developed by Black, Douglas, and Rutledge. But there is nothing material to the issue which Mason seems to have omitted, and his estimate of the situation is, therefore, as definitive as we are likely to get.

"Welfare Capitalism: Opportunity and Delusion" is the title for the next to last chapter, and it very nearly maintains the high standard of its predecessor. According to Mason, Welfare Capitalism is the Trojan horse designed by the N.A.M. as a substitute for the Welfare State, and one must at least agree that he has documented a persuasive thesis beginning with a highly arresting statistic, namely a public relations budget stepped up from $36,000 in 1934 to $793,000 in 1937! To be sure, the author may be assuming a closer correspondence than actually exists when he links the concept of countervailing powers propounded by Galbraith with the organized campaign for Welfare Capitalism. But, after all, Brandeis' suspicion of Bigness has not been entirely outdated, and political scientists may still hearken to one of his disciples with considerable profit.

The inspiration for the final chapter, "Can Freedom Conquer Fear," is, as might have been expected, the current "security" problem. And (also as might have been expected) the terms of reference already adopted by the author handicap him badly in harmonizing the freedom which needs to be vindicated today with the "freedom" whose praises have been sung throughout the earlier part of the book. Indeed, at no point prior to the last few pages, does "Freedom" figure significantly as other than the faithful concomitant of majority rule—the product of the dynamic intervention of government to secure economic equality. Nor do constitutional limitations figure conspicuously at any previous point in the essay as other than obstacles *to* freedom, interposed by the economic elite.

This is not to suggest that Mason is ever indifferent to the variety of doctrinal influences going to make up the American tradition. This volume is, in fact, dedicated to the task of disclosing just this variety over the whole of our history, and the job has been executed with great discernment. What troubles the reviewer is the possibility that "politics" may afford too superficial a current for trustworthy analysis of the depths the author means to probe. Being confined to this level, he finds himself bracketing the principal authors of the Federalist papers with the 20th-century captains of industry as exponents of the same "conservatism." And, for want of a suitable nonpolitical category, the "new conservatives" are, in effect, classified as exponents of Welfare Capitalism. Similarly, property and freedom are dichotomized too rigidly for other than a survey of current politics. Is it safe to disregard the kind of property involved—the distinction between the core of property and its *laissez faire* outwork of contract, for instance—when undertaking a long-range appraisal of our constitutionalism? Property is power, indeed, but not every kind of property constitutes a challenge to free government, and some kinds of property are probably integral to free government.

These observations are not intended to detract in the least from the tribute already paid to Professor Mason's book. They raise questions to which the answers are not easily come by, and this reviewer doesn't pretend to have them. He can, in closing, however, admonish Professor Mason for one proofreading error by virtue of his superior geographical position: the twice-mentioned "Senator Dill from New Jersey" was elected from Washington.

K. C. Cole.

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The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States. By Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1955. Pp. xiii, 527. $5.50.)

Academic Freedom in Our Time. By Robert M. MacIver. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1955. Pp. xiv, 329. $4.00.)

These volumes taken together are the final report of the American Academic Freedom Project sponsored by Columbia University as part of the University's Bicentennial program of 1954, the central theme of which was "Man's Right to Knowledge and the Free Use Thereof." Professor R. M. MacIver served as director of the project under a distinguished Executive Committee of which Professor Lewis Hacker was secretary. Those who participated as members of the Executive Committee, in addition to the authors, included Professors R. F. Butts, Henry Commager, Walter Gellhorn, Arthur Macmahon, I. I. Rabi, and Lawrence Chamberlain of Columbia. To assist the Committee a panel of advisers was recruited including the presidents of Vassar, Hobart, Amherst, Bowdoin, Dartmouth, Yale, Rutgers, and the State University of New York, the Chancellor of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, the directors of the Institute for Advanced Study, the Detroit Public Library, the New York

Public Library, the Pierpont Morgan Library, the ex-presidents of Yale and North Carolina, two trustees of Barnard College, and a dean emeritus of Columbia College. The entire project "is the outcome of the initiative and the generosity of Louis M. Rabinowitz," Council member of the School of General Studies at Columbia, who also served as a member of the Executive Committee.

Never before has there been so searching an inquiry into the history, theory, and practice of academic freedom. "The study," according to Professor MacIver, "was planned to consist of two parts, one a historical survey of the rise, development, and vicissitudes of academic freedom in this country, the other an analysis of the contemporary situation, and a study of the problems it presents, against a background designed to bring out the significance of academic freedom and its relation to the society in which we live." The two volumes under review are thus parts one and two of the study as planned. Taken together they constitute a monumental contribution to our intellectual history as well as to an understanding of the specific problem of academic freedom.

At no point have the authors forgotten that academic freedom is not simply a slogan or verbal gimmick concocted by professors to defend the irresponsibility of their own guild, but one important aspect of the general problem of freedom in society. It is appropriate, therefore, that Professor MacIver should begin his volume with a section on the "Climate of Opinion" and conclude it with a section on "The University and the Social Order." And it is also appropriate that the Hofstadter-Metzger volume should begin with an extended account of the European heritage and include, along with a fascinating history of American colleges, chapters on such topics as "Religion, Reason and Revolution," "Darwinism," "Academic Freedom and Big Business," and "Organization, Loyalty and War."

Both volumes lay particular stress on three basic ideas: (1) the integral relation of academic freedom to the prevailing social, economic, political, and ideological climate of the time; (2) the central importance of academic organization and government to the problem of academic freedom; and (3) the importance of inspired and courageous leadership within the college or university, to resist pressures for conformity not only from outside but also from within the academic community.

It is obvious that the nature and extent of academic freedom at any given time and place will depend in large measure upon the spirit and structure of the society of which the university is a part. "In the social structure of the Middle Ages," for example, "the universities were centers of power and prestige, protected and courted, even deferred to, by emperors and popes. . . . Such a theological center as the University of Paris stood at the heart of the spiritual life of the age. . . . If the universities were spiritual centers, they were scarcely less important as agencies of practical life. . . . They provided vocational training for the clerical functionaries of church and state, for notaries, secretaries, legates and lawyers." As both cause and effect of their importance to medieval society, "in internal matters the universities had the prerogative of self-government."

It would be false, however, to assume that power and prestige, together with the right of self-government, are in themselves guarantees of academic freedom. Indeed, the very importance which society attaches to the university may induce a solicitude for what is taught, for the manners and morals of faculty and students, that can stifle rather than sustain academic freedom. This was as true of the medieval universities as it was of colleges in colonial America. These early colleges no less than the medieval universities were important as training centers for both lay and clerical leadership. But "American collegiate education, like that of Europe, was the ward of religion," and sectarian religion at that—a sponsorship not noted for tolerance or respect for deviants and dissenters. Paradoxically, strict sectarian control with its overtones of censorship and enforced conformity was ultimately displaced, not by the decline of sectarian religion, but by the multiplication of rival sects. As James Madison later observed, "in a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects."

As the religious domination of extramural society declined, so did the religious control of higher education. An equally important transformation, although one that came later and has still to come in many places, was the shift in emphasis from indoctrination and the simple transmission of existing knowledge to the independent search for new knowledge. Academic freedom acquires an entirely new dimension when colleges and universities cease to be merely custodians of what is known or revealed and become centers for searching out new truths. During the period of this transition academic life is bound to be characterized by tension and conflict, and by elaborate rationalizations to reconcile the new with the old. Hofstadter and Metzger deal extensively and in detail with this process of rationalization and reconciliation from medieval to contemporary times. St. Thomas' ingenious effort to Christianize Aristotle, the more or less systematic campaign to reconcile Darwin with Genesis, and contemporary attempts to rationalize the welfare state with laissez-faire economic "laws" are but a few illustrations that come to mind.

Both of these volumes give extensive attention to the relation of academic government to academic freedom. The American pattern of college government which places final authority in a body of laymen rather than in the academic community itself has been a major source of difficulty. According to Hofstadter and Metzger, this plan of government "has hampered the development of organization, initiative and self-confidence among American college professors and it has contributed along with many other forces in American life to lowering their status in the community."

In spite of this sweeping indictment, academic government by laymen has not been and is not today an unmixed evil. The victory of a mixed board of laymen over the typical ecclesiastical body of the medieval university and the early American college was undoubtedly a step forward. "Paradoxical as it may seem," writes Professor Hofstadter, " . . . the growing religious and intellectual liberalism of 18th century America was identified in the colleges not with corporate autonomy but with lay government. Not until the 19th century, when lay government had been long established, was this situation reversed." And, in my judgment, the case for lay control even today is a strong one. Notwithstanding Professor MacIver's staunch faith in faculty government as the surest guarantee of academic freedom, I harbor some slight skepticism. Professor Hofstadter cites many cases both in European and American colleges and universities where the pressure for conformity came from the academic community itself rather than from the outside. In any case, the emerging pattern of academic government in the United States looks toward a community in which power and responsibility are shared by students, faculty, administrative officers, alumni, and governing board. With some fairly clear recognition of differential functions and jurisdictional limits among the various groups, this pattern of "countervailing forces" in academic government promises as good a guarantee for academic freedom as any other.

Both these volumes have much to say about the composition of academic governing boards. No uniform pattern appears, although businessmen (including bankers), lawyers, and industrialists clearly predominate. This has been due in part to the unceasing dependence of higher education upon private philanthropy and public funds, and in part to the predominance of these groups in our business civilization. Big business, says Professor Metzger, "did not enter academe as intruders, they were welcomed into the realm and escorted to its high places by its very grateful inhabitants." Yet somehow the notion grew that the business patron was anti-intellectual and an enemy of academic freedom. There is, of course, a good deal in the record to support this notion and both of these volumes contain the usual catalogue of horrors. But Professor Metzger particularly does a service in correcting the caricature of the big businessman as the big bad wolf of academe. "The contrary notion notwithstanding, the large contributors to the universities were usually not of that philistine crowd that undervalued the wisdom in books. . . . For all their quirks and vulgarities, the tycoons of Fifth Avenue and Newport were closer to the patricians of Beacon Street than to the business gentry of Main Street." As for their devotion to academic freedom, the record is by no means altogether negative. Indeed, the businessman has probably proved to be more intelligent, tolerant, and understanding on this score than his clerical predecessor, and probably more so than his political successor is likely to be. At any rate, I am grateful to Professor Metzger for his description of Benjamin Duke and his business associates standing firm in defense of Professor John Bassett of Trinity College, North Carolina, while so-called "liberal" editors, clergymen, and educators, including Josephus Daniels of the Raleigh *News and Observer*, cried out for his academic scalp. "Five of the seven voting against Bassett were ministers in the Methodist Church, one a United States Senator, and only one was a local businessman. . . . On the Bassett side, four ministers were aligned with twelve bankers and industrialists."

The other side of the coin, however, is presented here in abundance. The celebrated "cases" of Richard Ely of Wisconsin, I. A. Hourwich, and Edward Bemis of Chicago, J. Allen Smith of Marietta, John R. Commons of Indiana, Edward A. Ross of Stanford, and many more are described. Some of these appear in Professor Metzger's study in a new light, and one in which the forces of good and evil are less sharply delineated. Professor Ely, for example, was tried and acquitted by his own board of regents for economic heresy on charges (brought not by a businessman but by a small-town teacher serving as State Superintendent of Education) that he had among other things favored the closed shop, counseled workers to strike, and entertained a walking delegate in his home. Subsequently Professor Ely wrote to say that were these charges true, they would "unquestionably unfit me to occupy a responsible position as an instructor of youth in a great university." What price freedom! And J. Allen Smith, having been fired from Marietta for supporting the monetary theories of William Jennings Bryan, was offered a job by the Populist President of the University of Missouri, who proposed to make room for Smith, the true believer, by firing a professor who believed in the gold standard. Smith, who saw the "moral equivalence between this and Marietta's action," declined. Nor does the record show faculties rising courageously to the defense of their proscribed brethren. Although there are some cases of this, they are exceptional.

Time and again it appears that the first, and often the last, line of defense for academic freedom lies in the office of the college or university president. When this crumbles through timidity, cowardice, or simple submission to "expedience," a major bulwark of free thought goes. And when, as not infrequently occurs, the president himself is the offender, academic freedom is indeed in jeopardy. For the president in the American system of academic government is the link between the faculty and the governing board, and between the corporate body of the college and the larger community of which it is part. If he understands and believes in the high purposes for which American colleges and universities exist, purposes which can only be realized in an atmosphere of freedom, and if he combines with this belief insight, initiative, and courage, he, more than any other individual or group, can be the guardian and champion of academic freedom.

No possible summary of these volumes can do justice to the very great contribution they make toward an understanding and hence to the defense of academic freedom in our society. The historical foundations are brilliantly set forth by Professors Hofstadter and Metzger, and the contemporary scene is described in detail by Professor MacIver. The climate of opinion, the atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, which has made possible repeated attacks on academic freedom, the difficult problem of communism on the campus, are examined by Professor MacIver with his usual forthrightness and wisdom. One can quarrel in detail with much that is proposed, with his staunch faith in faculty government as the best guarantee of freedom, with his new bill of rights for professors which bristles with ambiguities, with his "conspectus" of principles to "guide us in dealing with communism on the campus." But these differences are minor ones in any case and weigh but slightly against the great sense of indebtedness one feels for this impressive and in some ways definitive study of one of the major problems of our time.

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Vernunftglaube und Religion in der Modernen Gesellschaft: Liberalismus, Marxismus und Demokratie. BY EDUARD HEIMANN. (Hamburg: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tübingen. 1955. Pp. xiii, 315.)

Eduard Heimann, whose teaching and research have impressed the initiated in this country for the last two decades, has found a wider audience and readier recognition in his native land. In fact, the quick succession of his German postwar publications, partly restoring an interrupted distinguished academic and pedagogical career of pre-Hitler days, gives a fuller cohesive picture of his overall endeavors as an inspirational and systematic social thinker. His approach, indeed, may find a more immediate response in Europe's spiritual vacuum of the totalitarian aftermath than in the less disturbed setting of the new world. Yet as the increasing influence of some theologians on our shores indicates (among them Heimann's comrade-in-arms and one-time fellow religious socialist, Paul Tillich), his writings put into an appropriate American mould will have a rising effect and will arouse (though possibly not win over) an alert social science, grappling with fundamentals in the ideological battles of this era of "International Civil War."

The book under discussion must be seen as the last of a trilogy, starting with his earlier studies (previously published in the United States) on *Freedom and Order* and on *Wirtschaftssysteme und Gesellschaftssysteme.* His is a "theology of society," in contrast to the presently prevailing interest in a "sociology of religion." In this latest attempt, his original and not altogether unfamiliar themes are reiterated, stressed, and systematized. Stripped of their somewhat complicated connotations, they state simply that the alternatives usually presented to us between freedom and order, person and community, liberalism and Marxism, individualism and communism are not truly consequential choices but interrelated forces, deriving from the same intellectual assumptions, leading to their necessary stalemate, and fundamentally remaining on the same level. The conflict of these two irreconcilable brethren (one fed by the other's "perversion of freedom into privileges") can be solved only by a new solution which, raising the issue to a new level, at the same time brings it back to the forgotten and abandoned base of its origin in Christianity. One quickly recognizes a familiar dialectic in such a construction and may even see—in the turn to religion as the suggested answer—a frequently proposed way out of the contemporary crisis.

What gives the study its special quality is the fact that it presents in the course of an astute analysis one of the most suggestive criticisms of the inner contradictions inherent in "the false circle" of a secularized society. The second part especially, dealing with the dramatic development of original Marxism and its logical self-destruction in the political theocracy of Bolshevism, deserves careful consideration. This story of great expectations and dismal disappointments, told in the main section of the book, reflects at the same time the intellectual biography of a sincere scholar and of his generation, which has lived through the enticements of a seemingly complete rational order and its debacle. That it must be difficult for such a group to find a more generous appraisal of the Enlightenment (as it may, however, shape up in the minds of oncoming scholars) is understandable. Heimann's reaction may well be the natural response of a deeply disturbed intelligentsia, caught in a spiritual crisis of the first order, searching for a new security, and yet positive enough in reaching out for available constructive forces. It may well be a satisfactory answer only to a specific historic generation.

For this and other reasons, there may be many who will take exception to the unequivocal conclusion that the "rational autonomy" (in both its versions from the brotherly contemporary foes) has proved its inability to master the present-day crisis and that "the never assured chance" for a productive synthesis of personal freedom and social justice can only be fulfilled by the third force of Christianity merged with the institutions of industrial, social democracy. Yet even those critics will be rewarded by the rich presentation of material, the thoughtful conceptual analysis, and the religious earnestness of this most sensitive social scientist.

SIGMUND NEUMANN.

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Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie. BY KARL DIETRICH BRACHER. (Stuttgart and Düsseldorf, Germany: Ring-Verlag. 1955. Pp. xxiii, 754. D-Mark 27.80.)

Why is it that the story of the downfall of the Weimar Republic still holds such fascination? Is it because this was one case where that modern barbarism, totalitarianism, won in long drawn-out, "democratic" competition with the forces of democracy? Or because of the uncanny impression that here, but for the grace of God, go we all?

However this may be, traditional "one-factor" explanations no longer hold. It was not only, or even chiefly, a Germany leaning toward authoritarianism, or the Great Depression, or the impoverishment of the middle classes, or a Nazi-plutocratic, or Nazi-military, conspiracy which caused the event. Never has the intricate mixture of causes—"historic necessities," seemingly overwhelming trends, historical "accidents," and the "personal equation"— become as apparent as through Bracher's book. One has the impression of overpowering forces driving toward the inevitable, and yet, at certain junctures, the feeling that but for a coincidence, but for a slightly different action by one of the fabulously inept main actors, it "needn't have happened" as it did.

This is an important book. For the first time story and analysis are based on an exhaustive use of all sources now available in Germany. How far the author was handicapped by the fact that possibly relevant documents are still in foreign custody is hard to say. But material available in Germany, foreign and indigenous (including important, hitherto unknown sources, such as the papers of Count Westarp), has been used comprehensively, and one gains the impression that, whatever may still come (e.g., Bruening's memoirs, still denied us by that exceptionally taciturn man), the great outlines of the period have now been established.

The great merit of the work is in tying in the events of 1930–1933 with a searching analysis of German institutions as they existed in the twenties. Bracher's analyses of bureaucracy, the military, interest groups, *Buende*, and "movements" (each constituting a complete essay by itself) are rewarding for any student of comparative government. There follows the blow-by-blow story of events during the last, fateful years. As does all significant history-writing, this account proceeds from a definite point of view, that of the democratic Left, but since minute care is taken not to disregard any source from whatever quarter this does not prevent the presentation from being as "objective" as any written from any other "viewpoint." To one whose doubtful privilege it was to live through that period in Germany, reliving it here is a shattering experience. To Germans it may prove to be more. In the ten years they have been free to explore their past again, little attention has been given to the Weimar and Nazi eras, and what there is tends, in dangerous fashion, to be apologetic as far as Rightist forces are concerned, and debunking, if not frankly hostile, toward Weimar democracy; finding it not white but gray, they proclaim it black. This goes not only for the flood of postwar memoirs but also for serious historiography (as witness a recent biography of von Hindenburg, not to mention worse publications). But "repression" and delusion cannot go on forever. The appearance of this book may turn out to be the first step in a process of a nation's self-analysis and self-purification and thus a political event of prime import. In any event, it is a work in which German scholarship may take legitimate pride.

John H. Herz.

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German Democracy at Work: A Selective Study. By James K. Pollock, Henry L. Bretton, Frank Grace, and Daniel S. McHargue. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press. 1955. Pp. viii, 208. $4.50.)

Forecasts about the political future of Germany have taxed for generations the prophetic skill of many political scientists. In the Weimar years hopes ran high, only to be followed by attitudes that ranged from a desire to ostracize Germany from the Western community of civilized nations and to reduce her to industrial impotence to the expectations that de-nazification and political re-education would bring the Germans back to the fold where they were once more desperately needed.

In this excellent volume the authors, under the direction of Professor Pollock, who can rightly claim not only a profound understanding of the German political system and ideology, but also some responsibility for our policies in Germany in the post-World War II period, present an optimistic point of view about Germany's future. The volume is devoted to the study of the working of the rediscovered democratic process, with particular emphasis on elections. The reader gets, for the first time, an excellent account of what the Germans thought and how they voted in the elections of 1953—an account generally similar to the ones given in the very competent volumes that appeared in Great Britain for the general elections of 1945, 1950, and 1951. The ideology and platforms of the major political groupings—the "majority party" (the Christian Democratic party) and the "opposition" (the Social Democratic party)—are carefully analyzed, though at times too much emphasis is placed upon the past history of these two parties rather than upon their contemporary ideological orientation and social composition. An excellent chapter is provided by Pollock on the electoral law under which the elections of 1953 were held and McHargue adds an able statement on the actual voting machinery as it was observed at the polls. Two "close-ups" of the electoral process for the months preceding the election and of the actual balloting and the election returns, along with a good interpretive analysis of the voting, are given by Bretton for one electoral district (Hersfeld, in North Hesse) and for another electoral district (corresponding to the Düsseldorf-Mettman *Landkreis*) which is considered to mirror as accurately as possible the Federal Republic. There is a good concluding chapter on United States policy in which the role played by this country in the election is frankly admitted. The identification of the Christian Democratic party position with United States foreign policy is candidly shown to have favored rather than harmed Chancellor Adenauer.

The reader, as we noted, will find in this volume an optimistic view. The elections were held in the most orderly fashion; extremists were routed and the young Republic, despite some of the policies advocated by the Social Democratic party, seemed to be remarkably close to a general agreement on the fundamental issues facing it. The democractic parties seem to be well in control of the situation today, as they were in the early years of the Weimar Republic. The scrupulous adherence to democratic processes in electoral campaigning and balloting, so well described by the authors, appears to leave little room for concern. The evaluative remarks of the authors, especially Bretton, go one step farther and help the reader reach a point of happy complacency. For instance, "There are no indications," he writes, "that the new German Army will again become an instrument of aggression," and "The German commitment to a democratic state appears to be sincere." It follows, of course, that the fears of the French are unfounded, and that many of our difficulties are due to the Soviet foreign policy, which sows "discord among the nations of the West." The solution to "Europeanize" the Saar is applauded, at the time of writing, by the same author as an indication of Germany's commitment to the West.

One cannot read these statements without considerable skepticism. They are, to begin with, premature; secondly, they leave out of consideration some of the basic concerns of the Germans—reunification being the most important today. What form will it take? Is the "neutralist" position plus the reunification advocated by the Social Democratic party worse than advocacy of reunification by force—something that may in the future break the Republic's tender back? If and when this is advocated then perhaps the Social Democratic policy may, retrospectively, appear to have been not really inconsistent with the interests of Germany, of the European community, and of the United States. Thirdly, despite intentions to keep the army under political control, one cannot ignore the historical role it has played nor fail to watch its growth without serious misgivings.

Such skepticism may be unfounded. It is the hope of this reviewer that the authors will produce volumes on many future German elections as competently as they have done for the last one. It is also his hope that the elections will continue to mirror the spirit of Germany's "commitment to democracy." At this stage, however, I cannot share Bretton's optimism. It is, of course, for the reader to decide how much real hope there is for Germany's future, and I can think of no better volume to suggest than the one Professor Pollock and his associates have produced.

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Israel's Emerging Constitution, 1948–51. By EMANUEL RACKMAN. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1955. Pp. xvi, 183. $3.00.)

Although poor in natural resources and small in population, Israel rightfully boasts of a larger per capita supply of difficult problems than any other country in the world. For the social scientist, this new state of less than two million people is a microcosmic laboratory in which political, economic, and cultural questions of worldwide significance can be studied at close range. Among these are the issues associated with clashing cultural backgrounds, religious differences, the treatment of national minorities, rapid economic development, serious inflationary pressures, the continuous threat of war, the existence of an economic blockade, the role of collective, cooperative, labor-owned, and national enterprises, the dilemmas of a victorious labor party, proportional representation, the operation of coalition government, the development of a new governmental structure, and—as vividly demonstrated in recent months—the great conflict between the free world and the Soviet bloc.

In this modest volume the author singles out for isolated treatment the development of Israel's constitution during the first few years of its existence. He gives special attention to the debate on whether or not a written constitution should be adopted. Although the founders of the state had done considerable work in preparing alternative drafts, the final decision was negative. Lip-service to the idea of a written constitution was provided, however, by a parliamentary resolution favoring a written constitution at some future date (a resolution that has thus far remained a dead letter). Of particular interest are the reasons for the negative decision. The author shows how politically-organized religious groups played a central role by insisting that a written constitution give a central status to the Jewish religion. Although the religious groups were in a minority position, it seems clear that Prime Minister Ben Gurion felt that it would be better to dodge this issue at a time when an effective coalition government depended upon their support.

The author also gives attention to the development of constitutional principles through the enactment of the new state's first laws. With but minor modifications, Israel's parliamentary system was based on the "shadow state" which had been organized by the Jewish community during the days of the British mandate. It consisted of a unicameral legislature composed of members elected through a system of nationwide proportional representation on the basis of national party lists. Proposals for a system of single-member districts were discussed but—because of the natural opposition from the large number of small parties—abandoned. The judicial system existing under the mandate—with its variegated array of Jewish rabbinical courts, Moslem courts, and Christian ecclesiastical courts—was also continued. This has meant some serious limitations in the civil rights of women. (The broader issues of civil rights, including the rights of the various Arab minorities, are not discussed.) The most drastic changes that were made in the earlier years were the merging of previously separate defense forces into one army, the abolition of bigamy and child marriage, and the offer of citizenship to any Jew coming to Israel. The issue of a national school system to replace the separate schools under the wings of political parties and religious groups was postponed. (A unified system was established, however, soon after the end of the period covered in the book.) With government action penetrating into almost every field of human endeavor, a broad consensus developed on the philosophy of the "positive state." The character of this consensus is partially indicated by the continuous demands of the right wing "free enterprise" minority to nationalize the health services and labor exchanges that have developed under the wing of the General Federation of Labor.

From the viewpoint of comparative government, this book is a useful—albeit limited—case study. From the viewpoint of Middle East affairs (which will probably attract more attention now that this area is once again a bitter bone of international contention), it is a valuable contribution, and should be supplemented by similar studies of constitutional developments in neighboring countries, particularly Egypt. In the opinion of this reviewer, however, the most notable contribution it can make is to help open up to broader and more intensive analysis the multi-hued host of twentieth century social and political questions to be found at this scene of ancient glory and tragedy.

BERTRAM M. GROSS.

Jerusalem, Israel.

Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process. BY MAX BELOFF. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1955. Pp. 134. $3.00.)

With the publication of these four Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, delivered in 1954 at the Johns Hopkins University, Max Beloff, already well known to American readers, joins the growing ranks of those examining the compatibility of democratic processes with effective foreign policy.

While his remarks are in part generalized and specific allusions are made to most of the Western democracies, it is the United States that Mr. Beloff has at the center of his attention. Americans inured to the criticisms of Lippmann, Kennan, Morgenthau, *et al.* may find Beloff's strictures lacking both novelty and bite. In setting forth the "Problem of Democratic Foreign Policy" the author cites the concern in this country over whether the adaptation of technological changes to improvement of international positions entails necessarily the abandonment of social, economic, and political values that lie at the heart of the concept of democracy. But he speaks of "concern," not of conscious or unconscious abandonment of the latter to the exigencies of the former. This same mildness and, one is tempted to say, balance are also evident in Beloff's examination of the "Pre-suppositions of Democratic Foreign Policy." Mention is made of the (erstwhile?) American penchant for public diplomacy, of the historical efforts to subject diplomacy to popular control, and of the greater concern which the State Department manifests over informing the public, as compared with both the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay. The conclusion, once again, is a tempered one: in foreign policy "newly enfranchised democracies would all seem to require at least a period of apprenticeship."

To this reader, at least, it was the third section, "Institutions of Democratic Foreign Policy," which seemed the most effective, because it was the most challenging. This is not to say that he agreed with all of Mr. Beloff's contentions. Despite the sources named, it would appear to be an exaggeration to repeat that " '. . . Congress is a co-ordinate member of a foreign policy team; and this co-ordinate membership extends to the House as well as the Senate.' " Also the frequently perceived cleavage in the Republican party between "isolationist," Middle Western, congressional leadership and "internationalist," Eastern, executive leadership may well be an over-simplification of a passing phenomenon. (After all, just how "isolationist" or Middle Western is Senate Republican leader Knowland?) One should not cavil too much, however. Americans tending to take executive control for granted, should be recurrently reminded of the enlarging role and responsibility of Congress. As we approach a national election, Democratic divisions over domestic policy should not totally crowd from view intra-Republican struggles over party orientation toward foreign affairs. It is timely to read of American dependence on the "accident of personality," though we do not forget Sir Winston and the present Prime Minister's difficulty in emerging from his long shadow. Mr. Beloff also performs a service in warning his readers of the danger of paying lip service to "civilian control" without any real comprehension of its meaning. In the concluding section the author confronts classical concepts of national sovereignty with the modern requirements of free-world security, but he at the same time follows the official position of the British government in refusing to see supra-national structures as an inevitable or even a necessarily desirable solution. Like Raymond Aron, Beloff can only hope for democratic wisdom in the use of techniques of statecraft forced upon us by the increasing improbability of total war but still so new that their dimensions and consequences have not as yet been ascertained.

Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process is an exceedingly well-written volume, benefiting perhaps from the fact that the material had first been read aloud. Much of its interest is to be found in seeing the United States through the eyes of a thoughtful, informed, articulate, foreign observer. Clearly directed toward the non-academic public, it deserves a wide audience.

EDGAR S. FURNISS, JR.

Princeton University.

Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought. EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY ERNEST J. SIMMONS. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1955. Pp. xii, 563. $7.50.)

This ponderous symposium is a collective attempt to determine the degree to which the Soviet regime has remade the Russians or has remained Russian. It emerged from a four-day conference which was held at Arden House in March, 1954 under the auspices of the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council. The participants represent a wide variety of disciplines, institutions, and personal experience.

The problem is approached in terms of six broad categories: economic thought; authoritarianism and democracy; collectivism and individualism; rationality and nonrationality; literature, state and society; and Russian and Soviet messianism and theories of action. No serious attempt can be made to evaluate or even mention each of the 26 individual specialized papers which comprise the bulk of the volume except to say that they are, on the whole, well-documented and that each is capable of standing alone. Some are highly specialized, such as Father Florovsky's paper on "Reason and Faith in the Philosophy of Solov'ëv and Nicholas Riasanovsky's study of "Khomiakov on *Sobornost'*." Others involve a greater sweep. Alexander Gerschenkron's paper, which deals with nineteenth-century Russian economic thought, also broaches the question of economic backwardness in general terms. Three papers on Stalin offer much in the way of enlightenment regarding his methods and the rationale underlying them: they are Alexander Erlich's paper on the late dictator's views concerning economic development, John Bergamini's study on collectivization, and Adam Ulam's "Stalin and the Theory of Totalitarianism." Of these, Ulam obviously had the most difficult task.

The danger of every symposium is that it can easily result in more fission than fusion. The thankless task of attempting to summarize, evaluate, and integrate the specialized papers fell to the veteran Soviet area specialists Alexander Gerschenkron, Merle Fainsod, Michael Karpovich, Geroid Robinson, Ernest Simmons, and Philip E. Mosely. If it were not for the work of these reviewers, the volume would completely fail to live up to its imposing title. Julian Towster, in his very able paper on "Vishinsky's Concept of the Collectivity," is one of the few authors of individual papers who succeeded in placing his topic in a broader perspective in the spirit of the volume's title.

Of course, this is a problem which in its analytical dimensions and complexity is one of tremendous importance and also one which requires methodological caution but also a certain degree of boldness. Merle Fainsod's review in the volume provides some sober and meaty reading in this respect. He complained quite justifiably, in reviewing the papers on authoritarianism and democracy, that the participants "in their collective wisdom . . . have avoided the issues of continuity and change like the plague, and they have left me to rush in where prudent men fear to tread." He also wisely warned that "the march of events plays tricks on the best of us" and that "we are the unavoidable victims of our time span, and it behooves us to be modest in rendering judgments which future events may belie" (p. 172).

The section on authoritarianism and democracy includes, in addition to Ulam's paper, a superbly documented study by Robert F. Byrnes on the arch-reactionary Pobedonostsev, as well as an able paper by Thomas Hammond on Leninist authoritarianism. Michael Karpovich, who himself is representative of the Western-oriented intelligentsia which was all too uncommon in Russia, contrasts the two Constitutional Democratic leaders Basil Maklakov and Paul Miliukov.

The section on literature contains some good papers on tsarist and Soviet literary practices and a thorough survey by Ernest Simmons which points to the dilemma faced by the Soviet regime on the question of publishing the Russian literary classics. Probably one of the best balanced as well as more manageable sections in the volume is that entitled "Russia and the Community of Nations," which includes papers by Isaiah Berlin, Hans Kohn, Kermit McKenzie, and Frederick C. Barghoorn. Hans Kohn has very succinctly contrasted the two great nineteenth-century Russian messianic thinkers, Dostoevsky and Danilevsky. Barghoorn's survey of Russian messianism in postwar Soviet ideology and McKenzie's paper on the Comintern provide a contrast with the earlier messianism and the basis for Philip Mosely's conclusion that the Soviet brand is far more significant, persistent, and effective than that of the nineteenth century.

The section on rationality and nonrationality includes an excellent survey of Soviet biology by Theodosius Dobzhansky, as well as interesting papers by George L. Kline and Herbert Marcuse, but its high point is Geroid Robinson's unusually provocative and able commentary. Robinson boldly and impressively questions the rationality of Russian pre-Soviet and Soviet thought and contends that "pre-revolutionary Russia was intellectually somewhat immature, and that this condition *helps* to explain both the immaturity of the Bolshevik ideology and its success in winning a certain following in the Soviet Union" (p. 359). He points out that Russian autocracy lacked a systematic political theory, that the Russian Orthodox Church has "placed more emphasis on mysticism, and less on intellectualism," and that its saints have not been scholars as was often the case in the Western Church. Of course, the Orthodox Church can be defended on the ground that the essence of religion is a matter of faith and not of reason, but Robinson strengthens his case by also citing the low level and obscure nature of the writings of the Populists and of the Socialist Revolutionaries who followed them. In this connection, mention should be made of Oliver Radkey's paper on Chernov, the Socialist Revolutionary leader, which goes far toward explaining the miserable performance of that party in 1917 despite its having won the elections to the Constituent Assembly. It is a pity that Robinson's stimulating commentary, which is reported to have created something of a limited uproar at the Conference, is not pursued in any of the other papers.

It is the impression of this reviewer that the Conference would have been more fruitful if greater resources had been devoted to enabling the volume to live up to its title. The individual papers could have been commissioned as well as some others, but a companion volume or, in any case, a more effective evaluation and synthesis would have been desirable. Yet this is a rich collection of papers and comments, whatever its shortcomings, and it will serve in many respects as a basic work on the Soviet Union and as a foundation for much-needed further study of the problem.

JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.

University of Pennsylvania.

Becoming. BY GORDON W. ALLPORT. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1955. Pp. 106. $2.75.)

Political scientists who are disturbed by the crescendo of demand to "psychologize" their profession will profit from this lucid book. Delivered in 1954 as the Terry Lectures at Yale, the essay reflects Allport's belief "that modern psychology is in a dilemma. Broadly speaking, it has trimmed down the image of man that gave birth to the democratic dream." If this diminution had some utility, Allport argues that positivistic psychology, with its stress upon man as an "empty organism," fails to supply the needs of democratic theory "that man possess a measure of rationality, a portion of freedom, a generic conscience, propriate ideals, and unique value" (Pp. 99–101).

The reasoning culminating in these conclusions begins with an examination of the philosophical roots of various psychological schools. Consciously oversimplifying, Allport dilates on two polar conceptions, the "Lockean and Leibnitzian traditions." For Locke, nothing could be in the intellect that was not first in the senses; but Leibnitz added the table-turning qualification: "save only the intellect itself"! Locke's formula underlies the various stimulus-response, behavioristic psychologies which fascinate so many contemporary American social scientists. Leibnitz's conception is more congenial to Gestalt, cognitive, and phenomenological psychologies and (paradoxical as it may seem to political scientists) furnishes better than Locke's the philosophical base for morally responsible adults.

Allport urges the study of man as a unique personality. This approach involves some depreciation of tendencies to isolate common traits, drives, needs, attitudes, dimensions, or behaviors in favor of dealing with the whole man. It implies criticism of superficial inferences from animal psychology. "I venture the opinion that all of the animals in the world are psychologically less distinct from one another than one man is from other man." It requires shifting the focus of study from man's past to his future—hence "Becoming." This refocusing is assisted by Allport's interpretation of infantile experience, which can inflict "an ineradicable scar" on the emergent character, but which also is capable of laying the foundation for a lifetime of "continuous and unimpeded growth."

To fill the "empty organism" of positivistic psychology without invoking a magical "self" to explain all psychic phenomena, Allport advances the "proprium." The proprium contains "all aspects of the personality that make for inward unity," including (among others) self-identity, ego-enhancement, rational agent, and self-image. One aspect, "propriate striving," refers to the propensity of human beings to set goals for themselves—Raold Amundsen is the telling example. Propriate striving radically qualifies the almost sovereign efficacy of "tension reduction" as the explanation for many psychologists of motivation. Here the analysis raises the question of conscience, which may begin with "internalized" Freudian musts and must-nots but which, in normal, rational adults includes much more—"specific habits of obedience give way to generic self-guidance" by means of values.

Enter cultural determinism's claim that values are socially prescribed and that personality is "merely the subjective side of culture." In deflating this claim, Allport arrives at the question of freedom of the will—"no other issue causes such consternation for the scientific psychologist." Allport's defense of a degree of freedom, his stress upon the question of the meaning of man's existence, and his concluding remarks on religion and democracy all help fulfill his intention to prepare the way for a psychology more adequate to human needs. Finally, the author relies throughout on the kind of evidence political scientists traditionally have understood and employed.

CHARLES M. HARDIN.

University of Chicago.

German History: Some New German Views. EDITED BY HANS KOHN. (Boston: The Beacon Press. 1954. Pp. 224. $4.00.)

The ideal of the historian may be to float above the conflicts of his time and to present the past as it really was, but as human being he cannot escape history. Twice in the last half-century, German historians have had to face this problem in a peculiarly acute form; twice their state and their society have suffered the devastating effects of losing a modern war. The book before us deals with this in two parts: an introduction and an essay by the editor in which he sets the problem, and eleven articles in which a group of German historians rethink some of the most important aspects of their history.

All of these essays were written between 1945 and 1952. In age and experience the authors range from Friedrich Meinecke, who was born in 1862, to Walther Hofer, who was born in 1920. Among them are Protestants and Catholics, conservatives and liberals, but all are scholars of recognized ability as historians. The choice of themes reflects the questions discussed by professional historians and by thoughtful laymen: the *via dolorosa* of the civilian spirit in Germany, militarism in modern history, the Bismarck problem, misfortune and moral decisions in German history. Of especial importance for readers interested in the broader problems of historical revision are Johann Rantzau, "The Glorification of the State in German Historical Writing," and Walther Hofer, "Towards a Revision of the German Concept of History."

The editor's own contribution to the work goes beyond the wise selection of the respresentative essays. In his introduction and in his paper entitled "Rethinking Modern German History," he has presented and analyzed the recent and contemporary trends in Germany. He points out that "in modern Germany scholars, and above all historians, have played a great role, indicating the changes in national temper and directing public opinion." He recognizes that the future of Germany "is being not only, and even not mainly, influenced by her historians," but also that German intellectuals and scholars have carried a great share of the responsibility for "the anti-democratic and anti-Western attitudes of the German people in the last one hundred and fifty years." The question is therefore pertinent: "Will they now be more helpful in integrating Germany into the democratic community of the West?" A part of the answer is found in the rest of this book.

My own experience during a year in Germany has strengthened my consciousness of the significance of Hans Kohn's question. Most Germans, historians and laymen, need to learn much about what happened in Germany and in the world when censorship and propaganda controlled their supply of information. It was encouraging to see the increase in the courses on recent history, given by young and well-balanced scholars in the normally conservative departments of history. The variety of questions and of answers, illustrated by the essays here published and matched by many that could not be included, have also helped to break the hold of misinformation and misinterpretation on the German mind.

Yet if the desired results are to be attained, we must recognize some problems which Kohn has considered only in passing or not at all. One is the danger that a program of purposeful historical revision will approach the other extreme, that in the sincere desire to accomplish a worthwhile end historians will produce propaganda which will be easily upset by historical fact. A reason for the ineffectiveness of the revisionist movement in Germany after 1918 was that much of this writing was by non-historians or by historians who did not have the respect of their fellows. Other questions are the validity of the contrast stressed by Kohn between "West" and "East," and of the "alienation of Germany from the West." It is true that even Gerhard Ritter in some of his writing accepted the idea that National Socialism was made possible by "the separation of German political thought from Western European thought," but his view that the pernicious trends in modern German history were common to European civilization as a whole has so far been answered only as Kohn answers it, that "isolated trends in Western nations became dominant ideas in Germany." Finally, in considering the possible effects of rethinking German history by German historians, we must not forget that outside of Germany, too, history is being "revised." "Twenty years of treason" and the writings of such men as Charles Tansill and Harry Elmer Barnes are not unknown in Germany. Time and again I had to remind Germans—and Americans in Germany—that it was Hitler not Roosevelt who broke down the barriers between Germany and the Soviet Union and initiated the movement that brought the Russians to Berlin.

Two years after the publication of *Some New German Views*, it is possible to answer Kohn's initial question by saying that the problems he saw and analyzed were also clearly seen and analyzed by his group of authors, and that German historians have helped to integrate Germany into the democratic community of the West, but that the future of historical interpretation in Germany, like the role of Germany herself, is fluid and uncertain under the impact of events and ideas at home and abroad.

LAWRENCE D. STEEFEL.

University of Minnesota.

Research Frontiers in Politics and Government: Brookings Lectures, 1955. BY STEPHEN K. BAILEY, HERBERT A. SIMON, ROBERT A. DAHL, RICHARD C. SNYDER, ALFRED DE GRAZIA, MALCOLM MOOS, PAUL T. DAVID, AND DAVID B. TRUMAN. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 1955. Pp. vii, 240. $2.75.)

The Reverend Sydney Smith in 1825 said of the function of the book reviewer, "One great use of a Review, indeed, is to make men wise in ten pages who have no appetite for a hundred pages; to condense nourishment, to work with pulp and essence, and to guard the stomach from idle burden and unmeaning bulk." No such service is required for the Brookings papers on the frontiers of political science research. In fact the materials are so lean and meaty that any subtraction or compression would be a wound in the flesh. There is no dispensable tissue, and nothing to compress. Readers of these words are therefore advised to seek here no condensation of their intellectual nourishment, but to read and re-read in detail the admirably succinct summaries of current research in political science and research yet to be done which a distinguished group of writers has brought together in these lectures.

The range of their interests is broad. Stephen Bailey discusses historical, institutional, behavioral, and philosophical approaches in political science research of interest to "decision-makers"—legislators, politicians, judges, bureaucrats—rejecting at the outset the notion that scholars have nothing to say to the practitioners. Herbert Simon appraises current research in organization theory in the perspective of twenty years of development; and says, among many other things, that we "need to construct not a single theory of organization but two bodies of theory—one of them applicable to programmed decision-making, the other applicable to non-programmed decision-making." The latter is "the principal *terra incognita* of organization theory today." Robert Dahl contributes a piece on four kinds of decision-making process (hierarchy, democracy, bargaining, and the price system), and identifies such obstacles to theory as the absence of satisfactory criteria for distinguishing different distributions of power, the variations in the level of political activity that each process supposes, problems of personality and predisposition which these processes present, and the problem of the policy-maker. Richard Snyder finds areas of interest common to the game theorist and the political scientist, and suggests some possible "applications and uses of the theory of games for the analysis of political behavior." Alfred de Grazia summarizes six changing techniques of research on voters and elections, and describes six topics being subjected to research by means of those techniques. These are: the relation of politicians to opinion; the identifications of voters with groups, ideas, and people; the voter's perception of the world of politics; his preferences among issues; his persuasability; and the level of political information and activity in America.

Malcolm Moos discusses the elements of a nominating theory which would be applicable to presidential conventions, and suggests that the most serviceable concept of the nominating process is to regard it as an act of leadership succession. Paul David deals with some developments in the study of comparative state politics, and hazards some hypotheses about the realignment of national parties that might be clarified by the use of data from the field of comparative state politics. And David Truman brings the symposium to a conclusion with a lucid account of the development in the behavioral sciences of research technique, which he thinks has progressed farther than the development of validated and expanded theory. He also discusses the impact of these developments on political science, and warns of limitations in their application to political science.

Comprehensive though the view of political science research is in these lectures, a more nearly accurate title for the book would be "Some Research Frontiers," a phrase that is used in the Introduction. Broad though it is, the coverage does not include discussion of recent work in the judicial process; in the field of comparative politics—for example the comparative politics of non-Western systems—apart from the references to comparative state politics; in international relations (except for passing references to the application of game theory to international situations); on the voting behavior of legislators, the legislative process in its many other aspects, or the activities of interest groups; on the convergence of the interests of political scientists and urban sociologists in the study of municipal institutions; to name some. Moreover, in most of these lectures, researchers at the frontier would appear to be at least as much concerned with problems of method as with the establishment of validated theory, if indeed not more so. It almost seems at points as though the frontiersmen were still hammering wheels on Conestoga wagons which they hope will some day drive them or others to fertile prairies of data. In many of the instances reported by the lecturers, the wagons have not yet started, and the frontier is still closer to Pittsburg than to Cheyenne.

The discussions of research bring certain general matters to mind. First, although there is more or less common concern with problems of method, the authors of these excellent lectures do not speak with a single tongue about the subject of the science. Is it decision-making (several papers stress this), institutions, the political process, policy? Or are all of these aspects of the single unifying idea of power, about which, Dahl says, we "do not have any wholly satisfactory criteria for distinguishing different systems of power." Second, if these be important frontiers of research in political science—assumedly the most important—are there many, if any, graduate schools and graduate programs that qualify a student to engage in work in these areas? What department contains even the minimal unity of concept and approach that these essays represent? The inadequacy of the conventional graduate "training" of political scientists is attested by the fact, among others, that imaginative postdoctoral spirits have to re-tread their training in the postgraduate centers of foundation philanthropy. Third, much of the current speculation about political science concerns itself not only with decision-making, which is a scientific category of great interest, but with decision-makers. And this brings to the front, as though we needed to be reminded of it, the refractory nature of the materials of our science. Perhaps it is not frivolous to think of the famous croquet game in Alice, where the materials of the game—the flamingos and the hedgehogs—don't simply lie inert, waiting to be manipulated, but show a depressing inclination towards independent actions of their own. Not only do our political wickets, balls, and mallets bend, run, blink, and sneeze—we hope that they will think well of us. Politics is indeed harder than physics, as Einstein said it was.

But there is no occasion to be discouraged. Perhaps we should, as David Truman suggests in the last lecture, recognize that as a consequence of the institutional focus of political science, the direct relationship between the behavioral sciences and political science is roughly that between "basic" and "applied" research. The political scientist can and should make use of "accepted hypotheses and promising models" developed in the behavioral sciences. But although he should borrow what he can use, neither he nor the behavioral scientist should think that what happens in the nursery among three children, called objectively A, B, and C, is an adequate explanation of what happens among three nations called America, Britain, and China.

If our problem in developing some political "science" seems to us unduly great, we should take comfort from the fact that the resurgence of interest in the field in the last quarter-century has been tremendous, that there is a sense of new and exciting discovery, and that there is undoubted accomplishment. The Brookings lectures make the resurgence, the sense, and the accomplishment abundantly clear.

EARL LATHAM.

Amherst College.

Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power. By EDWARD H. BUEHRIG. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. 1955. Pp. x, 325. $5.00.)

In this perceptive and cogent analysis of the causes of American entry into World War I, Professor Buehrig of Indiana University traces one-by-one each of the main strands of policy from 1914 to 1917, shows their interrelationships, and appraises their relative importance at different stages along our road to war. The main elements examined are neutral rights and submarine warfare, economic involvement with the allies, mediation between the belligerents, the development of the League idea, and the aim to make the world safe for democracy. Wilson's emphasis at first was on a rather legalistic defense of traditional neutral rights against the shattering impact of the new naval technology. But after he had staked America's prestige and honor on this issue by exacting the Sussex Pledge from Germany, the President himself, Buehrig emphasizes, came increasingly to regard neutral rights as insufficient grounds for a major war. Other objectives came to the fore, to be achieved in the context of a compromise peace—only to be transmuted into the Utopian objectives of a victorious war when the German strategists decided to throw down the gauntlet of unrestricted submarine warfare.

Concerning America's true national interest in World War I, Buehrig's own perspective is akin to that of George Kennan; our wisest objective would have been to mediate a compromise peace which would have preserved a balance of power in Europe. But Buehrig gives Wilson and House greater credit than do most of the current "realist" critics for attempting persistently in 1915 and 1916 to achieve essentially that very end, a "peace without victory." The effort failed mainly, he contends, because our military posture and isolationist traditions were such that England and Germany (indeed American leaders themselves) underestimated how much weight we would actually bring to bear against the side which most antagonized us.

Responsibility for the inadequacy of American diplomacy is thus made to rest upon the immaturity of the popular attitude toward world politics. The immaturity is traced mainly to the coddling effects of a century of British naval supremacy—but one wishes that Buehrig had given detailed attention to various currents in American opinion. Although his impressionistic judgments on this problem seem valid, his rather sketchy treatment of it constitutes the one major gap in what is otherwise a lucid and useful study of America's first gropings toward world leadership.

H. Bradford Westerfield.

Harvard University.

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Challenge of Law Reform. By Arthur T. Vanderbilt. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1955. Pp. vi, 194. $3.50.)

In 1954 Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the New Jersey Supreme Court delivered the William H. White Lectures at the University of Virginia Law School. This book is built on those lectures, somewhat revised and expanded.

Long a leading contributor and active participant in American legal reform, this distinguished jurist deftly probes those mechanics of our legal system which he knows from experience can be improved and charts a course which he believes must result in a much-needed refinement of the substance of the law itself.

The more immediate objectives, he contends, are clear and readily obtainable. Either the whole legal profession must accept its leadership responsibility, as in Delaware, or the needed changes will come about through a popular revolt as in England a century before and in New Jersey.

Visualizing simplification and modernization of the substantive law as a fourth sector on the reform battlefield, he sees the other three sectors as ones where victory must first be won. In order of importance these are: better judicial personnel including jurors, simplified judicial structure and procedure, and improved management methods to reduce the law's delays.

Most attention is given to the latter two sectors. The emergence of a simpler court structure, of flexible procedural rules aimed at minimizing technicalities and surprise, and of pretrial conferences and modernized rules of evidence are traced in the English setting and pointed to developments in certain American jurisdictions. Devices for better utilizing judicial personnel, for speeding up cases, and for producing an administrative organization within the judicial framework capable of developing and executing sound administrative policies are examined against a rich background of experience in New Jersey. This is a learned and effective presentation.

The really challenging task in the next half of the twentieth century, Justice Vanderbilt contends, is that of adapting the substantive law to the needs of the times. Voluminous and inaccessible as much of it is, serving as it does the conflicting objectives of different but overlapping eras in an age when economic, social, and political changes are more involved than in any comparable period before, busy as its technicians are—this is a tremendous undertaking. Who is to tackle it?

Judges and lawyers are thought to be too occupied to provide the needed leadership. The idea of a ministry of justice is examined and discarded. Law schools presently oriented to teaching are not the answer. What is needed are law centers—meeting places for legal scholars of all kinds and of informed laymen—whole faculties that can face the problem of law reform.

This little book preserves some able and challenging lectures and projects their challenge to all who will read and reflect.—Howard A. Calkins, *University of Texas.*

The Forgotten Ninth Amendment: A Call for Legislative and Judicial Recognition of Rights under Social Conditions of Today. By Bennett B. Patterson. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1955. Pp. vii, 217.)

Mr. Patterson's little volume boils down to a plea to the United States Supreme Court to find protection for our unenumerated rights —our "rights of natural endowment"—in the up-to-now unused Ninth Amendment. He prefers such protection to the Court's usual reliance on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and to its occasional reliance on the general but extra-constitutional principles of limited government. Mr. Patterson does not charge that those rights have heretofore been poorly protected by the Court or that the Ninth Amendment would offer them better protection. Rather, it is a matter of principle with him. He is concerned that twenty-one words in the Constitution seem to be sterile of meaning and convinced that, properly interpreted, their use would fill the one serious void in our Constitution as read by the Court today, namely, the lack in it anywhere of a succinct statement of the theory of individual, inherent rights. It is his contention and the central message of the book that "The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution is a basic statement of the inherent natural rights of the individual. . . . As such it is a statement of the essence of the aspirations of a democratic form of government. It is the declaration and recognition of individualism, which is the cardinal virtue of democracy . . ." (p. 4). But despite extensive presentation of its legislative history and other arguments supporting his thesis, Mr. Patterson does not satisfactorily demonstrate that the Ninth Amendment is or was intended to be what he declares it to be. He attempts to read into Madison's proposal of the Amendment to the First Congress a great deal more than Madison's few words have generally been construed to convey, and perhaps the Court has uniformly neglected the ratified form of the Amendment—there has never been a direct judicial construction of the Ninth Amendment—precisely because it says nothing not elsewhere said better. For even Mr. Patterson admits that our whole system of government and the Declaration of Independence provide both the guarantees we need for unenumerated rights and a concise statement of the theory behind them. Thus, while the author denies that he is stirring a tempest in a teapot, by and large his entire discussion is academic.

The book is divided into two parts, the central argument, occupying 85 pages, and an appendix, occupying 132 pages and consisting chiefly of excerpts from the *Annals* of the First Congress giving in detail the arguments concerning the adoption of the first ten Amendments to the Constitution. The whole is preceded by an introduction by Roscoe Pound.

All in all, the book is a peculiar example of special pleading. Perhaps the key to the entire volume is given in the closing paragraph of the seventh chapter, which bears the title, "What are the Unenumerated Rights?" "There must be some unenumerated rights. The amendment must be given some meaning. Its value and meaning should not be lost through disuse. This amendment can only be saved by our courts" (p. 56). If there are reasons for Mr. Patterson's feeling of urgency, they do not, unfortunately, communicate themselves to the reader.—RICHARD H. LEACH, *Duke University*.

A Passion for Politics: The Autobiography of Louis Brownlow, First Half. BY LOUIS BROWNLOW. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1955. Pp. xii, 605. $7.50.)

The warm personal story of the life of Louis Brownlow from his birth in the Ozark Mountains in 1879 when "All but a minute minority of the citizens saw the federal government, now that the army had been demobilized, only in and through the post office"; through the formative years when he was self-educated by doing, reading, and moving with people, and when he acquired his deep interest in politics; and on through his varied journalistic career—in Tennessee, Kentucky, Washington, and ultimately in the Far East, Latin America, and Europe; and up to the moment of his appointment as a Commissioner for the District of Columbia, when the second half of his life began. It is more, however, than a personal story for there is history of the times, comment on life and events abroad, and revelations on politicians and politics. The second volume on "Brownie's" career in administration will be anxiously awaited by friends, students of administration, and many others who know of his notable career and intimate writing.

Nine Men: A Political History of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1790 to 1955. BY FRED RODELL. (New York: Random House. 1955. Pp. xii, 338. $5.00.)

A mixture of fact and opinion in which Mr. Rodell favors a libertarian activist Supreme Court as regards civil liberties and an abstemiously passive Court as regards property and other economic rights. The book, therefore, is hardly history or constitutional law, whatever may be its merits as polemics.

The Supreme Court in the American Scheme of Government. BY ROBERT H. JACKSON. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1955. Pp. viii, 92. $2.00.)

An account of the Supreme Court as a unit of government, law court, and political institution in which the late Justice Jackson with characteristic candor discusses the work of the Court. There are interesting comments on the conference and the inability of the members of the Court to read all the materials presented in litigation.

The Congressional Anthology: Poems Selected by Senators and Representatives. EDITED BY ERNEST S. GRIFFITH AND KENTON KILMER. (Washington, D. C.: The University Press of Washington, D. C. 1955. Pp. ix, 156. $3.00; Student edition, $2.00.)

The favorite poems of 130 members of Congress, the Vice-President, and the chaplains of the House and Senate. The poems, arranged under the headings "The Man" and "The Statesman" and followed by four written by members of Congress, range from the classics to modern American verse and reveal much about the humanity and aspirations of the members.

Organization and Management: Theory and Practice. By Catheryn Seckler-Hudson. (Washington, D. C.: The American University Press. 1955. Pp. viii, 324.)

Written for teachers, training officers, supervisors, executives, and students this is a kind of text or manual of study, but it differs substantially from other texts or outlines. It concentrates on principles and processes, contains 20 tables, introduces each chapter with questions for study, builds each chapter by statement of a number of principles or elements in process or questions, and concludes with an extensive annotated bibliography. It deals with administration in large organizations, with particular focus on public management at the national level.

Reapportionment in Alabama. By James E. Larson. (University, Alabama: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama. 1955. Pp. viii, 76.)

A careful analysis of inequality of representation on a population basis in a state which has not had a legislative reapportionment since 1901 and of the probable effects of various plans for reapportionment which have been proposed.

The Florida Constitution of 1885: A Critique. (Reprinted from *University of Florida Law Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Spring 1955.) By Manning J. Dauer and William C. Havard. (Florida: University of Florida Press. 1955. Pp. 92.)

An incisive analysis of defects in draftsmanship in Florida's Constitution and an evaluation of its substantive parts in the light of the recentness, speed, and character of the state's growth, with suggestions for improvement.

The Minnesota Department of Taxation: An Administrative History. By Lloyd M. Short, Clara Penniman, and Floyd O. Flom. (Minneapolis, Minn.: The University of Minnesota Press. 1955. Pp. viii, 176. $3.00.)

A group research product of the Public Administration Center of the University of Minnesota detailing the administrative development of the Minnesota Department of Taxation, including both staff functions and operating tax activities.

The Jefferson County Survey of Health, Welfare, and Recreation Needs and Services. Prepared by a Citizens Committee of the Jefferson County Coordinating Council of Social Forces and Directed by Valerie A. Earle. (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press. 1955. Pp. xiii, 368.)

An exceedingly comprehensive and detailed account of services rendered by public and social agencies and of the deficiencies in program, with recommendations to both types of agencies for improvement.

The Government of Metropolitan Miami. (Chicago: Public Administration Service. 1954. Pp. xii, 194.)

A survey of the development and current problems of Metropolitan Miami together with a presentation of governmental alternatives and a recommended approach to the problem of government in the area.

American City Government and Administration. By Austin F. Macdonald. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 6th ed. 1955. Pp. xvi, 656. $6.50.)

A general, and in places extensive, revision of this text within the framework of previous editions.

American State and Local Government. By Claudius O. Johnson. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 2nd ed. 1956. Pp. xi, 305. $2.95.)

A revised text designed, as was the first edition, to be used in relatively short courses on the subject. The same plan of organization is continued and a new chapter—"The States in the American Federal System"—is added to deal with intergovernmental relations. Numerous charts and tables and the "Model State Constitution" are included.

Essentials of Missouri Government. By Robert F. Karsch. (Columbia, Mo.: Lucas Brothers, Publishers. 4th ed. 1955. Pp. i, 157.)

A revision of a very useful handbook of Missouri government presenting a great deal of information in concise form and with the aid of more than 50 tables, maps, and charts. Contains the Missouri Constitution of 1955 and amendments thereto.

The United States Patent System: Legal and Economic Conflicts in American Patent History. By Floyd L. Vaughan. (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press. 1956. Pp. xvi, 355. $8.50.)

An exhaustive analysis and evaluation by the author of *Economics of Our Patent System* (1925) of all aspects of the patent system with particular emphasis upon the part played by patents in patent pools, consolidations, cartels, and monopolies. Includes an instructive final chapter on "Remedies."

Experience under Railway Labor Legislation. By Leonard A. Lecht. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1955. Pp. viii, 254. $4.25.)

Contains the full story of the backgrounds of legislation and of experience thereunder, revealing the extent of success and failure under the Railway Labor Act in the successive periods during which it has been operative.

Can We Solve the Farm Problem? An Analysis of Federal Aid to Agriculture. By Murray R. Benedict with the Report and Recommendations of the Committee on Agricultural Policy. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 1955. Pp. xix, 601. $5.00.)

The Twentieth Century Fund presents an exhaustive research report on the several types of government aid to agriculture and the briefer analysis and recommendations of its Committee on Agricultural Policy. There are two lengthy appendices, one giving the history of the concept of parity and a summary of problems involved, the other supplying the Department of Agriculture's 1954 summary of costs of agricultural programs. The volume is to be succeeded by a second one on the various specific commodity programs.

Economic Needs of Older People. By John J. Corson and John W. McConnell with Policy Recommendations of the Committee on Economic Needs of Older People. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 1956. Pp. xvii, 533. $4.50.)

A comprehensive analysis of the economic problem of the aged and of all roads to their security, followed by the Report of the Twentieth Century Fund's Committee. The Report in general accepts present practice though it is recommended that the states assume an increasing share of the financial responsibility for old-age assistance. The Committee was divided on how provision should be made for the disabled.

Policies to Combat Depression: A Conference of the Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1956. Pp. x, 417. $8.50.)

A symposium—a joint effort of universities and the National Bureau—with lead statements and comments covering a range of policies, including among other things budget flexibility, state and local finance, taxes, money, public works, and social security.

Scientific Management and the Unions, 1900–1932: A Historical Analysis. By Milton J. Nadworny. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1955. Pp. vii, 187. $3.75.)

A scholarly analysis of the relations between scientific management and unions showing the attitudes of unions toward the movement for scientific management and of leaders in the movement toward labor union practices and objectives.

A Chronicle of Jeopardy, 1945–55. By Rexford G. Tugwell. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1955. Pp. v, 489. $7.50.)

Tugwell presents his reflections written on each of ten anniversaries of the Hiroshima bombing on the problems presented for man by the A-bomb and H-bomb, along with many other reflections on things domestic and international.

The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Origins of the New Deal. By Daniel R. Fusfeld. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1956. Pp. 337. $5.00.)

Traces the development of Roosevelt's ideas on political economy from the *noblesse oblige* ideals of his family, his early economics courses and the Progressive period to the campaign of 1932, with the general thesis, in conflict with opinions of some other authors, that his "views on basic economic matters were well articulated," though his knowledge, like most of those of his day, was weak on depression problems.

The Making of Charles A. Beard. An Interpretation by Mary Ritter Beard. With Chapters by Arthur W. Macmahon and George Radin and Reports from Japanese Correspondents. (New

York: Exposition Press, 1955. Pp. 104. $3.00.)

Thirty-six small pages by Mary Beard, addresses and reports related to Beard's service in Japan, a brief report on his mission to Yugoslavia, and a reprint of an article by Arthur W. Macmahon on Beard as a teacher.

Profiles in Courage. By John F. Kennedy. (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers. 1956. Pp. xix, 266. $3.50.)

A United States Senator gives an account of eight instances of courageous acts by eight Senators: Adams, Webster, Benton, Houston, Ross, Lamar, Norris, Taft—preceded by a chapter on influences affecting a Senator.

What I Think. By Adlai E. Stevenson. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1956. Pp. xvi, 240. $3.00.)

Selected speeches and writings, or excerpts thereof, since the presidential campaign of 1952.

The Private Diary of a Public Servant. By Martin Merson. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1955. Pp. x, 171. $3.00.)

This is an account of Mr. Merson's Washington experiences in 1953 as consultant to the International Information Administration with emphasis on the political difficulties encountered in effectively countering charges made by Senator McCarthy and others, especially those directed at I.I.A.'s overseas library program.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S APPROACH TO ITS CONVENTION RULES

The Call to the 1956 Democratic National Convention, issued by Chairman Paul M. Butler on December 21, 1955, provides:

> Notice is hereby given that the following resolutions have been approved by the Democratic National Committee for adoption as rules applicable to the 1956 Democratic National Convention:
>
> RESOLVED, That it is the understanding that a State Democratic Party, in selecting and certifying delegates to the Democratic National Convention, thereby undertakes to assure that voters in the State will have the opportunity to cast their election ballots for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential nominees selected by said Convention, and for electors pledged formally or in good conscience to the election of these Presidential and Vice-Presidential nominees, under the Democratic Party label and designation.
>
> RESOLVED, That it is understood that the Delegates to the Democratic National Convention, when certified by the State Democratic Party, are bona fide Democrats who have the interests, welfare and success of the Democratic Party at heart, and will participate in the Convention in good faith, and therefore no additional assurances shall be required of Delegates to the Democratic National Convention in the absence of credentials contest or challenge.
>
> RESOLVED, That it is the duty of every Member of the Democratic National Committee to declare affirmatively for the nominees of the Convention, and that his or her failure to do so shall be cause for the Democratic National Committee or its duly authorized subcommittee to declare his or her seat vacant after notice and opportunity for hearing.

These paragraphs are a marked departure from the familiar form of call, which is customarily confined to the bare essentials of time, place, and number of delegates from each state.

Proposed Solution to Loyalty Oath Problem. These rules are the solution offered by the Democratic party to the so-called loyalty oath problem which erupted on the floor of the 1952 Convention. They must be approved by the Convention, since each Convention prescribes its own rules.

The proposed rules deal with a problem that was the subject of confusion and rancor at the 1952 Convention. That Convention adopted as part of its temporary rules a resolution (Moody resolution) that no delegate shall be seated unless he shall give assurance that he will exert every honorable means available to him in any official capacity he may have to provide that the Convention's nominees appear on the ballot under the Democratic party designation.

Delegates from Southern states speaking in opposition contended: (1) The resolution did not in fact accomplish more than was required by state law in their states, yet their delegations were bound by party resolutions not to make commitments. (2) The resolution advanced a condition of eligibility of delegates not previously announced or included in the Call. The debate was pervaded by a theme of opposition to this resolution as a "loyalty pledge."

Thereafter, on a motion sponsored by the Credentials Committee, the Moody resolution was amended to provide that for this (the 1952) Convention only, such assurance shall not be in contravention of existing state law nor of the previous instructions of the state Democratic governing bodies.

The delegations of Louisiana, South Carolina, and Virginia advised that they could not give the assurances demanded by the Moody resolution. Governor Battle of Virginia explained that no one in Virginia would have any idea of keeping the Convention's nominee off the ballot, and that the Virginia statutes expressly provided for the Convention's nominees to be on the ballot, but that the delegation objected to the sense of the resolution as involving a commitment to support any future action whatever of the Convention. A motion was made to seat the Virginia delegation on the ground that Governor Battle's statement was in substantial compliance with the spirit of the rule. In due course the Virginia, and then the South Carolina and Louisiana, delegations were seated by the Convention.

The foregoing capsule account is in one sense misleading. It omits the oratory, the questioning as to the precise position of the Southern states, the voting reversals, in sum the drama of the occasion. The confusion and wrangling were the instigating cause of an Advisory Committee to survey the question in advance of the 1956 Convention.

The Special Advisory Committee. The proposed rules contained in the Call to the 1956 Convention were approved at a meeting of the Democratic National Committee in Chicago, November 18, 1955. They were recommended to the Democratic National Committee in a report filed in June, 1955 by its Special Advisory Committee on Rules and Procedures for the 1956 Democratic National Convention.

The Advisory Committee was established pursuant to a resolution of the Democratic National Committee at Chicago on September 15, 1953, providing:

> That the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee be authorized to appoint an advisory committee to study, review, and make appropriate recommendations concerning all rules governing the Democratic National Convention, including specifically, but not exclusively, the subject of the so-called or mis-called Loyalty Pledge Resolution adopted at the 1952 Convention and rules for the more expeditious handling of convention business, it being understood that the advisory committee's functions and authority are limited to the making of advisory recommendations for submission by the National Committee to the 1956 convention, and that the advisory committee will have widespread geographical representation and will be chosen from among members and non-members of the Democratic National Committee.

Formation of an advisory committee was opposed by some who believed that the matter was ticklish and best left to the deliberations of the 1956 Convention. Mr. Stephen A. Mitchell, then Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, strongly supported the formation of an advisory committee, being of the view that although there were risks and difficulties, these could be minimized and avoided by a program calling first for research and careful study of the problems, and second for consideration by men and women of good will in a composed atmosphere not easily found in Convention week.

By September of 1954, a Committee of 82 individuals from 45 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, had accepted appointment to the Advisory Committee. The membership consists of individuals who had served upon the Credentials and Rules Committees of the 1952 Democratic National Convention, or had otherwise taken part in the controversy concerning the so-called "loyalty oath," and other individuals of special competence and experience in the conduct of political conventions, who were regarded as representative of membership of the Democratic party in various parts of the nation.

At an organization meeting in Indianapolis on September 18, 1954, Mr. Mitchell was elected Chairman of the Advisory Committee. At his suggestion, the Honorable John S. Battle, former Governor of Virginia, and Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, of Minnesota, were named Vice-Chairmen. The representative span symbolized by these Vice-Chairmen was an eloquent indication of the broad approach of the Advisory Committee. Whatever differences Governor Battle and Senator Humphrey may or may not have on specific issues of platform or policy, their respect for each other and their belief in the importance of the work of the Advisory Committee were of greatest benefit to the Committee.

Mr. Mitchell brought to the work of the Advisory Committee the qualities of drive and constructive planning that distinguished his tenure as Chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

A number of advisers, including officers and staff of the Democratic National Committee, assisted the Advisory Committee in its work.

The Advisory Committee was an active one. Its meetings were held at the same time as regional meetings of the Democratic National Committee, occasions attracting interest and good attendance. At a spirited meeting in New Orleans on December 3, 1954, when over fifty members were present, agreement in principle was reached on a number of points, and the officers and staff were requested to undertake certain further research and drafting. At a meeting in Washington on April 16, 1955, also well attended, the draft rules were discussed, revised, and approved.

The undersigned, as General Counsel of the Democratic National Committee, and as Counsel of the Advisory Committee, was charged with responsibilities of draftsmanship, and with preparation of certain memoranda for the Committee. In a political science journal it is certainly appropriate to note the debt owed by the Advisory Committee to Dr. Abraham Holtzman, who was in charge of research.

The Advisory Committee considered not only questions of "loyalty" but also questions of Convention and pre-Convention procedure, which are not presented here.

The deliberations and report of the Advisory Committee confirm once again that the practical art of politics can make good use of the techniques and skills of political science.—HAROLD LEVENTHAL.

Editor's Note: The following three memoranda submitted to the Advisory Committee were transmitted to the Democratic National Committee and circulated among officials of the Democratic party. They are out of print and not easily obtainable. It is believed that they will be of interest to the readers of the REVIEW and they are accordingly reprinted here.

(Appendix A, a proposed Call, is substantially the Call adopted by the Democratic National Committee and is not reprinted here.)

March 7, 1955

I. MEMORANDUM

To: Members of Special Advisory Committee on Rules of the 1956 Democratic National Convention.

From: Stephen A. Mitchell, Chairman; John S. Battle and Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Chairmen.

Subject: Proposed Resolutions Clarifying Responsibilities of State Party and National Committeemen in Regard to Convention Nominees, and Disclaiming Special Oaths for Convention Delegates in Absences of Credentials Test.

1. Following the New Orleans meeting, and pursuant to suggestion at that meeting, we transmit this memorandum and the enclosures as specific proposal for consideration by the Special Advisory Committee at its next meeting.

2. We recommend that this Special Advisory Committee, in its report to the Democratic National Committee, recommend that the National Committee's Call to the next convention follow the form of the Call in Appendix A, and that the National Committee propose the resolutions set forth in Ap-

pendix A for passage at the 1956 Convention.

3. The Democratic National Committee has the authority to give notice in the Call it issues for the Convention of a proposal to be submitted to the Convention for a change in the Convention's rules. (This "notice" could also be in an Annex to the Call, or in a separate communication issued at the same time.) In this connection we may note the procedure followed in 1936 when the two-thirds rule was abolished. Mr. Bennett Champ Clark, as chairman of the Committee on Rules and Order of Business, in his report recommending the change, stated that the matter was referred to in the Call of the National Committee for the holding of the Convention (1936 Proceedings, p. 189).

4. The principal elements of the proposal in Appendix A are:

(a) There is made explicit the good faith assumption underlying a state party's sending delegates to the Democratic National Convention, that it undertakes to assure that the nominees of the Convention will appear on the ballot as the nominees of the Democratic Party.

This undertaking does not constitute a warranty or commitment by any one as to his personal action or support. His conscience may require him to decide to support the opposition candidates; there is no attempt to consider here what would be the consequences of such activity. However, good faith requires that voters be able, if *they* choose, to vote for the nominees of the Democratic National Convention.

(b) No written or special oaths shall be demanded of Convention delegates in the absence of credentials contests.

In the case of challenge or contest, such oaths or commitments may be appropriate. As a general requirement such "test oaths" are not necessary, and they are repugnant and offensive to many sincere Democrats who have long given to the Democratic Party their support, their energies, their loyalty, and indeed their love.

(c) The National Committeeman has an affirmative duty to support the nominees of the Convention. If he fails to discharge that duty, his seat may be declared vacant.

The National Committeeman is not only a member of the state party. He is also a member of a national organization, the Democratic National Committee. As such it is part of his duties to support affirmatively the national ticket. In case of "misfeasance," by his support of the opposition ticket, there would be cause for expulsion. In case of "nonfeasance," failure to declare for and support the Democratic national ticket, his seat may be declared vacant. That course has been adopted by the Democratic Party in the past and is the current rule of the Republican Party.

5. There are also attached hereto two detailed staff memoranda:

Appendix B:—Vacating Seat of National Committeeman Who Does Not Support the National Ticket.

Appendix C:—Background Material Relating to Responsibility of State Party Participating in National Convention; Eligibility and Responsibility of Delegates to National Convention and of Presidential Electors.

These memoranda are transmitted in deference to the wishes of many members of the Special Advisory Committee who expressed a desire for a more comprehensive background of salient elements of the problems discussed.

6. Appendix B provides background for the recommendation proposed herein regarding the responsibilities of National Committeemen, and reviews the applicable precedents and analysis.

7. Appendix C provides material on the various state provisions regarding party loyalty and responsibility. Without reviewing that memorandum in detail, it seems to us to supply these significant facts for our consideration:

(a) The state party has in general a basic authority to regulate its affairs and membership to further its political objectives, and to prevent interference by members of the opposition party. (The complications of "open primaries," however, should be noted.)

(b) In all states there is an assumption that the state party will handle various matters relating to selection of its delegates to the Democratic National Convention, and to selection of candidates for Presidential electors who will, if elected, vote in the Electoral College for the nominees of that Convention.

(c) There is wide diversity among the states in pertinent matters. Different mechanics are provided: The selection may be by convention, state committee, primaries, etc. The methods may or may not be the same for Convention delegates and Presidential electors. The extent of legislative control over the operations of political parties varies from state to state. But in every state there is considerable residual authority in the state party, and to a substantial degree in the state executive committee, at least in customary operations.

8. The Democratic Party has federal attributes. It is a confederation of state parties. The basic requirement of assuring a place on the ballot for the national ticket selected by the Democratic National Convention is properly the function of the state party which participated in that convention. Explicit recognition of that responsibility—in good faith—is appropriate at this time.

9. We have not recommended any enactment of state legislation. Such a course would raise technical complications, due to the wide diversity of practice and procedure. And it would be unnecessary. Political parties must rest in great part upon assumption of good faith cooperation.

10. Where there are contests over delegates to the National Convention, the question arises, which group truly represents the Democratic Party of and in the state. Determination of these contests is a major responsibility of the Convention. A separate memorandum recommends a procedural innovation for advance consideration of pertinent issues prior to the Convention. But in determining these contests the Credentials Committee and the Convention may properly examine and require assurances of the conflicting delegations.

We recommend for your favorable consideration the proposals set forth in Appendix A.

Respectfully submitted,

STEPHEN A. MITCHELL, *Chairman*
JOHN S. BATTLE AND
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, *Vice Chairmen*

* * * *

March 2, 1955

APPENDIX B

MEMORANDUM

To: Stephen A Mitchell, Chairman, Advisory Committee on 1956 Democratic National Convention Rules and Procedures.

From: Harold Leventhal, Counsel.

Subject: Vacating Seat of National Committeeman Who Does Not Support the National Ticket.

This is a memorandum to set forth some background information concerning the problem of the National Committeeman who fails to support the National ticket during the campaign.

A. General Precedents of Expulsion or Exclusion of National Committeeman

The Democratic Manual for the Democratic National Convention, prepared by Congressman Cannon in 1952, contains the following, among the duties and powers of the Democratic National Committee: "11. The National Committee is empowered to expel members for cause and has exercised this prerogative, as in 1896 when it expunged from its rolls the names of members actively opposing the election of the presidential nominee. (In 1896 the Committee struck from its rolls the name of a Pennsylvania committeeman who aggressively supported John N. Palmer, the 'gold-Democrat' candidate for President.)"

The records of the Democratic National Committee also reveal that on August 24, 1949, the Committee adopted the report of its Credentials Committee of August 23rd, that the names of certain members of the Committee from Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina, be "expunged from the rolls" and vacancies declared under the above quoted Rule 11. The members involved were those who had supported Strom Thurmond rather than Harry Truman as candidate for President in 1948.

In each case there was some discussion as to the extent of the authority of the Democratic National Committee in the matter. Normally every body has the right to determine its membership. A problem arises in the case of the Democratic National Committee only because the members are confirmed as members of the Committee by the Democratic National Convention, which is a superior body. But the conclusion has been maintained that the Democratic National Committee is necessarily the agency to exercise the power which would have been exercised by the Convention if in session. Therefore, it possesses the final ability to expel a member for cause.

A historian, reviewing the action of the National Committee following the 1896 campaign, commented:[1] "(The) National Committee must have the power to protect the party from enemies within its councils, otherwise local conditions might cause men to be seated in the executive councils who were traitors to the platforms and candidates approved by the party." Another political science text expressed approval of the action then taken: "There is another question affecting the membership of the Committee that might assume importance in a time of bitter factional conflict within the Party. A defeated faction might refuse to support the Presidential candidate and the platform, and the members of the National Committee belonging to that faction might give aid and comfort to the enemy. In such a case, with or without specific authority, the Committee would be justified in taking drastic action: self-preservation is a fundamental right."[2]

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[1] See James Albert Woodburn, *Political Parties and Party Problems in the United States* (1944), p. 300. Mr. Woodburn states that the places of both Mr. Cochrane (Massachusetts) and Mr. Harrity (Pennsylvania), who were out of sympathy with the purpose of the party in the 1896 campaign, were declared vacant by the National Committee. Apparently only Mr. Harrity contested the seat of his successor, Mr. J. M. Guffey, who was designated by a state convention.

Some discussion of the Committee's expulsion power appeared in the National Committee meeting of January 8, 1912, found in transcript of 1912 Proceedings at page 435 and following. Mr. Thomas N. Browne of Vermont stated: "If the authority given by the Democratic National Convention is improperly used, and the individual elected, after he becomes a member of this body, proves that he is not a Democrat, or brings social obloquy or infamy upon the Party, then some representative of the Democratic Party ought to have power to protect it, and that representative would be this body; but it would be after that gentleman had had an opportunity before the Committee to show that he ought not to be expelled from a body to which he had been legally elected. If after becoming a member of this Committee, his acts are so flagrant as to be a disgrace to this Committee, that [sic] the Committee has the right to protect itself."

Curiously enough, Mr. Browne used the power of the Committee to expel members as a reason for holding that the Committee did *not* have the power to exclude members, i.e., members selected by a state committee to fill a vacancy and hence that the action of the State Committee is conclusive.

Mr. William Jennings Bryan cogently defended the right of Democratic National Committee to review the fitness of proposed National Committeemen, even if armed with proper credentials from the State Committee, in terms of the authority of the National Committee, in an exceptional case, like the power of the Convention itself, to reject the credentials of someone who should not properly be allowed to sit as National Committeeman. Mr. Bryan stated (transcript of National Committee meeting of January 8, 1912, pages 442–443): "They are discussing in the Senate at this time the right of a Senator to his seat. Does everybody question that he comes as the representative of the State with regular credentials? Not at all. Yet the Senate is discussing his right to be a member of the Senate. The Senate will decide, without any member contesting his place, whether he has a right to a seat there. Everybody had a right to decide these questions. The people of Alabama, to illustrate, might have sent to this Committee a man whom it would be improper for the Committee to allow to sit here; something might have occurred after the man was appointed which would make it improper for us to receive him. I insist that this Committee is not compelled to accept the man without the right to consider."

The practice of the National Committee over the past forty years—perhaps longer—has been in accordance with the principles stated by Mr. Bryan (although he was overruled on his point of order at the 1912 meeting). The Democratic National Committee refers all new proposed members to its Credentials Committee, and the designations of the State Committees (to fill vacancies) do not become effective until the person is confirmed by the Democratic National Committee as a member of that Committee.

Procedure. In 1898 when Mr. Harrity was expelled, the vote was taken by the Chairman upon a mail poll of the members. (*New York Times*, June 7, 1898.) Mr. Harrity, in a letter of March 28, 1898, to Chairman (Senator) James K. Jones, wrote:[3] "I have always believed that the question could have been more intelligently considered at a meeting of the Committee. I have, however, not hesitated to acquiesce in your plan of submitting the question and taking a vote by mail, of the members of the Committee."

In 1949, the committeemen involved were given an opportunity to appear personally and defend themselves.

B. Recognition of Problem of Failure of National Committeeman to Support National Ticket

Apparently the only circumstances which have resulted in formal action by the Committee to date have been the cases of National Committeemen who were actively engaged in supporting the opposing candidate.

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[2] Howard N. Penniman, *Sait's American Parties and Elections*, p. 317.

[3] See "Pennsylvania Member of National Democratic Committee—Answer of Harrity," Library of Congress, Catalogue No. JK 2317, 1898A.

The clearest ground for expulsion comes in the case of a committeeman who actively declares for the opposition candidate.

What about a committeeman who does not actively declare for the opposition candidate, but also does not definitely state his support of the National ticket selected by the Convention?

There are precedents in both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party that such failure to support the national candidates is ground for declaring a vacancy to exist.

This reflects an awareness of the fact that the National Committeeman may stop short of active opposition to the Democratic candidate and still do harm to the ticket by virtue of his antipathy reflected in a refusal to endorse the candidate.

Moreover, non-support means a failure of the Committeeman to undertake and discharge his responsibilities. The Democratic Party may be jeopardized by sins of omission as well as commission.

Duties of National Committeeman. The Democratic Manual of 1952 prepared by Congressman Cannon sets forth the duties and powers of the Committee as follows: "The duties and powers of the National Committee are derived from the Convention creating it and while subject to variation as the Convention may provide, ordinarily include: 1. *Control and direction of the national campaign.* 2. Creation of committees deemed necessary to the proper prosecution of its work (1940-247). 3. Election or appointment of additional officers or committees (1932-363; 1948-423), who may or may not be members of the National Committee. (Conversely, the Committee would have power to remove at will any officer appointed under authority granted by the Convention.) 4. Adjudication of contests for membership on the National Committee (1932-371, 612; 1944-382, 395). 5. Maintenance of national headquarters at Washington and in the Convention city during the sessions of the Convention, supplying information, enlisting Party cooperation, carrying out Party mandates and contributing to fulfillment of Party pledges. 6. Maintenance of press, radio and television service, speakers' bureaus, club and organization supervision, supplying literature, speakers, organizers, and Party representatives. 7. Financing of Convention and campaign expenses and supervision of related expenditures (1944-325, 362). 8. Provision for the National Convention. . . . (f) Designation of temporary officers, subject to the approval of the Convention, including the Temporary Chairman, who sounds the keynote of the campaign (1944-15). 9. Filling of vacancies on the national ticket occurring by reason of death, declination, or resignation of any nominee of the Convention (1936-302; 1940-196; 1948-225). (Benjamin Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, nominated for Vice President in 1860, declined the nomination and the place on the ticket was filled by the National Committee.) 10. (Refers to Committee function of making recommendations to the Convention.) 11. (Quoted in foregoing part of this Memorandum.)

The functions of the members of the Democratic National Committee include the furtherance of the campaign of the National ticket, and the responsibility for helping to assure election of the Presidential and Vice Presidential nominees, including the choice of a substitute when necessary.

Democratic National Committee Rule of 1896. The issue whether a National Committeeman could be removed for failure to support the National ticket was to some extent involved in the case of Mr. Harrity and the 1896 campaign. Harrity stated in his own defense that he believed in the gold standard principles of Palmer but did not actively support Palmer for President. However, Mr. Harrity did not contend that he had supported Mr. Bryan and the Committee had knowledge of an incident in Philadelphia where Harrity refused to sit on the platform at a meeting where William Jennings Bryan spoke, and indeed even refused to attend the meeting. This incident is referred to in a letter from Mr. W. H. Thompson, National Committeeman from Nebraska, to Senator Jones, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. That letter is not in the files of the Committee, but a copy of it was sent to William Jennings Bryan, and appears in the Bryan papers in the Library of Congress.

Thompson's letter refers to a "resolution passed by the Democratic National Committee at its meeting in New York, wherein the following resolution was passed . . . that on the failure on the part of any member of this Committee to support the candidates of the Party for President and Vice President, it should be the duty of the Campaign Committee to declare a vacancy."

After alluding to the Philadelphia incident, Mr. Thompson continued: "Now, these facts may be known to the Campaign Committee, together with numerous other facts, in reference to what Mr. Harrity did or refused to do during the Campaign and since. And I understand the resolution above quoted to be a continuing resolution and the Committee so created was created for the express purpose of deciding such questions as this . . . and I would suggest that this whole controversy be submitted to this Committee with the power to act under that resolution."

There were apparently no formal findings as to the facts and grounds on which the Democratic National Committee expelled Mr. Harrity, although the case is often referred to as that of a National Committeeman who actively supported the opposition candidate.[4]

But the interesting point is that 60 years ago, the Democratic National Committee did pass a formal resolution that in case of failure of any member of the National Committee to support the candidates, it should be the *duty* of the Campaign Committee to declare a vacancy. It is also noteworthy that this duty was assigned to the Campaign Committee—possibly because of the anticipated necessity of prompt action during a campaign which could not await calling the entire committee.

Republican National Committee Rule. In 1912, the Republican Party at its national convention adopted the rule, which has been maintained at subsequent conventions, providing for declaring a vacancy in the seat of a National Committeeman who fails to support the national ticket.

The rule involved is Rule 31 of the Rules of the Republican National Committee:

"The National Committee shall, however, have power to declare vacant the seat of any member who refuses to support the nominees of the Convention which elected such National Committeeman and to fill such vacancy."

Duty of National Committeeman to Open Campaign Office. You have considered, for example, the desirability that each National Committeeman should be required to announce the fact that he has opened an office to assist in the conduct of the National Campaign.

There is no such requirement now applicable to a National Committeeman. It would be entirely proper for the National Committee, and certainly for the Convention, to specify that the functions of the National Committeeman included such a specific responsibility.

If such an obligation were placed upon the National Committeeman, then it would be appropriate to provide that upon failure to carry out such obligation, a vacancy could be declared in the Committeeman's position. There is precedent for the Committee itself determining upon the ground of such declaration of vacancy, although this might well be determined by the Convention (as is the case in Republican Party) as part of any proposal dealing with party responsibility.

It would be entirely appropriate for the National Committee to delegate to the Chairman (or perhaps to the Executive Committee) the responsibility of deciding whether such an office has been opened. The Chairman could then be empowered to declare the seat vacant upon a finding that such office has not been opened, and was not opened within a specified period (say 3 weeks after close of the Convention; or 3 days after notification by the Chairman). The Chairman could also be authorized to appoint a temporary Committeeman to hold office as such during the campaign, but this would require Convention authorization.

On the other hand, even without Convention authorization, the Chairman could specify a person in the state to act as the Committee's representative or liaison, in regard to the campaign.

C. National Committeeman's Membership in State Party

The foregoing discussion has not failed to give consideration to the fact the National Committeeman is basically a member of the State Democratic Party. The Democratic Manual indicates that the National Committeeman is selected, subject to confirmation by the Convention, either (a) by State Primary, (b) by delegates to National Convention, (c) by State Convention, (d) by the action of the State Committee. (He is a representative of that Party on the National Committee, and is therefore a member of a national organization and subject to control as such by that national organization.)

The situation is fully comparable to that of the United States Senate which, for example, under the Constitution is the judge of the qualifications of its members, although the members are selected by the electorate of a State.

Administrative Desirability of Organizing for

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[4] The case is so recorded in Cannon's Manual, and in Penninan, cited above. . . . . Expulsion suggests an element of "misfeasance," whereas declaration of a vacancy would have a connotation of "nonfeasance."

Establishment of Office. The Committeeman's duty to organize an office would not be merely a means of indicating that he supported the national ticket. It would be useful as indicating more clearly the role of the National Committeeman.

At the Indianapolis meeting on September 18, 1954, there was distributed to the Members of the Special Advisory Committee a list of topics for study. The emphasis for that meeting was on procedural improvement, rather than on the so-called loyalty oath question. One of the subjects for discussion was as follows: Item VII, paragraph 1: "Should duty of National Committeeman to set up campaign office in his state be established?" We received some favorable comment that such an office was a desirable, tangible expression of the function of the National Committee as set forth in the first paragraph of the 1952 Manual, as including "control and direction of the National Campaign."

The nature of the office established by the National Committeeman would, of course, be dependent upon local conditions. His office might be combined with that of the State Committee. It might be in the personal business or law office, or even residence, of the National Committeeman or National Committeewoman involved. But the office would be a tangible indication of the status and function of the National Committeeman.

This memorandum is based primarily on research done in 1953 prior to the meeting in Chicago of the Democratic National Committee. Particular mention should be made of the care and energy with which Richard Haas, Esq., unearthed fugitive and stray materials, particularly 40, 50 and 60 years old.

Respectfully submitted,
HAROLD LEVENTHAL, *Counsel*

March 3, 1955

APPENDIX C

MEMORANDUM

To: Stephen A. Mitchell, Chairman; Senator Hubert H. Humphrey and Honorable John S. Battle, Vice Chairmen, Advisory Committee on 1956 Democratic National Convention Rules and Procedures.

From: Harold Leventhal, Counsel.

Subject: Background Material Relating to Responsibility of State Party Participating in National Convention; Eligibility and Responsibility of Delegates to National Convention and of Presidential Electors.

A. Introduction

This is a memorandum to set forth certain background concerning state laws and state party regulations and practices which may be useful to the Committee in consideration of the subject of the so-called and miscalled "loyalty oath" which arose during the 1952 Democratic National Convention.

This memorandum is prepared for purposes of transmittal to the members of the Advisory Committee and it therefore does not set forth the details of our researches.

In general we have tried to focus our attention on three principal subjects:

(a) In general, who are the members of the Democratic Party in the state who are entitled to participate in the decisions of the state party?

(b) What special problems or features are involved in the selection of the men and women to the party office of delegates to the National Convention?

(c) What special problems or features are involved in the selection and functions of the party's candidates for the position of Presidential elector?

We have had reference to various materials. First, there are formal materials, such as state laws. Second, are materials and memoranda previously prepared on certain phases of these subjects by the Secretary of the Senate, the Library of Congress and the American Political Science Association.

Special mention should be made of the materials in letters addressed to you by State Attorney Generals, and other informed persons in each state. For convenience, there is set forth in the Appendix a copy of your letter of inquiry to these persons. We have had responses from a substantial majority of the states. (Certain Republican Attorney Generals did indicate that they could not provide the information requested; yet even among the Republican officials, more cooperated than not.) In general an earnest effort was made to supply us the material.

The writer desires at this juncture to express his appreciation to the members of the staff who assisted in the appraisal of this material, Dr. Abraham Holtzman, Gillis Long, Associate Counsel, and Robert Bock.

There may be errors or alleged errors in the material—due to mistakes, or possibly due to differences of interpretation or to changes, this subject being in a state of flux. For such errors we beg the indulgence of members from the states involved. We have confidence, however, that the general picture is portrayed with general accuracy.

B. Membership in the Party

The first line of inquiry is who is a member of a party, specifically the Democratic Party? Who is entitled to participate in its affairs?

Some general preliminary observations may be helpful. A political party is in its essence based upon the constitutional rights of citizens embraced in the freedoms of assembly, freedom of speech and press. Citizens are accordingly free to organize themselves, and to engage in political discussion of men and measures, so as to impress their views upon the electorate. See Bowe v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 251–3, 69 N.E. 2d 115, 130–1 (1946).

The members of a party have a corresponding right to determine and to control its membership, if for no other reason than to protect the party against "raiding," against the conduct of those who spuriously profess to be members of the party and intervene in its affairs solely to embarrass or destroy the party.

The foundation and justification for statutes and regulations prescribing tests of party membership is clear. To quote from one writer in the field: "* * * the general right to prescribe tests that will presumably protect the party against those who have no genuine interest in its welfare has been thoroughly recognized in numerous judicial decisions, the underlying basis of which was well stated in this striking sentence: 'A man has a constitutional right not to be a partisan, but he has no constitutional right as a non-partisan to participate in partisan proceedings'."[5]

These general observations are not lessened in validity in any way by the fact that certain parties have been held subject to Constitutional limitations and prohibitions in regard to efforts to limit membership to white persons. *Smith* v. *Allwright*, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (Convention Resolution of Democratic Party of Texas); *Terry* v. *Adams*, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (Jaybird Democratic Association); *Baskin* v. *Brown*, 174 F. 2d 391 (C.A. 4th Cir.) (Democratic Clubs of South Carolina).

Those courts rejected the contention that the state parties were purely voluntary organizations, like golf clubs, of persons entitled under the Constitution to determine in their absolute discretion their own membership and state their political beliefs. The courts in effect held that where a state party has such broad authority—including virtually the determination of the nominees appearing on the general ballot—it partakes of the character of an agency of the state government where violation of Constitutional rights is involved.

However, there is obviously no constitutional problem in excluding a person from party membership on the ground that his political actions in the past, opinions in the present, or proposals for the future, are contrary to the views held by others in the party. That is a familiar and sound limitation on a man's freedom of political association.

The concrete significance of party membership depends upon the state involved. Party membership may be a requirement to participation in caucuses, election of political committees, signing nominating petitions, voting in primaries, eligibility as party's nominee for office, etc.

Open Primaries. Before discussing the party membership, it should be recognized at the outset that in the few states where the "open primary" system prevails such tests are nonexistent in determining eligibility for the important task of selecting the party nominees for office.

Thus Mr. Don Eastvold, Attorney General (Republican) of Washington writes us: "We have what is known as the blanket primary, and it, frankly, has deteriorated party responsibility substantially."

The blanket ballot carries the "secret ballot" attributes of an open primary to its logical extreme. Instead of receiving a sheaf of primary ballots, and marking one of them, all voters receive the same blanket ballot, with the names of all proposed nominees of both parties.

It should be noted that Washington has a blanket primary, but it is a state convention which chooses delegates to the National Convention. The State of Wisconsin chooses delegates to the National Convention in a preferential Presidential primary which is conducted as an open primary.

Range of Party Tests. Where there are party "tests," they may consist solely of a simple declaration of party affiliation ("present affiliation"), or may include more elaborate oaths or declarations of past votes or actions ("past allegiance" tests), or intentions as to voting in the future ("future intention" tests). Or there may be combinations of two or more tests.

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[5] Berdahl, "Party Membership in the United States," 36 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. (Feb.–April 1942).

The state statutes may provide simply for presenting objections at the primary election to a person's avowed status. Many states have party registration or enrollment, and this provides a means for testing party regularity and guarding against raiding.

Present Affiliation and Party Enrollment. A large group of states have, in effect, a party test of present declaration or oath of party affiliation—either at the primary election polls, or at an advance registration or enrollment. In some states both methods are used—advance registration in large communities (in Nebraska, cities of over 7,000), and simple declaration at the primary in the smaller communities.

In some states, indeed, the declaration is apparently implied from the person's action in asking for the ballot of a particular party, e.g., North Dakota, Vermont. The response from a political leader in Vermont states the opinion that this procedure is virtually an open primary since no record is kept of the ballot demanded. It is reported,[6] however, that in 1952 many Minnesota voters were outraged to learn that the new Presidential primary, unlike the regular primary, was not an open primary and they were required to specify the ballot desired; particularly in smaller communities many voters declined to vote in the primary.

A more commonplace situation is the declaration of party enrollment which is permissible, but not compulsory, in conjunction with registration. Examples at random are Louisiana, Maryland, Wyoming, etc. (We may for present purposes omit non-party registration, as e.g., in Rhode Island, where the Permanent Registration Act does not make provision for registration of party preference.)

Party enrollment does amount to more than a mere declaration of present status. First, the requirement of advance registration automatically ensures at least a short period of party identification in advance of the primary. Second, the formal party registration is considered, and by some writers even objected to, as constituting for most voters a "much more solemn and binding method than that of mere verbal declaration at the polls."[7]

Thus certain states which have no time period, or only a short one, as a prerequisite for participation in a primary for persons registering originally, prescribe a six-month waiting period for any one changing his party affiliation.

This is provided, e.g., in Louisiana, Maine, and Maryland (general provisions for counties other than three specified, populous counties).

In contrast, under Texas law which establishes a "present affiliation" test without party registration, the statute expressly provides that a person may not be a participating member of more than one party *on the same day.*

Party enrollment under declaration of present affiliation may be used as a general test, but subject to requirement of more specific oath upon challenge (as in Florida and Maine, discussed below).

But in other states, such as California and Maryland, the enrollment of party affiliations is the only test provided by law. In California, indeed, a court opinion declares that registration is the "best and only test of party affiliation." *Heney* v. *Jordan,* 179 Cal. 24, 175 Pac. 402.

Tests of Past Allegiance and/or Future Intention—State Statutes. As already indicated there is a variety of tests of "past allegiance," "future intention," and combinations thereof, including combinations together with declarations of present affiliation.

First we refer to the tests specified in state legislation. The following is a sample of the statutes:

(a) *Pledge on Primary Ballot.* Various state statutes contain a pledge at the bottom of the primary election ballot, whereby the voter will, in the words of the Alabama law, "pledge myself to abide by the results of the primary election and to aid and support all the nominees thereof in the ensuing general election." Similar pledges are contained in the statutes of, e.g., Louisiana, Texas ("Pledge myself to support the nominee of this primary").

The same pledges, when required of candidates for nomination, amount of course to an agreement to abide by the primary.

(b) *Declaration Upon Party Enrollment.* In New York, the person enrolls with a party, at the time of registration or upon application to the Board of Election. In cities requiring annual personal registration, the voter must enroll anew each time he registers. The enrollment blank contains the declaration that "I am in general sympathy with the principle of the party . . . and that it is my intention to support generally at the next election, state or national, the nominees of such Party for state, or national offices."

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[6] See "Minnesota" chapter, *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952,* prepared by David, Moos, & Goldman (prepared under the auspices of The American Political Science Association, with the cooperation of the Brookings Institution).

[7] Berdahl, cited above.

(c) *Oaths Required in Event of Challenge.* In various states the statute specifies oaths, or declarations, which must be taken or made in the event of challenge of the right to participate in the primary.

In some states the party enrollment by declaration at time of registration is sufficient for eligibility to vote in the primary unless the vote is challenged, in which event he must take the statutory oath (e.g., Florida, Maine).

The oaths, affirmations and declarations required by state law of voters who are challenged at the primary election include the following:

FLORIDA—Oath that at the last preceding general election, if he voted, he voted for a majority of the nominees of the party.

KENTUCKY—Voter swears to support the principles of the party and vote for its nominees at coming regular election, that he was affiliated with such party, and that he supported its nominees at last regular election.

MAINE—Oath that he intends to vote for the candidates of the party at the next election and that he has not taken part in the caucus of any other political party within the past six months.

MISSOURI—Voter must either be known to affiliate with the political party or must "obligate himself to support the nominees of said party at the following election."

MONTANA—Oath that he has been and is identified with the party and it is his intention to act with the party, and identify self with party at ensuing election.

OHIO—Voter claims membership and affiliation with party and if challenged swears that he voted for a majority of the candidates of the party at the next preceding regular state election at which he voted, or that he has not voted at a previous regular state election.

OKLAHOMA—Statute provides that a voter challenged at a primary election must swear "that he is a member of, and does affiliate with the political party" involved. A 1922 opinion of the Attorney General rules that an elector may be required to take oath that he does "now in good faith intend to support the principles of that party and the candidate nominated by it at the primaries now being held." (Apparently, however, the challenge goes to basic good faith, as when the voter is notoriously a member of another party. Other opinions of the Attorney General rule that an elector registered as a Democrat is not disqualified from voting in the Democratic primary although he intends to vote for a Republican in general election, or intends to vote for non-partisan candidate in general city election.)

VIRGINIA—Upon challenge, voter in primary must declare that he supported the nominees of the party in the last general election in which he participated. If he never voted before, that he will support such nominees in the next ensuing election. (NOTE: Brookings Institution study, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, reveals that Attorney General of Virginia has repeatedly held that presidential electors are not considered nominees, for purposes of related party regulation.)

Tests of Past Allegiance and/or Future Intention—State Party Regulations. In addition to the tests provided by state laws, there are tests provided by state party regulations or resolutions. The following are illustrative:

ALABAMA—In addition to the pledge required by state law, set forth above, the state committee included in 1952 an additional pledge in the spring primary "to aid and support the nominee of the National Convention of the Democratic Party for President and Vice President of the United States." A similar pledge was required of all candidates and was upheld by the Supreme Court, as to candidates for Presidential elector, in *Ray* v. *Blair*, *72* Sup. Ct. 654 (1952).

ARKANSAS—Party regulations deny right to vote in Democratic primary election to any one who (a) has not openly declared his allegiance to the principle of the Democratic Party, etc., (b) has at the last preceding general election voted against any Democratic nominee, or voted for or espoused the cause of any candidate for office who was not a Democratic nominee, (c) will not pledge himself to vote for and support at the ensuing general election the candidate of the Democratic Party for all offices nominated in the Democratic primary election in which he is voting.

GEORGIA—To vote in Democratic primary, voter must pledge to support in general election all candidates nominated by Democratic Party of Georgia in primary or in any run-off.

C. Delegates to National Convention

Mode of Selection. The Democratic Manual for the 1952 Democratic National Convention prepared by Clarence Cannon notes (p. 17) that delegates to the National Convention are selected, pursuant to statute or custom: (a)

By primary—in 14 states and the District of Columbia; (b) By State Convention—in 34 states and territories; (c) By State Committee —in 5 states.

Eligibility and Requirements. In general, the state statutes and party regulations do not prescribe any tests or requirements for delegates to the National Convention other than those applicable to persons voting in the primary, already discussed above.

In addition, of course, men and women are not likely to emerge as convention delegates by action of the Committee or convention unless they are proven, loyal party workers, and not passive voters.

In states using the primary system, there may be an additional candidate's pledge to vote for the nominees of the Party, a pledge which generally specifies the obligation to abide by the results of the primary.

There are some special requirements for Convention delegates. In Florida (a primary state) delegates to the Convention must not only declare that they voted for a majority of the nominees of the party in the last general election (as all members of the Party must be prepared to swear), but in addition they must, like all candidates for nomination to office, pledge themselves to vote for a majority of the nominees of the party at the next general election.

In South Dakota (a primary state) the declaration of candidate which would govern the Convention delegate is a declaration that the candidate "intends to vote the ticket of that party at the primary election * * * and at the general election in November, and agree to abide by the results of the primary election in regard to any candidacy."

There are a few states where the delegates to the Convention are expressly pledged to support the nominees of the National Convention:

ALABAMA—Pledge required by Democratic State Committee of all candidates for office, including Convention delegates. (Discussed above.)

MINNESOTA AND WISCONSIN—By statute, every candidate for delegate to National Convention must file affidavit that he is affiliated with the political party whose nomination he seeks, and that he intends to vote at the ensuing election for the nominee for president of that political party.

Good Faith Participation in Convention. There is a basic understanding of good faith regarding the participation by a delegate in the affairs of a convention. The most noted ruling on this point appears in Cannon's Democratic Manual, 1952, p. 33, as follows:

"A delegate announcing he would not abide by the decision of the Convention was held not entitled to participate in its deliberations (1864-33)."

In the 1864 Convention, a Maryland delegate protested against the candidacy of General McClellan if the latter was chosen the nominee for the Presidency by the Democratic National Committee. An objection was raised that if a delegate publicly declared he would not vote for the convention's nominee, he was not fit to be a member of the Convention.

The Chairman ruled: "... those who will not submit to the decision of the convention have no right to take part in its proceedings."[8]

This memorandum does not consider any part of the question as to the extent to which delegates are bound at the National Convention, by previous pledges, preferences and commitments, to support particular nominees. There are different degrees to which a delegate may feel bound to support the winner of a Presidential primary, etc. But such "commitment" of course does not survive the life of the Convention.

D. *Presidential Electors*

Mode of Selection. In the majority of states, candidates for Presidential electors are selected at state conventions. For the most part these are conventions held prior to the National Convention, and indeed may select both delegates to the National Convention and the names of the Presidential electors at the same time. In some states, however, these state conventions are held after the national convention (e.g., Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Vermont). And in some states procedures have been established to permit modifying action by the state convention upon the completion of the national convention (e.g., Virginia, Texas).

The primary method and selections by state committees are the method used in most of the other states for designation of candidates for Presidential electors.

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[8] At the meeting of the Credentials Committee of the Democratic National Convention on July 22, 1952, Mr. Pyle of Mississippi referred to the following precedent as adopted in 1848. (Tr. p. 22): "The Credentials Committee adopted a resolution that it would not proceed to the investigation of the claims of the contesting delegations from the State of New York to a seat in the convention until the respective claimants would agree that they would abide by the decisions of the convention and support its nominees; whether the decision of the convention be in favor or against the claims of such claimants. And the Utica and Herkimer delegates, as they are called, having refused to enter into such agreement, the Committee agrees that the other delegates are entitled to seats in the convention."

In Pennsylvania the law provides that the presidential nominee of each party shall nominate the candidates for Presidential elector.

In Virginia by 1948 statute if the state convention instructs the candidates to vote in the Electoral College for someone other than the nominees of the national convention, a national representative of the party may certify the electors of that party. However, it is not entirely clear how the Virginia statute could or would operate. First there is the problem as to who is duly authorized to act as a National representative of the party.[9] Moreover the certification of alternate candidates must be made 60 days before the national election. But suppose the state convention rejects the nominee of the national convention only 60 days before the national election? Or even 65 days—taking into account the practical time problems in finding candidates with necessary technical qualifications.

Responsibility of State Party in Choice of Electors. The basic framework concerning the selection of electors is a good faith assumption that a state party affiliated with a national party will choose electors who will vote for the nominees of the national convention. Apart from the few statutes which purport to assure expressly that the electors will vote for the nominees of the national convention, the assurance in fact is obtained by the workings of the state party.

Where electors are selected by Convention or Committee, trustworthy men are presumably chosen. The position is often a prerequisite of mark of honor. And even in the handful of states when electors are selected in primaries, the responses to our inquiries reveal that it is generally the state committee which determines by its influence what names will be placed on the ballot.

Moral Commitment of Electors. As a matter of theory electors have discretion to vote for the person of their choice. This legal power would probably remain in effect regardless of any pledges given by the elector involved. But under the party system it would be a gross breach of political morality for electors to vote for any candidate other than the candidate obviously intended by the voting public. The party system remains a matter of practice and good faith.

The extent to which party practice is in fact the governing determination today is indicated by the fact that in half the states the electors are not even on the ballot, and the ballot contains only presidential and vice presidential nominees. In most of the remaining states, the ballot contains the names of both the nominees and the electors. Only in a few states does the ballot contain merely the names of the electors.

Statutory Declaration or Commitment. We have found only a handful of states which have any special requirement or commitment demanded of candidates for presidential elector. It appears that pledges, statutory declarations are used to reenforce the moral ties which bind the elector to vote for the party nominees, in Alabama, California, Florida, Mississippi, Oregon, Virginia and South Dakota.

There is a recognition of the elector's moral obligation in the laws of Massachusetts, New Jersey and New York, although no specific pledges are provided.

Validity of Pledge Required of Electors. There has been a Supreme Court adjudication concerning the resolution adopted by the State Democratic Executive Committee of Alabama, on January 26, 1952, requiring candidates in its primary to sign a pledge, printed on the primary ballot, reading as follows: "By casting this ballot I do pledge myself to abide by the result of this Primary Election and to aid and support all the nominees thereof in the ensuing General Elections. I do further pledge myself to aid and support the nominees of the National Convention of the Democratic Party for President and Vice President of the United States."

In *Ray* v. *Blair*, 343, U.S. 214, 72 Sup. Ct. 654 (1952), reversing the Supreme Court of Alabama's decision reported in 57 So. (2d) 826, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Reed, held: (a) It was proper for the state party to attempt to determine in advance that its electors would vote for the nominees of the national party convention to which the state party sent delegates. (b) A state political party, "affiliated with a national party through acceptance of the national call to send state delegates to the national convention, (may decline) to accept persons as candidates who refuse to agree to abide by the party's requirement." (72 Sup. Ct. at 659.) (c) The commitment demanded of the electors in no way violated the spirit of the Twelfth

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[9] Obviously the Chairman of the National Committee should have that position, but his office is not expressly stated, and if the state officials should demand proof of express authority from the National Committee—or worse, from the Convention—the statute could be made inoperative in fact.

Amendment to the Constitution, which provides the electoral system.

Substitutions by State Committee. Suppose one or more electoral candidates chosen at the state convention announced that he would not vote for nominees of the Democratic National Convention. It has been suggested that his name could be removed, for cause, and replaced by a substitute selected by a state executive committee which has the power of the convention during the interim between conventions. There is a possible analogy in *Browne* v. *Martin*, 19 So. 2d 421 (upholding action of Louisiana Committee in rescinding persons named by committee as delegates to the National Convention of 1944 when they refused to take the pledge, required by the committee, to support President Roosevelt). But when the candidate's announcement comes too late to permit of a substitution within the statutory period, there is probably no recourse except upon the basis of honor, to request that the individual resign and permit the operation of replacement methods provided by statute.

E. Role of State Party Organization

The great diversity of state statutes, rules, and practices make[s] it difficult to establish a clear chain of links between the delegate to the national convention and the candidate for presidential elector. They are often chosen in different ways.

The most valid generalization and observation is a quite simple one: It is the State Party which (a) chooses delegates to the national convention, (b) selects candidates for the position of elector, and (c) takes responsibility for the victory of these electoral candidates.

Generally speaking, the State Convention is considered to be the highest voice of a State political party. See *Nixon* v. *Condon*, 206 U.S. 73, 84 (1932).

But the matter is one of state law. The term "State Party" may refer to a convention, a committee, or a primary system, or some combination of these.

Some state statutes define a state party in terms of the assemblage of voters which cast a minimum percentage of votes at the last election.

The role of the state party is particularly significant in regard to matters of procedure. In one state after another, matters of party procedure are left by the legislatures for handling by the state party. In turn these are largely resolved in terms of "custom," although specific rules are also developed. Even where state enactments are relatively detailed, the area committed to the state party is substantial.

The discretion of the state party, and typically of the state committee, embraces at a minimum such matters as the time and place of state conventions, which seem like details but may be crucial. In some states the statutes permit the state committee to determine whether the delegates to the National Convention shall be chosen by state convention or by primary.

A number of statutes expressly set forth the broad discretion conferred upon the parties in the management of their affairs. In other states the discretion is implied from the original breadth of discretion and the fact that state legislation does not cover the entire field of political problems. In any event a broad expanse of the matters is left to the state parties.

The state committee is an administrative entity for the state party. Between conventions it is the state committee which acts as the voice and in effect the legal representative of the state party. Certainly, the state committee is a channel of communication to the state party; i.e., notice can be sent to a state party through its state committee even as to a matter to be acted upon in a state convention. And frequently the state committee is not merely an administrative mechanism, holding operation, or channel of communication, but is also an institution of influence even where actions are taken in the primaries or by conventions.

The state statutes generally provide detailed instructions for the selection of state central or executive committees. They may be selected by the convention. Or they may be chosen in direct primary election, with say two members chosen from each state senatorial district. Or they may be the apex of a pyramid whose base is the ward or precinct committee elected in public meeting. These committees elect the next higher layer, until the state committee level is reached.

In any event the state committee serves as a channel of communications in carrying out the responsibilities of the state party in regard to those matters where the state party is not acting by and for itself, but as a part of a national party.

F. Participation by State Party in National Convention

The Federal system assigns a place to the State Governments in their own sovereignty except as to "national" affairs where the sovereignty of the states yields to the sovereignty of the national government.

Political parties are also marked by a Federal system. In many respects the state party is sovereign and independent. But particularly in regard to national conventions and Presidential candidates, it is clear that the state party is not acting by and for itself, but as a part of a national party and, linked with all other state parties, in a national effort.

As the Supreme Court said, in *Ray* v. *Blair*, 72 Sup. Ct. 654, 659: "a state political party (is) affiliated with a national party through acceptance of the national call to send state delegates to the national convention. . . . "

The Court cited with approval an excerpt from *Ray* v. *Garner*, 57 Sc. 2d 824, 826: "Primarily, the pledge must be germane to party membership and party elections and, while the last clause of the pledge pertains to the national party, *the party in Alabama will be a part of it by sending delegates to participate in the national convention, the Executive Committee having ordered their election and the party thereby having signified its intention to become a member of the national party.* Therefore, it was within the competency of the Committee to adopt the resolution so binding the voters in the primary." 57 So. 2d 826. (Emphasis added.)

The Supreme Court noted that such a holding integrates the state and national party. The Court also noted with approval Cannon's Democratic Manual, including passages stating that the National Committee is the permanent agency authorized to act for the party between conventions as a creature of the National Convention and subordinate to its control and direction, that it has the duty and power to provide for the National Convention, involving: Authorization of call and determination within authority granted by the last National Convention of representation from States, Territories and Districts.

Reference may also be made to the following language from the *Opinion of the Justices:* "No one elected at the General Election as an elector could function unless he belonged to some political party which had held a National Convention and had a nominee for that office." 34 So. 2d 598.

G. National Committeeman

The subject of "loyalty" raises the question of the National Committeeman who advocates the election of the opposition candidate, or for that matter fails to support the nominees of the Convention. It is clear that the national committeeman, although in one sense a representative of the party in his state, is at the same time a member of a national organization just as is a member of the United States Senate. The national committeeman is accordingly subject to removal for such actions. For convenience, this question has been made the subject of a separate memorandum.

Respectfully submitted,
Harold Leventhal, *Counsel*

APPENDIX

Copy of the Inquiry made by Stephen A. Mitchell, Chairman of the Advisory Committee, of Advisory Committee members, of State Attorney Generals, and other informed persons.

Dear——————

It would be very much appreciated if you could inform us, at your earliest convenience, as to the legal requirements in your State applicable to the following:

(1) What the *qualifications* are for: (a) membership in the Democratic and Republican Parties; (b) for delegates to the Democratic and Republican National Conventions; (c) for candidates for the positions of Presidential electors.

(2) How Party delegates to the National Conventions and nominees for the positions of Presidential electors are or may be selected—by primary; convention; designation by State Committee; petition, etc.

(3) What certifications or legal requirements are involved in securing a designation on the ballot that the nominees for elector would, if elected, be the electors for the Presidential nominees for the respective Democratic or Republican National Conventions?

Is there provision that this be shown on the ballot by (a) listing the names of the Convention's nominees; (b) using the words "Democratic Party" or "Republican Party"; (c) using the emblem of the Democratic Party or Republican Party?

If the State law requires any pledge or commitment of these nominees, please advise us accordingly.

We should very much appreciate your reference to the statutory provision and court decisions in your State which concern this matter.

With many thanks for your kind cooperation.

Yours sincerely,
Stephen A. Mitchell

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FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
University of Maryland

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

The Origins of the British Labour Party. By J. H. Stewart Reid. (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press. 1955. Pp. 258. $4.50.)

The rise of the Labor party is one of the most fascinating chapters of English political history. Within barely a quarter of a century the new party replaced the Liberals as one of the two major parties. Two more decades and the original home of political and economic liberalism became the classical example of the welfare state, now in its major premises accepted by the majority of the nation.

Professor Reid gives the account of the formative period of the party between 1900 and 1918. Though the story has often been told in greater detail. two things come out especially well in Reid's book: the essentially moderate and constructive policy of the parliamentary group between 1906 and 1914, and the seeds of the discords which were to split Labor in the twenties and thirties. From its beginning the Labor party contained people for whom laborism was but a "left" extension of liberalism, and the more dogmatic socialists searching for a new social organization. The book documents once again the heightened interest in political and social radicalism which gripped English society as Great Britain's economic dynamism began to slow down in the 1880's. Some form of powerful social reform movement was clearly in the offing; it was a matter of fortuitous circumstances, of the destruction of the premises of European liberalism in World War I, that its main representative was to become the socialism of labor rather than a reformed and semi-socialist Liberal party.

But the rise of a party is only a fragment of the larger problem of the tremendous transformation of English politics and society during the past 50 years. Why was doctrinal Marxism of such little attraction to the British Labor movement whose "moderation" has often been overstressed? Why did Liberalism before World War I fail to identify itself more closely with the aspirations and postulates of the working classes? And finally, how has Conservatism, still stamped with the aristocratic principle and permeated by big business, managed to preserve its preeminent position in the country which has the highest proportion of industrial workers among its population? To answer such questions was not within the purport of Mr. Reid's book; that he hints at the answers enhances the value of his contribution.

What the reviewer misses is a more penetrating analysis of the various ideological components which entered into the Labor movement at its inception. The history of the movement cannot be simply resolved into the dichotomy of "moderation" and "extremism," or reforming pragmatism versus doctrinairism. In English socialism are found the echoes of the anti-industrialism of some of the Chartists, alongside of what is practically a socialist version of Utilitarianism in the early Fabians. What is most amazing, and to a social scientist most instructive, is how a wide variety of very often discordant ideologies and political impulses have coalesced into a single and effective political party. It is in the character and interaction of the various ideological ingredients of English socialism, rather than in a temporary though often symptomatic disagreement over a personality or a policy, that lies the main key to the future of Labor.—Adam B. Ulam, *Harvard University.*

The Philippine Answer to Communism. By Alvin H. Scaff. (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press. 1955. Pp. ix, 165. $4.00.)

In this book Professor Scaff presents a clear and readable explanation of the origin, development, and magnitude of the Hukbalahap revolution in the Philippines. He also gives a vivid description of an important part of the program which has been evolved by the Philippine Government to cope with the situation.

In tracing the development of the Huk movement, Professor Scaff provides information which makes possible a better understanding of occurrences and attitudes. He shows, with concrete evidence, that the Huks are not merely harmless agrarian reformers, or not even just the dislocated and disappointed remnants of guerrilla fighting forces which fought the Japanese. It is pointed out, for instance, that during World War II, while the

Huks as a guerrilla fighting force killed some 5,000 Japanese, they also liquidated some 25,000 Filipinos who were considered obstructionists to the Communist-inspired and Communist-led Huk movement. The report on the Huk leaders and on their ideas is also revealing.

The book contains a first-hand and well-documented description of that part of President Ramon Magsaysay's program which is designed to cope with the immediate problem of the Huk revolution. Involved in this part of the program is a recognition of the demand of the Huks for "Land for the landless," and the resettlement on public lands of former Huks who were willing to stop fighting. Those Huks who have continued to resist are relentlessly pursued by the army; the resettlement program is carried out in part by the army's Economic Development Corps.

While Professor Scaff has made a real contribution in portraying so well what has probably been the most successful specific approach to the problem of a Communist revolution, it is somewhat disappointing that he did not take a broader view of the whole situation and indicate how the various parts of a much larger program than the one which he described are interrelated. Such an approach would view at least the postwar Huk movement as one of the results of an underdeveloped economy, a semi-feudal economic system, and underdeveloped government services. Relatively little reference is made to these basic problems; and even less to the overall economic development program which is being fostered by the Magsaysay administration. Likewise, little attention has been given to the tremendous impact of the United States Government's foreign assistance program on the economic, social, and political developments which are now in progress in the Philippines. Significant developments are now taking place in specific fields such as agriculture, education, public health and sanitation, public administration, and industry.

Even though the resettlement program of the army's Economic Development Corps, the program the author singles out as the Philippine answer to communism, is the program that is concerned most directly with a large share of the Huk problem, it could nevertheless be pointed out that the success of this program has been dependent to a considerable extent on various parts of the larger program. For example, the Public Administration Division (and contractors in this field) of International Cooperation Administration has provided technical assistance to the Philippine Bureau of Lands on organizational and procedural problems to the extent that the latter agency has been able to increase very materially the number of land patents issued each month. The enlarged activity on the part of the Bureau of Lands was necessary for the success of the resettlement program. Reference could be made to numerous other parts of a large program which is designed to destroy the conditions under which communism grows and to develop the conditions which are conducive to higher standards of living, stable economies, and to democratic and efficient governments. It is recognized, however, that the author was concerned with a particular aspect of the total problem, and we are all indebted to him for a highly informative contribution.—Leo C. Riethmayer, *University of Colorado.*

Dos Estudios sobre la Usucapión en Derecho Administrativo. By Eduardo García de Enterria. (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos. 1955. Pp. 203.)

In these two essays, the author uses an historical approach in explaining the meaning and significance of contemporary doctrines of administrative law in Spain. His particular interest is the question of alienation of the public domain, and he analyzes in detail the origins of the practice of limiting concessions to private citizens for a period not to exceed 99 years. Such a time limit, he shows, is necessary to protect the state against the claim of "immemorial possession," according to which possession for more than 100 years is presumed to be based on legitimate title, even without documentary proof. One of the most interesting points made by the author is that the subjects of the Spanish monarch did not want the latter to sign away income producing parts of his personal realm, since this made necessary levying taxes on their properties. However, the author, active in the affairs of the present-day Spanish Council of State, rejects the pretension of some of the absolute inalienability of the public domain, arguing that such a doctrine is not necessary since by definitive practice the public lands and possessions are not accessible to private parties.—Felix Nigro, *Central America Public Administration School* (San José).

World Commerce and Governments: Trends and Outlook. By W. S. Woytinsky and E. S.

WOYTINSKY. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 1955. Pp. lii, 907, $10.00.)

This vast compendium of information is a companion to *World Population and Resources*, by the same authors. Together they complete a major project "jointly financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, through a grant administered by the Johns Hopkins University, and the [Twentieth Century] Fund." This volume is in three parts, "Trade," "Transportation," and "Governments." The part on governments (pp. 561–861, 879–88) contains much statistical and descriptive material, compactly presented, in six divisions: Nations and Governments (number, size, age of states, types of governments, etc.), Elections and Parliaments, Colonial Empires, Government Expenditures and Revenues, Public Debts, and International Cooperation (international organizations, U. S. foreign aid, European integration).

Bibliographie, livres, brochures, articles de revues concernant la nationalisation, catalogués à la Bibliothèque Centrale du Ministère des Affaires Économiques (Fonds Quetelet) à la date du 1er août 1955. 2e éd. (Bruxelles: 1955. Pp. 56.)

The bibliography of nationalization is arranged alphabetically by countries, includes mainly material since the Second World War in English, French, German, and Dutch, and is apparently based on the very useful monthly list of accessions of that library.—J.B.C.

Commentary on the Constitution of India. BY DURGA DAS BASU. (Calcutta: S. C. Sarkar and Sons, Ltd. 3rd ed. 2 vols. 1955. Pp. lvi, 875. Rs. 15.)

India's lengthy and complex Constitution, already several times amended, insures the frequent appearance of—and need for—volumes of this kind. Here is commentary on every article of the Indian Constitution, frequent comparison with similar articles in other constitutions, reference to Indian legal actions arising under almost every article, reference to comparable legal actions in other countries, and extensive discussion of the first four Constitution Amendment Acts.

Land Tenure Legislation in Uttar Pradesh. BY FRANK J. MOORE AND CONSTANCE A. FREYDIG. (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California. 1955. Pp. iii, 124. $1.00.)

Technical, brief, and very useful monograph by an economist and a political scientist about the policies and problems affecting land reform in one of the major provinces of India.

Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization. EDITED BY GUSTAVE E. VON GRUNEBAUM. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1955. Pp. xii, 385, $6.00.)

A collection of 16 papers presented at the International Conference of Islamists at Spa, Belgium, in 1953, surveying and evaluating the important relations between the universal Muslim culture pattern and the diverse local traditions of Islamic countries.

The Republic of Indonesia. BY DOROTHY WOODMAN. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1955. Pp. ix, 444. $6.00.)

A general description of the islands, their people and culture; a discussion of the struggle for independence; and a fairly detailed look at the policies and the problems of the Republic since 1950.

The Impact of the West on Government in Thailand. BY WALTER F. VELLA. (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press. 1955. Pp. i–vi, 317–410. $1.50.)

A short study of the government of Thailand through 1952, with emphasis on the developments of the last century as a result of Western advisers, Western education, and Western pressures.

Comparative Platforms of Japan's Major Parties. TRANSLATED AND ARRANGED BY CECIL H. UYEHARA, MICHIO AND SHIMAKO ROYAMA, AND SHIJURO OGATA. (Medford, Mass.: The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. 1955. Pp. v, 65.)

By excerpting from recent platforms and official statements the authors present a handy comparison of the positions of the two major Japanese parties (Social Democratic and Liberal Democratic) on a variety of issues, ranging from foreign affairs through domestic problems to intra-party organization and discipline.

Australia: A Social and Political History. EDITED BY GORDON GREENWOOD. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1955. Pp. xii, 445. $7.50.)

Originally projected for the 1951 Jubilee Celebrations, this social and political history by six Australian historians traces the development of that nation from 1788 to 1950.

A useful synthesis, but without striking interpretation.

University Representation in England, 1604–1690. By Millicent Barton Rex. (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc. 1954. Pp. 408. $7.50.)

The first full-scale effort to deal with this almost unique system of representation, Miss Rex's detailed and scholarly study describes the introduction of the university representatives and follows their history through the 17th century. She treats her subjects as members of Parliament and not merely as representatives of universities and the result is a portrayal of parliamentary life and development under the Stuarts, written from the fresh viewpoint of a special group of MP's. Other volumes are promised to bring the account down to the abandonment of the scheme in 1948.

Questions in the House. The History of a Unique British Institution. By Patrick Howarth. (London: The Bodley Head. 1956. Pp. 220. 18s.)

Deals with the problem from the first question of which there is record asked in the House of Commons in 1721 to 1881, when questions were regularly made according to prescribed rules and at definite times. The author speaks from the point of view of a number of years spent in the Civil Service.—J.B.C.

The British General Election of 1955. By D. E. Butler. (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd.; New York: St. Martin's Press. 1955. Pp. 236. $5.00.)

Mr. Butler and his colleagues of Nuffield College, Oxford, have produced a new volume in what has become a regular series on the general elections. This comprehensive and objective study is quite up to the standard set by its predecessors and should be similarly welcomed. The author examines in detail the candidates and their addresses, the national party campaigns, and the role of press and radio in the election. Of special interest are the summaries of the struggle in three selected constituencies, one in London, one in the Lancashire cotton district, and one in the rural south. Finally, there is a comprehensive analysis of the election results which employs the methods worked out in Mr. Butler's earlier study of the electoral system.

Britain and the British People. By Sir Ernest Barker. (London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1955. Pp. xii, 186. $2.00.)

An enlarged and up-to-date revision of a small volume first issued in 1942. The author describes in brief compass certain important elements of the British social scene: chapters are included on law, government, church, education, social welfare, etc., each delightfully interpreted by England's leading political scientist.

Rural Roads and Local Government. By The Royal Commission on Agriculture and Rural Life. (Regina, Saskatchewan: Queen's Printer. 1955. Pp. xix, 320. $1.00.)

The fourth of a series of reports submitted by the royal commission established in 1952 by the government of Saskatchewan.

The Liberian Year Book, 1956. Compiled and Edited by Henry B. Cole. (London: Diplomatic Press and Publishing Co. 1956. Pp. 312.)

For the first time there is readily available in one place rather detailed information about the government of Liberia, with a directory of Liberian diplomatic and consular representation abroad and of foreign diplomatic and consular representation in Liberia. A table of the 1955 election returns is included. There is a section on the presidents of Liberia and the principal events under each. A biographical section of about 100 sketches includes members of Congress and principal officials.—J.B.C.

Sammlung von Gesetzen für den Staats- und Gemeindedienst. 2. erweiterte Auflage. By the Ministerium des Innern of the Saar. (Saarbrücken: Saarländische Verlagsanstalt und Druckerei G.m.b.H. [1955]. Pp. 176.)

The compilation includes the official German text of the Constitution of the Saar, the general law on the administration of the state, the laws governing the organization of the Gemeinde and Kreise, their fiscal relationships to the state, and the operations of business activities.—J.B.C.

Führer durch das Saarländische Recht, 1945–1955, nach dem Stande vom 30.6.1955, mit Gesetzesregister. By Alexander Bender. (Saarbrücken: Gesellschaft für berufsbildendes Schrifttum m.b.H. 1 vol., loose-leaf. [1955].)

In a jurisdiction such as the Saar, it is often extremely difficult to know what laws, decrees, and regulations are in force. This work, prepared by a librarian at the Landgericht, Saarbrücken, attempts to remedy this deficiency by indexing the provisions as printed in the *Amtsblatt des Saarlandes* and in the looseleaf form, keeping it up to date by quarterly supplements. The position of the Saar in Europe makes it rather important that this information be readily available.—J.B.C.

Nationalratswahlen. Élections au Conseil National 1951. (Bern: Eidgenössisches Statistisches Amt. Beiträge zur schweizerischen Statistik, Heft 28. 1954. Pp. 170.)

This work continues the reports on the results of the proportional elections that have been published in Switzerland since 1919. The text is given in both German and French. —J.B.C.

La Procédure Parlementaire en Europe: Étude Comparée. BY LORD CAMPION AND D. W. S. LIDDERDALE. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1955. Pp. xix, 247.)

A translation of a useful volume, first published in English in 1953.

African Crossroads. BY SIR CHARLES DUNDAS. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; NewYork: St. Martin's Press. 1955. Pp. x, 243. $4.00.)

The memoirs of a successful career officer of the British Colonial Service, comprising the record of 40 years' experience in the Service, largely in East Africa.

Korea Tomorrow: Land of the Morning Calm. BY KYUNG CHO CHUNG. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1956. Pp. xxv, 384. $5.95.)

This is also Korea yesterday and today; a solid and comprehensive volume summarizing the nation's history, touching geographical and cultural factors, analyzing the economy, and reviewing the political evolution of the 20th century. The author is a young Korean, educated in Japan and the United States, and now teaching at the Army Language School.

History and Theories of Working-Class Movements: A Select Bibliography. COMPILED BY CHARLES A. GULICK, ROY A. OCKERT, AND RAYMOND J. WALLACE. (Berkeley, California: University of California. 1955. Pp. xix, 364. $4.50.)

All select bibliographies are open to criticism on grounds of restriction of coverage. The compilers of this bibliography explicitly limit their work to periodical material in the English language. A further restriction not specified is use of only major publications, material which is most likely to be found in other guides and bibliographies. No annotations are given, though articles of major importance are marked with a star. A suggestion of subject matter is found in the divisions of material under ten geographical areas and "International." Articles under Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia are subdivided by subject matter as are those under "International." Of the total, 143 pages are devoted to the United Kingdom.

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WILLIAM H. ROBERTS
Catholic University of America

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

Charter Review Conference: Ninth Report and Papers Presented to the Commission. (New York: Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. 1955. Pp. 226.)

This volume contains the recommendations of the Commission with respect to the holding of a review conference under the terms of Article 109 of the Charter of the United Nations, and a number of separate papers on topics which might be considered at such a conference. The publication of the Report in August, 1955 was timely, considering that the General Assembly was required by Article 109 of the Charter to place the question of the holding of a review conference on the agenda of its tenth session. The views expressed in the recommendations of the Commission appear in general to have been those of the great majority of the members of the Assembly judging by the action taken on the question. Of course, it is impossible to say what impact the Commission's conclusions had. Rightly, in this reviewer's opinion, the Commission stressed the dangers of the premature holding of a conference, the limited results it might be expected to achieve, and the pressing present need of developing a wide understanding of what the United Nations is, of its role in international relations, of the process by which the United Nations has in the past adapted itself to new conditions, and of the possibilities of such adaptation in the future.

The papers presented are of unequal value to the serious student of international organization. Some deal with fundamental issues in a scholarly and thought-provoking manner, while others are more superficial in their treatment. For example, Quincy Wright's paper on "Domestic Jurisdiction and the Competence of United Nations Organs" is an excellent discussion of this much-discussed question. Louis Sohn's paper on "The Role of the General Assembly and the Problem of Weighted Voting" is a careful analysis, loaded with statistics, on a rather academic question. Catherine Senf's piece, which follows it, is carefully thought out and ingenious. David Cavers has some interesting suggestions for breaking the disarmament deadlock. James N. Hyde gives a clear and concise analysis of "The Development of Procedures for the Peaceful Adjustment of Disputes."

"The Papers are not intended as a comprehensive review of the Charter" (Introduction.) It is obvious that the emphasis is on the peace and security function and activities of the United Nations. There are no papers dealing explicitly with Charter provisions and U.N. organizational activities in the fields related to economic and social cooperation and non-self-governing territories.—Leland M. Goodrich, *Columbia University.*

The Calvo Clause: A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy. By Donald R. Shea. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1955. Pp. xv, 323. $5.50.

In this timely study, Professor Shea has provided a valuable survey of materials related to the problem of the Calvo Clause. But the book is far more than a survey, and its primary claim to attention lies in the fact that the author has undertaken to relate the Calvo issue to problems of international and particularly inter-American politics, questions of international economic relations, and emergent trends in international legal development, as well as to clarify the legal significance of the Calvo Clause as a barrier to the diplomatic protection of aliens.

The author's major thesis is that, by virtue of the arbitral decision in the *North American Dredging Company* case (1926) and the following of that decision in subsequent cases, the Calvo Clause has acquired a position of limited validity which disproves the contention of most publicists that the clause is legally ineffective and superfluous. The clause is valid in the sense that the individual may effectively contract away his right to invoke the protection of his government; its validity is limited in that a government cannot lose the right to exercise diplomatic protection by the act of a private citizen, and in that it does not pose a legal bar to diplomatic protection in the event of a denial or undue delay of justice.

In the opinion of this reviewer, the effort to prove this thesis is not wholly successful. Professor Shea is clearly correct in the most literal sense: the *Dredging* case initiated a series of decisions in which the Calvo Clause has been cited as having determinative effect, and thus the clause has, since 1926, been legally effective. But the commission in that case explicitly asserted that the clause did not deprive the claimant of the right to invoke governmental protection if he had exhausted local remedies and justice had been denied or delayed, and it made much of the fact that this procedure had not been followed. What the commission said in effect was that even *without* the Calvo Clause, there is no right of diplomatic interposition when local remedies have not been exhausted, and even *with* the clause, there is such a right if those remedies have been exhausted. Insofar as the tribunal took a position generally applicable to cases involving the clause, it simply restated the familiar view that the rule of local remedies is determinative in respect to the admissibility of international claims, and is not modified by the existence of a Calvo Clause.

The crucial feature of the *Dredging* case was the fact that the parties had formally agreed to waive the local remedies rule. The commission ruled that the Calvo Clause overrode the waiver—that the claimant had a double obligation, under international law and under his contract, to exhaust local remedies, and that the waiver excused him from the first but not the second obligation. Then it found that he had not pushed the matter to the denial of justice stage, and thus that there was no case for governmental interposition on his behalf. It is noteworthy that *all* the cases cited as following the *Dredging* precedent have come under claims conventions in which the waiver of local remedies appears. Thus, it would seem that all that can properly be derived from this body of decisional law is the proposition that the Calvo Clause creates exceptions to general waiver clauses. In these terms, the clause is simply an emphatic reiteration of the normal legal rule pertaining to local remedies; the implication is that whenever the clause may be involved in a case unaffected by a waiver, it must be regarded as legally inconsequential—superfluous, in the sense that it is not needed to prevent interposition if there has not been a denial of justice, and futile, in the sense that it is impotent to prevent interposition if there has been a denial of justice. Thus, it seems to this reviewer that the legal significance of the Calvo Clause is more limited, and the views of the debunkers of the clause are more nearly accurate, than the author suggests.—INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., *Harvard University.*

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1954. PREPARED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT (New York: Columbia University Press. 1955. Pp. x, 656. $10.50.)

This volume covers the record of the United Nations and the specialized agencies for the calendar year 1954. It differs in important respects from its immediate predecessors in this valuable series. There are substantially fewer pages and the pages are somewhat smaller. This would appear to be the result not so much of less activity to report as of less money to spend. There are some indications that the organizational and political aspects of the Organization's record have been compressed more rigorously than the economic and social. It contains less detailed information and fewer texts of drafts and resolutions than its predecessors. There are documentary notes at the end of each subject discussed which provide references to documents and give the texts of resolutions adopted. This, no doubt, has certain advantages over the earlier practice of including references and texts in the factual accounts. The *Yearbook* remains an extremely useful and, in fact, indispensable volume for any serious student of international organizagion.—L.M.G.

Dynamics of International Relations. BY ERNST B. HAAS AND ALLEN S. WHITING. (New York, Toronto, and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. 1956. Pp. xx, 557. $6.00.)

A new contribution to the growing shelf of textbooks on international politics. The authors go over a good deal of familiar territory in analyzing the power factors, in arguing that power is a means to an end, and in acknowledging that ideals and moral considerations influence policy decisions, and in considering the role of international law and of international organizations. They suggest a new emphasis, however, on the varying nature of the "elite" groups which affect the international relations of any state; such groups include not only officials but those with "private" international interests. The actions of these groups are conditioned by the nature of the political institutions (the United States, Russia, Egypt, and Nazi Germany are studied as illustrations) within which they must work, but in turn the political institutions are responsive to the needs or values of influential elite groups.

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939. Third Series, Volume VIII, 1938–39. EDITED BY E. L. WOODWARD AND ROHAN BUTLER. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. Distributed by British Information Services, New York. 1955. Pp. lxxxiv, 560. $9.29.)

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939. Third Series, Volume IX, 1939. Edited by E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. Distributed by British Information Services, New York. 1955. Pp. lxxxiii, 539. $9.29.)

Two new issues in the well-edited official series of documents on British foreign relations. These two volumes constitute a single unit dealing with British relations with the Far East (predominantly Japan and China) from August, 1938 to the outbreak of war with Germany in September, 1939.

American Foreign Relations: A Bibliography of Official Sources. By Elmer Plischke. (College Park, Md.: University of Maryland, Bureau of Government Research. 1955. Pp. viii, 71.)

A brief and exceedingly useful source list, dealing with general U. S. Government publications, congressional sources, State Department and other department releases.

American Agencies Interested in International Affairs. Compiled by Ruth Savord and Donald Wasson. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 1955. Pp. vii, 289. $3.00.)

Listing of over 350 non-official agencies concerned in some way with some aspect of international affairs and providing, where available, information about the agency's officers, finance, purpose, and typical publications.

The United States and Asia. By Lawrence H. Battistini. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. Pp. xii, 370. $5.00.)

A rather brief review of Far Eastern history since 1895, from the viewpoint of the United States' interest and growing concern and responsibility in that area; a handy introductory volume.

The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1954. (Madras: University of Madras. 1954. Pp. ix, 454. Rs. 10.)

A collection of essays on a wide variety of topics, most by Indian scholars, arranged under two general headings: "International and Home Affairs," and "International and Comparative Law."

The Pattern of World Conflict. By G. L. Arnold. (New York: The Dial Press. 1955. Pp. vi, 250. $4.00.)

A rather routine look at the contemporary international scene, and one emphasizing the importance of an "Atlantic" view and community during the periods of cold war and/or co-existence; the author is one of the editors of *The Twentieth Century.*

Verträge der Bundersrepublik Deutschland. Serie A: Multilaterale Verträge Nr 1–11. Band I. By the Auswärtiges Amt. (Bonn, Köln, Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag. 1955. Pp. viii, 495.)

Volume 1 of Series A of the official treaty collection for the German Federal Republic includes the German, English, and French texts of the multilateral pacts which have been concluded and made effective to December 31, 1951. In Series B, bilateral treaties, the intent is to reproduce only the text in German. These are to be continued by annual collections. Another series is to contain the treaties of the Deutsches Reich regarded as valid for the Bundesrepublik. A special supplementary volume in loose leaf form is planned to contain information about the conclusion of treaties, their ratification, putting into effect, adherence of other states, etc. It is well to remember that treaties are published currently in Teil II of the *Bundesgesetzblatt.*—J.B.C.

Staatsverträge, Konventionen, Abkommen zwischen Frankreich und dem Saarland. (Saarbrücken: Saarländische Verlagsanstalt und Druckerei. 1955. Pp. [725]. Das Recht des Saarlandes. T.02.)

The convenient collection of the treaties, conventions, and agreements between France and the Saar has been assembled from the sections as published from time to time in the current unofficial law collection of the Saar, furnished with a table of contents and an index, and accompanied by explanatory speeches delivered in the Saar Landtag. In view of the current political changes in the Saar, these documents represent conditions that may have to be considered rather seriously.—J.B.C.

Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. *Sbornik deĭstuvui͡ushchikh dogovorov, soglacheniĭ i koventsiĭ, zakli͡uchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami. Vypusk X.* (Moskva: Gosudvarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury. 1955. Pp. [237]. 1 map. Rubles 4.50.)

The tenth and latest volume of the Soviet Union official treaty collection, edited by the Ministry of Foreign Relations, covers the period January 1, 1937–June 21, 1941, and re-produces the texts only in Russian. Vol. 1–2 (p. 371) containing the treaties to January 1, 1925, was published in 1928. Vol. 9 (p. 507), covering the years 1933–36, appeared in 1938. —J.B.C.

Africa in the Modern World. EDITED BY CALVIN W. STILLMAN. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1955. Pp. x, 341. $6.00.)

A symposium comprising 16 articles by as many men, some of whom are the world's leading students of modern Africa. Based on the 1953 Harris Foundation lectures at Chicago, the volume deals with selected areas south of the Sahara and considers as well certain problems (economic, social, political) common to the whole area. The coverage is necessarily incomplete and the total effect is uneven, but the volume contains some extremely able and useful contributions.

Britain in Western Europe: WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. A REPORT BY A CHATHAM HOUSE STUDY GROUP. (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1956. Pp. xiii, 121. $1.50.)

A well-written, short guide to the various movements for greater European unity, in which the continuing perplexity is Britain's wish to see a stronger Europe which will neither exclude British influence nor require full British membership.

The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955. BY GEORGE MCTURNAN KAHIN. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. 1956. Pp. vii, 88. $2.00.)

An excellent short essay on the origins and proceedings of this significant regional gathering; several major speeches and reports are appended. The author was an observer at the conference.

The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers. BY BENJAMIN SHWADRAN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1955. Pp. xii, 500. $7.00.)

Certainly the exhaustive, final word to date on the politics of Middle Eastern oil from the first effective concession by Persia to William Knox D'Arcy in 1901 through the 1954 production figures. The area is surveyed country-by-country and, while the emphasis is on oil, a good deal of relevant information about internal and external political matters is included. Thirty-nine pages of bibliography.

How Communists Negotiate. BY ADMIRAL C. TURNER JOY. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1955. Pp. xii, 178. $3.50.)

The senior United Nations delegate at the Korean armistice conference describes those tortuous negotiations with understandable exasperation and evidence of frustration. The admiral, incidentally, is not opposed to negotiation in principle, but is highly critical of the limitations imposed on the military commanders after the Chinese intervention.

Teaching World Affairs in American Schools: A Case Book. EDITED BY SAMUEL EVERETT AND CHRISTIAN O. ARNDT. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1956. Pp. xv, 270. $4.00.)

A summary of the more interesting and promising methods used to interest students in the United States in world affairs and to include materials on world affairs in curriculums. The survey ranges from elementary through college level, and also includes adult education and community service programs.

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WILLIAM H. ROBERTS

Catholic University of America

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POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

Historical Inevitability. By ISAIAH BERLIN. (London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1955. Pp. 79. $2.00.)

This first Auguste Comte Memorial lecture at the London School of Economics is now published in what must be a considerably expanded form, since not even Isaiah Berlin could pour some 40,000 words into a single lecture. There is a certain irony, of which Mr. Berlin seems quite aware, in dedicating this particular piece to the memory of Comte. For the lecture is a lively and thoroughgoing attack on all forms of that "historicism" of which Comte's famous sequence of theological-metaphysical-positive stages is an outstanding example. Comte, however, gets off lightly, and the heavy fire is directed toward Hegelians, Marxists, Spenglerians, Toynbeans, and all who see in the course of history a pattern of inevitability. The essay is written with Mr. Berlin's customary fluency and clarity. With commendable considerateness, he has banished to several long footnotes the more technically philosophical parts of the discussion.

Determinism is indeed Mr. Berlin's main target. But he also attacks historical relativism as another dissolvent of the proper moral energies necessary to our time. Lest the reader, not as aware as Mr. Berlin of the vast spaces philosophical thought provides, might think the lecturer's own position purely negative he gives a neat statement of his position, which he does not label, but which we will risk calling realistic pluralism, duly but not excessively spiced with skepticism: "The same facts can be arranged in many patterns, seen from many perspectives, displayed in many lights, all of them equally valid, although some will be more suggestive or fertile in one field than in another, or unify many fields in some illuminating fashion, or, alternatively, bring out disparities and open chasms; some of these patterns will lie closer than others to the metaphysical or religious outlook of this or that historian or historical thinker. Yet through it all the facts themselves will remain relatively 'hard'." (p. 70)

The whole lecture is a stimulating challenge to debate, as befits the pluralist point of view. Here we can note but one point, which has by no means escaped the reviewers. Mr. Berlin only tangentially deals with what must seem to many historians the obvious fact about deterministic beliefs: those who hold such beliefs most firmly do in life behave as if they were free moral agents, as if every moment were a choice between duty and sin. This is as true of convinced Marxists as of convinced Calvinists. Mr. Berlin knows this, of course, but he does not think it worth stressing. He prefers instead to emphasize the degree to which such deterministic beliefs corrupt normal common sense in the minds of men, which he rather hopefully assumes might otherwise operate rather as his own mind does. This conviction that thoroughly formulated systematic ideas about the behavior and destiny of men in society somehow poisons human behavior leads him at least once to list as bad influences practically everybody from Montesquieu to Sorel who has pronounced on men as political animals. It leads him indeed close to the edge of an anti-social-scientism where he has the usual assortment of very disagreeable associates. Of course the social sciences are immature, imperfect, and sometimes painfully cocksure, but they are surely not basically perverse, wrongheaded, wholly outside the tradition of reason and sense Mr. Berlin himself values so highly?—Crane Brinton, *Harvard University.*

The Psychology of Politics. By H. J. Eysenck. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1955. Pp. xvi, 317. $6.00.)

Here is a work to be handled at arm's length, neither clasped to the bosom, nor rejected out of hand. In three excellent chapters Eysenck summarizes most lucidly the problems of measuring public opinion, political attitudes, and voting decisions. Then with some skill he deals with the way in which political (and other) attitudes may be organized in a person's mind and develops some geometric devices for portraying the interrelationships of attitudes. At this point, what is conceived to be the major substantive contribution of the book comes into view—the concept of a continuum of tough- and tender-mindedness (T-scale) which gives a personality dimension "vertical" to the more usual radical-conservative ideological dimension. Much of the remainder of the book is devoted to elaboration of this view, relating it to other studies which are, so it seems, rather rudely pressed into service to support this tender-mindedness dimension. Finally, a theoretical basis is provided from the fundamental concepts of learning theory.

I am indebted to Richard Christie for the opportunity to examine his reworking of Eysenck's data, testing it for internal consistency and comparing Eysenck's inferences to the evidential support. Briefly, under this scrutiny (and additional scrutiny by Rokeach), the T-scale collapses. Yet the idea that there may be some such dimension (separating fascists and communists, on the one hand, from liberals and conservatives on the other) does not fall to the ground and the suspicion remains that, with other items, such a dimension may yet be measured.

In one or two other aspects, I find the work not quite satisfying. In a chapter entitled "A Theory of Political Action," Eysenck gives a summary of learning theory and its relation to attitude formation which seems curiously foreign to the world of politics, rather a disembodied discourse on an interesting but unrelated (because he does not relate it) problem. There is no harm done, but one could wish, with such a title, some closer guidance for those of us who seek help from the psychologists for our analysis of political processes. Further, perhaps because of the gingerly handling of psychoanalytic theory, the book gives an overpowering array of the interrelationships of belief items, but minimal insight into why these, rather than other, beliefs happen to go together.

But do not be quick to put *The Psychology of Politics* back upon the shelf. The data, studies, methods, and concepts (T-scale aside) discussed therein give better insights into the nature of ideologies than is available in most of the literature dealing with political ideas. And surely Eysenck has offered a useful beginning for a growing objective and operational (testable) analysis of political beliefs.—Robert E. Lane, *Yale University.*

Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Critical Study of His Life and Writings. By F. C. Green. (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press. 1955. Pp. 376. $5.00.)

In this book Professor Green undertakes to do two things: to give an account of Rousseau's life and character, and to show their influence on his literary and political works. The first task is accomplished in a sympathetic yet objective manner. The second reveals some difficulties that likely are inherent in a biographical approach to the interpretation of political philosophy.

Green's portrait of Rousseau is that of a not entirely unattractive man. No effort is made to minimize his defects of character, and these are perceptively traced to their roots in childhood. The many facets of his complex personality are judiciously described. Due weight is given to Rousseau's chronic illness in the explanation of his behavior. He does not come off second best in the account of his quarrels with Diderot and Hume. The explanation of his transformation on the road to Vincennes is excellent and shows Green to be a subtle psychologist.

The analysis of Rousseau's political writings fails to bring *The Social Contract* into sharp focus and is less convincing than the biographical parts of the book. Rousseau not only had a childhood but was acquainted with the literature of political theory, and we may assume that the latter also influenced his thinking. It is true that in the *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences* he "universalized his personal experience" (p. 100). But one is less sure that the "whole doctrine of natural human goodness was the involuntary projection, on a universal scale, of Rousseau's own moral and spiritual dilemma" (p. 122). No doubt he avoided many of his moral obligations, but this is not sufficient reason to interpret both *Émile* and *The Social Contract* as efforts to escape duty by equating it with necessity. Green grants neither Rousseau's pupil nor his citizen potentialities for moral growth and action. In consequence he regards the transformation which men undergo in Rousseau's society as caused by a "mysterious power" (p. 280) the nature of which is never explained. And social spirit becomes "the mysterious *élan* that brought men together originally into the political association" (pp. 292–93). An alternative interpretation is that Rousseau thinks of men as making the social contract from motives of expediency and self-interest. Given the appropriate form of association, they are transformed into moral beings in whom there gradually develops social sentiment as they come to appreciate life in a society guided by their general will.

Despite these shortcomings, which are not evident in the analysis of Rousseau's more literary efforts, Green has made a significant contribution to the re-evaluation of Rousseau's thought. The book is full of insights into the connections between his life and writings. It never fails to be both illuminating and stimulating. All Rousseau scholars, and indeed all students of political theory, are permanently indebted to Green for having done a job that has long needed doing.—JOHN W. CHAPMAN, *Smith College*.

Symbols and Society: Fourteenth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion. EDITED BY LYMAN BRYSON, LOUIS FINKELSTEIN, HUDSON HOAGLAND, AND R. M. MACIVER. (New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc. 1955. Distributed by Harper & Brothers, New York and London. Pp. xi, 611. $6.00.)

In the many-faceted program of this conference, papers were included on "The Queen as Political Symbol in the British Commonwealth," by Thomas Ritchie Adam, and on "Symbols of Political Community," by Karl M. Deutsch. There are several additional papers which contain considerable references to political symbols.

Methods in the Study of Administrative Leadership. BY RALPH M. STOGDILL AND CARROLL L. SHARTLE. (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. 1955. Pp. xv, 77. $2.00.)

Developed from the "Ohio State Leadership Studies," this monograph describes seven methods for study of leadership in organizations. It will be followed by six separate studies on application of the methods, scheduled for release during the first half of 1956.

The Engineering of Consent. EDITED BY EDWARD L. BERNAYS. CONTRIBUTIONS BY HOWARD WALDEN CUTLER, SHERWOOD DODGE, BENJAMIN FINE, DORIS E. FLEISCHMAN, A. ROBERT GINSBURGH, JOHN PRICE JONES, AND NICHOLAS SAMSTAG. (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press. 1955. Pp. viii, 246. $3.75.)

This is a book on how "trained practitioners" can "engineer public support." They will use "findings of social scientists" to know how better to make strategy, use of symbols, etc. effective. The book should be of interest not only to practitioners but to students of public opinion and of democracy who, like some students of law, are interested in more than the use of art for support of causes.

Democrazie e Cultura. BY HANS KELSEN. (Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino. 1955. Pp. xxviii, 175.)

A translation into Italian of three of Kelsen's publications—two in German: *Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie* and *Was ist Gerechtigkeit;* one in this REVIEW: "Absolutism and Relativism in Philosophy and Politics"—with an introduction by Nicola Matteucci.

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FRANCIS G. WILSON

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NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

1956 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION

The 1956 Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association will be held September 6–8, 1956, in Washington, D.C. The Chairman of the Program Committee is Professor Earl Latham, of Amherst College; the Chairman of the Committee on Local Arrangements is The Reverend James B. Horigan, S.J., of Georgetown University.

The 10th Anniversary Meeting of the Western Political Science Association was held on the campus of Utah State Agricultural College, Logan, Utah, March 30–31, 1956. Nine roundtables were conducted centering on the theme: "Politics and Political Science in the Western States." G. Homer Durham, first president of the Western Political Science Association, delivered an address on "The First Ten Years of the WPSA and the Next Ten Years." Curtis Martin of the University of Colorado delivered the presidential address, entitled "The Soft War." Harold Enarson, executive director of the Western Inter-State Commission on Higher Education, spoke on the organization and activities of the Commission.

Officers elected for the following year are: president, Russell H. Fitzgibbon, University of California (Los Angeles); vice-president, Howard J. McMurray, University of New Mexico; members of the executive council for two-year terms: Bernard Borning, University of Idaho; Frank Jonas, University of Utah; Ross R. Rice, Arizona State College (Tempe). Thomas Payne, Montana State University, was elected to a one-year term on the Council. Curtis Martin, as retiring president of the association, goes on the Council as *ex-officio* member for one year. Members of the Council who carry over for one more year are: Freeman Holmer, Willamette University, and John Vieg, Pomona. Also continuing in office is the secretary-treasurer, R. A. Gomez, University of Arizona. The next annual meeting of the Association will be held at the University of California (Los Angeles) in the spring of 1957.

On March 27 and April 26, 1956, the District of Columbia Political Science Association (DCPSA) held its second and third meetings of the current year in the Lounge of the Brookings Institution. The speakers and their topics were: March meeting—Colonel William R. Kintner, Operations Research Office: "The Impact of Modern War on International Politics"; April meeting—William Y. Elliott, Harvard University and Executive Office of the President: "The Limits of Behaviorism in Politics."

The annual meeting of the Pennsylvania Political Science and Public Administration Association was held in Harrisburg April 13–14, 1956. The two-day program included discussion of such topics as the political issues in 1956, political scientists and the problems of government, and education for politics and public service. Among the participants were politicians, newspapermen, public administrators, and political scientists.

The Northern California Political Science Association held its ninth annual conference on May 5, 1956 at Stanford University. New officers of the association are: president, Arnaud B. Leavelle, Stanford University; vice-president, Earl C. Segrest, Sacramento State College; secretary-treasurer, Father Richard J. Roberts, Santa Clara University; councilors, Roy Archibald, San Mateo Junior College; Norman Jacobson, University of California (Berkeley); Robert C. Johnston, Mills College; Hyman Palais, Humbolt State College; and Vernon Puryear, University of California (Davis).

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Administrative Science Quarterly, a new journal published by the Graduate School of Business and Public Administration, Cornell University, and devoted to advancing basic understanding of administrative processes in all types of organizations, will appear in June, 1956. Editor of the *Quarterly* is James D. Thompson. The editorial board includes Sune Carlson, Melvin de Chazeau, Alexander Leighton, Edward H. Litchfield, and Ewing W. Reilley. Paul Wasserman is book review editor.

The Sixth Inter-American Congress of Municipalities will be held in Panama City, Panama, August 14–19, 1956.

A new department of political science is in the process of being born at the State College of Washington. The present department of history and political science, established in 1928, will be divided into separate departments on September 16, 1956. During twenty-three years of the combined department's existence, Professor Claudius O. Johnson served as its chairman. Since 1951, the chairman has been Herbert J. Wood. The initial staff of the new department of political science will be professors Claudius Johnson and Paul Beckett, associate professor H. Paul Castleberry and assistant professors Daniel M. Ogden, Jr. and Thor Swanson. Professor Beckett has been elected the new department's first chairman, to serve until 1959.

The Institute of World Polity, sponsored by Georgetown University and "designed to serve as an organization for systematic research and discussion of questions affecting international relations and the foregin policy of the United States" has recently been re-organized. Among the full members of the Institute are: Samuel F. Bemis, Yale University; Willard B. Cowles, State Department; Edwin D. Dickinson, University of Pennsylvania; Rev. James B. Horigan, S.J., Georgetown University; Sheldon Z. Kaplan, House Foreign Affairs Committee; Rev. Brian A. McGrath, S.J., Georgetown University; Pitman B. Potter, American University; William H. Roberts, Catholic University; Pitirim A. Sorokin, Harvard University and Quincy Wright, University of Chicago. William V. O'Brien, Georgetown University, serves as acting chairman. At a business meeting held on April 29, 1956, an extensive research and publication program was discussed and adopted.

Tulane University, in cooperation with the American Assembly of Columbia University, sponsored a Southern Assembly on April 19–22 at Buena Vista Hotel, Biloxi, Mississippi. The conference topic was "Southern State Governments: Functions and Problems," and the background report was prepared under the direction of L. Vaughan Howard, chairman of the department of political science at Tulane. The composition, organization, and procedure of the Southern Assembly follow the pattern already established by the American Assembly.

In September, 1955 the division of social science at San Jose State College was subdivided into three departments: history, economics, and geography; sociology and social service; political science and public administration.

The Institute of Government, University of Utah, is conducting a series of studies for the Local Government Survey Commission of the State of Utah.

Kenyon College will hold a conference on April 4–7, 1957 on the theme "The Essentials of Freedom: the Idea and Practice of Ordered Liberty in the Twentieth Century." The project is supported by a grant from the Fund for the Republic. It will constitute the fifth in a series of conferences held at the College since 1947.

A grant from the Ford Foundation permits the department of political science at the State University of Iowa to sponsor an eight-week Seminar on the Teaching of International Politics again in the summer of 1956. Professors Richard Snyder of Northwestern, Harold Sprout of Princeton, and Schuyler Wallace of Columbia are serving as project advisers. Kenneth Boulding, William T. R. Fox, Clyde Kluckhohn, and others will meet with the seminar as visiting consultants.

The Northern California Citizenship Clearing House has been established at Stanford University. Director of the new clearing house is assistant professor Robert A. Horn, with the assistance and advice of Thomas S. Barclay, Arnaud B. Leavelle, and Robert A. Walker.

An American Committee for the Study of War Documents has been organized, having as its executive board a standing committee of the American Historical Association. Its purpose is to direct an organized effort for the fullest scholarly utilization of documents which came into the possession of the Allies as a result of World War II; to secure the aid of the appropriate governmental agencies in making these documents available for study by American scholars; to enlist the support and cooperation of universities and colleges, faculties and graduate students, and of other scholarly organizations, in the systematic exploration of this material; to collaborate with scholars and institutions abroad in regard to such studies. Inquiries should be addressed to the executive secretary, Sidney Wallach, 381 Fourth Avenue, New York.

The Samuel S. Fels Fund has given $200,000 to the University of Pennsylvania's Institute of Local and State Government to erect an addition to the Fels Center. With the added space the Institute will expand and improve all three phases of its work—its full time curricula for college graduates aspiring to public service, its part-time courses for public officials, and its consulting and research services.

A grant of $1,500,000 to the Institute of International Education was recently announced by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The sum, which is one of the largest single grants every made by this philanthropic foundation, will be used by the Institute for support and development of its programs of international student exchange over ten years.

A chapter of Pi Sigma Alpha was recently installed at Howard University. It became the seventy-eighth chapter of this national political science honor society.

Thomas H. Eliot of Washington University, St. Louis, and Paul G. Steinbicker of St. Louis University are co-directors of the Metropolitan St. Louis Survey. Carl A. McCandless of Washington University and Henry J. Schmandt of St. Louis University will be on leave for one year serving as associate research directors of the Survey.

The Central Regional Conference of Pi Gamma Mu met at Indiana State Teachers College on April 13–14, 1956 to discuss "The Future of the Social Scientist." Among those who addressed the conference were Charles S. Hyneman, Rollin B. Posey, Rexford Guy Tugwell, and W. Leon Godshall.

Indiana University's Second Little United Nations Assembly was held on March 2–4, 1956. Students from 38 colleges and universities attended as delegates. Reverdy T. Gliddon, of the department of government, served as President of the General Assembly and Mr. Andrew Cordier, Under Secretary General of the United Nations, addressed the Assembly.

Henry Reining, Jr., John M. Pfiffner, and Frank P. Sherwood, all of the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, will conduct a five-day Institute on public administration in Honolulu during the period June 18–22. The Institute is sponsored by the Hawaiian chapter of the American Society for Public Administration.

The Commemoration Authority *YAD VASHEM* of Jerusalem and the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research of New York are currently engaged in an extensive joint research project on the documentation of the European Jewish Catastrophe. These institutions, having some of the richest collections of material related to the era of Nazism in general and the persecution and annihilation of European Jewry in particular, concluded an agreement on January 5, 1954, providing, *inter alia*, for (1) the coordination of the efforts to be expended for the collection of "documentary material related to the destruction of European Jewry and its struggle against the Nazi enemy, as well as material related to the history of the destroyed communities; (2) the preparation and publication of a descriptive catalogue of the archival material held by the two parties and in the possession of other institutions and individuals; (3) the preparation and publication of a bibliography of literature of the *Destruction* and of the participation of the Jews in the Second World War, and of the anti-Semitic Nazi literature in general." In accordance with the stipulation of this agreement, the documentation projects were divided into three independent, yet mutually interrelated, divisions: Bibliographic Division; Archives Division; Pinkas Hakehilot (Annals of the Destroyed Jewish Communities). The first two are located in New York and the third in Jerusalem. The cooperation of the three divisions is assured through the synchronization of the work by a committee of experts, called the Joint Commission of YAD VASHEM and VIVO.

Robert E. Agger, assistant professor at the University of North Carolina, is the recipient of a three-year Faculty Fellowship from the Social Science Research Council.

Vernon V. Aspaturian, assistant professor of political science at The Pennsylvania State University, will be on leave of absence from July, 1956 to September, 1957, to do research and writing under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Stephen K. Bailey, director of the graduate program of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton, attended the Air War College Forum at Maxwell Field, Alabama, from April 16–20, 1956.

Hollis W. Barber will be on leave from his post as professor of political science at the Chicago Undergraduate Division of the University of Illinois for the academic year 1956–1957 to work with the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City.

Thomas S. Barclay of Stanford served on the Jury of Award for the Bancroft Prizes of Columbia University during the current academic year.

Vaclav L. Benes, associate professor of government, Indiana University, addressed a conference on the Midwest Heritage at Coe College on April 7.

Denis W. Brogan, of Cambridge University, England, served as George A. Miller visiting professor of political science at the University of Illinois during the spring. He also inaugurated the series of lectures at the University of Illinois commemorating Woodrow Wilson.

Bernard E. Brown, assistant professor at Michigan State University, has received a post-doctoral Fulbright grant. He will be affiliated with the Institute of Political Science in Paris during 1956–1957.

Edward H. Buehrig, professor of government, Indiana University, has been appointed chairman of the Indiana University Summer Conference on American Foreign Policy, to be held at Bloomington, Indiana, June 29 and 30, 1956. Professor Buehrig participated in the Lectures and Seminar at the University of Chicago in connection with the celebration of the Woodrow Wilson Centennial, January 30 to February 3, 1956.

J. Alton Burdine, University of Texas, spent the spring semester 1955–1956 on a research assignment in Austin.

Byrum E. Carter, of the department of government at Indiana University, has received a summer faculty research grant from the Graduate School.

Al Castagno, a member of the government department in the School of General Studies at Columbia, has received a Ford Foundation grant for study in Africa.

William N. Chambers, associate professor of political science at Washington University, has been appointed Visiting Fellow in General Education at Harvard University for 1956–57.

Eugene P. Chase has been invited to lecture under a Fulbright grant on American Institutions at the University of Aix in Nice this summer.

Robert L. Clark has been appointed executive secretary of the National Committee for the Development of Scientists and Engineers.

Cornelius P. Cotter, Stanford University, has been elected a member of the governing board of the Bay Area Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration.

Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., assistant professor of political science at Vassar College, has been made director of the Vassar-Wellesley summer interne program in Washington, D.C.

Robert A. Dahl, professor of political science, Yale University, has returned after a year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

P. Allan Dionisopoulos, lecturer in government at Indiana University, has received a faculty research grant from the Graduate School.

John Dorsey, assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University, has been appointed deputy adviser in charge of the Presidency Project of the Michigan State University technical assistance program in Vietnam.

Alex N. Dragnich, professor of political science, Vanderbilt University, was granted a faculty fellowship by the Fund for the Advancement of Education and is on leave during 1955–56 spending the year at Harvard University.

Lewis J. Edinger, assistant professor of political science at the Air University, has received an International Relations Training Fellowship from the Ford Foundation for 1956–57 and will pursue his studies at Stanford University.

Russell H. Fitzgibbon, of the University of California at Los Angeles, will teach at the University of Illinois in the summer school in 1956.

Michael J. Flack, assistant professor of political science at Vassar College, served recently as independent consultant to the Ford Foundation's international relations program.

Henry C. Galant, chairman, department of government, Skidmore College, has received a summer grant from the Social Science Research Council for research in France.

Federico G. Gil has been granted a year's leave of absence from the University of North Carolina for research in Latin America.

Edward B. Glick, interim instructor in the department of political science of the University of Florida, has been appointed a consultant to the Latin American Department of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

Albert Gorvine, Brooklyn College, will remain for a second year as director of research at the Institute of Public Administration of the University of Ankara, under arrangements with New York University, supported by the International Cooperation Administration.

Priscilla Greeley, assistant professor of government, Skidmore College, will study at the University of London this summer.

Charles M. Hardin, University of Chicago, is rapporteur general of a roundtable (on the political role of the farm community) to be held at the International Political Science Association meeting at Geneva, Switzerland, in September.

Friedrich A. Hayek, Aaron Director, and Herbert Heaton are this year's lecturers at the Institute on Freedom and Competitive Enterprise at Claremont Men's College, June 10–24, 1956.

Paul M. Herzog, associate dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration, has been appointed a member of the International Labor Office's Committee on Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. Mr. Herzog has also recently been elected Vice-President of the American Society for Public Administration.

Roger Hilsman, formerly of Princeton University, has been appointed Chief of the Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.

Bernard L. Hyink, dean of students, and William B. Storm, of the School of Public Administration faculty, University of Southern California, will serve with the School's Institute of Administrative Affairs, University of Tehran, Iran, during the 1956–57 school year. Richard C. Gable will continue as a member of the Institute faculty during the same period.

Frederick C. Irion, associate professor and director of government research at the University of New Mexico, has been appointed editor-of-reports for the New Mexico legislature's Welfare Investigating Committee. He has also been invited to attend the Second Conference on Democratic Theory to be held at Buck Hill Falls in June.

G. Edward Janosik, assistant professor at the University of Pennsylvania, has been given a special Summer Research Grant by the University of Pennsylvania.

Rex Johnson, formerly research director and secretary of the Recreational Planning Division of the Council of Social Agencies of Rochester, is now executive director of the Mental Health Association of Dayton.

Herbert Kaufman has been granted leave from Yale University for 1956–57 and will collaborate with Wallace S. Sayre of Columbia University under a research grant from the Russell Sage Foundation.

Joseph A. Kitchin has resigned from the department of political science at Queen's College to accept appointment as director of the United States Information Service in Calcutta, India.

Louis E. Lambert will direct the 8th Annual Workshop in Problems of State and Local Government this summer, to be held under the sponsorship of the department of government and the School of Education at Indiana University.

Harold D. Lasswell, professor of law and political science at Yale University and president of the American Political Science Association delivered the second lecture in public affairs at the University of Maryland, sponsored by the department of government and politics and the Bureau of Governmental Research.

Walter H. C. Laves, chairman of the department of government at Indiana Iniversity, attended the annual meeting of the Governing Board of the UNESCO Institute for Social Science in Cologne, Germany on March 16 and 17, 1956. Mr. Laves gave the principal address at a two-day conference on Technical Assistance and the Role of Universities at the University of Liege, Belgium.

Arnaud B. Leavelle, of Stanford University, is president-elect of the Northern California Political Science Association.

Charles O. Lerche, of the department of political science at Emory University, has been appointed associate director of the faculty Seminar for the Improvement of Teaching in International Relations being held at the University of Iowa during the summer session.

Werner Levi, of the University of Minnesota, will spend the summer in Europe where he will attend an International Sociological Conference and participate in an international seminar on some problems of international relations.

Georgia Bell Levy, associate professor of political science at Prairie View A & M College, has received grants from the Ford Foundation and the Danforth Foundation to engage in research on India and SEATO.

Guenter Lewy, an instructor in Columbia College has received an SSRC grant for 1956–57 to enable him to complete his dissertation.

Oliver J. Lissitzyn will be on leave from Columbia for the academic year 1956–57.

Clarence Ludwig, member of the political science faculty and director of the Municipal Reference Bureau at the University of Minnesota, has returned from a period of service as a consultant in local government on the staff of the Institute of Public Administration at the University of the Philippines.

Arthur W. Macmahon, Columbia University, gave the annual Edmund J. James Lecture on Government at the University of Illinois on February 29, 1956.

Robert J. M. Matteson was appointed the first executive director of the American Society for Public Administration. The creation of this full-time post, which provides a chief administrative officer for the Society, was made possible by the recent $245,000 grant of the Ford Foundation to the Society for a five-year development program.

Edwin B. McPheron, Indiana University, will conduct the second summer Property Tax School for municipal and county assessors under the sponsorship of the department of government at Indiana University, July 31 and August 1, 1956.

John H. Millett, University of Rochester, will teach at the University of Illinois during the summer session of 1956.

Lennox A. Mills, University of Minnesota, will attend a conference on South and Southeast Asia which will be held July 2–6 at the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London.

Hans J. Morganthau, University of Chicago, will be a member of the Columbia University Summer Session staff.

Ray Olpin, president of the University of Utah, Roy V. Peel, head of the department of political science, and Franz B. Schick, professor of political science, attended the Institute of World Affairs at Riverside, California, December 11–16, 1955.

Norman D. Palmer, professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed a member of the Committee on Institutional Projects Abroad of the American Council on Education. On February 10, Professor Palmer delivered the opening lecture in the Gabrielson Lecture Series at Colby College and on February 3 he lectured at the Army War College.

Otto Charles Press, of the North Dakota Agricultural College department of social science, has been appointed visiting assistant professor of government at Indiana University for the summer term 1956.

Allan R. Richards, associate professor of government at the University of New Mexico, has been appointed an administrative researcher to the New Mexico Legislature's Welfare Investigating Committee.

Benjamin Rivlin, Brooklyn College, will be Lecturer on North African Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies during the summer of 1956.

James R. Roach, associate professor of government at the University of Texas, has been awarded a Foreign Area Training Fellowship by the Ford Foundation for fourteen months beginning in June, 1956.

David W. Smith, former graduate student in the department of political science, University of Utah, is now attached to Amerika House in Heidelberg, Germany, as a member of the Foreign Service of the United States.

Ralph Smuckler has been appointed acting chief adviser of the 30-man technical assistance team of Michigan State University, in Saigon, Vietnam.

Clyde F. Snider, University of Illinois, was on leave during the spring semester, 1956, to continue his study of rural local government.

Richard F. Staar, professor of political science at Harding College, presented a paper at the Ninth University of Kentucky Foreign Language Conference on April 28, 1956.

John E. Stoner, professor of government, Indiana University, has received a grant from the National Association of County Officials to conduct a study of county road administration in the State of Washington.

Henry A. Turner, Santa Barbara College, University of California, will offer courses in the summer session at the University of Nebraska.

Amry Vandenbosch, University of Kentucky, was a member of a 10-man mission to confer with scientists, university administrators, and government officials of the Colombo Plan countries on the establishment of an Asian Nuclear Center, which will be located in the Philippines.

Robert A. Walker, Stanford University, has been named chairman of the Committee on General Studies at Stanford, charged with carrying forward the extensive curricular revisions recently adopted by the faculty.

James T. Watkins, IV, Stanford University, has been appointed to the California Committee for the Study of Education by the Association of Western Colleges.

Wilfred D. Webb, associate professor of government at the University of Texas, has been appointed to the City Planning Commission of the city of Austin.

Edward W. Weidner, head of the department of political science at Michigan State University, has returned to the campus to reassume his duties after serving as chief adviser of the Michigan State University technical assistance program in Saigon, Vietnam, for nine months.

J. D. Williams, assistant professor of political science, University of Utah, is active in the Home Rule Committee of Salt Lake City which is seeking a change from the Commission form to the city manager form of city government.

Francis G. Wilson, University of Illinois, will teach at the University of Washington summer session of 1956.

Leon Wolcott, visiting professor of government at the University of New Mexico, has been appointed executive director of the New Mexico Legislature's Welfare Investigating Committee.

Arnold Wolfers has been granted sabbatical leave from Yale University for 1956–57 and has received a research grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Recently, the Swiss government appointed him to the six-man Governing Board of the Graduate Institute of Advanced International Studies at Geneva, Switzerland.

Chitoshi Yanaga, associate professor of political science, Yale University, has returned after a year in Japan.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Harold F. Alderfer has resigned as executive secretary of the Institute of Local Government at The Pennsylvania State University to become Assistant Commissioner of Operations of the Urban Renewal Administration in Washington, D.C.

John A. Armstrong, Jr. has accepted an appointment as visiting assistant professor in the Russian Institute at Columbia University during 1956–57.

Roscoe Baker has become a member of the department of government and politics of the University of Maryland and will participate in their overseas program.

John Ballard, University of Iowa, has been appointed to an instructorship in political science at San Jose State College.

Walter F. Berns, Jr., has been appointed an assistant professor of political science at Yale University.

Ralph Conant has been appointed an instructor in the department of political science at Michigan State University.

Alexander Dallin will become visiting assistant professor at the Russian Institute at Columbia University during 1956–57.

Richard A. Edwards of Lafayette College will be on leave through January, 1957 to be director of research for the Commission on Government Security.

Keener C. Frazer who, as a visiting professor, has held the Chester W. Nimitz professorship of social and political science at the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island during the past year will return to the University of North Carolina in September.

Frank Gibson has recently assumed his duties as director of the University of Georgia bureau of public administration and as supervisor of government training and service, Georgia Center for Continuing Education.

Federico G. Gil has been appointed to the rank of professor of political science at the University of North Carolina.

Kurt Ulaster has been appointed a member of the department of government and politics to work in the University of Maryland overseas program.

Charles D. Goff, of the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, is serving during the second semester as a lecturer in political science at the University of California at Los Angeles.

William R. Hamilton has joined the department of government and politics of the University of Maryland to work in the overseas program.

Willard R. Hancock has returned to the department of political science at the University of Pennsylvania after four and one half years as Director of the Bureau of Municipal Affairs, Department of Internal Affairs, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Charles H. Heimsath has been appointed an instructor in political science at Yale University.

Richard H. Heindel, dean of the college of arts and sciences and professor of history and government at the University of Buffalo, has been appointed the University's first vice-chancellor for planning and development.

Edwin C. Hoyt, Jr., will join the staff of the department of public law of Columbia University to give the international law lectures.

Charles S. Hyneman, Northwestern University, has been appointed professor of government at Indiana University beginning in the fall of 1956.

William S. Jenkins has become the first director of a new bureau of public records collection and research established at the University of North Carolina. He will continue to teach his courses in constitutional law.

Samuel S. Jones, formerly with the State Department and more recently with the Foreign Service, has been appointed Burton Craige Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of North Carolina.

Joseph LaPalombara has been promoted to

an associate professorship at Michigan State University.

Charles F. LeeDecker has become associate professor and executive secretary of the Institute of Local Government at The Pennsylvania State University.

Frank M. Lewis, who spent the last year doing research in Chile, has become an instructor in political science at the University of Texas.

George T. Little, University of Vermont, has been granted a leave of absence to accept the position of professor of government in the National Political University, Taipei, Taiwan.

William S. Livingston has resumed his associate professorship at the University of Texas, having served as visiting lecturer at Yale University during the fall semester, 1955–56.

Harvey C. Mansfield, Ohio State University, will be a member of the Columbia University summer session staff.

Harris Martin, Stanford University, is a member of the San Jose State College staff for the academic year 1956–57.

James A. McConnell has been appointed professor of agricultural industries at Cornell's Graduate School of Business and Public Administration as of February 1, 1956. Professor McConnell was formerly Assistant Secretary of Agriculture and Executive Vice-President of the Cooperative Grange League Federation, Inc.

David W. Miner, University of California, has accepted an appointment as instructor of government in the School of General Studies at Columbia University.

Allan S. Nanes has been promoted to the position of assistant to the deputy director for research, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.

Edward R. O'Connor, who received his Ph.D. in 1954 at the University of Notre Dame, has accepted an appointment as instructor in the department of government, University of Texas, effective the spring semester of 1956.

Edward R. Padgett was appointed to a position in the department of government and politics in the University of Maryland overseas program.

Paul A. Pfretzschner, Lafayette College, has been promoted to associate professor of government and law as of February 1, 1956. In addition to his regular work this year, Professor Pfretzschner is giving a course in the Institute of Local Government at the University of Pennsylvania. He will teach at the summer session at the University of Buffalo.

Emmette S. Redford, University of Texas, has been appointed to a research assignment for the fall semester 1956–57 to prepare a study of government regulation of economic enterprise.

Harry W. Reynolds, Jr., formerly of the University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed visiting assistant professor of public administration at the University of Southern California.

Fred W. Riggs, Yale University, has been appointed associate professor of government at Indiana University beginning in the fall of 1956.

Henry L. Roberts has been appointed director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University.

Heinrich A. Rommen, Georgetown University, has received an appointment as exchange professor at the law faculty of the University of Frankfurt for the spring semester, 1956 and as a Fulbright lecturer in political science to the University of Nijmegen, Netherlands, for the academic year 1956–57.

David N. Rowe, professor of political science at Yale University, will return in September after two years in Formosa.

Dankwart A. Rustow, Princeton University, will be a member of the staff of the Center of Turkish Studies at Columbia University during the year 1956–57.

John A. Schutz, Whittier College, has been promoted to the rank of full professor in the department of political science and international relations.

Robert A. Shanley, formerly instructor at the University of Detroit, has been appointed associate professor of political science at Oglethorpe University.

Allan P. Sindler has been promoted to assistant professor of political science, Yale University.

Ward Stewart, assistant commissioner of education, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, has been appointed professorial lecturer on the part-time faculty of the American University.

Melvin P. Straus, formerly of the University of Illinois, has been appointed instructor in political sicence at the University of Texas.

William L. Strauss, formerly with The Fund for the Republic, Inc., has accepted a position as associate professor of political science at Arizona State College beginning in the academic year 1956–57.

Loren E. Tesdell, formerly of Stanford University, has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Texas.

Kenneth N. Waltz has been promoted to assistant professor in the government department of Columbia College.

Earl Warner, Ohio Wesleyan, has been appointed to the rank of associate professor and has been reappointed chairman of the department of political science for a two-year period ending June, 1958.

Frederic A. Weed, of the department of social sciences, Northern Illinois State College, has accepted a position in the department of political science, San Jose State College, effective September 1, 1956.

Henry Wells will join the political science department of the University of Pennsylvania as an associate professor. Professor Wells is presently an associate professor of political science and chairman of the political science staff at the University of Puerto Rico.

Philip M. Williams, Jesus College, Oxford, has accepted an invitation to join the department of public law and government at Columbia University during the academic year 1956–57.

Richard B. Wilson was appointed to a position in the department of government and politics in the University of Maryland overseas program.

James R. Woodworth, who recently received his Ph.D. from Harvard University, has become assistant professor of social studies at Miami University.

Paul W. van der Veur has been appointed assistant professor at the University of Hawaii.

Richard W. Van Wagenen will take leave of absence from Princeton University to join the civilian faculty of the National War College in Washington, D. C. for the year 1956–57.

Gerard F. Yates, S.J., professor of government at Georgetown University, is in charge this year of Georgetown's newly established Junior Year Abroad program at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. He is also visiting professor at Fribourg for the year 1955–56.

IN MEMORIAM

William Madison Boyd, chairman of the department of political science at Atlanta University, died on March 10, 1956 at the age of thirty-nine after a long illness. Dr. Boyd had his A.M. and his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan.

Dr. Ernst H. Feilchenfeld, professor of international law and chairman of the Institute of World Polity, Georgetown University, died of a heart attack on March 25. A great Jew, a great German, and a great American, he embodied the most profound elements of all three civilizations in his remarkable career as a writer, advisor, and teacher. As a young man, his brilliant career at the University of Berlin was interrupted by the First World War. Although he fought at Verdun, in Silesia, and in

Palestine, he never became the proverbial "professional" war veteran and military expert. He used to say jokingly, "Wherever I arrived, the front collapsed immediately."

Dr. Feilchenfeld completed his studies at Berlin, where he obtained his J.U.D. as well as the legal offices of assessor and referendar. Disturbed by trends in German society, he moved to England and finally to the United States, where he became a citizen in 1936.

At Harvard Law School, Professor Feilchenfeld became a leading figure in a new field which he did much to establish, namely: international economic law. During World War II, he went to the Treasury Department where he worked for what he insisted upon calling the Board of Economic "Illfare." By 1944 Dr. Feilchenfeld came to Georgetown where, at last, his wanderings ceased. His reputation rested upon his many publications in the field of international law.

Dr. Feilchenfeld will be missed by many eminent statesmen, scholars, and public servants who enjoyed his friendship and advice for so many years. Surely the Cosmos Club in Washington, D. C. will be different without him. But his greatest contribution lay in the inspiration and guidance which he lavished upon his students. It was moving but hardly surprising to listen to the many students who came to pay their last respects to Dr. Feilchenfeld. They all said substantially the same thing: "He had a great influence on my life; he was like a father to me." Surely these devoted students are his greatest legacy.—WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN

SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

REPORT OF NOMINATING COMMITTEE

At the annual meeting of The American Political Science Association, to be held September 6–8, 1956 in Washington, D.C., the Committee on Nominations will propose the following officers for 1956–57: *President-Elect,* V. O. Key (Harvard University); *Vice-Presidents,* Carl Brent Swisher (Johns Hopkins University), Wilfred Binkley (Ohio Northern University), Albert Lepawsky (University of California, Berkeley); *Secretary,* Gladys Kammerer (University of Kentucky); *Treasurer,* Max Kampelman (Washington, D.C.); *Members of the Council* for two years, William T. R. Fox (Columbia University), Ruth Weintraub (Hunter College), John D. Lewis (Oberlin College), Thomas Eliot (Washington University, St. Louis), Alexander Heard (University of North Carolina), York Willbern (University of Alabama), Allan Saunders (University of Hawaii), Christian Larsen (Sacramento State College).

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